

THE OPEN UNITED FRONT

THE COMMUNIST STRUGGLE IN SINGAPORE

1954-1966



SOUTH SEAS SOCIETY
SINGAPORE

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Preface

In 1976, I published *The Communist Organisation in Singapore: Its Techniques of Manpower Mobilisation and Management, 1948-66*. I felt later that this earlier work should be followed by a larger piece. The present book is the result.

It has been suggested by various scholars that the open united front struggle of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) in Singapore during the period 1954-1966 was an important development in the history of that party. I would tend to agree with this, as the contents of this volume will indicate.

At present there are already two important works in circulation on the broad subject of Communism in Singapore in the 1950s and sixties. These are Richard Clutterbuck's *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaysia, 1945-63* (1973) which was later re-issued with an additional section as *Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia, 1945-83* (1985), and Dennis Bloodworth's *The Tiger and the Trojan Horse* (1986). Since these publications are already available, why bring out another volume on the same subject? To answer this, there are two significant points to be considered. Firstly, my capable predecessors have written from perspectives different from that presented in this book. Clutterbuck was primarily interested in the military aspects of Communist operations whilst Bloodworth's focus was in highlighting the drama of the crucial struggle between the Communists and Lee Kuan Yew's non-Communists and other groups. I, however, am more concerned with giving a theoretical interpretation, with a full account of events of Communist activities in Singapore. This theoretical framework basically involves the concept of the open united front as a political instrument. Secondly, the earlier authors both considered that in 1954-1966 the Communists in Singapore aimed to overthrow the British and to seize power by armed force in the island. My belief is that the Communists had, in fact, a more limited objective. Their aim was only to create a more favourable situation in Singapore so as to pause and rebuild their strength which had been greatly depleted in the jungle fighting in the Emergency from 1948 till 1960. It was for the Communists a re-gathering and regrouping of strength for another strategic phase, leading to a showdown with their opponents. This view is explained in the Introduction to this volume.

Four major political groups were involved in the struggle. These were the CPM, the British authorities, Lee Kuan Yew's non-Communists and the Alliance Party. Ideally, when one writes one should have access to the complete records of the thoughts, deliberations, decisions and activities of the innermost top leadership of each of these groups. But, is this possible with the CPM or even with the others? Could one ever get hold of the papers of Chin Peng, the Secretary-General of the CPM, and his Central Committee, assuming that such papers exist? During the years surveyed here, the Communist machinery for the implementation of policies in Singapore, under the direction of the Central Committee, consisted simply of a cell of a few persons. Since 1950, this cell had followed the practice of not keeping any written records. How then is one to know of the deep secrets, and the comings and goings of these people? Yet, it can be said that use of available materials has made possible new insights into and sound analysis of the workings of the CPM. Thus, what can be seen is certainly not an illusion but a reality, not assumptive guesswork but firm historical happenings. This manuscript, when completed, was shown to Mr Lim Chin Siong for comments. Mr Lim was the most important leader from the Communist side who functioned openly, rather than underground during the years studied here. Mr Lim made the remark that one need not be over-concerned with any small inaccuracies that will occur in a book of this nature. Future writers can rectify any mistakes. For the present, he said, he had read the book with benefit. He used to understand the various observed facts of the struggle in isolation, but after having gone through this work, he recognised the underlying patterns for the various courses of action taken by the CPM.

Security authorities and scholars usually refer to the Communist *united front* struggle but not to the *open united front* struggle. I propose to use the adjective "open". I advocate this because a united front, as will be explained in the Introduction, can be organised either underground and illegally, or in the open and legally. In 1954-1966, it was organised in the latter manner. There were times also, as will be explained in the Introduction, when it was organised furtively. It is thus useful to make a clear distinction between the two modes of operation as it will help to understand the Communist *modus operandi* better. The title of this book reflects the need for this distinction to be made and the difference to be clearly comprehended.

In this book, extracts are sometimes quoted from ex-detainees, detainees and others in order to illustrate or demonstrate important points. Such extracts, taken from actual records, are often couched in English which is inelegant and sometimes not even easily comprehensible. The reason for this is that these statements were originally Chinese and the

translators who rendered the Chinese into English were more concerned with correct than with readable translations. In order not to impair the accuracy of the statements as they stand, the writer has made no effort to amend, edit or paraphrase these translations in any way.

Chinese names found in this book are usually not given in *Hānyǔ Pīnyīn*, but rather in the customary way, observed until recently in Singapore. This may be called folk or provincial transliteration. I have kept to the original to avoid confusion especially for Western readers. The folk or provincial transliteration of, for example, Lee Siew Choh, when converted into *Hānyǔ Pīnyīn* becomes Li Shao-zū. This could leave the reader in English more than a little confused.

This volume would not have been possible if not for the help and advice given by many friends. These friends fell into three groups. The first were those who made the study financially possible. The second were those who gave me advice on and helped me to collect my research materials. And the third were those who, in various ways, lent me a helping hand in shaping and moulding the manuscript into a more readable and a generally better book. Some of these friends have preferred to remain anonymous, while others do not mind their names being mentioned. To be fair to all, I feel in the end that I should leave out citing any names. However, this is not to be construed that I am less grateful to some of my benefactors than to others. I wish them all to know that I will always remember their kindness with the deepest appreciation and with much respect.

The first draft of this book was completed in 1985 and was based primarily on sources from the archives of the Internal Security Department, Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore. It was revised two years later to take account of some new sources accessible to the writer in the Oral History Department, Ministry of Information and the Arts. In 1994, the concluding chapter was re-written essentially to give a brief account of how the Communist movement further developed in the nearly 30 years since 1966 whence the main story in this book stopped. This further story, unlike the previous texts, is not based on government departmental materials but only on ordinary official documents and media resources because, by the time it was written, only such sources were available to the author. What it relates, therefore, is only very tentative in nature.

T.H. Lee
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Abbreviations

AMCJA	All-Malaya Council of Joint Action
ASH	Association of Singapore Hawkers
BSS	Barisan Sosialis Singapura
CCC	Chinese Chamber of Commerce
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CJA	Council of Joint Action
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
CPMML	Communist Party of Malaya, Marxist-Leninist
CPMRF	Communist Party of Malaya, Revolutionary Faction
DP	Democratic Party
GNUG	Guild of [Nanyang University] Graduates
HPTU	Hawkers' and Petty Traders' Union
ISC	Internal Security Council
IWU	Industrial Workers' Union
KURA	Katong United Residents' Association
LF	Labour Front
LPM	Labour Party of Malaya
LSP	Liberal Socialist Party
MCA	Malayan Chinese Association/Malaysian Chinese Association
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MNLA	Malayan National Liberation Army
MNLF	Malayan National Liberation Front
MNLL	Malayan National Liberation League
MNP	Malay Nationalist Party
MPAJA	Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army
MPAJA-ESCA	Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army Ex-Service Comrades' Association
MPSF	Malayan People's Socialist Front
NEP	New Economic Policy
NF	National Front
NTUC	National Trades Union Congress
NUSU	Nanyang University Students' Union
OBAs	old boys' associations
PA	People's Association

PAP	People's Action Party
PAS	Parti Islam Semalaysia
PKI	Partai Kommunis Indonesia
PMIP	Pan-Malayan Islamic Party
PNI	Partai Nasionalis Indonesia
PP	Progressive Party
PPP	People's Progressive Party
PPSO	Preservation of Public Security Ordinance
PR	Partai Rakyat
PRB	Partai Rakyat Brunei
PRM	Partai Rakyat of Malaya
PUTERA	Pusat Tenaga Rakyat
RMNP	Revolutionary Malay National Party
SA	Singapore Alliance
SATU	Singapore Association of Trade Unions
SBHEU	Singapore Business Houses Employees' Union
SBWU	Singapore Bus Workers' Union
SCHFEU	Singapore Commercial House and Factory Employees' Union
SCMSSU	Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union
SCP	Singapore Citizens' Party
SCPA	Singapore Country People's Association
SFA	Singapore Farmers' Association
SFSWU	Singapore Factory and Shop Workers' Union
SGEU	Singapore General Employees' Union
SHB	Singapore Harbour Board
SHBSA	Singapore Harbour Board Staff Association
SHU	Singapore Hawkers' Union
SIHSA	Singapore Itinerant Hawkers' and Smallholders' Association
SLP	Singapore Labour Party
SMMWU	Singapore Manual and Mercantile Workers' Union
SMU	Singapore Malay Union
SPA	Singapore People's Alliance
SPABL	Singapore People's Anti-British League
SRRA	Singapore Rural Residents' Association
STCEU	Singapore Traction Company Employees' Union
STCU	Singapore Trade Union Congress
STULS	Singapore Trade Unions Liaison Secretariat
STUWC	Singapore Trade Union Working Committee
STUWC	Singapore Trade Unions Working Committee
SUPP	Sarawak United People's Party

SWF	Singapore Women's Federation
SWHDA	Singapore Wooden House Dwellers' Association
TUC	Trade Union Congress
UDP	United Democratic Party
UMNO	United Malay National Organisation
UPP	United People's Party
WB	Work Brigade
WP	Workers' Party



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I

Introduction

Origins

Communism was introduced into Singapore and Malaya in the 1920s. When the international movement began in the mid-nineteenth century, it was limited to Europe. It spread to eastern and southern Asia only early in the twentieth century. The driving force behind its introduction to the East was V.I. Lenin, who captured power for the Communists in Russia in the Bolshevik Revolution of October/November 1917. Two years later he set up an international organisation to promote the spread of Communism all over the world, including Asia, called the Third International or Comintern. It was the Comintern which brought Communism to Singapore and Malaya.

Karl Marx had expected the proletarian revolution to break out and succeed in Europe. There were indeed worker uprisings, but all of them failed because of lack of sufficient support. When Lenin later inquired into why most workers in Europe were not inclined to participate in attempts to overthrow the bourgeoisie, he found that because the livelihood of such people had steadily improved under the capitalist regime, rather than worsened, they had become complacent. He postulated too that workers in Europe had prospered because their countries had founded colonies and dependencies in other parts of the world, including Asia, from which a great deal of wealth had been earned. The European bourgeoisie, therefore, did not need to exploit their own kith and kin at home anymore but rather they exploited the subject peoples abroad. In fact, part of the wealth taken from the subject peoples was distributed to the European workers; thus the latter had become better and better off. Proceeding from such views, Lenin stated that the way to overthrow the bourgeoisie in Europe was not only to incite the workers there to rise up in rebellion but also to agitate the subject peoples in the European colonies and dependencies to stand up and overthrow colonial rule.¹ That was why he spread Communism to the colonial world of the East.

Communism was introduced into Singapore and Malaya probably in 1925.² From that time up to the present day the movement has undergone a development of more than sixty years. To provide a perspective of the movement in Singapore for the years 1954 to 1966, it is necessary to take

a brief look at this history, together with its relevant theoretical background. We will focus on the basic aims or objectives of the movement, the methods of struggle adopted to achieve such aims or objectives, and the organisational tools through which the aims were effected. This approach is more appropriate for a clear understanding of the various themes in the present study.

Presently, Malaya, which is a part of Malaysia and is commonly referred to as Peninsular Malaysia, and Singapore are separate states. However, before 1965 their histories were intertwined. When the Communist movement first began, it spanned both territories. The name of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), adopted in 1930, was also applicable in both places. Therefore, in this discussion, whenever the term "Malaya" is used, it is deemed to include both the peninsula and the island. Of course, in places where the term "Singapore" is used, then what is discussed has relevance only to the island.

Another point which requires clarification is that the MCP is nowadays usually referred to in English as the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). The first name was commonly used up to around 1960 (when the Malayan Emergency was officially ended), and the second came into fashion after that. In Chinese, the name of the Party has never changed. The Chinese version is the original because, as will be shown later, the Party has always been largely a Chinese one. The Chinese characters for the Party are Ma-lai-ya Kung-ch'an-tang (马来亚共产党). In this study, to avoid confusion, I shall name the Party the CPM consistently, regardless of whether I refer to it in the past or at present.

The Theoretical and Historical Background

The Basic Aims or Objectives of the Malayan Communist Movement

The basic aims or objectives of the Malayan Communist movement determined its orientation. It is important to understand how the CPM viewed Malayan society, for it was on the basis of a philosophy of society that the CPM devised a path for the revolution which it wished to pursue. The question concerns how the population, in Communist eyes, was divided into different groups on the basis of economic status, race or other criteria.

One document in the CPM sources which deals succinctly with an analysis of the Malayan society is *Ma-lai-ya Kê-ming ti Chi-pên Wên-t'i* (The Basic Problems of the Malayan Revolution).³ This document was actually a resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the Party in

December 1947. There were two themes in the paper. The first was an analysis of social classes and racial groups in Malaya, and the second was, on the basis of the first, a prescription that the revolution at that time should follow what may be called a new democratic path. Half a year after the resolution was adopted, in June 1948, the Party rose in armed rebellion against the British who then ruled Malaya. What the *Chi-pên Wên-t'i* said of the Malayan society held good until 1957. In that year, the British Government granted independence to the Federation of Malaya. To the Communists, this political change was soon followed by social changes in the country which slightly altered the class character of society. I have not come across another Party document like the *Chi-pên Wên-t'i* which gives a formal analysis of the post-1957 era. The new social picture was, however, noted in many Party pronouncements, for instance, in a broadcast in 1975 celebrating the founding of the organisation, which carried the title "The Malayan Communist Party is the Force at the Core Leading the Malayan Revolution" (hereafter "The Core").⁴

According to the *Chi-pên Wên-t'i*, the Malayan society was made up of the following economic classes: workers or the proletariat, peasants, the middle-class or petty bourgeoisie, the national capitalists or national bourgeoisie, compradore capitalists or simply compradores, landlords or aristocrats, and monopolists. The workers were considered to be the poorest section of the population and the monopolists, the richest. The *Chi-pên Wên-t'i* stated that as regards race in Malaya, there were Chinese, Indians, Malays and British. The document further interpreted society in terms of a combination of economic status and race. Thus, the majority of the workers were Chinese and Indians, the greater number of peasants were Malays, the middle class up to the compradore capitalists were again mainly Chinese and Indians, the landlords were chiefly Malays and the monopolists were the British. After 1957, some of the compradore capitalists and landlord classes assumed positions as ministers in the new government, bringing about an element of social change by becoming a new phenomenon in society. The CPM called them bureaucratic capitalists. This was the statement in "The Core".

When it came to practical politics, the CPM viewed Malayan society from a wider range of perspectives than those which were stated in the *Chi-pên Wên-t'i* or "The Core". Language was one aspect of this. The different races in Malaya spoke different languages. However, English, by virtue of the fact that it was the language of the establishment, became a lingua franca used by other races besides the British. In fact, sometimes people of other races could only speak English and not their own mother tongues. Because of this, the social groups, as determined by the twin factors of class and race, were complicated by the language factor.

Generally speaking, the lowest classes, the workers and the peasants, used only their native tongues. A great number of the middle class had acquired an English education and had become English-speaking, and some of the national capitalists and the landlords could also get by with English. The compradores, by virtue of their profession, had to be able to speak English. The problem of languages, as will be shown in later chapters of this book, was a very serious issue in the politics of Singapore from 1954-1966.⁵

Another category of social analysis by the Communists was the students who were separated from the rest of the population for special attention.⁶ If they could be so seen, the students were an occupational group. The Communists had a special interest in students because these were a great force in politics. The CPM also at one time paid particular attention to women.⁷ Again, as in the case of the students, women were considered to be of great value to the revolution. Finally, the Communists also honed in on youth.⁸ Youth were singled out on the basis of age.

The class-ethnic-linguistic structure of modern Malayan society was a creation of British rule. The British first came to Malaya in the late eighteenth century and expanded their sphere of political control during the nineteenth century. Before the coming of the British, the Malayan economy was, in Marxist terms, a feudal one and the inhabitants of the country were almost exclusively Malays. The British brought capitalism as well as immigrant peoples from India and China to help work the new system, thus forming this new kind of society.

The Communist movement was supposed to be a movement of the workers. The greatest aim or objective of this movement, according to original doctrine, was to create a society in which the only social group would be workers. If the Malayan Communists had been interested in immediately creating a society of this kind then not only would they have to destroy the British, but also all the other economic-ethnic-linguistic groups whose interests were not the same as those of the workers. Karl Marx, when issuing his *Communist Manifesto* in 1848, had indeed called for a revolution of this nature in Europe. However, in Malaya, the CPM did not see fit to follow Marx to the letter.

Before 1940, the CPM pursued a revolution of socialist character to create a socialist society. A socialist revolution and a socialist regime meant workers aiming for the destruction of all social groups other than the peasants, and forming with the peasants a new government for the country after the revolution. This was Lenin's method in Russia in 1917 when he overthrew the Czarist Government and set up a soviet republic.⁹ That the CPM adopted Lenin's model in its early career is evidenced by the proclaimed goal of its revolutionary movement to be a Soviet Republic

of Malaya.¹⁰ It is important to understand why Lenin and the CPM did not closely follow Marx's advice on the course of the revolution but chose instead to approach utopia in a more indirect way. This will be discussed later.

After 1940, the CPM changed from pursuing the objective of a socialist revolution to that of a new democratic revolution. Such a revolution meant the destruction of only those social groups higher than the national bourgeoisie. The proletariat would carry out the struggle for power with the assistance of, or in alliance with, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. After the capture of power, the proletariat would allow the friendly groups a share in the government. This followed Mao Tse-tung's example in China where the Communists seized and exercised power precisely according to this formula.¹¹ The CPM's interest in a new democratic revolution after 1940 was shown by the fact that in that year a meeting of its leadership adopted a new programme to guide the revolutionary struggle in the country, one point of which was to establish a Democratic Republic of Malaya.¹²

Why did the CPM in 1940 change its goal from socialism to new democracy, or re-orientate itself from a Leninist to a Mao Tse-tung path? Between the years 1927 and 1935, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had followed Lenin's line in the attempt to capture power in China, but had failed. Mao Tse-tung then showed a new way out for the Chinese Communists which proved to be viable.¹³ Mao's way was more applicable for China than Lenin's because the problems of China were different from those of Russia. Mao's way was determined by the pressing need of the CCP to forge a united front with the Kuomintang, especially in view of the Japanese full-scale invasion of China after 7 July 1937. The CPM considered the problems of revolution it had to resolve to be closer in nature to those of the Chinese than those of the Russians and therefore changed policy. This is seen, for example, in *Chi-pên Wên-ti* in which social categories were based more on Chinese than Russian models.

Generally speaking, after the year 1940, the overall goal of the CPM was a new democratic revolution. However, for a brief span of three years, between 1945 and 1948, it worked only for self-government.¹⁴ This was an unusual exception. A soviet or a democratic republic implied independence and self-government was a lower objective than independence. There were special circumstances which led the CPM in 1945-1948 to lower its sights, to which we shall later return.

The Methods of Struggle

Once aims or objectives were settled, the next question which the CPM found itself having to answer was how such aims or objectives could be

realised or, in other words, what methods of struggle should the Party follow in order to achieve such goals. The answer was actually quite simple: get the workers, peasants and others to fight. The forms of struggle could be go-slows, strikes, acts of sabotage, demonstrations, etc. If such escalated into an attempt to overthrow the government by force of arms, then the course of action would be deemed to be armed struggle. On the other hand, if violence was averted, then the tactic followed would be one of peaceful struggle. The CPM had, at different times in its long career, believed in armed rebellion or peaceful politicking. A policy of violent confrontation was followed from the first days of the Party to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, during that war, in the post-war period from 1948 to 1954 and from 1961 onwards for many years. The periods 1945–1948 and 1954–1961 were taken up with peaceful struggle.

As in social aims or objectives, so also in the methods of revolution, the CPM was usually indebted to international guidance. The idea of armed insurrection which they followed before 1940 had its roots in the experiences of Lenin in the Russian Revolution. Thereafter it was an imitation of Mao Tse-tung in his seizure of power in China by October 1949. Lenin's armed uprising took place in urban centres and was largely the effort of workers living there. Such a mode of struggle is usually referred to as urban insurrection.¹⁵ Conversely, Mao Tse-tung's method was to take the countryside first, and then the towns and cities. Mao's capture of power was mainly an effort on the part of peasants who populated the countryside. The strategy is nowadays described as "the countryside surrounding the cities and the seizure of power through armed struggle".¹⁶ The policy of peaceful struggle followed by the CPM from 1945–1948 was largely the brainchild of Loi Teck, the Secretary-General of the Party (1939–1947),¹⁷ and from 1954–1961, it was that of N. Khrushchev, the Russian leader in the 1950s and sixties.¹⁸

The strategy was, in effect, engaging the enemy with one's strength alone. A better policy was to form an alliance with all other political forces which also happened to share the same enemy, and confront the enemy with this combined strength. This way, victory in the struggle would be more assured. The other political forces thus befriended, or made use of, might also be, fundamentally speaking, one's enemies. However, for the time being, conflicts with such must be set aside. Principal contradictions must take precedence over subsidiary ones. Only after the arch enemy had been disposed of should secondary enemies be dealt with. Of course, amongst the secondary enemies, there were also the greater and lesser ones. When the opportunity came to deal with them, they had also to be categorised into principal and subordinate targets. The policy in the new context would once again be to fight the main foe only and to do so with

the support of the subordinate ones. Thus, in the long-run, all enemies could be eliminated one by one. This method of dealing with enemies was the tactic of the united front.

In a communist revolution in the literary sense, the workers would fight all enemies simultaneously and would not make use of secondary enemies to help fight the principal one. In a socialist revolution, however, there would be an alignment between workers and peasants to fight all the other social classes. In a new democratic revolution, the workers would widen the scope of the united front and make friends of not only peasants but also of the petty and the national bourgeoisie. They would treat only those classes beyond the national bourgeoisie as enemies.

Karl Marx in the *Communist Manifesto* had urged workers in Europe to try to overthrow the bourgeoisie, but had not at the same time advised them to go about the task with the support of friends or allies. The workers would fight in isolation.

In the context of Russia, however, Lenin saw early the advantage in harnessing the support of the peasants in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. In the 1890s, in his battles with the Narodniks, he strongly advocated this philosophy. Thus, the worker-peasant alliance became the cornerstone of the socialist revolution.¹⁹ The CPM in Malaya inherited this idea of the socialist revolution and the worker-peasant alliance, from Lenin.

In China the idea of the socialist revolution and the worker-peasant alliance held sway in the Communist Party for a long time until it was found to be too narrow in scope for the needs of the Chinese revolution. The idea of a new democratic revolution with its four-class alliance of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie then evolved. This new tactic was the creation of Mao Tse-tung, whose ideas became more influential than Lenin's in the CPM after 1940.

There was a close relationship between armed struggle, whether the Leninist or Maoist version, or peaceful struggle on the one hand, and the united front on the other, for the united front was always used by Communists in conjunction with armed or peaceful struggle. To use an analogy, one could say that the CPM was a person and the armed or peaceful struggle, and the united front were his two arms with which he did combat with his enemies.²⁰

Another important issue with regard to the Communist methods of struggle was whether the Communists could carry out their activities only secretly, that is underground and illegally, or also in the open and legally. This problem was one of great consequence, because if the Communists could operate only secretly then their ability to develop and grow would be seriously limited. To be able to develop and grow, the Communists

had to make contact with workers, peasants and so on, and recruit them into their organisations. If they could go about such operations only stealthily, they would not easily be able to reach out to their targets. On the contrary, if they could go about their activities openly, without fear of violating the law, they would be able to reap greater harvests.

Because the purpose of the CPM was to dethrone the established government, it could not enjoy any legal status in society. Throughout its whole history, the CPM was recognised only once in the period 1945–1948 for reasons which will be later explained. This made it necessary for the Party to carry out its activities underground or in a clandestine manner most of the time. However, given the choice, the CPM would have preferred to operate in the open and in conformity with the law. To resolve the problem, the CPM ultimately resorted to taking underground or clandestine struggle as its main form of struggle, and open and legal struggle as a supplementary form, thus fusing the underground and illegal with the open and legal method.

The CPM did not itself invent this technique which was again learnt from the experiences of the international Communist movement. The tactic was first practised by Lenin in Russia in his attempt to capture power. During the time of the Pacific War, a leader in the Chinese Communist Party, Liu Shao-chi, also used the strategem with great effect in areas under the control of the Kuomintang, which was simultaneously a united front partner and an enemy of the Chinese Communists.²¹ The CPM could be presumed to have read with diligence the works of Lenin and Liu.

With regard to actual fighting, the history of the CPM before the Pacific War can be divided into two stages. The dividing line was mid-1937. Before that year the British were the only serious enemy the CPM had, but thereafter the Japanese were also treated as an important enemy because they invaded China. The CPM was a workers' party, but was also largely a Chinese organisation. The CPM was antagonistic towards the British on the grounds of class and race; its hatred for the Japanese was similarly motivated.

From mid-1937 to the end of 1941, the CPM fought the Japanese and the British simultaneously, but not always with the same emphasis as this changed according to the international political environment. From 1935 up to August 1939, Russia, leading the international Communist movement, championed a united front of the Communists and Western Europe against the Fascist powers which included Japan. Therefore, during the period between mid-1937 and 1939, the CPM in Malaya devoted more effort to dealing with the Japanese than with the British. From August 1939 to June 1941, the Soviet-Nazi Pact was in operation,

and thus the CPM switched back to the British as their chief target of revolution. In June 1941, the Germans invaded Russia and consequently in Malaya the CPM once again paid more hostile attention to the Japanese.²² It was a question of alternating principal and secondary enemies.

In the years prior to mid-1937, the CPM had initiated large-scale mass movements to harass its enemies. It is recorded that at that time, plantation, mining and other workers used to carry out sensational strikes. The Party also led farmers, students and other social groups in perpetrating similar struggles. The agitation finally reached a climax in early 1937 when workers in a coal mine in central Malaya seized possession of the mine and declared the establishment of a workers' soviet. Ideally speaking, the Communists should have gone on from there to seize towns and cities, and take over the whole country, but they were not strong enough to do so. In actual fact, even the regime in the coal mine lasted for a mere few days, after which it was overwhelmed by government forces.²³ Very clearly, this occasion of seizing power in a production centre was an imitation of what took place in Russia in October 1917.

For the ultimate success of the revolutionary enterprise, the CPM had to be able to mobilise not only workers but also peasants. The worker-peasant alliance was the cornerstone of the socialist revolution. However, in the pre-1937 days, the Communists were unable to arouse the peasants at all. The greater number of peasants in the country, as noted, were Malays for whom, it seemed, the Communist gospel simply had no appeal. At times, leading members of the Communist Party of Indonesia (founded in 1920) were sent by the Third International to work on the Malays in Malaya, but these attempts were entirely fruitless.²⁴ The united front struggle made no headway at all in the early years in the history of the Party. During this earliest period of its history, the CPM had little opportunity to sponsor open and legal activities. Functions were carried out mainly underground.²⁵

The period between July 1937 and August 1939 witnessed the continuation of the ordinary mass struggles. The most important success achieved in this field was among tin mine workers in northern Malaya. But what stood out most prominently as a great victory was the creation and development of an anti-Fascist united front. The front was called anti-Fascist because it was anti-Japanese, and it was a united front because it involved not only workers, but also the petty and the national bourgeoisie. The majority of the petty and the national bourgeoisie, as pointed out earlier, were Chinese in race. Like the workers, they developed a great hatred for the Japanese because of their invasion of China. The united front struggle consisted of a great deal of propaganda and organisational activities,²⁶ and followed the approach of Mao Tse-tung. It

also accepted and implemented advice from the Third International because the international anti-Fascist united front was first broached in this organisation in 1935 by one of its leaders, Georgi Dimitrov.²⁷ Because the anti-Fascist united front was anti-Japanese and anti-German, but not anti-British, it was not interfered with by the British Government, and was largely an open and legal struggle.²⁸

The period August 1939 to June 1941 saw the CPM, in the mass movements, diverting its energies back to fighting the British rather than the Japanese, although the anti-Japanese effort continued. There were two spectacular achievements in the anti-British struggle during these years. One was that of the workers' movement staging a mammoth demonstration against the government and the other was that of students besieging a police station in a major town. The anti-Fascist united front also underwent a great change during these years. It dropped agitation against the Germans and concentrated on the Japanese as a result of the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact between Russia and Germany. The front was also widened to include the British because the Japanese were now showing signs of expanding into Southeast Asia, which posed a threat to British Malaya and other British possessions. The activities of the new front involved a great number of people.²⁹

In June 1941, Germany attacked Soviet Russia and the Nazi-Soviet Pact came to an end. As a result, the CPM scaled down its attacks on the British but stepped up attacks on the Japanese and Germans. The full anti-Fascist united front was revived with great force. Intense propaganda and organisation activities were mounted under the front.³⁰

From February 1942 till August 1945 the Japanese occupied Malaya and Singapore. They evicted the Western powers, the British, the Dutch and the Americans, from Southeast Asia in a brief few months. During the period, therefore, the CPM's only target was the Japanese.

From the very beginning, the struggle against the Japanese was armed fighting. Ordinary struggles of the masses, for example workers' strikes, because of Japanese pressure, were no longer possible. The main form of armed fighting adopted by the CPM, because of its weakness in relation to the Japanese, was guerilla warfare. During the nearly four years that the Japanese were in the country, the CPM saw more than 340 military engagements with them. The areas in the country in which the Communists armed forces operated were the cultivated countryside and the jungle which fringed it. The ultimate success of the CPM during this period of history, on the basis of its own claims, was the liberation of more than half the total number of villages in the country and the establishment of varying degrees of control over a large number of small and medium towns. The enemy was in occupation of the major urban centres. The

situation became, therefore, one of the countryside surrounding the cities. If developments had continued to be favourable, the CPM could have amassed sufficient strength to overwhelm the major urban centres and drive the Japanese out of the country. In the end, however, things did not happen this way. It was during this period that the CPM effectively changed over from Lenin's road of urban insurrection to Mao Tse-tung's path of rural revolution.³¹

During the Pacific War years, the CPM continued with the anti-Fascist united front. This time the British responded to Communist overtures to have them included in the front. Soon after Japanese troops had landed in northern Malaya, the British released Communist prisoners from jail and organised a band of fighters from amongst them and others to help stem the advance of the Japanese. Thereafter, the British were evicted from Malaya by the Japanese, but in 1943 they were able to re-establish contact with the CPM from their base in India and this was followed by their sending of military supplies of all kinds to the Communist guerillas to help them in their development.³²

The anti-Fascist united front during this period of CPM history exhibited certain peculiar features. In relation to the Japanese, it was an underground movement, but in one area it was able to engage in open and legal activity. In order to obtain help in the control of the local population, the Japanese had organised certain security bodies led by the local bourgeoisie and other upper class elements. The Communists were able to persuade some of the leaders to co-operate with them against the Japanese. Such persons were thus drawn into the anti-Fascist united front, and the manipulation of them by the Communists took the form of activities of an open and legal nature. A second peculiarity of the anti-Fascist united front at that time was that in the military co-operation between the CPM and the British, certain units of Communist fighting men were carefully kept away from the eyes of the British. The Communist armed forces were thus split up because the CPM felt that when the common struggle against the Japanese was over, it would once again oppose the British and therefore the British should know as little as possible of its fighting capabilities.³³

After the Japanese were defeated in the Pacific War and the British returned to Malaya, the CPM and the British found themselves once more in confrontation. The two could have resorted to armed violence at once to settle differences, but both restrained themselves preferring to settle problems peacefully. What considerations led the British to stay their hand were unknown. For the Communists, it was a change of strategy from that of armed violence to that of peaceful struggle. This change in the line of struggle paralleled the lowering of the Party's objec-

tive from one of independence to one of self-government. The CPM suddenly turned "moderate" after the Pacific War because its Secretary-General, Loi Teck, decided for various reasons that it should do so and also because of advice from the Chinese Communist Party.³⁴

The big issue during the immediate post-war years between the Chinese-based CPM and the British was that while the CPM was interested in wresting some measure of power from the British, the British were planning to amass even more power. The CPM wanted the British to grant Malaya self-government but the latter implemented what came to be known as a Malayan Union scheme. In the days before World War II, Singapore, with two other territories in the peninsula, Penang and Malacca, had constituted a colony called the Straits Settlements which was directly administered by the British. There were other territories in the peninsula called states and these were, in legal terms, ruled by Malay chiefs assisted by British officers. Under the Malayan Union scheme, Singapore would become a colony all by itself whilst all the territories in the peninsula were to be amalgamated to form a separate colony, a Malayan Union. The Malay chiefs in the mainland were all to be reduced to commoners. The Communists protested against this attempt by the British to increase their own power and the separation of Singapore from the peninsula. The Malay chiefs, on their part, also fought against the loss of power and over the issue of the British allowing the immigrant Chinese and Indian communities to become citizens of the Union easily like the Malays. The triangular contest concluded eventually with the British compromising with the Malay aristocrats. The Malayan Union was replaced by a Federation of Malaya under which Singapore still became a separate colony by itself while the various territories in the peninsula were unified into a federation. The Federation was ruled by a Conference of Malay rulers assisted by a British officer. Citizenship for the non-Malay communities could also now be granted only on stringent terms.³⁵

The mass and united front struggles mounted by the Communists from 1945-1948 honed in on the ordinary discontentments of the masses, for example, low wages of the workers and the acute constitutional dispute. As in earlier days, workers, students and any other group hostile to the Government were mobilised. The united front during these years, unlike earlier, was forged with political forces which were new on the scene, products of the Japanese occupation. One was a Malay group consisting of ordinary people and led by what, in Communist terms, could be called petty bourgeois intellectuals. A second was a multi-racial assemblage: English-educated middle class and without mass following. A third group were Indian bourgeoisie. Communist collaboration with all groups was a "united front from above". The first and second groups were

simultaneously “blocs within” because Communists joined them while being members of the CPM. “United front from above” and “blocs within” tactics were, of course, learnt from the Third International which founded and developed them under Lenin and others between the years 1920 and 1927.³⁶ Mass and united front activities assumed the usual forms of strikes, rallies, demonstrations and so on. An outstanding success along these lines seemed to have been a total stoppage of work on one occasion by all workers throughout the country. Another was a complete boycott of classes by all students in affected schools and yet a third was the staging of hartals by businesses on two different occasions. But the greatest triumph of all was the unmasking of the Secretary-General of the Party, Loi Teck, as a British agent. Loi Teck had, according to present day Party history, done great damage to the Party, the worst of which was his getting the Party to become “moderate” in 1945. He had joined the Party in 1934 or 1935, and became the Secretary-General in 1939. After he absconded, leadership in the Party was assumed by Chin Peng.³⁷

Because of wartime friendship and because the CPM was willing to undertake peaceful struggle, the British gave the Party legal recognition after the war. This meant that the CPM could now function in the open instead of underground. Given the new situation however, the CPM decided not to come out completely into the open. What it did was to divide the Party into two sections, one to remain underground and the other to come into the open. Some members of the Party had to continue to hide away from the British because it was thought that the British could withdraw recognition of the Party at any time, in which case, if all members were known to the British, the whole Party could be destroyed. It was felt that a number of Party members must be preserved, no matter what the circumstances. Following the legalisation of the Party, all mass and united front activities assumed an open character. In the open, such activities could involve the greatest number of the population. Underground Party members stood behind open ones to direct them in their direction of open mass and united front struggles.³⁸

The years 1948 to 1954 marked another period in the development of the CPM. In June 1948, the CPM rose up in armed rebellion against the British, but reverted to peaceful struggle in July 1954. The armed struggle on this occasion was even more Maoist in character than during the Pacific War because Mao Tse-tung's teachings on this kind of warfare, sanctified by success in China, came to be even more consciously followed.³⁹

There were both internal and external factors which made the CPM embark upon armed struggle. The failure of Loi Teck's line to achieve any tangible result, together with the realisation, perhaps shocking, that this

line was actually sabotage of the Party by a British agent, embittered many Party members. At this time too, the Cold War between the international Communist camp and the free world was underway. This had begun as soon as World War II ended with the Soviet "take-over" of Eastern Europe. It is commonly believed that in early 1948, the Russians passed on advice or instructions to the CPM to revolt.⁴⁰ It is interesting to note that simultaneous with the outbreak of violence in Malaya there were military uprisings in other parts of Southeast Asia, for instance in the Philippines and Burma.⁴¹

The rebellion followed generally the same lines as the anti-Japanese campaign during the Pacific War. The plan of the Communists was to graduate from a defensive to an offensive position, that was from guerilla to positional warfare. This was never realised, however, and after all the years of fighting the CPM in fact became a progressively weaker party. According to Party estimates, between mid-1948 and mid-1954, it fought more than 19,100 engagements with the British. Of these, the majority took place before the end of 1951,⁴² by which time, the Party could be said to have already lost the war. The situation for it had become so bad that it had to make a decision to avoid contact with British troops and scale down the fighting.⁴³ The following year, Chin Peng had to evacuate his headquarters from central Malaya to the Malaysian-Thai border.⁴⁴ By 1954, he had lost two-thirds of all his fighting men.⁴⁵

During the Pacific War, the CPM had been able to control the population in more than half of the countryside and in a number of small and medium towns in the peninsula at various times. On this occasion, however, it was unable to repeat the same performance. On the contrary, whatever mass following it had had at the beginning of the rebellion was lost to it by the end of 1951. This had come about in two ways. Firstly, in order to give the British maximum trouble, the guerillas had resorted to sabotage action in the most important production centres in the country: the rubber plantations and tin mines. Such action undoubtedly hurt the British and whoever owned the enterprises, but it also cost workers their jobs. Thus, workers became alienated.⁴⁶ Secondly, and this was the most important factor, the British removed all the Chinese workers and peasants as well as some of the other communities from their original homes in the countryside and resettled them in new villages which were fenced in by barbed wire and other defences. The move had the effect of severing contact between the villagers and the Communists.⁴⁷

In the heat and fury of the fighting, the CPM, contrary to lessons taught by leaders of the international movement, also neglected united front operations altogether. This had the effect of isolating it from many

sectors of the population. The British, on the contrary, developed united front programmes in a carefully planned manner and were, therefore, able to multiply their strength. The CPM's neglect of the united front, was a major factor contributing to its ultimate defeat.⁴⁸

The concept of the new democratic revolution required the proletariat to forge not only an alliance with peasants but also with the petty and national bourgeoisie. However, the economic sabotage activities perpetrated by the CPM antagonised, besides the workers, the petty and national bourgeoisie who, in many cases, were owners of the plantations and mines. In fact, in the Malayan situation, the CPM should have gone further than the teachings of new democracy by fraternising with the compradores and landlords in order to completely isolate the most important enemy, the British monopolists.

The CPM claimed that it fought the British because it wished to recover sovereignty of the country from them. To meet this challenge, the British took the decision to relinquish control over all the social groups which the CPM had antagonised and to turn such into friends or allies to fight the Communists. The British refused to deal with the Communists but accommodated the others because the Communists would not only deprive the British of political power but also all other influences. The other groups were, however, likely to be contented only with recovering political sovereignty. The British withdrawal was carried out in several stages to ensure that those on whom power had been conferred would indeed prove to be true friends.

The first step was taken in Singapore early in 1948. At the time the Government in the island consisted of a Governor, a Legislative Council and an Executive Council. The innovation was to allow limited elected representation in the Legislative Council which, up until then, had only had nominated representation. Two years later, in 1951, this representation was enlarged. Simultaneously, two of the elected representatives were allowed to also sit in the Executive Council to manage certain administrative departments as virtual ministers. In the Federation of Malaya, there were similar developments. The Central Government there, similar to Singapore, consisted of a British High Commissioner, a Legislative Council and an Executive Council. Below this, there were various levels of local government. In 1951, elections for local government were introduced for the first time. At the same time, some members of the Legislative Council, who were all nominated by the High Commissioner, were appointed to sit also in the Executive Council to take care of certain administrative departments. There were no further developments until 1954 to which we shall later return.⁴⁹

A last question to be asked about the years 1948–1954 in CPM history was whether the Party had much opportunity to carry out activities in the open and without infringement of the law. The answer to this question is obvious. The Party was engaged in open rebellion against the Government. It was natural, therefore, for the Government to try to tie its hands as much as possible.⁵⁰

In the middle of 1954, the CPM again made the decision to abandon armed struggle for peaceful struggle.⁵¹ This time, however, peaceful struggle was different from that in the immediate post-war years. In 1945–1948, the Party was recognised by the Government, but this time, although the CPM hoped to regain that status, it failed. Nevertheless, in spite of non-recognition, the Party still tried as far as possible to avoid military activities and concentrated all efforts on peaceful manoeuvres. A new situation emerged: while, in theoretical terms, the Party continued armed insurrection, in practical terms, it pursued non-violent struggle.

Another peculiarity about this second period of peaceful struggle was that, while in terms of policy the CPM once again gave up peaceful struggle and reverted to armed struggle in late 1961, in actual fact, in Singapore peaceful struggle was continued until 1966. The reasons for this will be explained later on.

There is a third point to note about this second period of peaceful struggle. In the words of the CPM itself, the Party leadership as a whole, after Loi Teck, never believed that peaceful struggle would really enable them to overthrow the British and seize power. Only some individuals had faith that it would be possible. The Party was firmly convinced that only when violence was used, either in Lenin's or Mao's way, would the revolution be eventually successful. The peaceful struggle of 1954–1966 was carried out mainly in the urban centres in Malaya, particularly in Singapore. If violence were to be used, such a struggle could very well have developed into a military uprising like that in Petrograd in Russia in 1917. The CPM leadership still kept in mind the possibility of an urban insurrection. However, British defences in Singapore at the time were very strong. Ultimately, there was no opportunity at all for the CPM to try anything very startling and the peaceful struggle remained one that truly merited its name.

If the struggle in 1954–1966 was not to achieve power, then really what was its purpose? The Party had a very clear answer to this: the struggle was to rebuild the strength of the movement. It has already been noted that by late 1954, the Party had lost the greater part of its armed forces. Even earlier, it had lost its mass base and whatever united front strength it had. The new peaceful effort was to till the ground and sow seeds again.⁵²

There were good reasons why the CPM changed course in 1954. The first was quite obvious: it was defeated in the armed uprising. Second, the British had developed united front partners against the CPM. As seen, the effort began in 1948 but slowed down after 1951. Then in 1954, it picked up again with great speed. What brought about the initial delay and then the final spurt forward? In October 1951, the Communists ambushed and killed the British High Commissioner in Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney.⁵³ This incident was not the outcome of deliberate planning but happened by chance. However, it had a traumatic effect on the British Government. It was decided, on the one hand, to make an even greater effort to stamp out the Communists and, on the other, not to proceed any further with the exercise of transferring power to probably friendly local political groups but to accelerate the process once the Communist danger was effectively overcome.⁵⁴ A new High Commissioner, General Sir Gerald Templer, was sent out from Britain to Malaya in 1952 to implement the policy which he called "Winning the hearts and minds of the people". By February 1954, Templer had satisfactorily fulfilled his military tasks. Then, he had it announced that Singapore and the Federation of Malaya would both be given new constitutions in the near future by which Singapore would obtain partial and Malaya full self-government.

The new Singapore constitution later acquired the name of the Rendel Constitution.⁵⁵ To implement the new constitutions, the British Government had to grant both territories a great deal of political freedom, such as easy formation of political parties, trade unions and other organisations, and minimum restrictions on propaganda. The CPM decided to take advantage of the opening: it could go in strength into mass and united front work. Thus was begun the peaceful struggle.

The CPM's change of course was, like in 1948, also an outcome of fresh developments in the international Communist movement. By 1954, the Cold War between East and West was fought to a stalemate. In actual fact, even earlier in 1952, Stalin, head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and leader of the international Communist movement, had felt that a new approach in dealing with the West had become necessary. A more productive line would be indirect assault, which was peaceful struggle. Stalin first broached his idea at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which took place in that year. In 1953, he died. The leadership of the Russian party was soon taken over by N. Khrushchev. In the realm of East-West relations, Khrushchev developed fully the new trend initiated by Stalin. His line came to be characterised by the description of peaceful co-existence and competition with the West, and eventual peaceful transition of the whole world from Capitalism to Communism.⁵⁶ The new stance in Communist international

politics soon had repercussions in Malaya. According to the CPM itself, it came under strong pressure from both Khrushchev and Liu Shao-chi to change its method of struggle, and complied.⁵⁷

As mentioned, an ideal of the CPM in the peaceful struggle was to regain the legal status which it enjoyed in 1945-1948. If it was a recognised political organisation, it would be able to freely develop mass and united front movements. On the contrary, if it remained a banned political party, it could still carry out activities but certainly without as much success. It fought hard, therefore, to try to regain its former status once the new policy of peaceful struggle was decided upon. However, as seen, in this it was not successful, and in the end it had to remain underground and supervise mass and united front movements in an indirect manner.

On various occasions, the CPM sent out feelers to its opponents to negotiate peace. This resulted in the convocation of a meeting between the two sides in December 1955. The meeting was held in a small town, Baling, in northern Malaya. Chin Peng, leading two other CPM members, attended the talks. The opposing side did not include the British, but only the leaders of local political parties which had won power in Malaya and Singapore under the new constitutions, implemented in 1955. Those who came from the peninsula were Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tan Cheng Lock. These men represented a United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) and a Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). The UMNO was formed in the late forties, out of the Malay agitation against the Malayan Union Scheme.⁵⁸ The MCA was organised in 1949.⁵⁹ The two had linked up together in a common front to fight and win the elections provided for by the self-government constitution.⁶⁰ The delegate from Singapore was David Marshall whose political party was the Labour Front (LF) which had also won in elections provided for by the Rendel Constitution.⁶¹

In CPM terms, the UMNO was largely a party of the landlords or aristocrats, the MCA a party of the compradores, and the LF a party of the petty bourgeoisie. In actual fact, the UMNO was also an organisation which embraced the common Malay peasant. At the time, the CPM was thus the Chinese proletariat facing in isolation a broad united front of almost all the other social groups in Malaya. Chin Peng's stand at the talks was that the CPM was willing to abandon the guerilla war in exchange for recognition and the right to participate in the peaceful politics in the country. The attitude of the other side, however, was unaccepting. It was counter-demanded that the CPM dissolve itself and that the Communist movement be wound up. However, individual members of the Party would be allowed to take part in politics through being members of other political parties after they had been ascertained to be no longer a danger to society. Both sides refused to compromise on their respective terms as

a result of which the talks collapsed.⁶² Thus, the CPM failed to secure legal recognition and had, therefore, to carry out peaceful struggle under conditions different from 1945–1948.

An important development after the failure of the Baling Talks was the granting of Malayan independence to the UMNO and the MCA by the British Government in 1957. This further strengthened the friendship between the British and the two parties against the CPM.⁶³

During that period, like so many times before, the CPM launched mass and united front struggles. Massive student, worker and other movements were founded. Just before the peace talks in Baling took place, Chin Peng issued a manifesto in which he explained the policy he would adopt in the talks. This included what attitude his Party would take on the question of how conflicts between the workers and various social classes could be resolved. Chin Peng was most conciliatory. There would be a place for all under the sun, including the feudal chiefs. Quite clearly, he was trying to create a united front in the broadest possible terms against the British monopolists.⁶⁴ In Singapore, the united front was forged mainly with English-educated petty bourgeois groups who happened to be socialist in political orientation. In 1945–1948, as seen, alliances were also built with middle forces. However, there were differences between the two periods. Formerly, the CPM had an open office as well as an underground section. The open office established co-operation with the friendly groups while simultaneously the underground section infiltrated men into them. From 1954–1966, however, because of Chin Peng's failure at the peace talks, the CPM had to operate entirely underground. Therefore, during this second period, the united front assumed only the form of infiltration. Both open collaboration and infiltration were "united front from above" while infiltration was, at the same time, also the "bloc within".

Mass and united front work from 1954–1966, the specific period covered by this book, can be divided into two stages. During the first stage, 1954–1957, there were underground and illegal mass and united front operations as well as open and legal ones. After 1957, however, everything was done above board only.

The Communist struggle during this period, as on previous occasions, was fought out with great determination and force with the usual work stoppages, political rallies, demonstrations, etc. In the early years, there were even riots. In 1959, the united front also captured power in Singapore island and formed the government. However, in the final analysis, the great struggle was only a success up to 1961. After that year the tide turned, and the story came to an end in 1966.

The CPM's failure in peaceful struggle this time was in its being outwitted by the British united front manoeuvres. Continuing the policy of decolonisation, in 1961 it was proposed that one day the Federation of

Malaya, Singapore and British possessions in northern Borneo should be brought together to form a new nation called Malaysia.⁶⁵ The scheme had several purposes, one of which was to line up all friendly forces in the territories against the Communists in Singapore. Finding that there was really no means of stopping the formation of the new alignment, the CPM quit the line of peaceful struggle in late 1961, deciding that it was no longer viable.⁶⁶ Thereafter the CPM reverted to armed struggle.⁶⁷ In reality, the armed war in the jungle was not begun again until after 1968, in which year a public pronouncement was made to this effect.⁶⁸ During the interval, peaceful struggle continued, as open and legal opportunities to contact mass and united front targets were not terminated in Singapore until 1966 and in the peninsula until 1969 by the respective governments. Only after 1966 did operations in the open and legal field begin to be transferred underground by the CPM in both territories.⁶⁹ When the jungle war re-started in Malaya, similar flare-ups took place also in Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Burma and the Philippines.⁷⁰ A reversion to Maoist struggle meant reviving the patterns of fighting which prevailed in 1941-1945 and 1948-1954.

There were again both internal and external factors which impelled the CPM to change policy once more. The first, obviously enough, was the inability of the peaceful method to continue. The second was the repudiation of Khrushchev's philosophy of struggle in the international Communist movement by Mao Tse-tung. When Khrushchev preached peaceful co-existence and competition with the West, and peaceful transition of the world from Capitalism to Communism, Mao Tse-tung disagreed with him and insisted that the only way to deal with the West was through violence. The dispute between the two men began in the 1950s and became open in 1960. In China there was one important person who believed in Khrushchev and opposed Mao. This was Liu Shao-chi. Mao, therefore, had not only to fight Khrushchev but also Liu. In 1965, Mao initiated a campaign to liquidate Liu which came to be known as the Cultural Revolution. Liu was crushed in 1968. The CPM, from its earliest days, had been more closely connected with the Chinese than with the Russians. In the Sino-Soviet split, the CPM, therefore, stood with Mao. Now that the line of peaceful struggle was repudiated by Mao, the CPM also gave it up and readopted Mao's method of revolution.⁷¹

The new policy adopted in 1961 applied until 1980 whence there was another change in strategy. The Maoist armed struggle is, one remembers, "the countryside surrounding the cities and seizure of power through armed struggle". Under this approach, mass and united front work has to be carried out mainly underground and not in the open.

Organisational Tools

After the methods of struggle were decided upon, the organisation of the various forces which would carry out the struggle was another problem to be resolved.

The Communist movement was composed of various sections: the Party itself, the various mass organisations, for example, trade unions and peasant societies, the armed forces and the instruments of the united front. These were all integrated into one closely-knit complex.

The Party stood above the rest. The relationship between the Party and the others was a vertical one — it was the leadership or the vanguard of the others. Leadership of the Party over the other sectors was exercised in the following way: either the Party deployed members in the other sections to form their leadership, or they recruited their leaders to become members of the Party. In practice, there were both types of connection. The degree of leadership which the Party could exercise over the other sections varied according to circumstances. If leadership was strong, control was ensured, but if weak, even influence would be only marginal. The ideal of the Party was naturally to secure as strong a leadership as possible over the subordinate sections. The relationship among the subordinate sections was lateral in nature. They functioned parallel to one another, on an equal basis.

In the *Communist Manifesto*, Karl Marx had made clear that the political organisation of the proletariat would lead them in the revolutionary struggle. Lenin had also spoken emphatically about the vanguard role or leadership status of the proletarian party in the mass organisations, the fighting units and in the united front with other political forces.⁷² Mao Tse-tung had not only echoed Marx and Lenin, but had also developed their views.⁷³

The Communist organisation in Malaya began as part of the Kuomintang organisation. In 1912–1928, China was ruled by self-seeking military men known as warlords. In 1924, a Chinese political leader, Sun Yat-sen, reorganised his political group into the Kuomintang and pledged to rid China of the warlords and make it once again a rich and powerful nation. The Manchu Dynasty, which ruled China before the warlords, was overthrown by Sun in 1911. Power, however, fell not into Sun's hands but into the hands of the dynasty's generals who also came to be regarded as warlords. Sun's reorganisation of his political group was undertaken only a few years after the founding of the Third International. The warlord regime was recognised by the Western powers. The International had already created the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. On the occasion of Sun's organisation of the Kuomintang, the International advised members of the Chinese Communist Party to join Sun's party as

members to help Sun achieve his political programme. So a united front was created between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang. This united front was a "from above" as well as a "bloc within" type. The alliance lasted until 1928 when the Communists were purged from Sun's party by his successor, Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese Communist Party carried out activities on its own thereafter and the two parties became deep enemies.⁷⁴

In the 1920s, the Kuomintang had many branches in Malaya, including Singapore. Many members in such branches were simultaneously Communists. This was how the Communist movement in Malaya began. After the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party split in China, the Communists in Malaya were advised by the Third International to re-group into a Nanyang, or South Seas, Communist Party. This organisation had jurisdiction over not only Malaya but also some neighbouring countries, for instance Thailand. Then in 1930, the International broke up the Nanyang Communist Party into various national parties, including the CPM. Thus was born the CPM proper.⁷⁵

Available materials do not give a very clear picture of how the Party was organised during the Kuomintang and the Nanyang Communist Party periods.⁷⁶ After the formation of the CPM proper, knowledge is more certain. In 1931, the leadership of the Party consisted of a Central Committee. A section of this Committee handled the organisation of Party members and related matters. As Party members were scattered throughout the length and breadth of Malaya, there was a hierarchy of local committees, divisional committees, and branches and cells to draw them together. A local committee was responsible for a state or settlement, a divisional one for an area or a town in a state or a settlement, and branches and cells were responsible for correspondingly smaller areas.⁷⁷ The Central Committee as a whole took charge of the various mass movements through various mass organisations. Members of the Party became leaders or ordinary members of such organisations.⁷⁸

Mass work, of course, had begun even during Kuomintang days, covering the areas of labour and youth. By 1931 there was a Malayan General Labour Union, a Malayan Seamen's Union and a Communist Youth. The Malayan General Labour Union led a number of affiliates and the Communist Youth was made up of a Children's Corps, a Students' Federation, a [Young] Women Section and a Young Workers' Department.⁷⁹ There is no information about which part of the Central Committee was in charge of united front work but this kind of work was soon begun. An Anti-Imperialist League existed in those early days.⁸⁰ Before the onset of the anti-Japanese movement all organisations were of

a clandestine character because their activities were disfavoured by the British Government.

For the study of organisations, 1937-1941 can be treated as one period. Within the Party organisation, the Central Committee was divided into an organisational and a political bureau. The duty of the first was to manage Party members as well as mass and united front organisations, and the second was responsible for propaganda and liaison with fellow Communist parties. The hierarchical organisation of Party members on a territorial basis remained unchanged except that there were now regional organs put on top of the local committees and some of the town committees were elevated to the same rank as the local committees. These changes came about obviously because there was an increase in Party membership. The mass and united front organisations also continued as before except for perhaps some internal reorganisation in the latter. The Anti-Imperialist League seemed to have given way to a Malayan Racial Emancipation League.⁸¹

A new feature on the scene during these years was the appearance and proliferation of anti-Fascist or anti-Japanese united front organisations. The anti-British united front in the form of the Anti-Imperialist League of former days was very weak probably because of limited participation by the middle and wealthy classes. These were generally afraid of getting involved because they were dependent on the British for their economic well-being.⁸² On this occasion, however, the anti-Fascist or anti-Japanese movement was enthusiastically participated in not only by workers and youth, but also by shopkeepers, small and medium rubber estate and mine owners, and even very rich businessmen. The situation was different because the Japanese at the time did not rule Malaya and the richer people did not have to be afraid of them. An important anti-Japanese organisation created by the CPM during the period was the Singapore Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association which later was renamed the Malayan Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese National Salvation Backing-Up Society. The Party also converted the Malayan General Labour Union into a Labouring Class Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society. Next to these, the Communists got the two organisations to develop links with some bourgeois-controlled opposite numbers such as the Chinese People's Revolutionary Alliance, the Chinese Emancipation League and the Chinese Emancipation Vanguard Corps.⁸³

What was the legal status of the various mass and united front organisations during these years? Very clearly, they fell into two categories, one anti-British and the other anti-Japanese. Needless to say, the first type remained illegal and had to continue to function underground. The

second type however was different. They enjoyed a legal or semi-legal status. The legal ones were those registered with the British Government, and the others were those which the Government tolerated.⁸⁴

Evidence shows that the Singapore Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association was led by a committee of eight persons, of whom three were members of the CPM. The three Communists together with another three CPM members formed yet another committee which directed the work of the first three in the association. The committee of eight was known to the public, but the second one was secret. The three Communists on the open committee formed a Party Corps in that committee. A Party Corps was the specific machinery by which the CPM exercised leadership or influence in a mass or a united front organisation.⁸⁵

Information about Party organisation during the Japanese Occupation is scanty. According to available police sources, the CPM at this time consisted of state, district and section committees in all except three Malayan states and settlements. This presumably referred to the organisation of the Party below the Central Committee level. In some instances, the mass and united front organisations were separate, but very frequently they were rolled into one, necessitated by the small memberships which were due to difficulties in recruitment under Japanese watchfulness. Among purely mass organisations, farmers' unions and youth associations were prominent. Important mass and united front societies were an anti-Japanese Resistance League, an Anti-Japanese Self-Protection Society, an Anti-Japanese Union and a Friends of Guerilla Warfare. Certain personalities serving in two important Japanese-sponsored organisations, an Overseas Chinese Association and a Special Constabulary Corps, as mentioned already, were recruited to become agents for the CPM as well. Thus these organisations became Communist united front tools.⁸⁶

The greatest achievement of the CPM in organisational matters during this period of history was the creation and development of an armed force. This armed force first began when the Japanese invaded Malaya. The British gave a number of Communists military training so that they could help to fight the Japanese. After the British had left and the Japanese had conquered the country, these men remained in the jungle. Later, through recruitment, the bands expanded into eight different units, or independent regiments, occupying different states in the peninsula. The CPM called the whole force the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). In support of this main force, there was a corps of reservists and a militia.⁸⁷

As far as the Japanese were concerned, all the organisations of this period except the two government-sponsored ones were illegal in nature. The British were only aware of the open component of the MPAJA, not the secret one. This point has already been explained. The Party had a Representative (usually known as Political Commissar in other Red armies) in every regiment so as to exert Party control in the army. The authority of this person was even higher than that of the commander.⁸⁸

Peaceful struggle prevailed from 1945–1948. Generally speaking, the organisation of the Party during these few years was along the following lines. In 1946, the "Central", that was the Central Executive Committee, was divided into an Organisation Department and a Political Bureau. The former was put in charge of the organisation of all Party members as well as the labour and youth movements. The latter was responsible for propaganda, external relations, united front work, ex-servicemen and other matters not coming under the purview of the Organisation Department. In 1947, youth work was transferred from the Organisation Department to the Political Bureau.⁸⁹

The organisation of Party members and the various mass movements was done on a territorial basis. The situation was similar to that in earlier days. In 1946, below "Central" there were various state and town committees, from which stemmed various district committees; from these stemmed various branch committees; below such branch committees there were various branches led by one or several men; and below each branch there were various cells, each led by a single man. After mid-1947, between "Central" and the state and town committees were installed various regional bureaus. Functional departmentalisation operated on the different levels of committees except in the regional bureaus and the cells. This functional departmentalisation followed the pattern in the Central Committee of two divisions: one organisational and the other propaganda. There was no departmentalisation at regional or cell level because in the former, the unit involved was too large and in the latter, too small.⁹⁰

The mass organisations sponsored by the CPM during this period were a General Labour Union which later split up to become a Singapore Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) for the island of Singapore and a Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU) for the peninsula, a New Democratic Youth League (NDYL) and a Women's Federation (WF). Except for the SFTU, all were national organisations with branches in the various states or major towns, just like the CPM itself.⁹¹ Because this was now a period of peaceful struggle, the MPAJA was disbanded, but its members were formed into a MPAJA Ex-Service Comrades Associa-

tion (MPAJA-ESCA) so that the Party could maintain contact with them. This organisation was necessary in the Party's view because peaceful struggle could one day give way again to armed struggle and the ex-guerrillas would then have to be mobilised. The association was, therefore, a very special kind of organisation in 1945-1948.⁹²

The united front at this time, as mentioned earlier, was formed with a Malay group, an English-educated multi-racial group and an Indian group. The Malay group was the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP), the English-educated multi-racial group was the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) and the Indian group was the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). The MNP had a following of mass organisations of its own and the whole complex was called the Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (PUTERA) or, in English, the Centre of People's Power. Promoting the united front, the CPM first got the PMFTU, the NDYL, the WF and the MPAJA-ESCA to link up with the MDU and the MIC into an All-Malaya Council of Joint Action (AMCJA). The PUTERA and the AMCJA were later persuaded to come together to form an even broader united front, the PUTERA-AMCJA. The co-operation of the Communists with the three different racial groups were all "united fronts from above". With the MNP and the MDU, it was also simultaneously "blocs within" because there were CPM members in leadership roles in these parties.⁹³

As far as the legal status of the various Communist organisations during this period was concerned, all of them (including the Party) were given recognition by the British Government. However, the Party kept most of its members underground and maintained only open offices to deal with other people. This attitude was adopted because it foresaw the day when it would have to take up arms against the Government and therefore acted to conceal as many of its members as possible.⁹⁴ The leadership of the Party in the mass organisations was, according to tradition, exercised through Party Corps.⁹⁵

When rebellion broke out against the Government in mid-1948, many changes were made in the Communist organisations because circumstances were now different. In the Central Committee, the Organisation Department was abolished and a Military High Command created. All the functions which formerly came under the Organisation Department were now assumed by the Political Bureau. This change was obviously made because the former open mass organisations were now all proscribed by the British. New mass work had henceforth to be carried out underground. Underground mass work could not be as quantitative as open mass work, and therefore, there was no need of a separate organisation to handle it. The Military High Command also came under the

jurisdiction of the Political Bureau. This unit had to be formed because the Party was now engaged in armed struggle.⁹⁶

There was, however, no change in the hierarchy of territorial organisations. The pattern of regional bureaux down to cells continued, but there was internal reorganisation from the state down to the branch committees. The state committees now had, besides an organisation and a propaganda department, an armed forces department. The district and branch committees, as well as branch leaderships, continued their former organisational duties but no longer undertook propaganda work.⁹⁷ In Singapore, there were also internal changes in the town committee. The organisational section was split into three independent units, one responsible for controlling Party members in the municipal area, a second for those in the rural areas, and a third for mass work. The former propaganda section continued but it was given additional responsibility for organising students. District committees, branch committees and branch leaderships carried on with their former organisational duties but gave up propaganda work. The branch committees assumed a new function of the control of semi-military units. There was no change at cell level.⁹⁸

The situation of the mass and united front organisations was much the same as in 1941-1945. At this time, the whole lot of mass organisations came to be called the *Min Yuen* which was an abbreviation of *Min-chung Yün-tung*, meaning People's Movement. "Mass movement" in Chinese was *Ch'ün-chung Yün-tung*, and *Min-chung Yün-tung* was just a different name for the same thing. The mass organisations included unions of peasants, mine workers, rubber workers and women.⁹⁹ Those which were of both a mass and united front character were, in Malaya, a National Liberation Alliance and in Singapore, a Singapore People's Anti-British League (SPABL).¹⁰⁰

The CPM military arm on this occasion was given the name of the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA).¹⁰¹ It was formed through mobilisation of the members of the MPAJA-ESCA. Eventually, it consisted of ten regiments, variously deployed in the different states of the peninsula. This main force was supported by semi-military units, variously designated, but usually called the Workers' Protection Corps.¹⁰²

Because of the armed uprising, the CPM was now once again banned by the British Government and became an illegal society. The *Min Yuen* and the armed forces were similarly illegal. However, *vis-à-vis* the public or the masses the *Min Yuen* was regarded by the CPM as an open movement in order that people could be easily contacted and recruited into it.¹⁰³ The Party controlled the *Min Yuen* through Party Corps, and the Malayan National Liberation Army through Party Representatives.¹⁰⁴

For the 1954–1966 period, I have no information about the situation of the CPM except its unit in Singapore. In the island, between mid-1948 and mid-1954, the whole unit was completely destroyed by British action except the part which was responsible for propaganda and student work. Therefore, it was this part which took charge of activities in the island at that time.¹⁰⁵ The fact that only the propaganda and students' outfit dealt with everything meant that there was no more strict specialisation of functions in the Party as in the former days. In the past, this unit kept strictly to the propaganda and student fields and never, for example, touched the workers or peasants. Now, however, it could venture into all fields and a single target could simultaneously be worked on by many of its sub-divisions.¹⁰⁶ The disruption suffered before 1954 and the desire to avoid further disruption in the future gave rise to yet another special characteristic in the Singapore organisation. In the past, the Town Committee and its various subordinate organs were given clear designations and they would hold periodic meetings at which all members would participate. Between 1954–1966, the different levels of organs were maintained, but they were no longer given any names. Also, groups would not meet and superiors would maintain contact with subordinates only on an individual basis.¹⁰⁷

The picture of the mass and united front organisations in the peninsula for this period is also unclear.¹⁰⁸ There is only information on conditions in Singapore. Firstly, the SPABL of the earlier days continued until 1957 when it was dissolved. This organisation was both a mass and an united front outfit. Pure mass organisations proliferated: in the student field, there were such major names as the Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union (SCMSSU) and, later on, the Nanyang University Students' Union (NUSU); in the labour movement, the Singapore Factory and Shop Workers' Union (SFSWU), the Singapore General Employees' Union (SGEU) and the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU); in the peasant movement, the Singapore Wooden House Dwellers' Association (SWHDA), the Singapore Farmers' Association (SFA), the Singapore Country People's Association (SCPA) and the Singapore Rural Residents' Association (SRRA). The cultural movement, the women's movement and the hawkers' movement were similarly articulated in many organisations. In the united front area, there was at first the People's Action Party (PAP) and later the Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS). Both were political parties and were the CPM's link-up from above with the English-educated petty bourgeois group.¹⁰⁹

Between 1945 and 1948, when the CPM pursued peaceful struggle, the MPAJA was disbanded. Although, in practical terms, the MNLA assumed a similar policy, it was kept intact because the Baling Talks

failed. If the talks had been successful, the MNLA would have been dispersed. All semi-military units in Singapore were wound up.¹¹⁰

As far as the legal status of the Party and the various subordinate organisations in the island was concerned, the CPM unit remained completely underground. This was again due to the failure of the Baling Talks. The SPABL was also a proscribed organisation. It was dismantled in 1957 because it was thought that this would help safeguard the security of its members and those of the CPM who were deployed in open and legal activities. The various pure mass organisations and political parties were all open and legal societies. Members of the CPM functioning in such places, as in previous days, still exercised control or influence, but were not formed into Party Corps. Also, the superiors who directed them maintained contact with them only on an individual basis. This was observed, of course, for the sake of security.

The CPM abandoned peaceful and returned to armed struggle, in theoretical terms, in 1961 and, in practical terms, in Singapore island in 1966. What the situation of the Party and the different kinds of subordinate organisations has been since then until now, will be, wherever possible, touched upon briefly in the Conclusion of this book.

The Stages of Struggle

After the promulgation of the Rendel Constitution and before elections provided for under this constitution were held, the CPM took quick action to mobilise the various social groups and put them into organisations to prepare for its participation, in its own right if it secured legal recognition, and through proxies if it did not. This was the beginning of the open united front struggle in Singapore. The effort was earnest and the outlook optimistic.

The elections were won by the LF, whose leader, David Marshall, became the Chief Minister in the new government. Marshall stayed in office for a year. During this time, the Communists pushed very hard in their organisational activities and some bloody incidents were perpetrated. But their labours were followed by impressive results: Marshall's Chief Ministership proved to be a time of rapid growth for the Communist movement.

Marshall resigned from office in the middle of 1956 and was succeeded by his colleague, Lim Yew Hock. In close co-operation with the British authorities, Lim Yew Hock took drastic security measures against the Communists. He hit at them on two occasions. On the first, he disbanded a number of their most important organisations as well as

arrested a great number of the activists. However, Lim's efforts ultimately failed to check the growth of the Communist movement. In 1957 there was an election to a governmental authority called the City Council. Two years later, all Singapore had a new constitution and general elections were held again. On both occasions, Lim Yew Hock's party was defeated by the PAP, which was then a united front party of the CPM. The PAP was heavily infiltrated by members of the latter. This period was the time when Communist united front and mass activities suffered temporary reverses but rallied to achieve success even in elections.

During the first year while the PAP was in office, the members of this party who were not simultaneously also members of the CPM and those who were, co-operated with and contended against each other at the same time. Eventually, the two sides split and the united front came to an end. The non-Communists joined up with the UMNO and the British to fight the Communists. The Communists, for their part, found allies in a new group of non-Communists in the PAP and established with them a new political party called the BSS.

The following two years saw the decimation of the Communist movement. After the split in the PAP, the Communists did two things: one was to evacuate those of its cadres who might possibly be arrested by the Government; the other was to continue with the struggle in Singapore with those members of the Party who had to or could remain behind. The authorities took drastic action against the latter.

The last days of the Communist open united front struggle in Singapore were from 1963 to 1966. During this time, the Government continued its action to crush the Communists. Within the movement itself, there was great disunity, which resulted from conflicting policies over various issues.

Notes

- 1 See V.I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism" in *Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968). Lyman P. Van Slyke, *Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 7-9.
- 2 Sometime in 1923-1927 according to "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraph 5, and 1925 according to "Wu-shih nien". Works dealing mainly or in part with Malayan Communism generally have something to say on its origins. The stories they tell generally tally with accounts in the "Basic Paper" and "Wu-shih-nien". One good example of such studies is Gene Z. Hanrahan, *The Communist Struggle in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1971, originally published by The Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1954), pp. 28-31. Another is Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 131-133.
- 3 The edition available to the author is that which was reprinted by the Hung-hsing-pao Shê (Red Star News Press), n.p., 1951.

- 4 By Voice of Malayan Revolution on 27 June 1981. Aloysius Chin, *The Communist Party of Malaya: the Inside Story*, chapter 12 mentions a new constitution adopted by the CPM in 1972. The view of Malayan society in this document, as related by Chin, was not different from that shown in "The Core". It is to be noted that the new constitution was a more basic document than "The Core".
- 5 No CPM document seen by the author discusses the problem of language. However, this factor was in the mind of the Communists in practical politics. For example, in Singapore in 1950, there was a Party unit called the United Front Department which worked on English-educated intellectuals like lawyers, doctors and university students. The Singapore organisation was conscious of such English-educated and English-speaking groups. Incidentally, one of the persons worked upon by the United Front Department at that time was the one time President of the Republic of Singapore, C.V. Devan Nair. Cf "AC" & "HS". Also, police file entitled "Operation Seaside - Titt Fung Documents - Correspondence re:".
- 6 See, for instance, in *Ma-lai-ya Kung-ch'an-tang Chi-nien Min-tsu Chai-fang Chan-chêng Shih Chou-nien Hsüan-yen (A Declaration by the Communist Party of Malaya in Commemoration of the Tenth Anniversary of the War of National Liberation)*, 20 June 1958.
- 7 There was a women's movement expressed in the form of a Women's Federation in 1956. See chapters III and IV of this volume on this point.
- 8 The youth movement from 1954-1966 assumed the form of old boys' associations.
- 9 See Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), (ed. and authorised), *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), chapter 7.
- 10 "Wu-shih-nien". *Nan-tao chih Ch'un*, pp. 9 & 15. "1962 Speech". "AC". Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 34 mentions Communist propaganda materials of 1928 which called for the establishment of a Soviet State, and p. 43, based on a CPM source, "The Communist Party of Malaya", a Pan-Malayan Cadre's Meeting of the Party in 1931 which adopted the following resolution: "... to carry on the struggle for national liberation, formulate a military programme for the overthrow of imperialism and feudal aristocracy, and to establish the Soviet Republic of Malaya by the co-ordinated efforts of the proletariat and peasantry". Charles B. McLane, op. cit., p. 200, based on a Malayan Communist text, "History of the Malayan Communist Party", mentions that the CPM had a meeting in September 1932 in which it adopted a twelve-point programme. One of the points called for the establishment of a "Malayan Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Republic".
- 11 Lyman P. Van Slyke, op. cit.
- 12 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 41 & 45. *Nan-tao chih Ch'un*, pp. 21 & 26. "Wu-shih-nien." Cf. Harry Miller, *Menace in Malaya* (London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1954), [hereafter Harry Miller, op. cit. (1)], pp. 43-44. J.H. Brimmell, *Communism in South-east Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 148 & 197.

In 1972, when the CPM adopted a new constitution, its revolutionary goal remained one of new democracy. See Aloysius Chin, op. cit., p. 199.

- 13 See Jerome Chen, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), chapters 5-9; and Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 553-563.
- 14 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 49 & 59. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 91-94. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., pp. 306-308. Cheah Boon Kheng, *The Masked Comrades: A Study of the Communist United Front in Malaya*

- (Singapore: Times Books International, 1979), [hereafter Cheah Boon Kheng, op. cit. (1)], p. 26.
- 15 "April 25th Statement".
 - 16 Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), chapters IV & V. "April 25th Statement".
 - 17 "April 25th Statement". "Wu-shih-nien". "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraph 59. Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 92. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., pp. 308-316. Cheah Boon Kheng, op. cit. (1), pp. 20-23.
 - 18 "April 25th Statement". "Wu-shih-nien". Douglas Hyde, *The Peaceful Assault: The Pattern of Subversion* (London: The Bodley Head, 1963).
 - 19 See V.I. Lenin, *Lun Kung-nung Lien-mêng [On the Worker-Peasant Alliance]* (Moscow: Wai-kuo-wên Shu-chi Ch'u-pan-ch'ü Ch'u-pan [Foreign Languages Publishing House], 1956). Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), op. cit., pp. 39-41.
 - 20 The analogy was first used by Mao Tse-tung. See his *Selected Works* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), vol. II, p. 295.
 - 21 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), op. cit., pp. 207-212. Lyman P. Van Slyke, op. cit., pp. 164-165.
 - 22 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 26-42. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 46-51 & 56-57. Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), pp. 32-34. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., pp. 146-150. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., pp. 237-241.
 - 23 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 5-33. "Wu-shih-nien". See also Rene Onraet, *Singapore - A Police Background* (London: Dorothy Crisp & Co. Ltd., 1947), chapter 8; N. Parmer, "Labor Organisation by Chinese in Singapore in the 1930's" in K.G. Tregonning (ed.), *Papers on Malayan History, Journal of South East Asian History*, (1962), pp. 239-255, and "Chinese Estate Workers' Strikes in Malaya in March 1937" in C.D. Cowan (ed.), *The Economic Development of South-East Asia* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964), pp. 154-173; M.R. Stenson, *Industrial Conflict in Malaya*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), chapter II; and Yeo Kim Wah, "The Communist Challenge in the Malayan Labour Scene, September 1936-March 1937", *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XLIX: 2 (1976), pp. 36-79. "Wu-shih-nien" gives the date of the workers' soviet as 1935. This, apparently, is only a "recollection" and is not based on any documentation.
 - 24 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 4, 15-16, 18 & 20. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 28-30. Lucian W. Pye, *Guerilla Communism in Malaya: Its Political and Social Meaning* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 48-51. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., pp. 131-132, 135 & 240-244.
 - 25 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 1-34. "Wu-shih-nien". "HS".
 - 26 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 26-36. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 49-51. Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), p. 31. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., pp. 146-147. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., pp. 239-240. Yoji Akashi, *The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement* (Kansas City: University of Kansas, Centre for East Asian Studies, 1970), pp. 15-33 & 63-73. Stephen Leong, "The Kuomintang - Communist United Front in Malaya during the National Salvation Period, 1937-1941", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, VIII: 1 (March 1977), pp. 31-47.
 - 27 Jane Degras, *The Communist International, 1919-1943: Documents* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1971), vol. III, pp. 346-349 & 355-370. Douglas Hyde, *United We Fall: The Tactic of the United Front* (London: Ampersand Books, 1964), pp. 46-70. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 46-49. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., pp. 237-242.
 - 28 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 26-36. "Wu-shih-nien". "HS". Cf. Yoji Akashi, op. cit., pp. 16-17, 20, 22-27, 29, 31-33 & 72.

- 29 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 37-40. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 56-57. Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), pp. 32-33. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., pp. 147-149. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., pp. 242-244. Yoji Akashi, op. cit., pp. 73-82.
- 30 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraph 41. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 57. Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), p. 33. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., p. 148.
- 31 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 42-44. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. F. Spencer Chapman, *The Jungle is Neutral* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1954). Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., chapter III. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., pp. 194-197. Cheah Boon Kheng, *Red Star over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation, 1941-1946*, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), [hereafter Cheah Boon Kheng, op. cit. (2)], p. 64.
- 32 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 42 & 46-48. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. F. Spencer Chapman, *ibid*; Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 61-68, 70 & 77-83. Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), pp. 33, 37-38 & 44-49. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., pp. 149-150 & 196. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., pp. 303 & 305. Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960* (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1975), pp. 21 & 23-24. Cheah Boon Kheng, op. cit. (2), pp. 73-75. John Drysdale, *Singapore: Struggle for Success* (Singapore: Times Books International, 1984), pp. 13-15.
- 33 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 47-48. "Wu-shih-nien". "HS". Cf. F. Spencer Chapman, op. cit. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 78 & 83. Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), pp. 47-48. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., p. 196. Cheah Boon Kheng, op. cit. (2), pp. 62-63.
- 34 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 49-78. "April 25th Statement". "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 88 & 92-93. Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), pp. 59, 63-64 & 69-70. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., p. 199. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., pp. 306-316. Cheah Boon Kheng, op. cit. (1), p. 23. John Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 16 & 27-28.
- 35 See Yeo Kim Wah, *Political Development in Singapore, 1945-55* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1973), chapter I; M.N. Sophe, *From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation: Political Unification in the Malaysia Region, 1945-65* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Malaya, 1974), chapters II & III; and Anthony J. Stockwell, *British Policy and Malay Politics During the Malayan Union Experiment, 1945-1948*, *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Monograph No. 8, 1979.
- 36 See Jane Degras, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 1-3. Douglas Hyde, op. cit., pp. 25-26. Lyman P. Van Slyke, op. cit., chapters 2 & 3. Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), chapter V. Cheah Boon Kheng, op. cit. (1), pp. 53-54. Cheah considers the CPM's co-operation with the other political forces to be "united front from above", including "bloc within", and "united front from below" at the same time. The author believes there was no "united front from below". This was because the CPM had no means of subverting the mass following of the Malay group and the other two groups had negligible or no mass following.
- 37 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 53-54, 56-57 & 60-69. "April 25th Statement". "Wu-shih-nien". *FEER*, 16 January, 1981. Cf. Virginia Thompson & Richard Adloff, *The Left Wing in Southeast Asia* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950), pp. 133-151. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 98-104 & 106-107. Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), pp. 63-73. Lucian W. Pye, op. cit., pp. 83-86. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., pp. 202-211. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., pp. 307-312. Cheah Boon Kheng, op. cit. (1). M.R. Stenson, op. cit. John Drysdale, op. cit., chapters 2 and 3.

- 38 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraph 52. "April 25th Statement". "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), p. 61. Lucian W. Pye, op. cit., pp. 77-78. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., p. 199. Cheah Boon Kheng, op. cit. (1).
- 39 Two CPM Central Committee resolutions laid down the guidelines for the armed struggle on this occasion. These were *Ma-lai-ya Kê-ming Chan-chêng Chan-lioh Wên-ti* (*Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War*) and *Tui "Ma-lai-ya Kê-ming Chan-chêng Chan-lioh Wên-ti" ti Pu-Ch'ung I-chien* (*Supplementary Views on "Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War"*). Both were clearly modelled on the military writings of Mao Tse-tung.

Most published works on the CPM are about the armed uprising which broke out in 1948. Some of such books are Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit.; Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), as well as his later publication *Jungle War in Malaya: The Campaign Against Communism, 1948-1960*, (London: Arthur Baker Ltd., 1972) [hereafter Harry Miller, op. cit. (2)]; Lucian W. Pye, op. cit.; Edgar O'Ballance, *Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1966); Richard Clutterbuck, *The Long, Long War: The Emergency in Malaya, 1948-1960* (London: Cassel, 1966), [hereafter Richard Clutterbuck, op. cit. (1)], as well as his *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945-1963* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1973), [hereafter Richard Clutterbuck, op. cit. (2)]; Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya & Vietnam* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967); Noel Barber, *The War of the Running Dogs: How Malaya Defeated the Communist Guerrillas, 1948-1960* (London: Collins, 1971); Anthony Short, op. cit.; and Richard Stubbs, *Heart and Mind in Guerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989). What is said in this and the following paragraphs about the Communist uprising is based generally on these works and some primary sources as cited in the next few notes.

- 40 There is a comprehensive study of the various theories about the origin of the revolt in Tan Kay Chee's "The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-60: A Study of Different Interpretations of Its Origins and Failure", Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Singapore, 1975. Chin Peng himself was reported to have, on one occasion, talked about why he started the rebellion in 1948. See Aloysius Chin, op. cit., p. 118.
- 41 See Charles B. McLane, op. cit. chapter 6.
- 42 "Wu-shih-nien". British reports had it that there were some 13,585 actions between the two sides from June 1948 to December 1951. Of these, 4,155 were major engagements. See Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 84.
- 43 In October 1951, the CPM made a decision to de-emphasise the military struggle and divert main resources to the development of mass and united front movements. This had to be done because the ranks of the armed forces had become very depleted as a result of war casualties. The mass and united front movements would bring in fresh supplies of manpower and financial and other resources to the Party. The decision was conveyed to Party members in a circular entitled "Wei Chêng-chû Chan-chêng ti Kêng-ta Shêng-li êrh Tou-chêng (To Struggle for Greater Victories in the War)". Commonly, this document is nowadays referred to by the police as the October Directive and by the CPM itself as the October Resolution.
- 44 According to a Central Committee member of the CPM, Ah San, who at one time headed the Committee's Central Malayan Bureau and later the South Malayan Bureau. See his statement to the police, "AS", paragraph 41. See also Harry Miller, op. cit. (2), chapter 12.

- 45 Richard Clutterbuck, op. cit. (1), pp. 79–131.
- 46 Even one of the most senior persons in the CPM itself, Ho Lung, Secretary of the South Malayan Bureau during the latter part of the Emergency, testified to this. See “HoL”, paragraph 109. Point confirmed by “AC” & “HS”.
- 47 Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 141–142. Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), chapters 10 & 11; and op. cit. (2), chapter 7. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., p. 326. Richard Clutterbuck, op. cit. (1), chapters 7 & 8; and op. cit. (2), pp. 175–178. Anthony Short, op. cit., chapters 9 & 15.
- 48 Tan Kay Chee, op. cit., chapters III & IV explain the various causes of the failure of the Communist uprising. Aloysius Chin, op. cit., p. 119, relates that Chin Peng, on the same occasion as that noted in note 40 above, gave an explanation of why his Party failed to acquire power in Malaya. Chin Peng pointed out not only the reason for the failure of the 1948–1960 uprising, but also the error that the CPM did not act earlier, in 1945 instead of in 1948.
- 49 Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 54–57. Gordon P. Means, *Malaysian Politics* (London: University of London Press Ltd., 1970), pp. 56–64, 123, 132–134, 137, 143 & 168.
- 50 Confirmed by “HS”.
- 51 “April 25th Statement”. “Wu-shih-nien”. Cf. Richard Clutterbuck, op. cit. (2), pp. 81–82.
- 52 For instance, “April 25th Statement” says: “From its very foundation, our Party has recognised that only through violent revolution will our people obtain thorough liberation. Even after the ‘20th Congress’ [of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], there were only individuals in the Party who believed in the fallacious argument of ‘peaceful transition’. However, regarding the basic question of whether our country should actually pursue the path of ‘urban insurrection’ or ‘the countryside surrounding the cities’ in order to seize power, there was no clear solution for a long time. During the anti-Japanese war and the first few years of the anti-British war, although, because of objective realities, our Party concentrated its main strength in the countryside and carried out guerilla warfare, yet we did not elevate the practice of these two periods to the level of theory, so we were not conscious or fully conscious of the need to follow the road of ‘the countryside surrounding the cities and seizure of power through armed struggle’. It was as a result of this that under certain circumstances, an impracticable idea was born which regarded that a temporary change in the form of struggle would be advantageous to the accumulation and development of the strength of the revolution which would provide better conditions for the armed struggle in the future”.

Hsioh (Study), the theoretical journal for Party members, issue no. 8 of November 1954, right from the beginning of the 1954–1966 period, had already given advice or instructions to Party members in the following terms: “It should be pointed out that the task of the revolution in the central cities of the enemy is not to lead the masses to a showdown with the enemy. Because the central cities are places where the enemy’s rule is close and strong, to pursue there armed struggle is impossible. The task of revolutionary work in the central cities must be: to lie concealed for a long period, to work skilfully and diligently under cover, to accumulate strength and to wait for the opportunity [to strike]. In concrete terms, this means that one should, over a long period of time and with patience, take the organisation of the masses to be one’s first duty and this is to develop, lead and push forward the struggles of the masses and the mass movements. One should through such work accumulate and develop strength so as to enable one at the right opportunity to expedite the arrival of the high tide of the

revolutionary struggle and be in a position, simultaneously, under conditions of the armed struggle uninterruptedly achieving victories, to assist the liberation army to conquer the cities".

There is also a record of Ng Meng Chiang, the man who was in charge of operations on the spot in Singapore in the earlier years of the 1954-1966 period, telling a subordinate of his, Chan Yean Fock, what the nature of the struggle in Singapore in those years ought to be. The record reads: "Ng Meng Chiang ... told me that armed struggle in the urban areas should only be carried out to co-ordinate the armed struggle in the 'front-line' (meaning in Malaya). He explained that the 'front-line' armed struggle was now at its low ebb ... The withdrawal of the armed struggle to Northern Malaya [i.e. to the Malayan-Thai border] was only a temporary set-back. He compared this to the C.C.P. [i.e. Chinese Communist Party] 'Long March' in China where they also suffered this set-back. Eventually, like in China, the final victory would be ours ... Ng Meng Chiang ... instructed that our cadres in the urban areas should lie low for the time being so as to consolidate our position. We should not carry out violent struggle in the urban areas and disregard the situation in the 'front-line'. The main purpose of armed struggle in the urban areas was to cause tension and disorder so as to divide the attention of the government against the 'front-line' struggle. If we carry out violent struggle in the urban areas independently at the time when the armed struggle in Malaya was at its low ebb we should not be able to produce very much result whilst at the same time we would only be sacrificing our cadres and cause our position to be weakened ...". Cf. "CYF (72)", paragraph 76.

The above testimonial sources were acquired before 1985 when the first draft of this book was completed. Aloysius Chin's op. cit., printed in 1995, provides further evidence that the struggle in 1954-1966 in Singapore was not to capture power in the island but only to rebuild the strength of the revolution. According to Chin, between 1956 and 1961, the CPM leadership often discussed among themselves why they failed in the previous armed struggle. In their deliberations, the open united front struggle, then in progress in Singapore, was reviewed. No mention was made that the struggle was to seize power, but only to "acquire majority support" for the CPM. See his pp. 66-68.

- 53 Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), pp. 190-196. Richard Clutterbuck, op. cit. (1), p. 63. Noel Barber, op. cit., pp. 130-131.
- 54 Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), pp. 203-204. F.G. Carnell, "Constitutional Reform and Elections in Malaya", in *Pacific Affairs*, 26: 4 (December 1953).
- 55 See Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 58-61 and Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 61-64 & 147-150. Also Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 136-137.
- 56 D.S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1959-61* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967). W.E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1964). See also Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 122-123.
- 57 See "April 25th Statement".
- 58 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 99-100.
- 59 *Ibid*, p. 120.
- 60 *Ibid*, pp. 133-134.
- 61 See chapter II of this volume.
- 62 See the following: *Report by the Chief Minister of the Federation of Malaya on the Baling Talks* (Kuala Lumpur: [Federation of Malaya Government], 1956); Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, *Looking Back*, (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1977), articles 1 & 2; Harry Miller, *Prince and Premier* (London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd.,

- 1959), chapter 26; Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 265-268; Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 137-138; and John Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 129-132.
- 63 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 189. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., p. 336.
- 64 *Ma-lai-ya Kung-ch'an-tang Hsüan-yen - Wei Shih-hsien Ma-lai-ya ti Tu-li, Min-chu, Ho-p'ing erh Tou-chêng (A Declaration by the Communist Party of Malaya - To Struggle for the Realisation of Independence, Democracy and Peace in Malaya)*, loose leaflet, dated 23 December 1955. Cf. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., pp. 332-336.
- 65 See chapter V of this volume.
- 66 See chapter VI of this volume.
- 67 "April 25th Statement". "Wu-shih-nien". No secondary source deals with this point.
- 68 See chapter VII of this volume and *Kao-chü Wu-chuang Tou-chêng Wei-ta Hung-ch'i, Fên-yung Ch'ien-chin! (Hold High the Great Red Banner of Armed Struggle and Bravely March Forward!)*, 1 June 1968, carried by New China News Agency on 19 June 1968.
- 69 See *Path of Violence*.
- 70 *FEER*, 6 March 1981, pp. 27-28.
- 71 D.S. Zagoria, op. cit. W.E. Griffith, op. cit. L. Dittmer, *Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974). "HS".
- 72 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), op. cit., pp. 60-61 & 78-86.
- 73 Stuart R. Schram, op. cit., chapter IV.
- 74 A general work on modern Chinese history which has a good account of this story is Immanuel C.Y. Hsu's, op. cit. See pp. 518-531.
- 75 "Wu-shih-nien". "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 5, 9, 11 & 12. Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 30-32 & 38-40. Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), pp. 19-23. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., pp. 90-94. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., pp. 131-136.
- 76 The best primary source on the subject available to the author is "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, charts 2A & 2B, and notes.
- 77 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, chart 3. Also paragraphs 14, 17, 19, 22 & 24 for related information. No secondary work deals with this subject.
- 78 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, chart 3. There is no secondary work on the subject.
- 79 *Ibid.* Also paragraphs 5, 7, 9-12, 15, 17, 19, 20 & 24 for related information. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 40-41 & 51-52. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., pp. 94 & 96. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., p. 136.
- 80 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, chart 4, and paragraphs 9 & 15. Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 43, note 2.
- 81 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, chart 5; and pt. IV, appendix "A". Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 49 & 59. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., p. 149.
- 82 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, chart 4.
- 83 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 33, 35, 37 & 40. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 49-51 & 59. Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), pp. 31-33. Lucian W. Pye, op. cit., pp. 62-64. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., pp. 146-149. Charles B. McLane, op. cit., p. 240. Stephen Leong, op. cit. Yoji Akashi, op. cit.
- 84 "Wu-shih-nien". No secondary work deals with this point.
- 85 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraph 32; and pt. IV, appendix "A". Secondary works are silent on this point.
- 86 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 43 & 44. "Wu-shih-nien". "HS". Cf. Virginia Thompson & Richard Adloff, op. cit., p. 130. Gene Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 71 & 85. Harry Miller, op. cit. (1), p. 42. J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., p. 194. Cheah Boon Kheng, op. cit. (2), pp. 65-66. John Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
- 87 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraph 44. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Virginia Thompson &

- Richard Adloff, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-130. F. Spencer Chapman, *op. cit.* Gene Z. Hanrahan, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-77. J.H. Brimmell, *op. cit.*, p. 194. Charles B. McLane, *op. cit.*, pp. 303-305. Cheah Boon Kheng, *op. cit.* (2), pp. 60-64.
- 88 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraph 44. Cf. Cheah Boon Kheng, *op. cit.* (2), p. 67.
- 89 "Basic Paper", vol. II, pt. V, paragraphs 1-45, and charts A(1) & B(1). "Wu-shih-nien". No secondary work deals with the subject of the paragraph.
- 90 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraph 65; vol. II, pt. IV, paragraphs 3-19 and appendix "C"; and vol. II, pt. V, paragraphs 1-45, and charts A(2) - A(4) & B(2). No secondary work deals with the subject of the paragraph.
- 91 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 53, 64, 77, 82 & 84; vol. IV, pt. XI, paragraphs 1-5 & 7-10. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Virginia Thompson & Richard Adloff, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-142. Gene Z. Hanrahan, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-102. Harry Miller, *op. cit.* (1), p. 62. Lucian W. Pye, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-78. J.H. Brimmell, *op. cit.*, pp. 198, 202 & 206. Charles B. McLane, *op. cit.*, pp. 307-308. M.R. Stenson, *op. cit.* Cheah Boon Kheng, *op. cit.* (1), pp. 25, 44, 51, 78, 81, 83 & 87. John Drysdale, *op. cit.*, chapter 3, note 5.
- 92 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraph 1; and vol. IV, pt. XI, paragraph 6. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Virginia Thompson & Richard Adloff, *ibid.* Gene Z. Hanrahan, *op. cit.*, p. 91. Harry Miller, *op. cit.* (1), p. 60. Lucian W. Pye, *ibid.* J.H. Brimmell, *op. cit.*, p. 198. Charles B. McLane, *ibid.* Cheah Boon Kheng, *op. cit.* (1), pp. 27, 87, 107 & 155.
- 93 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraphs 63, 64 & 69; and vol. IV, pt. XII, paragraphs 28-31. "Wu-shih-nien". Virginia Thompson & Richard Adloff, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-148. J.H. Brimmell, *op. cit.*, pp. 200 & 202-203. Cheah Boon Kheng, *op. cit.* (1), pp. 57, 60, 63, 65-67, 74-75, 77-78, 81-83, 87, 97, 118 & 136. John Drysdale, *op. cit.*, chapter 3.
- 94 "Basic Paper", vol. I, pt. II, paragraph 58. "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Harry Miller, *op. cit.* (1), p. 61. J.H. Brimmell, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
- 95 "Basic Paper", vol. II, pt. V, charts A(1) - A(4) & B(1) - B(2). Cf. Lucian W. Pye, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78. Richard Clutterbuck, *op. cit.* (2), pp. 58-63.
- 96 "Basic Paper", vol. II, pt. IV, paragraphs 3-19; and pt. V, paragraphs 46-55 and chart C(1). Cf. Harry Miller, *op. cit.* (1), pp. 101-103 and *op. cit.* (2), pp. 51-52. Richard Clutterbuck, *op. cit.* (2), pp. 171 & 195-199.
- 97 "Basic Paper", vol. II, pt. IV, paragraphs 3-19 and appendix "C"; and pt. V, paragraphs 50-61 & 63-64, and chart C(2). Cf. Harry Miller, *op. cit.* (1), p. 103 and *op. cit.* (2), pp. 51-52. Richard Clutterbuck, *op. cit.* (2), pp. 171 & 195-199.
- 98 "Basic Paper", vol. II, pt. IV, paragraphs 3-19 and appendix "C"; and pt. V, paragraphs 62 & 65, and chart C(3). Cf. Richard Clutterbuck, *op. cit.* (2), pp. 66-67.
- 99 "Basic Paper", vol. IV, pt. XI, paragraphs 12 & 30, and charts A(2) - A(4). Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120. Harry Miller, *op. cit.* (1), pp. 103-107 and *op. cit.* (2), pp. 57-58. Richard Clutterbuck, *op. cit.* (2), pp. 199-202. Anthony Short, *op. cit.*, pp. 24, 111-112, 213, 218, 221, 227, 237-238, 285, 302, 333-334, 362, 395, 405, 411, 414, 472 & 474-475.
- 100 "Basic Paper", vol. IV, pt. XI, paragraphs 17-19 & 35-38, and chart A(1). The "Basic Paper" calls the National Liberation Alliance the Races' Liberation Alliance. "National" and "Races" are English translations of the Chinese term "Min-tsu". To the author, "National" in this context reflects more accurately than "Races" what the CPM wished to convey by "Min-tsu". Cf. Richard Clutterbuck, *op. cit.* (2), pp. 59-62, 64-65, 69, 78, 91-93, 97, 99 & 266. Anthony Short, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

- 101 The "Basic Paper" calls the Malayan National Liberation Army, the Malayan Races' Liberation Army. The author prefers the term "National" to the term "Races". See comment in previous note.
- 102 "Basic Paper", vol. II, pt. V, paragraphs 67-157 and charts D(1) - D(2); and vol. IV, pt. XI, paragraphs 11, 13 & 31-34, and chart A(5). "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Gene Z. Hanrahan, *op. cit.*, p. 117. Harry Miller, *op. cit.* (1), pp. 103-113 and *op. cit.* (2), pp. 51-52 & 54-57. Richard Clutterbuck, *op. cit.* (1), pp. 47, 81, 87-88, 91-92, 113, 115, 118, 120, 126, 129, 150, 166 & 185 and *op. cit.* (2), pp. 170-172 & 195-199. Anthony Short, *op. cit.*, pp. 349-352, 366-367, 373-374, 386-387, 472, 480-482, 486-487, 489, 494-495 & 505-506.
- 103 "Basic Paper", vol. II, pt. V, chart C(2); and vol. IV, pt. XI, paragraph 14.
- 104 "Basic Paper", vol. II, pt. V, charts D(1) - D(2); and vol. IV, pt. XI, paragraphs 14, 18, 23-25, 27 & 31, and charts A(1) - A(4). Cf. Harry Miller, *op. cit.* (1), p. 103.
- 105 "CPM, 1960", pp. 8-9. "CPM, 1960-1968", pp. 6 & 8. "TSH(O)", p. 7. Cf. Richard Clutterbuck, *op. cit.* (2), pp. 71 & 75-77.
- 106 "CPM, 1960", pp. 29-50. "CPM, 1960-1968", p. 14. No published secondary source deals with this point.
- 107 "CPM, 1960", pp. 11, 26-49, 79-80 & 117-127. "CPM, 1960-1968", pp. 2, 9, 10-78 & 93-97. No published secondary source deals with this point.
- 108 The statement here was written in 1985. In Aloysius Chin, *op. cit.*, which appeared in early 1995, there is some information about the subject. See his pp. 73, 75, 77, 79, 80, 82, 85 & 86.
- 109 See rest of volume for discussion of these organisations.
- 110 "Wu-shih-nien". Cf. Richard Clutterbuck, *op. cit.* (1), pt. III. Noel Barber, *op. cit.*, pt. III. Harry Miller, *op. cit.* (2), chapters 19-22. Anthony Short, *op. cit.*, chapters 18-19.

The Beginning

The period from February 1954 to April 1955 saw the beginning of the Communist open united front struggle in Singapore. In February, a new constitution, popularly known as the Rendel Constitution, was adopted for the island. The British Government hoped that it could form an alliance with a local political party, the Progressive Party (PP), to operate the constitution against the CPM. Following the introduction of the new constitution and similar developments in Malaya, the CPM took immediate steps to launch its new course of struggle. It carried out various activities and created a number of open mass movements, besides establishing an open united front political party with a group of democratic socialists, which came to be known as the PAP. At the time, there were other contestants in the political arena in Singapore apart from the British Government, the CPM and their respective friends. In April 1955, general elections were held under the new constitution; and a middle force between the two camps, the LF, won the electoral contest.

The Rendel Constitution

The recommendations for a new constitution for Singapore were made by a commission called the Rendel Commission, which produced a report.¹ There were two sets of important recommendations, besides others.² The first concerned the problem of securing maximum participation of the electorate in voting in the elections. The second pertained to the question of how much power was still to be retained by the British authorities and how much was to be transferred to local hands. These two points had to do with the legitimacy as well as the safety of the constitutional experiment.

In previous elections in 1948 and 1951, a great number of voters took no interest in going to the polls. In 1948, the estimated total number of eligible voters was 100,000, of whom only 22,395 registered themselves for voting. In 1951, the total number was 250,000 but only 48,155 put their names on the electoral register. The recommendation of the commission was that all eligible voters should in the future be automatically registered for voting, a recommendation subsequently implemented.³

The Rendel Report recommended¹⁰ that the former Executive Council now be replaced by a Council of Ministers. This council should be made up of nine persons, six of whom should come from the political party, or a coalition of parties, which had secured the greatest number of seats in the Legislative Assembly. One of these six could also come from among the nominated unofficial members of the assembly, if necessary. The three others should be the ex-officio members of the assembly.

The portfolios of the six local Ministers were to be as follows:

1. Commerce, Industry, Shipping, Agriculture and Fishery;
2. Labour, Immigration and Social Welfare;
3. Education;
4. Housing and Administration of the Adjacent Islands, Town and Country Planning and Local Government;
5. Civil Aviation, Communications and Public Works;
6. Health.

As for the functions of the three ex-officio Ministers, those of the Attorney-General and Financial Secretary were apparent from their titles. The areas of responsibility of the Chief Secretary, however, were defined to be:

- a) External Affairs;
- b) Internal Security, including Police and Prisons;
- c) Defence;
- d) Public Relations, Broadcasting and the Civil Service.

Reforms in the executive branch of government were also an improvement on what was obtained in 1948 and in 1951. In 1948, in the Executive Council there were four unofficial members, who were nominated by the British Governor, and six official members. In 1951, the number of unofficial nominated members was increased to six. The two new men came from among the elected unofficial members in the Legislative Council.¹¹

There was a third area of the administration which concerned the reserved powers of the Governor. In this, the Rendel Report conceded to the Governor the following:

1. He could declare any bill or motion effective even though such had failed to be passed by the Legislative Assembly;
2. He could prorogue or dissolve the Legislative Assembly at his wish;
3. He could appoint or dismiss any Minister at his own discretion;
4. He could summon the Council of Ministers on his own initiative.

The Rendel Report recommended, however, that with regard to the first point, before the Governor exercise such powers, he should consult the Council of Ministers, and with regard to the other three points, he should first consult the Leader of the House, who was the leader of the majority political party in the Legislative Assembly.¹² The Governor had enjoyed all these reserved powers since 1948.

It has been said that the constitutional changes which were introduced in 1955 were partly for the purpose of forging a partnership between the British authorities and friendly local political forces against the Communists. The purpose of this new direction in Singapore politics could clearly be seen in some of the observations made by the Rendel Report. One observation read,

A few of the memorialists who have made representations to us have pressed for almost complete independence for Singapore forthwith. We do not accept that view. Others have urged that a closer association of Singapore with the Federation of Malaya is essential before full independence within the British Commonwealth can be achieved. The majority of us share that view. Moreover, apart from major difficulties arising out of the present disturbed and dangerous world situation, we consider that the prospects of stable administration would be prejudiced if complete self-government were to be granted before the necessary political experience had been acquired. We believe that apart from these considerations, too hurried an emancipation would merely offer an opportunity to Communist and other disruptive elements to infiltrate into the government and the administration, and to attempt to bring about a state of disorder and insecurity aimed at bringing Singapore eventually under Communist dictatorship.

We therefore consider that there should be a transition period during which autonomous institutions and political experience can be developed ...¹³

In view of the fact that the new constitution was for the purpose of combating the CPM, it is not surprising that the latter reacted sharply to it. At the time, the Communist organisation in Singapore published a newspaper called the *Tzū-yu Pao* (*TyP*) or, in English, *Freedom News*. In December 1954, this newspaper produced a special article, entitled "The Ugly Face of the British Imperialists' 'Constitution' and 'General Elections'", to condemn the new constitution and the general elections which were to be held under it.¹⁴

In one place, the *TyP* commented upon the provision regarding automatic registration of eligible voters. The paper stated that the Rendel Constitution recommended this because voters had not participated enthusiastically in elections in the past. The innovation was actually cosmetic to make the coming elections more attractive.

There was also a complaint made that the projected elections would be held under the Emergency Regulations. This meant that members of the CPM would not be able to participate in them. The other political parties which could take part in the contest were puppets of the British.

Then, the article commented on the recommended increase in the number of elected unofficial members in the legislature. It stated that since all those who could participate in the elections would only be the henchmen of the British, whether they were a greater or a smaller number was a matter of no consequence.

The article also criticised the position of the six elected members in the Council of Ministers. These six were greater in number than the three ex-officio Ministers; however, being the majority was meaningless for three reasons. Firstly, they would be puppets. Secondly, they would be in charge of areas of government which were less important than those which came under the control of the ex-officio Ministers. And thirdly, the Rendel Constitution had made provision for each of the elected ministers to be assisted by a Permanent Secretary, a person there to control and give directions to his Minister.

Finally, the *TyP* did not like the reserved powers of the Governor. The paper made no mention of the recommendation of the Rendel Report that the Governor should exercise such powers only in consultation with the Council of Ministers or the Leader of the House. It was interested only in the fact that the Governor had such powers.

The Progressive Party

The British Government had in mind that the Rendel Constitution should be implemented by an actual coalition between itself and the PP. The two should form a united front or alliance against the CPM.¹⁵ There were good reasons why, of all the local political parties, the PP was preferred: this group had the least differences with the British.

The PP was founded only in 1947. However, some of its leaders had already formed a relationship with the British long before this. Friendship first began in the days before the Second World War. Between 1936 and 1941, two of the future leaders of the PP were commissioners in a municipal authority which administered the downtown area of Singapore island.¹⁶ After the war, between late 1945 and early 1946, the whole of Singapore was governed by a Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer under a British Military Administration. The officer had an Advisory Council to assist him. One of the later leaders of the PP had a seat on this council.¹⁷ In early 1946, the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer gave way to a

Governor when the British Ministry Administration came to a close and civilian rule was restored. The Governor retained the Advisory Council and the number of future leaders of the PP in this organ of government was increased from one to four.¹⁸

In 1948, popular elections were introduced in Singapore for the first time. The Advisory Council was reconstituted a Legislative Council, membership of which was to comprise 22 persons, six of whom were to be elected. When this constitutional change was made, political groups in Singapore debated whether or not to give it recognition and take part in the election of the six members. The PP, for one, accepted the change and participated in the elections. The PP was formed, in fact, just a year earlier so that it could play a role in the new order. In the elections, the PP won three of the six contested seats, with the rest going to independents.¹⁹

In 1951 there was further constitutional advance. This was brought about by the war situation with the Communists, as mentioned in Chapter I, and pressure from the PP. A year earlier, the PP had made known to the British that it was interested in shouldering a greater burden in the government of Singapore.²⁰ The development was the enlargement of the Legislative Council by another three elective seats. This was followed by elections, the result of which was that the PP won six of the total nine elective seats. Of the remaining seats, two went to another political party, the Singapore Labour Party (SLP), and one to an independent. Parallel with this reform, two of the elected members of the Legislative Council were nominated by the Governor to become also members of the Executive Council in the administration. The two persons eventually chosen were PP members.²¹

The Rendel Constitution was another step in the political progress of Singapore. This constitution had been a product of the war as well as of the PP's request for concessions. It was, in fact, drawn up together by the British and the PP. The Rendel Commission was composed of nine persons, including the Chairman. Of the nine, the Chairman and three others were British, three were members of the PP, one person was a labour representative and the last was an UMNO man.²² Another fact which gave some indication of the special position of the PP was that the PP, on its own, had already released a blueprint of proposals for the political future of Singapore, which were similar to the recommendations in the report of the commission which came out later in February 1954.²³

The PP were close to the British because the party followed a political philosophy which could be said to be diametrically opposed to that of the CPM. In 1954 too, the PP held its Seventh Annual General Meeting. The speech given by its leader on this occasion contained the following sample of the ideology of this party:

The Progressive Party is just as eager as anyone for the achievement of independence in this country, but as long as we have any say in the matter, we shall see that any step nearer independence is accompanied by the necessary preparations to ensure that what we achieve will be a democratic form of government under which the rule of law will prevail and there will be no opportunity for thuggery and the other violent practices of either fascism or communism.²⁴

Both the CPM and the PP desired independence. Whereas, however, the CPM had sought to make the British leave Malaya by violent rebellion, the PP would seek to do so only through "necessary preparations". Moreover, after the British were gone, the Communists would establish an order which would be very different from the former system, but the PP would only opt for the "democratic form of government". The CPM and the PP could not have been further apart.

As an expression of its basic political beliefs, during the elections held under the new constitution, the PP championed a platform which could be considered "conservative" in nature. Two aspects of this programme may be briefly mentioned.

In economic matters, the PP advocated the line that the present kind of economy in the island should not only be preserved but, in fact, should be strengthened. Firstly, its greatest earning asset, trade, must be maintained and this should be done through the free status of its port being guaranteed. Next there were then few secondary industries in the island. These should be encouraged, and both local and foreign investment attracted through various incentives, for instance, light income tax.²⁵

Another important issue in the politics in Singapore at the time concerned the subject of language, education and culture. There was a clamour by the CPM and some other political groups besides, as will be seen more fully later, that the English language and English-medium schools should not monopolise the stage, and that the vernacular languages and vernacular schools should be accorded equal treatment. On this matter, the PP quite frankly stated that what it believed in was that only English should be the official language in Singapore and only English schools should be given priority consideration.²⁶

The ideology and policies of the PP were probably linked with its class and linguistic-ethnic characteristics. According to one study, the leadership of this party between 1945 and 1955 consisted of 20 persons. Of these, 11 were professionals, seven were in business and two were office workers. According to yet another study, 25 per cent of its rank and file came from the higher-salaried professions, 55 per cent from the clerical categories and 22 per cent from the labouring groups.²⁷ The PP was also largely English-speaking rather than vernacular-speaking. Of its 20

leaders, 18 could speak only English, and the remaining two were bilingual. The group consisted of nine Chinese, five Indians, one Malay and the rest were other races. Among the overall membership of the organisation, 43 per cent were Chinese, 25 per cent Indians, 28 per cent Malays and 4 per cent were from other communities.²⁸ The most important person in the PP was Tan Chye Ching, more popularly known as C.C. Tan, who was an English-educated lawyer.²⁹

Because the PP was a friend of the British and an enemy of the CPM, the latter sometimes had harsh words to say about it. For instance, issue no. 48 of the *TyP*, published 15 April 1954, carried articles which contained references to the PP and C.C. Tan. When these were mentioned, the PP was referred to as a "running dog" political party, and C.C. Tan was called a "running dog", a "slave" or a "puppet".³⁰

Genesis of the Mass Movements

During the fourteen months between February 1954 and April 1955, the CPM was able to make a start in establishing open mass organisations in the student, labour and peasant fields.

It was with the students that the Communists first started the mass movement. There were special circumstances which led to this. At the time, of all the different sections of the CPM set-up in Singapore, only the one in charge of propaganda and students remained intact. The others had all more or less been destroyed by enemy action.³¹ The propaganda sector consisted of only a few people, but the student sector had many members. Thus, it was the student sector which had the manpower to launch the open united front struggle when the time came. After the student unit had begun activities in its own area, it also sent personnel into the labour and peasant fields to establish the necessary organisations.

The objective of having an open and legal student movement in Singapore was to get all students in the Chinese middle schools assembled into an overall umbrella organisation.³² This required two steps. The first was to seize upon an issue which would arouse and mobilise the students; the second was to get the student organisation, once it was formed, recognised by the Government. The person who was in charge of activities on the spot in the island at this time was Ng Meng Chiang. He was the head of the student unit. On the issue of starting the open and legal student movement, one of Ng's subordinates had the following to say:

In the student field, Ah Kong [Ng Meng Chiang] ... said an organisation should be formed so that it was able to concentrate the strength of all Chinese

schools to direct and launch an open student movement for the whole of Singapore ...³³

On the same point, another of his subordinates said:

Our main aim was to struggle for the setting up of a legal open organisation to represent all Chinese middle-school students.³⁴

The issue which Ng Meng Chiang capitalised upon as a means to mobilise the students was National Service. On 16 March 1954, the Officer Administering the Government, William A.C. Goode, announced in the Legislative Council that young persons, born in Singapore or Malaya, who were between the ages of 18 and 20, would be drafted into National Service. He explained that this was a duty to the country which must accompany the privileges to come with the Rendel Constitution.³⁵

National Service was unpopular among the Chinese. If agitation could be mounted against it, there was a distinct chance that the students could be mobilised. In fact, even the parents of the students would be aroused to take a stand against the Government. Ng Meng Chiang had also spoken to one of his subordinates on the usefulness of the National Service issue. The following is of relevance:

Ng Meng Chiang ... told me that the agitation against the National Service Ordinance was very appropriate in our struggle. This was because we had the sympathy of the general public against National Service, based on the old Chinese concept that 'A Good Son Never Joins The Army'...³⁶

Ng Meng Chiang reacted very quickly to Goode's announcement. On 30 March, he issued a directive to all party members that an all-out effort should be mounted to foster agitation against the legislation and specially selected personnel should carry out this task in schools as well as in factories among those who were eligible for the call-up.³⁷

Affected persons were to register for the call-up from 8 April to 12 May 1954.³⁸ When the protest campaign first started, students from the Chinese schools refused to turn up for registration.³⁹ In view of this, the Government sent visiting teams to the schools to enrol the students on the spot. This exercise, however, was also a failure. The students simply shunned the registration teams.⁴⁰

In face of the strong resistance from the students, on the last day of registration the British Government made the announcement that certain categories of students would be granted postponement of service. These categories were undergraduates of the University of Malaya, pupils who were studying in the eighth and ninth standards in English schools, and in Senior Middle 2 and 3 in Chinese schools. The others, however, would

have to register and the closing date of registration for them would be extended for ten days.⁴¹

In Singapore island as a whole, 24,425 youths of call-up age had already registered by 12 May. This was 98 per cent of all those who were eligible for National Service. The students of the Chinese schools were among the 2 per cent minority who refused to co-operate.⁴²

Meanwhile, after they had successfully evaded the registration teams and before the British Government had announced its concession on 12 May, the Chinese school students took their agitation against the call-up one step further:⁴³ They sent petitions to the Officer Administering the Government, requesting total exemption for themselves from National Service.

In reply to the students, the British Government declared that exemption could not be considered. However, the students, if they so wished, could apply individually for postponement of service and their applications would be considered. The students were also told that Goode would meet a delegation from them in the afternoon of 13 May for a conversation on the matter.

On 13 May, therefore, representatives from the affected students made preparations to meet Goode in Government House.⁴⁴ In order to strengthen their hand in the negotiations, they mobilised as many as possible of their schoolmates to turn up and assemble in the vicinity of Government House to give them support in the form of a demonstration. The crowd which eventually turned up numbered about 1,000.

The British responded by using police to disperse the crowd, since the gathering was in violation of the Emergency Regulations which the British Government had passed since the Communist uprising in mid-1948. Fighting broke out. The Communists claimed that 50 to 60 students were injured and 48 were arrested. The Communists did not plan on the students becoming violent in the demonstration. However, they were ready in case the police resorted to violence. Non-violence on the part of the students and violence on the part of the police would win the sympathy of the public for the students.⁴⁵

On the night after the clash, more than 1,000 students congregated in the Chung Cheng High School, one of the two main schools which led the agitation against National Service. The assembly broke up only in the afternoon of the next day, after leaders of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce (CCC) had visited the students and promised to intercede on their behalf with the Government. The CCC was traditionally the leader of the Chinese community. By then all the students who were arrested had been released on bail.⁴⁶

On 18 May, a delegation of students met leaders of the CCC and asked them to present several demands on their behalf to the Government.⁴⁷ These demands were a total exemption from National Service for all Chinese school students, an enquiry into police action on 13 May, compensation for injured students and unconditional release of all students arrested on that day.

At the same time the CCC also came under pressure from the Government. It was advised by the latter to close down all the disobedient schools indefinitely. At this juncture, school holidays were just about to start. The CCC announced that the holidays would be advanced by two weeks, with effect from 22 May. This decision allowed them to steer a middle course between the students and the Government.

The announcement of the CCC caught the students by surprise. On the day when the advanced school holidays were supposed to begin, they again congregated in Chung Cheng High School as a means of protest. This time, the crowd numbered 3,000. However, the gathering broke up the next day because the police prevented food supplies from going into the school and parents arrived to take their wards away.

The students returned to school ten days later and organised another assembly to press their demands.⁴⁸ This time the camp-in lasted for a very long time, from 2-24 June. The police observed that this gathering was much better organised than the previous ones. This time the students assembled at the Chinese High School, another leading school in the agitation. During this camp-in, the students at first still held on to their original demand for exemption from National Service. Later on, however, they revised their request to one of postponement of call-up for all students of the right age group from all standards in school and not only for those whom the Government on 12 May had announced would be granted such a privilege. The Government, however, refused to listen to their new plea.

On 15 June, the students went on a hunger strike to exert pressure on the Government. They terminated it only after leaders from the CCC had visited them and promised to speak on their behalf to Government. A few days later, the Chairman of the Management Committee of Chung Cheng High School visited the protestors and told them that the Government had now acceded to their request for postponement of National Service for all affected students. They could, therefore, now disperse. However, this was in fact not the expressed policy of the Government; the Chairman only took it upon himself to give the assurance to the students. Thinking that they had obtained satisfaction for their demand, the students broke camp and went home.

It was reported that, in September, at a meeting between student representatives and leaders of the CCC, the students complained that the promise given to them that students of all categories would be granted postponement of National Service was not carried out. The Government also refused to make concessions to the students in any other way.⁴⁹ In July, seven of the students who were arrested on 13 May, were sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment for obstructing the police. In October, the seven students filed an appeal in the High Court against the sentence, but their appeal was rejected.

The agitation against National Service was only part of the effort to launch an open and legal student movement. The other part was to have the students who were already mobilised over the issue put into an organisation which would be given recognition by the Government. While the agitation was in progress, the second plan of action was also initiated.⁵⁰

On 18 May, between the first and the second camp-ins, the students established an "All-Singapore Middle-School Students Appeal for National Service Exemption Delegation", which was made up of 55 members. The function of this body was to manage the ongoing agitation. During the second gathering, after the students had changed their demand from total exemption from National Service to postponement for all students, the name of the delegation was changed to "All-Singapore Middle-School Students Appealing for Deferment of National Service Delegation".⁵¹

As mentioned above, in October, the appeal of the seven students against the sentence of three months' rigorous imprisonment was rejected. After this, the appeal delegation was dissolved. In its place, a Preparatory Committee for the purpose of organising a Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union (SCMSSU) was created. The appeal delegation was a temporary body, but the SCMSSU was to be a permanent society.⁵² The Preparatory Committee of the SCMSSU then applied to the Government for registration of the projected union on 14 January 1955. The application was rejected. Subsequently, the Preparatory Committee requested a reconsideration, but this request was also turned down.⁵³

Then came the General Elections, which were held under the Rendel Constitution. On 30 March, four days before polling day, the students staged a one-day boycott of classes to protest against their failure to obtain registration for the SCMSSU and on 2 April, polling day, they sent representations to the Governor on the issue. The strike and the petition to the Governor were timed to impress the students' plight both upon candidates in the elections and upon voters.⁵⁴

The students were basically supporters of the PAP because this party was a united front organ of the CPM. During the general elections,

however, they entered into an agreement with the LF that they would give assistance to the latter in the elections if the LF would register the SCMSSU, should it win the elections and come to power.⁵⁵ As will be seen in the next chapter, registration was successfully achieved after the elections. The SCMSSU was created with the purpose of getting all Chinese secondary school students in Singapore organised. According to police estimates, the membership of this society, after it was registered, numbered 10,000.⁵⁶

In the eyes of the Communists themselves, the agitation over National Service was a great success. Ng Meng Chiang made the following comment to one of his subordinates:

Ah Kong ... said that the tremendous success of the May 13 Incident was beyond expectation ... this was the most successful student struggle ever since the Emergency Regulations ... Ah Kong ... concluded by saying that by the very incident on May 13th, many student leaders had been created. We should give every possible help to these student leaders so that they could in future become the "pillars" of the Student Movement ...⁵⁷

The CPM was looking for manpower and the result of the 13 May incident was a fulfillment of this aspiration.

Workers were the next sector of the population to be mobilised after students. As in the case of the students, the way to get the workers on the move was to agitate them to fight over issues which affected their interests. Such were mainly the demand for better wages and conditions of service, or related problems. Between February 1954 and April 1955, the CPM gave first priority to the student movement. There was also agitation in the workers' field, but the disturbances were in no way comparable to what happened in the anti-National Service campaign of the students.

In July 1954, there was a big strike in the City Council involving 9,000 workers. From September to November in the same year, there was also a strike in a factory called the Malayan Textile Mills involving 400 workers. In February 1955, there was yet another strike in the Paya Lebar Bus Company. The disputes in the first and third cases were over terms of service of the workers, and in the second over dismissal of staff.⁵⁸

The *TyP* reported and commented upon these incidents, indicating CPM interest in them. Members of this party however, did not have a hand in the first strike. Only some students turned up to give support to the workers. In the second and the third strikes, however, the Communists were directly involved.⁵⁹

Some open and legal trade unions at this time were also showing indications that they were coming under the influence of the Communists. In August 1954, three such unions were noted. By April the next

year, the number had increased to 14. Two of these were later to give the Government a great deal of trouble. They were the Singapore Factory and Shop Workers' Union (SFSWU) and the Singapore Bus Workers' Union (SBWU).⁶⁰

Two members of the CPM played leading roles in the strikes of the Malayan Textile Mills and the Paya Lebar Bus Company. One was Lim Chin Siong and the other was Fong Swee Suan. In March 1955, Lim became the Secretary of the SFSWU, and in May 1954, Fong became Secretary of the SBWU.⁶¹ Lim was at the same time the secretary of two other unions and Fong a leading light in five others.⁶²

In December 1954, an opportunity befell the CPM to begin a peasant movement. During that month, heavy rain fell in Singapore and a number of rural areas were flooded. These areas were Changi, Bedok, Geylang Serai, Lorong Tai Seng, Bartley Road, Potong Pasir and Delta. A great number of the inhabitants of these areas were vegetable and poultry farmers. The waters caused extensive destruction and damage to farm produce and properties, and five persons were drowned.⁶³

Chinese school students, led by the "All-Singapore Chinese Middle School Students Appealing for National Service Exemption Delegation", immediately came to the rescue of the flood victims. They raised a great amount of money and collected a large quantity of foodstuff, clothing and blankets, and distributed these to the affected areas. Two clinics were also engaged to treat the injured and the sick.⁶⁴

While on the one hand, the students took practical steps to bring assistance to the farmers, on the other, they carried out a propaganda campaign against the Government, blaming it for the disaster. The Government was accused of not having taken preventive measures against the floods, for refusing to compensate the peasants for their losses, for not putting real effort into relief work and for not giving real co-operation to others who were really helping the farmers. The students also planned to have a flag-day and to stage a series of concerts to raise funds for the victims, but they were refused the necessary permits to do so by the Government, for which it was also attacked.⁶⁵

At this time, the CPM, through the agency of the student and labour movements, had already helped bring into existence the PAP with a group of non-Communist intellectuals. The PAP, together with a student organisation in the University of Malaya called the Socialist Club, considered to be a basic support of the non-Communist intellectuals, also joined the Chinese school students in helping the flood victims.⁶⁶

The campaign to rescue the farmers was concluded in January 1955. In the same month, a farmers' organisation was created and registered with the Government. This was the Singapore Wooden House Dwellers'

Association (SWHDA). It was led by a Communist, who was also the President of the SFSWU.⁶⁷

The United Front – The PAP

The British Government looked to establishing a partnership with the PP to operate the Rendel Constitution against the CPM. Similarly, the CPM sought the co-operation of another middle political group to help it to exploit the Rendel Constitution against the British. This group was led by Lee Kuan Yew. The CPM, through its open front cadres, together with Lee Kuan Yew founded a new political party which was called the PAP.

There were then two factions in the PAP; the CPM faction and the Lee Kuan Yew faction. The former will hereafter be referred to as the Communists and the latter the non-Communists. Certain people, who were not members of the CPM, were attracted to the Communists and came to be referred to as pro-Communists. In the Communist faction, only the members of the CPM exercised leadership.

There were similarities and differences in political philosophy between the Communists and the non-Communists in the PAP. The CPM laid stress on the similarities and played down the differences. On one occasion, Ng Meng Chiang talked to one of his subordinates about co-operation with the non-Communists in the PAP:

Ah Kong ... said that the present open activities had been begun and that we should utilise a legal political party to form a United Front and launch an Anti-Colonialism Campaign. Ah Kong ... added that in Singapore history, there had never been a true left-wing political party. The present PAP could represent Singapore's "Anti-Colonialism" political party and although the characteristics of the leaders of the PAP [that was the non-Communists] were of the petty bourgeoisie type, we should still help them to function in order that our Party could realise our objective.⁶⁸

This was the basis of co-operation between the two wings in the PAP.

Coincidences and divergences in ideology between the two factions pertained in one area to such problems as what should be the ideal society created for the country and what methods should be used to realise this aim. In another area, they concerned attitudes which should be adopted towards the Rendel Constitution, which was found wanting in the light of conceptions of the future ideal society, as well as what social programme should be advocated during the tenure of the Rendel Constitution.

Basically, as seen, the CPM believed in a doctrine which sought to create a society made up of only the working class, or in other words, classless, because in relation to the working class there would be no other

classes. Between the earliest days and 1940, as an interim measure, it was interested in creating a society in which there would be only two classes, namely the workers and the peasants. This was to be a socialist society. After 1940 it advocated new democracy. In a new democratic society, there would not only be workers and peasants but also the middle classes and the national capitalists. In 1954, when the open united front struggle began, the CPM stretched the application of the principle of a new democratic revolution to tolerate even the continued existence of the compradores and the aristocrats. After 1954, the CPM sought to fight only one enemy, the monopolists or, in a word, the British.⁶⁹

The non-Communists in the PAP followed the philosophy of democratic socialism. The question of how to dispose of the various social classes, except for the British, was not tackled. As for the British, the non-Communists wanted to take away their power from them.⁷⁰ On the basis of their mutual animosity towards the British, therefore, the two wings of the PAP came together. Problems which did not require immediate solutions were pushed into the background.

On this question of attitudes towards the different social classes, the non-Communists later were to record,

The drawing up of the manifesto for the new party was by no means a smooth affair. The manifesto has of necessity to view the aims of the party in somewhat broad terms. But it became clear in the course of the discussions that individuals in the group had different views when it came to a detailed interpretation of these generalities. What did each of us mean by democracy? by socialism?...

At that time the group did not go too deeply into a detailed interpretation of these generalities. Each member assumed that there was complete identity in this respect though, as subsequent events were to show, this was not the case as regards some individuals in the group.

In 1954, the main preoccupation of the group was the need to end colonialism. The dominant and recurring theme in the manifesto written six years ago is anti-colonialism. Everything else is over-shadowed by it. In this it did no more than reflect the popular mood and trends of the time. It was this willing subordination of all other problems to the immediate task of combating colonialism which helped to conceal the reservation that some individuals had about the ultimate aims and objectives of the party.⁷¹

This was one feature of the united front.

The CPM held the belief that it could achieve its goal only through violence. The violence could take the form of an urban insurrection or an uprising in the countryside. However, between 1954 and 1961, it was prepared to follow the path of peaceful or constitutional struggle. This was, of course, for the sake of accumulating strength so that violence

could be resorted to again sometime in the future.⁷² The non-Communists in the PAP, however, eschewed violence in principle as a method of struggle. They believed that only the constitutional method should be used to pursue any political objective.

An agreement was reached between the CPM and the PAP in 1954 on the question of which method should be used to fight the British. This was the second point which linked the two groups in the PAP. In the words of the non-Communists:

... the members of the group were not all of one mind ... For example, the majority of the group felt that the new party should adhere strictly to constitutional tactics and that if it wanted to conspire against colonialism, such a conspiracy must be legal and open. A party which deviated from this, the group felt, would lay itself open to immediate suppression and elimination by a well-armed colonial authority.

The manifesto of the party therefore endorsed the use of constitutional means for achieving its ends. There were some who were skeptical of the effectiveness of constitutional methods and weapons in weakening the hold of colonialism ...⁷³

Though disagreeing that only constitutional methods should be used under any circumstances, the Communists kept their belief to themselves for the time being.

The CPM criticised the Rendel Constitution for returning only limited powers to local hands and the PAP also expressed their dissatisfaction.⁷⁴ Despite the CPM's bad opinion of the Rendel Constitution, it did not make the PAP abstain from taking part in the general elections which were held under it. The PAP fielded four candidates, two from each faction. Lim Chin Siong, from the extremist faction, won in his ward and became a member of the Legislative Assembly.⁷⁵ For the Communists, this place in the Legislative Assembly was to be used as a propaganda platform, firstly, to attack the British and, secondly, to disseminate their own advocacies and views. Through this, they hoped to be able to agitate and mobilise the masses.

With regard to taking advantage of the legislature and making use of it for one's own purposes, Lim Chin Siong, in a statement to the public at the time of electioneering in April 1955, quite frankly said:

Since the new Legislative Assembly is a false democracy and cannot bring about the independence of Malaya, then why should the PAP take part in the elections? Is it not self-contradictory? Our leader and members unanimously believe that the PAP should send their representatives to the Legislative Assembly to expose its false democracy, to refute the various unreasonable policies of the colonial government, thereby venting the feelings of the people and fighting within a practical limit for the well-being of the people. We dare

not absolutely entertain any illusion of working in the Legislative Assembly to achieve the independence of Malaya, the prosperity of Singapore and the elimination of the system of exploitation. We will certainly keep our promise to fight resolutely for the rights of the people.⁷⁶

The objective of the CPM in working the Rendel Constitution was, therefore, clear.

The non-Communists in the PAP toyed at first with the idea of boycotting the elections. However, in the end they decided to participate. They also fielded two candidates, one of whom was Lee Kuan Yew. Both non-Communist candidates were returned in the contest.⁷⁷ What motivated the non-Communists to participate can be summed up in their own words:

It was agreed that the party should constitute an opposition force in the Assembly with a view to exposing the shortcomings of the pro-colonial Rendel Constitution.⁷⁸

Also:

... the majority felt that the constitutional machinery could be skilfully used to wither down the power of colonialism by the process of mobilising mass opinion and fervour around the PAP.⁷⁹

Thus, the non-Communists in the PAP had the same views as the Communists about participation in the elections.

During electioneering, like other political parties, the PAP made a number of promises to the electorate on its election platform. These included most importantly the promises to fight for the abrogation of the Emergency Regulations, a fully-elected legislature, the abolition of the Governor's reserved powers and the improvement of livelihood for industrial workers, farmers and others. The Party would also struggle for eventual independence for Singapore through merger with Malaya.⁸⁰

These goals, if achieved, would give members of the CPM a great deal of freedom to carry out activities, and would also draw the masses into the fold of their movement. The goals were in tune with the spirit of the CPM's social programme enunciated in 1955 to launch the open united front struggle, which was why the Communist faction in the PAP agreed to them.⁸¹ The non-Communist wing was interested in gaining the support of the CPM as well as of the electorate.

As far as ideology was concerned, common ground was the factor which made an alliance between the two sides possible. However, differences in their mass bases made the two parties need the support of each other. The supporters of the Communists were found in the Chinese middle schools, in certain trade unions and among the rural people.

Those of the non-Communists, on the other hand, were found amongst certain students in the University of Malaya and other trade unions. The left-wing students in the university had an organisation called the Socialist Club. At the time of the elections in 1955, there were 11 unions which were open to the influence of the non-Communists in the PAP.⁸²

The one significant difference between the mass bases of the Communists and the non-Communists was that the former was largely Chinese-speaking and the latter mainly English-speaking. The Communists were interested in spreading their influence among the English-speaking students and workers. The non-Communists, on their part, wanted the Chinese-speaking students, workers and country people to come under their wing.⁸³ So the Communists and the non-Communists came together to form the PAP.

The two wings in the PAP did not have the same social origins. The first divergence was in professional status. Among the Communists, people like Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan, for example, worked in lowly-paid jobs. Just before the Rendel Constitution took effect, Lim was a clerk in the Changi Bus Company and Fong was a conductor in the Green Bus Company. On the other hand, most of the non-Communists had prestigious occupations. Lee Kuan Yew, for instance, was a lawyer.⁸⁴ The Communists and the non-Communists also had different educations. Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan were originally students of the Chinese-medium Chinese High School. Lee Kuan Yew, on the contrary, first went to the English-medium Raffles Institution, then to Raffles College and finally to Cambridge University.⁸⁵

The first contact made between the two sides to establish a united front was in the aftermath of the agitation by Chinese school students over National Service. In July 1954, as related, seven students were sentenced by the court to three months' rigorous imprisonment for obstructing the police in the 13th May disturbance. In August, the students engaged D.N. Pritt, a Queen's Counsel, to defend them in their projected appeal against the sentence. Lee Kuan Yew was engaged as one of the assistants to Pritt.⁸⁶

The Socialist Club produced a magazine called *Fajar*. In May, a provocative issue of this magazine was released and the leaders of the club were arrested by the police. In August, they were charged in court for sedition. However, they won the case and were acquitted by the Judge. Pritt argued for their defence, assisted by Lee Kuan Yew.⁸⁷

In October, the appeal of the seven Chinese school students was heard. However, the appeal was rejected.⁸⁸ After the appeal had failed, the All-Singapore Middle-School Students Appealing for Deferment of National Service Delegation was dissolved. In its place, a Preparatory

Committee to establish the SCMSSU was formed. Lee Kuan Yew was appointed one of the Legal Advisers of the Preparatory Committee.⁸⁹ Following in the wake of the students, Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan made acquaintance with Lee Kuan Yew and the other leaders among the non-Communists.⁹⁰

On 21 November 1954, the PAP was inaugurated. Among the convenors there were both Communists and non-Communists. A *pro tempore* Central Executive Committee for the Party was elected. This was made up of 12 persons, three of whom were from the Communist group. It was understood between the two factions at the time that there should not be more than three or four left-wingers in this organ and they should also not hold any office.⁹¹

The Middle Ground – Other Political Groups

The PP, led by C.C. Tan, and the non-Communists in the PAP were the extreme ends of the middle group between the British on the one hand and the CPM on the other. The other political groups in-between were the Democratic Party (DP), the Singapore Alliance (SA), the LF and the SLP. The SA was made up of three components, the UMNO, the MCA and the Singapore Malay Union (SMU).

The Democratic Party

The DP was founded by a group led by Tan Lark Sye in February 1955.⁹² Before this party was formed, the group acted through the CCC. The DP, like the PP, was pro-status quo. It did not seek a change in the pattern of society or, if it did, it did not believe in doing so through violent means.⁹³

The DP was also ready to operate the Rendel Constitution. The CCC had made representations to the Rendel Commission that the Chinese-speaking Chinese should be given a greater say in things in Singapore. These were rejected. Once the Rendel Commission had decided on what the new system of government for Singapore should be, Tan Lark Sye and his group accepted the inevitable. The DP put in a great deal of effort to interest the electorate in going to the polls.⁹⁴

The election platform of the DP closely resembled that of the PP in economic matters. However, it was diametrically opposed to the PP in its advocacy that not only English but also other languages should be allowed to be used in the legislature, that Singapore citizenship should be given to those who did not yet have political rights in the island, and that equal treatment should be given to Chinese language, education and culture.⁹⁵

Traditionally, the CCC was the spokesman of the Chinese-speaking Chinese in Singapore. Because of this, the DP regarded itself as enjoying the support of this community. However, as the general elections were later to prove, this community switched its interest over to the PAP once that party had appeared on the scene.⁹⁶

As in the case of the PAP and the PP, the DP's political philosophy and the immediate expressions of it were a consequence of the social background of its members. The DP, unlike the PAP, was made up of businessmen, some of whom were extremely wealthy. Another aspect of the DP was that most of its members were Chinese-educated and Chinese-speaking.⁹⁷

Neither the British nor the CPM chose the DP to be their partner in their struggle against each other. The one thing which the British disliked about the DP was its Chineseness. The DP, like the PP, was an upper class organisation, but, unlike the PP, was not English-speaking. On grounds of economic status, the British found the DP complementary. However, on grounds of language and culture, they saw no affinity with it. Rejection by the Rendel Commission of the CCC representations was an expression of British feeling.

The CPM, of course, found the class character of the DP objectionable. However, in 1954-1955, what the CPM was most concerned about *vis-à-vis* this party was not that it was a rich men's organisation but rather it was a Chinese-speaking one. The Chineseness of the DP was a threat to the CPM's influence over the Chinese-speaking masses. Moreover, the DP was now championing issues such as multi-lingualism in the legislature which promoted the interests of this community. For the CPM, the whole point of having the open united front struggle was to harness the support of the Chinese-speaking masses. If the DP won the coming general elections, its threat to the CPM would become even greater. Should the DP form the government, it would prioritise the welfare of the Chinese-speaking community and this community could thus be irretrievably lost to the CPM. The *TyP* was, at this time, in the habit of saying bad things about the PP. However, it attacked the DP even more extensively and intensively.⁹⁸

The Singapore Alliance

The SA⁹⁹ was made up of three individual political parties, the UMNO, the MCA and the SMU. The headquarters of the UMNO and the MCA were in Malaya, the organisations in Singapore being only branches. The SMU however, was only a Singapore party.¹⁰⁰ The UMNO and the MCA were originally already united front partners, the SMU being brought into the fold only later on. The UMNO and the MCA were interested in getting the British to relinquish power in Malaya and Singapore.

Originally, the SMU was not anti-colonial, but later on seemed to have gone along with the trends of the time. All the three parties had a belief in the constitutional method of achieving their aims.

While ready to take part in the elections as recommended by the Rendel Constitution and thereafter to operate this constitution, the SA looked forward to a future when there would be self-government in the island and ultimately even independence through merger with Malaya. In fact, during the elections this organisation campaigned mainly on the slogan of independence. The SA also advocated that the Emergency Regulations should be amended, the vernacular languages be accorded official status in the legislature and vernacular education be given equal treatment.¹⁰¹

The UMNO and the SMU enjoyed the majority support of the Malay population in Singapore. The influence of the MCA in the Chinese community, however, was weak, as the Chinese masses were with the PAP.¹⁰²

In Malaya, the UMNO was an organisation which involved Malays of all social classes, the traditional aristocrats, the middle class, which was small in number, and the peasants who, as a social group, included the fishermen. In Singapore, the party was only made up of the middle class, workers and fishermen, since there were no aristocrats or Malay farmers on the island. The SMU influenced the same groups as the Singapore UMNO. The one difference between Singapore UMNO and the SMU was that the former was less communal-minded than the latter and, at one point, the SMU was unwilling to join with the MCA in a united front.¹⁰³

The MCA was an organisation of upper and middle-class Chinese. In this, it was actually quite similar to the PP or the DP. The real difference lay in the matter of its degree of communalism. The PP was a multi-racial party. The MCA, on the other hand, was merely a Chinese organisation and the DP was also a Chinese party. Whilst the MCA had connections with the Kuomintang of China, the DP had some links with the Chinese Communist Party.¹⁰⁴

As mentioned earlier, the UMNO was founded in 1946 and the MCA in 1949. The SMU was founded in 1926. The SA, an amalgamation of the three, was formed in December 1954.¹⁰⁵

In Malaya, the British had the idea of partnering the UMNO and the MCA against the CPM. In Singapore, however, their choice was the PP.¹⁰⁶ Basically speaking, the CPM disliked the UMNO, the MCA and the SMU. At this point, however, it tried to gain the friendship of the UMNO and other Malayan political forces to form a united front against the British. Its attitude was different, however, towards the MCA, which had been referred to as a running-dog party of the British.¹⁰⁷

The Labour Front

The LF was led by David Marshall and Lim Yew Hock. The philosophical outlook of the LF was derived from that of the British Labour Party. This organisation stated that it was against colonialism and Communism simultaneously. It believed in "dynamic socialism" and peaceful methods of struggle.¹⁰⁸ The LF was not satisfied with the Rendel Constitution. Marshall made the remark that the constitution was already obsolete the moment it was launched. During electioneering, the LF campaigned for immediate self-government for Singapore and eventual independence through union with Malaya.¹⁰⁹ Regarding the Emergency Regulations, the LF advocated that they be abolished. It also demanded that Singapore citizenship be granted to those who possessed no political rights in the island, equal treatment be given to vernacular education and multilingualism be adopted in the legislature.¹¹⁰ In economic matters, the LF believed that the economy should be re-oriented so that it should not serve only the interests of the British and that there should be more equality in the system.¹¹¹

The mass base of the LF was the Singapore Trade Union Congress (STUC), led by Lim Yew Hock. In 1948, when the Advisory Council was reorganised into the Legislative Council, Lim was nominated by the Governor to be a member of the latter to represent labour interests. The STUC was founded in 1951. Before it was banned in mid-1948, the trade union movement in Singapore was led by a CPM labour organisation. The STUC was founded to fill the vacuum. On the eve of the Rendel elections, there were two rival camps in the labour field in Singapore: one led by the PAP and the other by the LF.¹¹²

David Marshall and Lim Yew Hock characteristically represented the class and ethnic-linguistic nature of the LF. The former was a professional man, a lawyer and an English-speaking Jew, and the latter had been a clerk and later a career trade unionist and was an English-speaking Chinese. Professionals and white-collar workers from the different races who spoke English made up the membership of the LF. There were also some businessmen in the leadership of this party.¹¹³

The PAP non-Communists and the LF, as distinct from the Communists, were then both the moderate kind of socialists. Their divergence lay in the fact that whereas the former were really interested in bringing about a socialist transformation in society, the latter occupied themselves more with only trying to win elections and holding office. The PAP were in temper nearer to the Communists than the LF.¹¹⁴

The LF was actually formed by a group of persons, led by Lim Yew Hock, who were originally members of the SLP. A split occurred in the SLP in late 1952 and this group left the party. Late in the following year,

Lim's group took the decision to form a new party, which was to be called the Democratic Labour Party. Negotiations with the non-Communists led by Lee Kuan Yew to create a single new organisation consisting of the two groups were attempted, but the discussions led nowhere because of differences between the two. Early in 1954, Lim's group established itself as the Singapore Socialist Party. In July the same year, the new party entered into talks with the SLP to fuse the two into one single body. The discussions were successful and a People's United Front was founded, which was soon renamed the Labour Front. A few months later, however, the SLP withdrew from the LF because leaders from Lim Yew Hock's group were nominated to take part in the coming general elections while those from the SLP were not.¹¹⁵

The LF was not looked upon with favour by the British. In the first place, its programme was already too much to the left for their liking. Also its leader, David Marshall, was seen, among other things, as having a very hostile attitude towards the police. Lim Yew Hock had been in friendly association with the British for a long time but was now in a left-wing party and of no use to the British as an individual.¹¹⁶

During this time, as mentioned, the *TyP* focused its unfriendly attention mostly on the DP and then on the PP. It did not say anything about the LF. This was probably because, compared with the DP or the PP, it was unimportant to the CPM or because it arrived late on the political scene. As a person, Marshall was also not referred to. This could have been due to the fact that he was brought into the LF only by Lim Yew Hock and was originally not the leader in that Party. For Lim Yew Hock, however, the *TyP* had harsh words. In issues no. 52 and no. 55 of 15 August and 15 November 1954, Lim was accused, as a labour leader, of not having given real support to the strikes in the City Council and the Malayan Textile Factory, which occurred at that time. In an earlier issue, no. 48, Lim was also referred to as a "running-dog" and "slave" of the British in a discussion of the report of the Rendel Commission. Lim's trade unions were mentioned as "yellow trade unions", which was a derogatory term.¹¹⁷

The Singapore Labour Party

The SLP in 1954-1955 was what still remained of the original organisation after Lim Yew Hock's group had defected from it in 1952 and later formed the LF. In political character, this party was essentially the same as its offspring.¹¹⁸

Like the PP, in its earlier days the SLP was an important political force. Founded in 1948, sometime after the general elections held in that year, it declared that its purpose was to become a counter-influence

against the CPM among the labouring classes in society. In the year following, Lim Yew Hock, who sat on the Legislative Council as a nominated representative of labour interests, joined it as a member. Until then, Lim belonged to the PP. When, in 1951, the number of elected seats in the Legislative Council was increased and elections to these seats were held, the SLP won two of them. After 1952, however, the fortunes of the SLP waned.¹¹⁹ The split that year was fatal to it: it never quite recovered from the shock and thereafter functioned as an organisation only in name.

In 1954, there was one reference to the SLP in the *TyP* no. 48 as a "running-dog" and a "slave" of the British. It was accused of hankering after "puppet" seats in the new Legislative Assembly.¹²⁰

Elections

General Elections to implement the Rendel Constitution were held in April 1955. The political parties which took part in the contest and the number of seats which each fought for and won were as below:¹²¹

Party	No. of seats contested	No. of seats won
PP	22	4
DP	20	2
SA	5	3
LF	17	10
SLP	1	0
PAP	4	3
Independents	10	3

The victor was thus the LF. Such results were contrary to the expectations of almost everyone.

The British had expected the PP to win. The PP itself had been confident of success. All the other political groups which played a part or had an interest in the General Elections, except the DP, had also expected the PP to win. As David Marshall observed:

The Progressive Party ... everybody ... certainly the British ... expected to form the Government...¹²²

The fact that the PP fielded 22 candidates, the largest number of all political parties, was an indication of the positive mood of the party. The CPM saw things in the same light as David Marshall. In an editorial in no. 60 of April 1955, *TyP* commented upon the expectations of the British,¹²³ and no. 48 stated that C.C. Tan, at the time concerned,

behaved as if the PP would win the elections and he would become the Prime Minister of Singapore.¹²⁴

It was seen earlier that both the Communists and the non-Communists in the PAP were dissatisfied with the Rendel Constitution because it granted only limited concessions to Singapore. Now, they saw also that whatever powers were to be returned were not intended for them, but for the PP. On account of this, the PAP, therefore, took the decision to fight in the elections only to win enough seats to constitute itself an opposition force in the new Legislative Assembly. For the same reasons, the SA and the LF also fought to become only opposition forces.¹²⁵

On the occasion of the elections, the PAP also came to an understanding with the SA, the LF and Independents not to fight one another, but to pool strength and to present a common front against the PP and the rest of the parties. With the SA, it agreed not to contest in the same constituencies. To all three groups, it gave indications that in wards in which these others were competing but in which it was not fielding any candidates, it would give support to them. Chinese school students, who were part of the mass base of the PAP, also secured an undertaking with the LF that they would back them if the LP would register the projected SCMSSU, should it win in the elections and become the government.¹²⁶ The DP was the only party which did not believe that the PP was certain to win in the elections. It therefore challenged the PP in strength, fielding 20 candidates.

The unforeseen outcome of the elections was due to the following developments. For the purposes of the Rendel Constitution, as related earlier, the British authorities sought to involve a great number of the Chinese-speaking Chinese in voting in the elections. This was achieved through the introduction of automatic registration of eligible voters. The hope of the British was that the Chinese-speaking voters would give their support to the PP. The Chinese-speaking voters, however, came under the influence of the CPM, which worked upon them through the various mass movements that it had now activated in the student, worker and rural fields. The PP was an upper class and English-speaking political party. The greater number of the Chinese-speaking voters, however, belonged to the lower-income groups and did not speak English. The CPM placed itself in the gap between the two sides.¹²⁷

The DP had expected itself to win too. Although a rich men's party, it was Chinese-speaking, like any ordinary Chinese person in the street. If not for the intervention of the CPM, this party would most probably have carried the Chinese-speaking voters with it. The electorate, however, had been persuaded by the CPM to think more along class than linguistic-ethnic lines.¹²⁸

The British were sadly disappointed with the results of the elections. It was said that the consternation of officialdom and the shock of the commercial community was considerable. However, the British soon accepted the situation.¹²⁹

The results of the elections also presented the British with a practical problem. The LF did not win a large enough number of the elected seats. How then would it be able to run the administration? The LF, on its own accord, entered into a coalition with the SA to obtain a majority in the Legislative Assembly. The three ex-officio members could also line up with the LF. However, in the end, the LF still controlled only 16 out of the 32 seats in the assembly. Finally, the British sought a solution to the problem by appointing two members from the LF to fill up half of the four nominated seats. Thus, eventually, the LF came to have a majority of 18.¹³⁰

To help itself out of a difficult situation was not the only reason which led the LF to invite the SA to become a partner in the government. The LF also felt that the Malays should take a proper place in society. Hitherto, they had been underdogs to the other communities. Another motive of the LF was that it looked forward one day to achieving independence for Singapore through union with Malaya. The trends of the time showed clearly that in the future Malaya would be ruled by the Malays. Therefore, to have Malays in the administration would facilitate the possible fusion of Singapore with Malaya in the years ahead.¹³¹

When the new government was inaugurated, David Marshall, the leader of the winning party, became the Minister of Commerce and Industry. He was also called the Chief Minister. The British and Marshall now faced the Communists together.

The elections took place in early April. Later in the same month, the *TyP* (no. 60) came out with three articles on the new situation which had arisen. The first article was an editorial bearing the title of "A Further Step in the Unfolding of the Patriotic Movement and the Disastrous Failure of the Reformist Deception of the British Imperialists",¹³² which stated that the elections were a victory for the CPM and a failure for the British. The second article, which was entitled "Expose the Running-dog Face of Opportunist Politicians and Strive Hard to Realise the Patriotic Slogans",¹³³ was devoted to telling the readers what the LF and its leading personalities, including David Marshall and Lim Yew Hock, were, and advising them to work hard for the aims of the open united front struggle. The third article, "A Refutation of the Fallacious Arguments of the Nationalist Reformers" was a condemnation of the political philosophy and programme of the LF.¹³⁴ A part of the second article also gave warning that the British and the LF were enemies and that both should be

fought against. That the British were an enemy had always been the case. However, during the elections, the LF, as noted, was regarded as a friend. This was no longer the case. Thus, in *TyP* no. 60, the CPM clarified its policy towards the British as well as towards the LF for the times ahead.

Notes

- 1 *Rendel Report*.
- 2 *Rendel Report*, pp. 3 & 5-6.
- 3 *PAP 1960*, pp. 14-15. *PAP 1964*, pp. 205-206. *PAP 1969*, p. 125. David Marshall, *Singapore's Struggle for Nationhood, 1945-1959* (Singapore: University Education Press, 1971), p. 3. F.G. Carnell, "Constitutional Reform and Elections in Malaya", *Pacific Affairs*, 27:3 (September 1954), pp. 216-217 & 219. T.J. Bellows, *The People's Action Party of Singapore: Emergence of a Dominant Party System* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1970), pp. 67-68. Yeo Kim-Wah, op. cit., pp. 254-260. Pang Cheng Lian, *Singapore's People's Action Party* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 2. Ong Chit Chung, "The 1959 Singapore General Elections", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 6:1 (March 1975), p. 162. R. Nithianandam, "The Rendel Commission, 1954", Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Singapore, 1972/73, pp. 50-52.
- 4 F.G. Carnell, op. cit., pp. 216-220. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 254-260. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., p. 68. Ong Chit Chung, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
- 5 T.J. Bellows, op. cit., p. 68.
- 6 The Chinese-speaking Chinese had always been the basic support of the Communist movement in Malaya and Singapore since the day of its birth. See, for example, "Basic Paper", vol. 1, pt. II.
- 7 *Rendel Report*, pp. 3 & 9-14.
- 8 Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
- 9 Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., p. 56. F.G. Carnell, op. cit., p. 217. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., p. 67. David Marshall, op. cit., p. 3.
- 10 *Rendel Report*, pp. 3 & 16-19.
- 11 Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 55 & 57. David Marshall, op. cit., p. 3.
- 12 *Rendel Report*, p. 20. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
- 13 *Rendel Report*, p. 5.
- 14 *TyP*, no. 56, December 1954. The original Chinese title of the article is "Ying-ti 'Hsien-chih' ho 'Ta-hsüan' ti Chöu Mien-mu" (This article will hereinafter be referred to as *TyP*, no. 56, article in separate sheet.) The *TyP* had already earlier commented upon the Rendel Constitution in issue no. 48, 15 April 1954, p. 3 in an essay entitled "'Hsien-chih' Pa-hsi Wan-chiu Pu Liao Shih-pai (The Trick of a 'Constitution' Could in No Way Salvage a Failure)". However, the opinions expressed on this earlier occasion were not as fully developed as those in the later article.

It is necessary to contrast Communist and British opinions of the new constitution. An example of the latter would be that of F.G. Carnell, who said: "There can be no doubt of the boldness of these proposals. They amount to internal self-government similar to that conferred on the Gold Coast in 1951. When the proposed reforms are implemented in about a year's time, Singapore will take its place as one of the most constitutionally advanced British colonial territories. If the genuine opportunities for self-rule offered by the new constitution are not grasped by the people of Singapore, they will have no one to blame but themselves ...". Cf. F.G. Carnell, op. cit., pp. 219-220.

In 1959, one of the leaders of the non-Communist faction in the PAP, Dr Toh Chin Chye, said something about the Rendel Constitution too. His statement was: "... The Rendel Constitution was undemocratic ... all the powers were under the control of three colonial officials, namely the Chief Secretary, the Financial Secretary and the Attorney-General, and on top of these there was the Governor ...". Cf. "Legislative Assembly Elections - 1959", Folio (229).

Another non-Communist PAP leader, Dr Goh Keng Swee, expressed similar sentiments about the Rendel Constitution many years later, in 1978. See "M-L Course", Handout no. 66, paragraph 9.

The LF, which participated in the elections in 1955, was to the right of the PAP but to the left of the other parties. Its leader, David Marshall, was also not satisfied with the Rendel Constitution. His words on the point were: "Then came the new era with the Rendel Constitution. This provided for a Cabinet of the Governor and 9 others, including three officials - the Chief Secretary, the Financial Secretary and the Attorney-General, whom I used to refer to as the Gibraltar, Malta and Port Said of the Singapore Government - an elected Chief Minister and 5 other elected ministers. The Assembly comprised 25 elected members, the 3 official members in the Cabinet, and 4 members nominated by the Governor to represent commercial and minority interests. Although there was an elected majority in the Legislative Council, the Governor had tremendous reserve powers in all matters of defence, foreign affairs and internal security, and the right to suspend the constitution". Cf. David Marshall, *op. cit.*, p. 6. These feelings of David Marshall found echo in one of his cabinet ministers, J.M. Jumabhoy, who was also not satisfied with the Rendel Constitution. See Loh Mun Loong, "The Lim Yew Hock Government, 1956-1959", Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Singapore, 1976/77, p. 44, note 3.

- 15 William A.C. Goode, Chief Secretary and later Governor of Singapore, once told John Drysdale: "... as far as we could judge when the Rendel Constitution was passing through orders-in-council, the only organised political party then were the Progressives.

They seemed to have the talent; they had the men who appeared willing to give time up. They had the public figures. If you had said, 'Why do we have a new constitution, you haven't got anyone to run it?' We would say, 'Yes, we have; we have got quite a number of people; and they are quite competent, a lot of experience. Give them this constitution, we think they will work it and we think they will move on from there.'" See John Drysdale, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

- 16 C. Mary Turnbull, *A History of Singapore, 1819-1975* (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 235. A. Jayanath, "The Progressive Party (1947-1956)", Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Singapore, 1972/73, p. 24.
- 17 C. Mary Turnbull, *op. cit.*, pp. 224 & 236.
- 18 A. Jayanath, *op. cit.*, pp. 4 & 24.
- 19 Yeo Kim Wah, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-266. C. Mary Turnbull, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-236. A. Jayanath, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.
- 20 Yeo Kim Wah, *op. cit.*, p. 56. A. Jayanath, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
- 21 Yeo Kim Wah, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57. C. Mary Turnbull, *op. cit.*, p. 241. A. Jayanath, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38.
- 22 *Rendel Report*, pp. 41-43. Yeo Kim Wah, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58. C. Mary Turnbull, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-242. R. Nithianandum, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-49. On 22 July 1955, in a meeting of the Singapore Legislative Assembly, Lee Kuan Yew said of the Rendel Constitution, "This was a constitution tailored by the British and the Progressives for the Progressives ...". Cf. *LAD*, vol. I, col. 420. David Marshall also said, "... the

- Rendel Constitution was mainly tailored for the Progressive Party ...". Cf. David Marshall, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
- 23 C. Mary Turnbull, *op. cit.*, p. 242. R. Nithianandam, *op. cit.*, p. 40. A. Jayanath, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.
- 24 Cited in T.J. Bellows, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
- 25 Yeo Kim Wah, *op. cit.*, p. 272. A. Jayanath, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-15 & 18. "Election — Legislative Council", pt. 4, Folio (305), annexure "A".
- 26 Yeo Kim Wah, *op. cit.*, p. 272. A. Jayanath, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16 & 18. "Election — Legislative Council", pt. 4, Folio (305), annexure "A".
- 27 Yeo Kim Wah, *op. cit.*, p. 102, Table 3, and A. Jayanath, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-26 have similar things to say. "Election — Legislative Council", pt. 5, Folio (352) comments that the PP was "... Conservative, business interest, wealthy".
- 28 Yeo Kim Wah, *op. cit.*, p. 102, Table 3. A. Jayanath, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
- 29 C. Mary Turnbull, *op. cit.*, p. 235.
- 30 No. 48, p. 3, article 1. No. 56, article in separate sheet. One can also find an instance of the CPM condemning the PP in 1952. *TyP*, no. 27, 15 July 1952, p. 2, article entitled "Man-t'an 'Chêng-tang' yu 'Kung-hui' (On 'Political Parties' and 'Trade Unions')", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 27, p. 2, article 1), made the following remarks: "The 'Progressive Party' was established by some 'upper' elements of the bourgeoisie in Singapore like Tan Chye Ching and Laycock. If there was anything which was good for the British Imperialists or if there was any way of doing things which was to the benefit of the British Imperialists, this running-dog party, because of the fact that the interests of its class were appended to the British Imperialist master, would rush all at once to pick up such things and turn them into its 'party policy' and 'party tasks'".
- 31 See p. 28 of this volume.
- 32 Before 1954, open and legal organisations already existed in some of the Chinese middle schools. An instance was the Student Aid Society. However, the scope of this kind of organisation was limited to only individual schools. The new organisation which was created in 1954 covered all schools. A more comprehensive organisation served the purposes of the Communists better. Cf. "LHK", paragraphs 36-42. "LWK", paragraphs 21-24.
- 33 "LSG", paragraph 74.
- 34 "CYF(73)", paragraph 73. The person who was in charge of activities in Singapore and who also headed the student organisation before Ng Meng Chiang was one Wong Mau Choong. Wong was arrested in January 1954 and was replaced by Ng Meng Chiang. Cf. *IJ*, 1954, Supplement no. 4, paragraph 12.
- 35 *Proceedings of the Second Legislative Council*, Fourth Session, 1954/55, p. B290. "NSI", pp. 1-3. The bill for National Service was first introduced in the Legislative Council in early 1952, but came into force only now. At the time when the bill was only presented for debate, Wong Mau Choong had asked for instructions from Ho Lung about what to do when the bill came into effect in Singapore. Ho Lung, as mentioned in note 46 in the previous chapter, was the Secretary of the South Malayan Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party. He was the immediate superior of Wong. In Wong's words, the answer Ho Lung gave was as follows: "... we had no power in opposing the Singapore Government in passing the said Bill but we should carry out propaganda to resist it. He was not in favour of demonstration to be carried out in objecting the National Service Registration by students but he did say that persons concerned should try to evade the registration". Cf. "WMC", p. 19.

In the agitation mounted by the students against National Service, there was a demonstration which resulted in bloodshed. This was in the calculation of Ng Meng

Chiang, who directed the agitation. It is interesting to note that in 1952 Ho Lung was not interested in demonstrations against National Service. At that time, there were no opportunities to proceed without counter-productive results, whereas in 1954, the situation was different.

- 36 "CYF(73)", paragraph 73. ("A good son never joins the army" should properly read "A good son does not become a soldier and good iron does not make nails". The latter is the correct version of the original idiom in Chinese.)
- 37 *Ij*, no. 7/1954, paragraph 158. The same source of information also noted that on 21 June, Ng Meng Chiang issued another directive which instructed Party members that they should comply with the British order and register themselves for National Service in order to avoid drawing attention to themselves, but at the same time continue to carry out their Party activities. In the event that any important person was really called up by the British for active duty, arrangements would be made for him to go underground. Other persons, however, should remain to carry out sabotage within the organisations to which they might be posted by the Government. In this source of information, Ng Meng Chiang was mentioned as Comrade "D". "D" was one of the many aliases of Ng Meng Chiang. See "CPM, 1960-68", p. 12.
- 38 *Proceedings of the Second Legislative Council, Fourth Session, 1954/55*, p. D290.
- 39 "KTE (10.56)", paragraph 34. "SCT", paragraph 19.
- 40 "LHK", paragraph 54. "KTE (10.56)", paragraph 35. "SCT", paragraph 20. *TyP*, no. 50, 15 June 1954, pp. 2-4. "Chuan-tun: T'uan-chieh Tou-chêng, Chan Shêng Ti-jên (Special Essay: Unite and Struggle, and Defeat the Enemy)", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 50, pp. 2-4). "LCS", pt. 5, Folio (225)¹, p. 8. "NSI", pp. 4-6.
- 41 *TyP*, no. 49, 15 May 1954, p. 2, "Jên-min ti T'uan-chieh, Ying-ti ti Ku-li (The Unity of the People and the Isolation of the British Imperialists)". *TyP*, no. 50, pp. 2-4. On 11 May, one day before the closing date for registration, the CPM's semi-military organisation, the Workers' Protection Corps, made preparations to try to assassinate the Principal and a teacher of Chung Cheng High School. The effort failed, however, because a police radio car happened to be in the vicinity of the intended place of action on the day. The police speculated that there was this plot because, if it had succeeded, the students would have received fresh stimulation on the eve of the closing date to continue boycotting the call-up. "AC", however, stated to the author that the two intended victims had actually been targeted for death as far back as 1950. According to him, at the height of the Emergency, many other Chinese educationists had also been put on the death list by the CPM. The only thing was that the opportunity to kill these two men probably did not occur until May 1954. Nevertheless, "AC" also expressed the view that the Workers' Protection Corps could have taken the decision to carry out the killing on 11 May really to bring about continued resistance against registration. According to the Workers' Protection Corps itself, the school principal had to be killed because he had urged his students to obey the Government and the teacher because he was a Kuomintang reactionary. However, the Principal, was considered to be unco-operative by the Government. Cf. "ATK", p. 20. *Ij*, no. 7/1954, paragraph 158. "AC". "NSI", pp. 4-9.
- 42 "NSI", p. 7.
- 43 *Proceedings of the Second Legislative Council, Fourth Session, 1954/55*, pp. B127-B131. "LHK", paragraphs 55-60. "KTE (10.56)", paragraphs 36-41. "SCT", paragraph 22. *TyP*, no. 50, pp. 2-4. "NSI", pp. 6-9. "LCS", pt. 5, Folio (225)¹, p. 9. "LSC", pp. 8-9.
- 44 "LHK", paragraph 61. "LSG", p. 51. "KTE ((10.56))", paragraphs 42-43. "SCT", paragraph 23. "LSC", pp. 9-10. "CYW", p. 17. "LgKS (6.65)", paragraph 15.

- "NSI", pp. 9-10. *TyP*, no. 49, 15 May 1954, editorial, "Ch'üan Hsing-chou ti Jên-min T'uan-chieh-ch'i-lai, Chih-ch'ih Hsioh-sheng ti Chêng-i Tou-chêng (All People of Singapore, Unite and Support the Just Struggle of the Students)"; and p. 2, "Fan-tui Ying-ti Wu-li Pê-hai Hsioh-sheng ti Pao-hsing (Oppose the Brutality of the British Imperialists in Using Force to Oppress the Students)" and "The Unity of the People and the Isolation of the Imperialists". *TyP*, no. 50, pp. 2-4. "LCS", pt. 5, Folio (225)¹, p. 9. John Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 73-74.
- 45 "SCT", paragraph 23.
- 46 "LHK", paragraph 62. "SCT", paragraph 25. "KTE (10.56)", paragraphs 43-44. "LSC", p. 10. "NSI", p. 11. "LCS", pt. 5, Folio (225)¹, p. 9. *TyP*, no. 50, pp. 2-4.
- 47 "LHK", paragraph 62. "CYW", p. 18. "SCT", paragraphs 26-27. "KTE (10.56)", paragraphs 48-49. "NSI", p. 31. "LCS", pt. 5, Folio (225)¹, pp. 9-10. *TyP*, no. 50, pp. 2-4.
- 48 "LCS", pt. 5, Folio (225)¹, pp. 10 & 12. "SCT", paragraphs 28-30. "KTE (10.56)", paragraphs 50-58. "LHK", paragraphs 63-65. "LWK", paragraphs 30-34. "LSC", pp. 11-13. *TyP*, no. 50, pp. 2-4. "NSI", pp. 24-41. *IJ*, no. 9/1954, paragraph 223¹. John Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 75-76.
- 49 *IJ*, no. 8/1954, paragraph 192^c; and no. 10/1954, paragraph 276^c. *TyP*, no. 51, 15 July 1954, p. 1, "T'i-fang Chien-hsien-ti San-mien-jên (Beware of the Cunning Three-Faced Man)"; and p. 2, "P'ing-lun: Chê Chiu Shih Ying-ti-kuo-chu-i ti 'Fa-t'ing' (Comments: This is the 'Court' of the British Imperialists)". No. 54, 15 October 1954, p. 3, "Chien-lao Ya-fu Pu Liao Jên-min ti I-chih (The Prison Cannot Suppress the Will of the People)". "NSI", pp. 44-45 & 54. John Drysdale, op. cit., p. 81.
- 50 "CYW", pp. 18-20. "LSG", p. 52.
- 51 "LCS", pt. 5, Folio (225)¹, pp. 9-10. *Sing Cmd 53 of 1956*, p. 3. "LWK", paragraphs 28-29. "LSC", p. 10. "SCT", paragraph 25. "KTE (10.56)", paragraph 46. "LSG", p. 52. "NSI", p. 16.
- 52 *Sing Cmd 53 of 1956*, p. 3. "LWK", paragraphs 34-36. "LSG", p. 53. "CYW", pp. 20-21. "LSC", pp. 13-14. "SCMSSU", pp. 1-2. *IJ*, no. 10/1954, paragraph 276^d.
- 53 *Sing Cmd of 1956*, p. 3. "SCMSSU", pp. 4-5.
- 54 *Sing Cmd of 1956*, p. 3. "SCMSSU", pp. 5-7. "SCT", paragraphs 37-49. "KTE (10.56)", paragraphs 74-77. "LWK", paragraphs 37-40. "LSG", p. 53. "CYW", p. 21. *IJ*, no. 3/155, paragraph 74^P.
- 55 "DM", pt. 2, Folio (109)¹. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., p. 198.
- 56 *IJ*, no. 3/1956, Supplement no. 1, p. 32.
- 57 "LSG", p. 21.
- 58 *IJ*, no. 7/1954, paragraph 197; no. 8/1954, paragraph 193; no. 9/1954, paragraph 235; no. 10/1954, paragraphs 227 & 277^a; no. 11/1954, paragraph 318; and no. 3/1955, paragraph 75. *TyP*, no. 52, 15 August 1954, editorial, "Shih-chêng-chü Kung-yu Ch'ü-tê Liao Chü-ta ti Shêng-li (The Workers of the City Council Secured a Great Victory)", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 52, editorial); no. 54, 15 October 1954, pp. 3-4, "Sha-ch'ang Pa-kung I-ting Yao Ch'ü-tê Shêng-li (The Strike in the Textile Factory Must Achieve Victory)"; no. 55, 15 November 1954, p. 2, "Sha-ch'ang ti Pa-kung Shêng-li Liao (The Strike in the Textile Factory is Victorious)", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 55, p. 2, article 2); and no. 59, March 1955, p. 2 and no. 60, April 1955, p. 3, "Min-tsu Tzū-pên-chia Ying-kai Kan-k'uai Chio-wu (The National Bourgeoisie Must Quickly Wake Up)", (The article was printed twice).
- 59 *Ibid.* "PSS", appendix B, pp. 2-3.
- 60 The three unions were: Pineapple Workers' Union, Sawmill Workers' Union and Coal

Workers' Union. Cf. *IJ*, no. 8/1954, Supplement no. 4, paragraph 41. The 14 unions were: SBWU, SFSWU, Singapore Workers' Union, Singapore Spinning Workers' Union, Malayan Amalgamated Pineapple Workers' Union, Singapore Dry-Cleaning and Dyeing Workers' Union, Singapore Shoe Makers' Union, Singapore Film and Entertainment Workers' Union, Civil Aviation Workers' Union, The Mobilised Overseas Chinese Mechanics' & Drivers' Association, Singapore Barbers' Assistants' Union, Singapore Rattan Workers' Union, Singapore United Metal Workers' Union and Singapore Tailors' Union. Cf. *IJ*, no. 4/1955, Supplement no. 1, appendix D.

- 61 *IJ*, no. 4/1955, Supplement no. 1, appendix D(a); and no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraph 4. "FSS", paragraph 41. Both Lim and Fong first became members of the SPABL and then of the CPM. The Communist background of Lim is shown in Lee Kuan Yew's *The Battle for Merger*, Appendix A. Even stronger proof of Lim's membership in the CPM was the following. In the fifties and sixties, the Communist who was in charge of operations on the spot in Singapore was at first Ng Meng Chiang. Later on, it was Fong Chong Pik. Fong had a female courier. On one occasion, this woman drove him in a car to Dunearn Road to pick up a man. This man was Lim Chin Siong. Fong and Lim were afterwards taken by the courier to Kallang Park to have a conversation. Concerning this fact, see "KSH", paragraph 28. On Fong's connection with the SPABL and the CPM, see "FSS", paragraphs 10-14. Also according to the authority of "AC".

Sources "KSH", "FSS" and "AC" were seen or consulted before 1985. In 1995, new information about Lim Chin Siong's background and his part in the open united front struggle in Singapore came to light. "The CPM ... had to deploy CPM elements in open front activities ... Siu Cheong and Ah Hoi [members of the CPM's Central Committee] quoted Lim Chin Siong as a case in point. Lim Chin Siong was chosen because he was a very important CPM member, who had excellent qualities as a Communist United Front (CUF) cadre ... moreover he had been involved in CPM activities since his schooldays. Consequently, he was specially selected to be transferred from underground activities within the Anti-British League (ABL) ... to open front activities ...". See Aloysius Chin, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

- 62 Lim's two other unions were the Singapore Workers' Union and the Singapore Spinning Workers' Union, and Fong's five other unions were the SFSWU, the Malayan Amalgamated Pineapple Workers' Union, the Singapore Dry-Cleaning and Dyeing Workers' Union, the Mobilised Overseas Chinese Mechanics' and Drivers' Association and the Singapore Barbers' Assistants' Union. Cf. *IJ*, no. 4/1955, Supplement no. 1, appendices C and D(a).
- 63 *TyP*, no. 56, December 1954, pp. 2-3, "Ta Shui-tsai Shih Ying-ti Chih-tsaio-ch'u-lai ti (The Great Floods were created by the British Imperialists)".
- 64 *TyP*, *ibid.* *IJ*, no. 12/1954, paragraph 354^a; and no. 1/1955, paragraphs 4-4^a. "KTE (10.56)", paragraph 78. Yeo Kim Wah, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
- 65 *TyP*, *ibid.* "SCT", paragraphs 14-41. *IJ*, no. 1/1955, paragraphs 4^b-4^c. Yeo Kim Wah, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
- 66 *Fong*, pp. 24-25. "CMH", p. 9.
- 67 *IJ*, no. 2/1955, paragraph 39^a; no. 3/1956, Supplement no. 1, p. 34; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. 3, appendix X, p. 11. Yeo Kim Wah, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
- 68 "LSG", p. 23.
- 69 See pp. 4-5 & 19 of this volume.
- 70 On this question, see T.J. Bellows, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-18.
- 71 *PAP 1960*, pp. 12-13. See also *PAP 1964*, p. 205.
- 72 See p. 16 of this volume.

- 73 *PAP 1960*, p. 12. See also *PAP 1964*, p. 205.
 74 See pp. 43-44 & note 14 above of this volume.
 75 See p. 64 of this volume.
 76 "LCS", pt. 1, Folio (28)².
 77 See p. 64 of this volume.
 78 *PAP 1960*, p. 14.
 79 *PAP 1964*, p. 205.
 80 "LCS", pt. 1, Folio (28)². The election platform of the PAP in detail was as follows:

Political

1. Strive for a fully elected Legislative Assembly with complete sovereignty;
2. A multi-lingual Legislative Assembly;
3. Merger with Malaya;
4. Scrap National Service. Only an elected Legislative Assembly has the right to introduce conscription;
5. All those who regard Malaya as their permanent home should be given the franchise. Foreigners with special rights should not be granted the right to vote;
6. Abolish the Emergency Regulations prohibiting freedom of speech, assembly, etc. A non-fully-elected Government should not have the [sic].
7. Amend the Labour Ordinance.

Social

1. Repeal the Labour Disputes Ordinance which is against the interests of the workers;
2. Legislate a Workers' Charter to provide:
 - a) minimum wage;
 - b) equal pay for men and women;
 - c) forty-hour week;
 - d) two weeks' annual leave;
 - e) children's aid and confinement allowance;
 - f) unemployment subsidy;
 - g) expand the Labour Compensation Ordinance to provide relief to workers injured at work, and,
 - h) forty-eight days' sick leave and entitlement per year.
3. Free education for all children below 16 years of age. Every community should have the right to develop its own education and culture and equal financial assistance to be given to all schools.
4. Slum clearance; to grant interest-free loans to the Singapore Improvement Trust for the building of low-cost housing.

Civil Administration

Same pay and conditions of service as the civil service for employees in the British Military Bases.

Economic

1. Impose tariffs to protect local industry;
2. Complete control of the Malayan trade; abolish export ban on rubber; local control of the gold reserves.

Cf. *Fong*, pp. 27-29.

- 81 See p. 19 of this volume.
 82 The Socialist Club was founded in 1953 by a group of left-inclined students. Among these were members of the SPABL examples of whom were J.J. Puthucherry and Abdullah Majid. Later on, even members of the CPM got into the society. Two of these were Chen Mong Hock and Lim Shee Ping. However, the club could not be

counted as a mass organisation of the CPM in spite of the presence of these persons. The majority of both the leadership and the membership of this organisation were democratic socialists who had their own style of playing politics. On the failure of the SPABL and CPM persons to really affect the character of the club, Lim Shee Ping had the following to say: "... It took me some time after joining the University to get to know well the people who were active in the Socialist Club ... these people were very outspoken, and highly politically conscious. Though they could be classified as militant leftists ... I regarded them as nowhere near the standard of the ABL [that was the SPABL] members that I knew in my Chinese school days. These people lived in a completely different world in spite of the fact that their political utterances were quite close to those of the Chinese-educated leftists".

Also: "... neither Ng [Ng Meng Chiang] ... nor Chiam [Chiam Choong Chian, Lim's superior contact after Ng] ... had any idea of the English-educated and their political inclinations. What little they knew was the resistance of the English-educated intellectuals towards the CPM and Communism in general. In the circumstances, they did not expect me to be able to do anything in the University that could be of a direct and positive help to ABL and the Party [CPM]. Even the Socialist Club were considered by them as immature and unreliable by the standards of the ABL and the Party".

And further on: "Whenever we met, Chiam ... would draw me into a discussion of current political situation, be it Singapore politics, or international politics. He would give me his views on political events. I on my part would keep him informed of the conditions in the University. This usually took the form of how hopeless and useless the English-educated intellectuals were as far as revolution went ...".

"AC" also stated categorically to the author that the Socialist Club was in spirit alien to the CPM. Cf. "LSP (63)", paragraphs 13-15; and "LSP (65)", paragraphs 24-35. Also "WS", paragraphs 14-25. "PJJ", paragraph 16. "CMH", pp. 6-10. John Drysdale, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-78.

The 11 non-Communist PAP trade unions were: The Singapore Union of Postal and Telecommunications Workers, Posts and Telegraphs Uniformed Staff, PWD Labour Union, Singapore Medical Services Union, Singapore Government Workers' Union, Singapore Civil Service Association, Singapore Harbour Board Staff Association, Singapore Naval Base Labour Union, Federation of City Council Labour Union, Registrar of Vehicles Workers' Union and Civil Service Union. Cf. *IJ*, no. 4/1955, Supplement no. 1, appendix D. Before the founding of the PAP, Lee Kuan Yew and some of the other important non-Communists had led some of these unions in their fight for better salaries and service conditions. These unions thus became their natural following. Cf. *Lee*, pp. 15-16. "M-L Course", Handout no. 66, paragraph 5. *IJ*, no. 6/1954, Lee Kuan Yew's 'Who's Who', pp. 3-5; no. 11/1954, K.M. Byrne's, "Who's Who", pp. 2-3; and no. 1/1955, Goh Keng Swee's "Who's Who", p. 4. John Drysdale, *op. cit.*, chapter 5.

- 83 The Communists' interest in English-speaking students and workers could be understood in terms of their philosophy regarding social groups and the united front. For the interest of the non-Communists in the mass base of the Communists, see *Lee*, pp. 17-18.
- 84 That Lim Chin Siang was at one time a clerk in the Changi Bus Company is vouched for by C.V. Devan Nair, who was at that time Lim's close friend. See "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 2. For Fong Swee Suan, see "FSS", paragraph 5. *IJ*, no. 6/1954, Lee Kuan Yew's "Who's Who", p. 1.
- 85 *IJ*, no. 11/1955, Lim Chin Siang's "Who's Who", p. 2. "FSS", paragraphs 1, 3 & 4. *IJ*, no. 6/1954, Lee Kuan Yew's, "Who's Who", p. 2.

- 86 "NSI", pp. 44-47. *IJ*, no. 8/1954, paragraph 192^c; and no. 4/1955, Supplement no. 1, first page. John Drysdale, op. cit., p. 80.
- 87 "NSI", p. 47. *IJ*, no. 8/1954, paragraph 192^a. "LCS", pt. 5, Folio (225)¹, paragraph 51. John Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
- 88 See p. 51 of this volume.
- 89 "LWK", paragraph 35.
- 90 *Lee*, p. 18.
- 91 *PAP 1960*, pp. 13-14. *PAP 1964*, p. 205. *IJ*, no. 11/1954, paragraphs 340-340^b. "Capture", pp. 2-6. *Fong*, pp. 10-24. John Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 83-92. Aloysius Chin, op. cit., pp. 67-68. The convenors were: Toh Chin Chye, Lee Kuan Yew, S. Rajaratnam, P. Govindasamy, Ismail Rahim, Lee Gek Seng, A.K. Kuruppiah, Mofradi bin Haji Mohamed Noor, Tann Wee Keng, Tann Wee Tiong, Fong Swee Suan, C.V. Devan Nair, Chan Chiaw Thor, Samad Ismail. Cf. *Fong*, p. 267. See also "CCT (63)", paragraph 14. The last four persons were from Lim Chin Siong's group, according to Ong Pang Boon, who became the Organising Secretary of the PAP in 1956. Three of the four got elected into the *pro tempore* Central Executive Committee (see below). Lee Kuan Yew also stated that these three used to push the Communist point of view in this Committee. Cf. *PAP 1979*, p. 45. *Lee*, p. 25.

The 12 members of the *pro tempore* Central Executive Committee and their status were:

Toh Chin Chye	— Chairman
Lee Kuan Yew	— Secretary
Ong Eng Guan	— Treasurer
S. Sockalingam	— Ordinary Member
Lee Gek Seng	— do
Mofradi bin Haji Mohamed Noor	— do
Tann Wee Keng	— do
Ismail Rahim	— do
Fong Swee Suan	— do
C.V. Devan Nair	— do
Chan Chiaw Thor	— do

Cf. *Fong*, p. 267. "CCT (63)", paragraph 15.

From 1945 to 1948, as mentioned in the Introduction, there was in Singapore a political party called the MDU. The Open Office of the CPM had contact with this party. At the same time, the underground section of the CPM also had members in this party. This party was essentially an organisation of the English-educated middle class. In 1948, when the war between the CPM and the British broke out, the MDU was dissolved. Lee Kuan Yew, it was said by the *IJ*, originally drafted the rules of the MDU. Cf. *IJ*, no. 6/1954, Lee Kuan Yew's "Who's Who", p. 3. See also John Drysdale, op. cit., p. 20.

- 92 *IJ*, no. 3/1955, paragraph 53. *PAP 1960*, p. 14. *PAP 1964*, p. 205. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 134 & 137.
- 93 Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., p. 274.
- 94 *TyP*, no. 48, p. 3, article 1; No. 55, 15 November 1954, p. 2, article entitled "Yung Kou Pi 'T'ui-tung Min-hsüan' (Using a Dog's Nose to 'Popularise Elections')"; and no. 56, December 1954, article in separate sheet.
- 95 Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 272-273. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., p. 258.
- 96 *PAP 1960*, pp. 14-15. *PAP 1964*, pp. 205-206. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., p. 134.
- 97 "Election — Legislative Council", pt. 5, Folio (352), p. 1. *IJ*, no. 1/1955, paragraph 20^b; no. 2/1955, paragraph 53; no. 3/1955, paragraph 89; & no. 4/1955, paragraph 121. *PAP 1960*, p. 14. *PAP 1964*, p. 205. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., p. 258.

- 98 TyP attacks on the DP can be found in no. 48, p. 3 article 1; no. 54, p. 2; & no. 56, article in separate sheet.
- 99 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., articles 4–10. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 59–64, 147–150, 161–164, 170–172 & 188–189. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., pp. 148–149 & 159. *IJ*, no. 2/1955, paragraph 55^b; and no. 3/1955, paragraph 90^c. "Election — Legislative Council", pt. 2, Folio (352), pp. 2–3.
- 100 There was a Peninsular Malays Union (PMU) in Malaya. This was considered by people to be a twin of the SMU. Cf. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 125.
- 101 *IJ*, no. 1/1955, paragraphs 21^c–21^d & appendix. "Election — Legislative Council", pt. 4, Folio (305), annexure "A". Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 270–272 & 274.
- 102 "Election — Legislative Council", pt. 5, Folio (352). *IJ*, no. 2/1955, paragraph 51.
- 103 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 98–102. Means explains how the UMNO was founded. The origin of this political party gives an indication of its social composition. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., pp. 148–150. Turnbull also explains how the SMU originated. Further discussion also touches upon the occupational status of the Malays in Singapore. *IJ*, no. 7/1954, paragraph 62.
- 104 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 120–121: an account of the formation of the MCA. A. Jayanath, op. cit., pp. 8–10: on the non-communal ideals of the PP. The PP also disliked the fact that Malaya was dominated by the Malays. *IJ*, no. 1954, Supplement no. 2, paragraph 30.
- 105 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 99–100 & 102. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., p. 148. *IJ*, no. 12/1954, paragraph 382; and no. 7/1955, "Who's Who" of Mohamed Sidik bin Abdul Hamid, p. 2.
- 106 In Malaya, the British wished at first to ally themselves with the Independence of Malaya Party, later reorganised as the Party Negara. Later, however, attention was switched from this party to the UMNO and MCA combination. Cf. *PAP 1960*, p. 11. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 61–64 & 147–150.
- 107 TyP, no. 48, p. 3, article 1. Barjier, the TyP had talked badly about both the UMNO and the MCA. No. 27, p. 2, article 1 had the following comments on the UMNO: "The 'UMNO' ... [was] organised by a minority of reactionaries and feudal die-hards from among the Malays. Acting under instructions from the British imperialist masters, [this organisation] went all out to provoke conflicts among the races. [It raises] the reactionary slogan 'Malays' Malaya', thereby rendering assistance to the British Imperialists to oppress the Chinese through using means which are the most cruel in nature and to destroy the unity of the various races in the anti-British united front."
- The same document said also of the MCA: "The 'MCA' was organised by the big running dogs of the British Imperialists and Chinese reactionary capitalists like Tan Cheng Lock, Yong Shook Lin and Lee Hau Shik, together with reactionary party terrorists of the Kuomintang from various places. During the past few years, the 'MCA', under direction from the British Imperialists, has managed a lottery in the name of doing 'charity' and swindled the people of vast sums of money. It has helped the British Imperialists in 'resettling villagers' and driven hundreds of thousands of farmer and worker masses from the countryside into inhuman concentration camps. At the same time, it is going around everywhere openly making propoganda against the revolution to defend the criminal action of the British Imperialists in slaughtering the people".
- 108 The political doctrines of the LF were enunciated in a set of *Principles and Aims* prepared by its Executive Committee and a manifesto entitled *I Believe* written by David Marshall, which were released to the public in September and November 1954, respectively. Cf. Singapore Labour Front, *Singapore Labour Front, Its Principles and Aims, and Four-Year Programme*, Singapore, [1954]. "DM", pt. 1, Folio (68). *IJ*,

- no. 12/1954, David Marshall's "Who's Who", p. 2. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 114-115. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., pp. 257-258.
- 109 Singapore Labour Front, op. cit. "Election — Legislative Council", pt. 4, Folio (305), annexure "A". Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., p. 271. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., p. 257.
- 110 *Ibid.*
- 111 Singapore Labour Front, op. cit. "Election — Legislative Council", pt. 4, Folio (305), annexure "A".
- 112 *IJ*, no. 8/1955, Lim Yew Hock's "Who's Who". David Marshall, op. cit., p. 6. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 229-238. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., p. 238. "M-L Course", Handout no. 70, pp. 4-5 & 8; and Handout no. 72, pp. 1-2. Ang Li Choo, "A General History of the Trade Union Movement in Singapore (1959-1963)", Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Singapore, 1973/74, pp. 2-6. How Lip Cheng, "A History of the National Trade Union Congress (1961-1971)", Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Singapore, 1973/74, pp. 1-2. Teo Kah Beng, "Towards an Explanation of Trade Union Membership: A Study of Singapore's National Trade Union Congress, 1961-1979", unpublished B. Soc. Science Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Singapore, 1979/80, pp. 24-26. When the STUC was first formed, 28 out of a total of 107 trade unions in Singapore were affiliated to it. The membership of the 28 unions was 24,000 and that of the 107 was 58,300. At the time of the general elections in April 1955, the number of affiliates of the STUC had increased to more than 40. Cf. Singapore Labour Department, *Annual Report, 1951*, (Singapore, 1952), p. 6. Cited in Ang Li Choo, op. cit., p. 5. *TyP*, no. 52, editorial.
- 113 "Election — Legislative Council", pt. 5, Folio (352), p. 1. This document considers the LF to be a right-wing socialist party. *IJ*, no. 12/1954, David Marshall's "Who's Who"; no. 6/1955, A.J. Braga's "Who's Who"; no. 6/1955, Chew Swee Kee's "Who's Who"; no. 6/1955, Lim Chuan Ho's "Who's Who"; no. 7/1955, J.M. Jumabhoy's "Who's Who"; no. 7/1955, A.R. Lazarous's "Who's Who"; no. 7/1955, Mak Pak Shee's "Who's Who"; no. 7/1955, Lee Choon Eng's "Who's Who"; no. 7/1955, Seah Peng Chuan's "Who's Who"; no. 7/1955, Tan Theng Chiang's "Who's Who"; no. 8/1955, Lim Yew Hock's "Who's Who"; and no. 9/1954, Francis Thomas's "Who's Who". All the persons mentioned here were the leaders of the LF.
- 114 *PAP 1960*, pp. 11-12. *PAP 1964*, pp. 204-205. *IJ*, no. 12/1954, David Marshall's "Who's Who", p. 2; no. 8/1955, Lim Yew Hock's "Who's Who", pp. 3-4; and no. 4/1955, Supplement no. 1, p. 44. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 114 & 122. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., p. 253.
- 115 *IJ*, no. 6/1954, Lee Kuan Yew's "Who's Who", p. 5; no. 9/1954, Francis Thomas's "Who's Who", p. 3; no. 11/1954, K.M. Byrne's "Who's Who", p. 3; no. 12/1954, David Marshall's "Who's Who", p. 2; no. 1/1955, Goh Keng Swee's "Who's Who", p. 4; no. 8/1955, Lim Yew Hock's "Who's Who", pp. 2-4; and no. 4/1955, Supplement no. 1, p. 44. *LAD*, vol. 2, col. 581. *PAP 1960*, pp. 11-12. *PAP 1964*, pp. 204-205. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 111-114. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., pp. 238-239 & 253.
- 116 *IJ*, no. 12/1954, David Marshall's "Who's Who", p. 2.
- 117 *TyP*, no. 48, p. 3, article 1; no. 52, editorial; and no. 55, p. 2, article 2.
- 118 Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 111-113. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., pp. 238-239. *PAP 1960*, p. 11. *PAP 1964*, p. 204. *IJ*, no. 1/1955, paragraph 33. "Election — Legislative Council", pt. 5, Folio (352).
- 119 Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 105-109. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., pp. 238-239. David Marshall, op. cit., p. 5. *IJ*, no. 8/1955, Lim Yew Hock's "Who's Who", p. 2.
- 120 P. 3, article 1.

- 121 "Election — Legislative Council", pt. 5, Folio (407)¹. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., p. 274, Table 17. Pang Cheng Lian, op. cit., appendix "A". T.J. Bellows, op. cit., p. 192, appendix 2.
- 122 David Marshall, op. cit., p. 7.
- 123 Entitled "Ai-kuo Yün-tung ti Chin-i-pu Chan-k'ai, Ying-ti Kai-liang Ch'i-p'ien ti Ts'an-chung Shih-pai (A Further Step in the Unfolding of the Patriotic Movement and the Disastrous Failure of the Reformist Deception of the British Imperialists)", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 60, editorial).
- 124 P. 3, article 3.
- 125 "HS". *PAP 1960*, p. 14. *PAP 1964*, p. 205. David Marshall, op. cit., p. 7. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., p. 267. Pang Cheng Lian, op. cit., p. 2. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., pp. 257–258. *IJ*, no. 2/1955, paragraph 65; & no. 4/1955, Supplement no. 1, p. 45. "Capture", p. 8. *PAP 1960*, p. 14 & *PAP 1964*, p. 205 state that there was one opinion in the PAP which did not favour this Party contesting the elections. This opinion advocated boycott instead. The general understanding is that this opinion was that of the Communists in the Party. This understanding, however, is erroneous because the CPM was interested in the constitutional process. One of the strategies of the open united front struggle was taking advantage of the constitutional process. The boycott policy was only the thought of some of those who had been members of the SPABL but not yet of the CPM. Two of these were J.J. Puthucherry and C.V. Devan Nair.
- 126 *TyP*, no. 82, February 1957, p. 2, article entitled "I Ch'ieh-shih, Chū-t'i Hsing-tung Chien-li Hsing-chou Tso-p'ai T'ung-i Chan-hsien (To Establish the United Front of the Left-Wing in Singapore with Practical and Concrete Action)". *IJ*, no. 1/1955, paragraph 21E; no. 2/1955, paragraph 55^F; no. 3/1955, paragraph 90, 90^A & 98; no. 3/1955, Supplement no. 1, p. 45. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 267–268.
- 127 *TyP*, no. 60, editorial. *Sing Cmd 33 of 1957*, p. 6. Ong Chit Chung, op. cit., pp. 63–64. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 270–271 & 276–277. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., p. 258.
- 128 As mentioned earlier, of all the political parties, the *TyP* hit the hardest at the DP. *PAP 1960*, pp. 14–15. *PAP 1964*, pp. 205–206.
- 129 David Marshall, op. cit., p. 7.
- 130 *TyP*, no. 60, April 1955, p. 1, article entitled "Chieh-ch'uan T'ou-chi Chêng-k'è ti Tsou-kou Mien-mu, Chêng-ch'ü Shih-hsien Ai-kuo K'ou-hao (Expose the Running-dog Face of the Opportunist Politicians and Struggle Hard to Realise the Patriotic Slogans)". Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., pp. 61–62. C. Mary Turnbull, op. cit., p. 258. John Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 103–104.
- 131 David Marshall, op. cit., p. 8.
- 132 See note 123 above for the original Chinese title.
- 133 See note 130 above for title in original Chinese.
- 134 The original Chinese title of the third article was "Po-ch'ih Kuo-chia-kai-liang-chu-i-che ti Miu-lun".

III

Rapid Growth

There were three important developments during Marshall's Chief Ministership from April 1955 to June 1956. One was the rapid growth of the various Communist mass organisations, the second was the appearance of divisions within the ranks of the PAP and the third was conflict between Marshall and the British.

The various Communist mass organisations expanded with great vigour at this time. The British were prepared to meet this challenge with strong measures, but Marshall stayed their hand. At first, the Communists resorted even to violence to further their activities. However, when confronted with British toughness, they put a curb on themselves. The British and Marshall had two ultimate checks against the expansion of the Communist movement: the enactment of the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance (PPSO) and other security laws which replaced the Emergency Regulations, and their refusal to give legal recognition to the CPM. In these two things, the British and Marshall took a common stand.

The violence perpetrated by the Communists in their expansionary efforts brought about division between the two wings in the PAP. This however, was eventually overcome and the united front was preserved.

The conflict between Marshall and the British was over two issues. Firstly, Marshall sought to improve his position and powers *vis-à-vis* the British within the framework of the Rendel Constitution. Secondly, he wanted the British to give Singapore a new and better constitution altogether. In his struggles against the British, Marshall was solidly supported by the CPM.

The Communists Moved Forward

Confrontations and Growth in the Labour Movement

Unlike the situation before the general elections, the labour movement was now beset with the sharpest conflicts between the contending parties. Later, the antagonisms became milder as the Communists realised that excessive intransigence displayed by both parties would be more counter-productive for themselves than the British. In 1955, nearly 300 strikes broke out in the island. One of these, which took place in the Hock Lee

Bus Company, sparked riots in the city. However, in another confrontation, which followed soon after in the harbour area, the Communists moderated their posture and there was no ensuing violence.¹

The Hock Lee dispute involved the Communists and the management of the bus company which had a Kuomintang background,² the non-Communists in the PAP, the British, and David Marshall and his Ministers. The Communists and the management of the company both adopted hard attitudes. The non-Communists in the PAP went along with the Communists until violence broke out and then dissociated themselves from the violence. This difference between the Communists and the non-Communists in the PAP will be discussed fully in a later section. The British gave full backing to the management of the bus company. David Marshall displayed more sympathy for the workers than for the employers and in fact secured a settlement of the dispute more in favour of the former than of the latter. Marshall refused to co-operate fully with the British and was interested in drawing away the support of the workers from the PAP non-Communists to his LF.

The violence occurred between the afternoon of 12 May and the morning of 13 May, the anniversary of the day when students and the police clashed over the issue of National Service. The decision to bring about fighting between 12 and 13 May on this occasion was made with reference to the previous disturbances and with an eye to its mobilisational effect.

In February 1955, Fong Swee Suan, Secretary of the SBWU, managed to persuade three-quarters of the workers in the Hock Lee Bus Company to form themselves into a branch of the SBWU. He simultaneously secured a victory in a strike for the workers in the Paya Lebar Bus Company. In March, the *TyP*, when reporting and commenting upon the successful outcome of the struggle in the Paya Lebar Bus Company, gave advice to the owners of other bus companies not to stand together with the British but with the workers. The same article was reprinted in the April issue to drive the point home.³

The management of Hock Lee responded forcefully to the challenge of the Communists. A week before the SBWU branch could be formed, it dismissed from service two of its employees who were actually responsible for forming that branch. When that branch was eventually established, the management proceeded to organise a rival union to counter it. Action was also taken to recruit redundant workers into a reserve pool so that they could take over operating the buses should the members of the SBWU branch go on strike. The rival union comprised these spare workers and a few of the old workers who had not joined the SBWU branch.⁴

The first series of disputes between the employees and the employers then followed. The former demanded, among other things, the reinstatement of their dismissed colleagues. Notice to strike to back up all these demands was also served on the employers. On 4 April, however, the two sides reached an agreement and the quarrel was resolved for the time being.⁵

The second round of disputes soon began, however, when two clauses in the agreement were interpreted differently. In the first place, nine persons were refused any increment in salary by the management when they were supposed to have been given such consideration by the agreement. Secondly, two workers without tenure who had the greatest seniority were refused emplacement on the permanent establishment when they were thought to be entitled to such treatment.⁶

A confrontation consequently shaped up. On 22 April, the leftist workers served notice on the employers that they would go on strike in a fortnight's time. In retaliation, on 24 April, the employers informed the workers that they were dismissed from employment. The leftist workers reacted to the dismissal notice by going on strike immediately.⁷

On the morning of 25 April, members of the rival union tried to take the buses out of the depot. Members of the SBWU branch, however, formed themselves into a human barrier at the gate of the depot with arms and legs interlocked. The management called in the police to clear the pickets. When the police arrived, the strikers gave up their attempt to stop the buses from leaving the depot. The next morning, the same pattern of struggle was repeated. On 27 April, however, the pickets refused to disperse on the arrival of the police. The police then tried to pull them away, but the effort did not succeed. The ordinary police were next replaced by men from the Reserve Unit. A fight between the two sides ensued. The human barrier was eventually broken up. Throughout the rest of the day there were large crowds of strikers, sympathisers and students outside the depot, who carried out an intensive propaganda campaign against their enemies. David Marshall's government immediately appointed a Commission of Inquiry to look into the facts and circumstances of the dispute.⁸

For the next ten days, large crowds of strikers, sympathisers and students carried out "indignation" meetings at the depot. These assemblies numbered in the thousands. David Marshall tried to bring about a settlement between the strikers and the management of Hock Lee. On 1 May, Labour Day, there was a rally which was attended by 8,000 workers and 2,000 students. Fong Swee Suan mentioned in a speech to the gathering that bloodshed was inevitable in a revolution. The occasion exacerbated hostile feelings. After the meeting the participants marched

in a procession to the Hock Lee Bus depot to visit the strikers. Finally, on 5 May, an agreement was reached. The Commission of Inquiry ruled that all the dismissed workers should be reinstated. The routes of the Hock Lee buses would be divided into two sections. One section would be operated by two-thirds of the members of the SBWU branch and the other by one-third of the members of the rival union.⁹ The decision of the Commission of Inquiry closed the second round in the conflict between the employees and the employers of the Hock Lee Bus Company.

On the morning of 6 May, members of the SBWU branch returned to work. At this juncture, the management required each of them to fill in forms to register for employment again. Information such as name, badge number and the particular bus the person was on were asked for. The workers disliked the procedure. They refused to run the buses and went on strike again.¹⁰

On 10 May, as on the previous occasion, the strikers formed a human barrier at the gate of the bus depot to prevent members of the rival union from taking the buses out into the streets. After having failed to persuade the pickets to disperse, the police broke them up with water from fire hoses, injuring a number of them.¹¹ The following day, the SBWU branch members again blockaded the exit of the depot but gave up the effort when the police arrived to deal with them. Propaganda against the enemies continued until the next day.¹² On the morning of 12 May, the striking workers repeated their obstruction. The police at first urged them to leave, but when they refused to listen, police again used water to scatter them. Following this, the crowd gathered around and attacked the police with stones and bricks. Three of the buses which left the depot were also damaged by missiles and had to return. The propaganda campaign of the leftists continued.¹³

In the afternoon, the Hock Lee buses which were run by members of the rival union were attacked en route. Finally, all members of the rival union were intimidated into stopping the buses running altogether. Large crowds of strikers, other workers and students gathered in the area of the bus depot. The police expected riots. A system of road blocks was established throughout Singapore island, including the danger area, to prevent possible rioters from coming in and joining the hostile crowds. Despite this, large numbers of people managed to infiltrate into the depot area on foot. A strong police guard was posted at the depot and mobile squads were deployed within the danger area to handle individual attacks on property. In the late afternoon, fighting broke out between the two sides and worsened after nightfall. The struggle lasted until the early hours of the next morning. The rioters attacked the police with stones, bottles and sticks. On occasions, the mobs were as large as a thousand persons.

Vehicles were also attacked and set on fire. The police counter-attacked the rioters with tear-gas and sometimes with firearms. Arrests were also made and a curfew was declared.¹⁴

Among the casualties of the riots was a Chinese school student. After he was wounded by a stray bullet, some of the rioters carried him around town so as to incite the feelings of the people and generate support for the left-wing movement. The boy later died. The Communists then planned to turn his funeral and internment into a large-scale demonstration. This, however, was frustrated. The boy was later buried in a grave next to that of Lim Ah Liang, who was a leading Communist in the late 1940s. Lim had suffered injuries in riots against the British in February 1946 and had also been put into jail. He died in August 1947, shortly after being released from prison, and it was rumoured that his death was due to poisoning prior to his departure from prison. Lim was held as a great martyr in the Communist movement.¹⁵

Following the riots, the workers of ten of the other 11 bus companies on the island all went on strike in sympathy with the Hock Lee strikers. Public transport came to a standstill.¹⁶

According to one source, at the very outset of the dispute, the British advised David Marshall to have the leftist labour leaders arrested, but Marshall declined to accept the advice.¹⁷ At the height of the disturbances, it was also suggested to him that he should make a request to the Governor to call in troops to restore order when necessary. However, he refused also to accept this suggestion, on the grounds that a decision to use troops would not be made by him but by the Governor, and the security information on which such a decision would be based would also not be divulged to him but made known only to the Governor.¹⁸

Whilst Marshall, on the one hand, declined to co-operate absolutely with the British, on the other, he secured a settlement of the dispute completely in favour of the members of the SBWU branch. On 14 May, the agreement was reached and its terms were:

1. The rival trade union should be dissolved;
2. The strikers should all be reinstated in their employment; and
3. The Commission of Inquiry should be dissolved.¹⁹

The Hock Lee incident was a serious confrontation between the Communist movement and its opponents. The *TyP* commented upon it in an editorial in issue no. 61. The newspaper considered the struggle to be a success for the Communists because through it, the workers in Singapore had become more united; because it had developed from being a fight only against employers into a fight also against the Government, that is, from being simply an economic struggle it had developed into a

political one; because the masses had dared to match force with force; and because the strikers secured a complete victory in the dispute. The *TyP* warned at the same time, however, that the Hock Lee success did not mean that further struggles ahead for the Communists would be easy. On the contrary, the future would be even more stormy. Advice was also given that struggle attitudes in the future should not be too leftist.

The British were highly irritated by the event. The new Legislative Assembly under the Rendal Constitution first met on 22 August. Just before this, following a request by Marshall, the Governor had revoked a number of the Emergency Regulations which were designed to control riots and demonstrations, including No. 6, which gave power to the police to impose curfews. On 27 August, less than a year before the Hock Lee riots, the revocations were confirmed by the Assembly. At the outbreak of the riots, the Governor restored the power of the police to impose curfews and, as seen, one was immediately imposed. On 16 May, on the motion of the Chief Secretary, the Assembly readopted Emergency Regulation No. 6.²⁰

In May 1955, other than the troubles in the Hock Lee Bus Company, there were disputes between employees and employers in other places. For instance, there were strikes in the Singapore Harbour Board and the Alexandra Brickworks. During the Hock Lee dispute, workers of other bus companies had stopped work in sympathy with the members of the SBWU branch. Similarly, sympathy strikes had broken out in support of original strikes in work places other than Hock Lee. In the end, the number of persons involved in sympathy strikes totalled 20,000. After the battle at Hock Lee had been successfully concluded, the Communists followed up with a plan to bring out more than 100,000 persons on sympathy strikes. To realise this, they aimed to make use of the conflict then going on in the Singapore Harbour Board (SHB) between the board management and the Singapore Harbour Board Staff Association (SHBSA). In 1955, the labour force in Singapore was nearly 300,000 and almost 140,000 of these were unionised. If 100,000 persons could be made to take industrial action, then the mobilisation effect of the campaign would be very great. The SHBSA was mainly an English-speaking and white-collar trade union, and was controlled and influenced by the PAP non-Communists and not the Communists. However, the Communists made a decision to come to the assistance of this union with their own unions and generate the mammoth strikes.²¹

The quarrel at the harbour, as elsewhere, was over the demands of workers for better pay and conditions of service. Claims were submitted to the SHB by the SHBSA at the beginning of 1955. Negotiations then followed, but they were inconclusive. On 30 April, the SHBSA went on strike. Some of the claims had been outstanding for some time.²²

The strike dragged on for more than a month. Then, on 8 June, the SFSWU, headed by Lim Chin Siong, announced to the public that all its members would go on strike for one day on 13 June in sympathy with the SHBSA if the Government did not intervene to settle the dispute. Two days later, the SBWU led by Fong Swee Suan and the Federation of Coastal Workers also issued the same threat. There were indications that the threatened one-day strike would be extended if the demands of the SHBSA were not met. The strike would have affected the operations of the postal service and all passenger transport.²³

Reacting to the coercion, Marshall invited Lim Chin Siong and two of his close associates to a talk. He urged them to help bring a settlement to the conflict, to which the group agreed. However, immediately after the meeting, Lim and the other two paid a visit to the strikers. They addressed the strikers and urged them to stand firm in their struggle. On the following day, one of the three, in a private meeting, urged the Secretary of the SHBSA to call off the strike. The latter, however, refused to heed this advice.²⁴

In view of what transpired during Lim Chin Siong's visit to the strikers, David Marshall summoned him and his friends to another meeting on the night of 11 June. Marshall attacked the group for breaking their promise. He then suggested to them that they should cancel the threatened sympathy strike and he, on his part, would get the SHB to reopen negotiations with the SHBSA and see that the latter obtain a fair deal. Lim was amenable to Marshall's proposal because he was aware that the British would not let him get away with the strike if it took place. The agreement reached between the two sides was broadcast over the radio on the same night.²⁵

Before the meeting broke up, however, Marshall took leave to see the British authorities. He left and returned twice before informing Lim and his friends that the British would take punitive action against them in spite of the agreement which they had just concluded with him.²⁶

According to Marshall himself, the British had wanted to use "truncheons and bullets" against the Communists. They had planned also to arrest 200 persons. Marshall had urged moderation, however. In the end, there was no bloodshed and only seven persons were arrested.²⁷ These seven persons were arrested between 11 and 13 June, one of them being Fong Swee Suan. On the night of 11 June, the premises of the SFSWU were also searched by a police raiding party.²⁸

In response to this, in the afternoon of the 12 June, the SBWU got all bus workers to go on strike. The next day, the SFSWU also got most of its union members to down tools and the members of the Federation of Coastal Workers, except those of one of its affiliates, came out on strike too. According to the police, 16,000 persons stopped work, but the

Communists put the number at 60,000 or 70,000. The Communists declared that the strike would go on until the detained persons were released or brought to trial.²⁹ On 16 June, Marshall announced that the cases of the detainees would be fully considered during the two weeks following the arrests, in accordance with stipulations in the Emergency Regulations.³⁰

Lim Chin Siong called off the strike the following day. The reason, according to police reports, was that some of the unions were not fully supporting the strikes. The Malay and Indian members of the Singapore Traction Company Employees' Union (STCEU) were especially keen to resume work. Only the Chinese members wished to carry on. However, when terminating the strikes, Lim and his friends stated that the fight would resume if the detained comrades were not released or brought to trial within a fortnight from their arrest.³¹

In keeping with his promise, Marshall dealt speedily with the case of the arrested persons. On 24 June, four of the seven were released unconditionally. On 30 June, one was tried in court and sentenced to several years' imprisonment for possession of CPM documents and proscribed publications. In July, Fong Swee Suan and, in October, the last person were also set free without conditions.³² A settlement was also reached on the original conflict at the harbour between the SHBSA and the SHB,³³ bringing to an end the great confrontation of June 1955.

Unlike the Hock Lee incident, the struggle in June 1955 was not as much of a success as the Communists had wished it to be. Lim Chin Siong was prepared not to have the 100,000 workers called out when he obtained an agreement from Marshall that the SHB would be persuaded to be less hostile against the SHBSA. This was a back-down. Then, after the British security action had eventually triggered him into launching the strikes, he had them called off after only a few days. This was something of a defeat.

The reason for Lim's initial compromise with Marshall, as mentioned already, was the preparedness of the British Government to ban his unions as well as to arrest people. The aim of any struggle of the Communists at this time, to reiterate, was to build up the mass organisations and accumulate strength. Any course of action which would serve to frustrate rather than promote the fulfilment of this objective had to be discarded. This was why Lim and his comrades had to become less ambitious in June than they had been in May.³⁴ Another factor was that after the strikes had broken out, they did not enjoy the unquestioning and wholehearted support of all the workers. The purpose of having strikes was to get those involved interested in them. If this could not be achieved, then there would be no point in having strikes.³⁵

Nevertheless, the efforts in June seemed not to have been entirely in vain. The labour movement did expand because of the strife. It was reported that after the disturbances, workers of many commercial and industrial establishments joined the unions. Also, before the strike, the STCEU was controlled by persons who were opposed to the Communists. Now, these were voted out of the committee of the union and replaced by leftists.³⁶

Yet another result of the June campaign was the unconditional release of six of the seven persons who were arrested in connection with it. The Communists felt this to be a great victory, as was stated by the *TyP* in issue no. 62, published in June. By the end of June, only four persons had actually come out of jail, but the *TyP* was already happy. The paper explained that a victory was won because the release of the persons was the first of its kind to happen. Never before had persons arrested under the Emergency Regulations been let out of prison unconditionally: the Government had succumbed to pressure from the Communist movement.³⁷

The CPM seemed to be not altogether dissatisfied with the outcome of the June engagement. How, on the other hand, did the British authorities feel about it? Was the struggle a success or a failure to them? There is no evidence to suggest any answer to these questions. However, it may be assumed that they could not have been too happy about Marshall's softness towards the Communists.

The moderation of attitudes in the open united front which appeared in June 1955 persisted after that date. The experience in that month gave indications that the extremism which had been followed since the anti-National Service movement in 1954 might now be counter-productive. For the sake of long-term success, there must be patience in work for the time being. Because of this view on the part of the Communists, for the rest of Marshall's Chief Ministership, except in March 1956, incidents like the Hock Lee riots did not occur again. In March 1956, a gathering at Kallang Airport to demonstrate support for Marshall in his struggle for constitutional concessions from the British brought about fighting between demonstrators and the police. However, as will be explained later, the violence this time was only a spontaneous outburst of the crowd and was not the result of machinations by the Communists.

The idea that there should be caution and vigilance in the march forward was conveyed to members of the Party in *Hsioh*, no. 11 of June 1955.³⁸ Meetings of underground cells discussed the matter.³⁹ In August as well as in September, the editorials of no. 64 and no. 65 of the *TyP* reiterated the policy.⁴⁰

The *Hsioh* and the *TyP* were read only by members and sympathisers

of the CPM and the SPABL.⁴¹ In the open, the message of restraint was also urged on all members of the various legal organisations. For instance, in August, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the SFSWU, Lim Chin Siong told workers in a speech that they must not stage irresponsible strikes against employers. An assistant of Lim spoke too and advised that a moderate approach should be adopted in two industrial disputes which were then in progress in the Singapore Traction Company and in the Singapore Cold Storage.⁴²

The SBWU branch in the Hock Lee Bus Company might have created great disturbances in Singapore in May 1955, but it was not the most important part of the Communist labour movement in the island. Neither was its parent body, the SBWU itself. At that time the SHBSA was the cause of another conflict, but this union was even further away from the centre than the SBWU. The most important unit of all the left-wing trade unions at this time was the SFSWU, which also had the most impressive growth rate.

The SFSWU expanded by establishing branches in production centres wherever appropriate. A new branch was created in the following way. Firstly, the SFSWU would despatch field organisers to make contact with the workers in a production centre which had been targeted for penetration. Contacts could also be established by the workers themselves taking action to get in touch with the SFSWU. The next step after contact had been made was calling a meeting of all the workers of the production centre, at which leaders of the SFSWU would make speeches. At the same time, demands for better wages and conditions of service, which were to be presented to the management, would be submitted to the gathering for approval. This was followed by negotiations with the employer about the demands. The workers might adopt go-slow tactics to strengthen their hand. If an employer was tough, the go-slow might even develop into a strike. Finally the settlement of the dispute took place. During the process of the struggle, the branch union was set up. It was in this way that the SFSWU expanded.⁴³ This method of development was in fact used not only by the SFSWU but also by the other left-wing unions, which by their nature could develop branches. An example of these other unions was the SBWU.

Thus, the SFSWU enlarged itself. By March 1956, it had established more than 100 branches in various production centres. It was reported that it had subsidiaries in such places as rubber-works, sawmills, tin factories, cement works, leather works, quarries, bakeries, biscuit factories, mee hoon factories, packing-case factories, building and construction works, sago mills and sago transport, and tinned-goods and aerated-water factories.⁴⁴ The growth of the SFSWU could also be seen in the ever

enlarging figure of its total membership. In March 1955, when Lim Chin Siong first became its Secretary, membership was only 1,354. By 22 June, it had grown to 16,018, by 12 July 19,103 and by August 23,000. By August the following year it had reached 37,000.⁴⁵

The fact that the SFSWU was the core of all the left-wing trade unions could be seen from its size as compared with those of the other unions. In March 1956 the SFSWU had 32,000 members. At the time there were five fellow unions which were very sympathetic and 13 others sympathetic to it. The total membership of the first group was 6,000 and that of the second was 46,050. Thus, the SFSWU had more than one-third of all the strength of the whole left-wing labour movement.⁴⁶

In the Communist labour movement, for individual unions to set up branches was only one way of increasing its strength. Another way of developing the power of the movement was to foster unity among the various member unions. Unity could be promoted through unified influence or control. The highest ideal, in fact, was to have unity not only among one's own unions but also between one's own unions and those of others. This could be achieved through the technique of the united front.

An opportunity which enabled the Communists to establish unified influence or control over their own unions, and a united front between these and other unions came in the latter part of 1955. At that time, Marshall's administration enacted new security legislation to replace the Emergency Regulations. These new laws were even more repressive of the activities of the CPM than the old ones. The CPM mounted a protest campaign against the change which was successful in terms of the building of the mass movement.

In August 1955, the new security bills were introduced in the Legislative Assembly for first reading. On 18 September, before the second reading of the bills, representatives of 95 trade unions met to initiate the protest campaign. A committee was set up for the purpose called "The Singapore Trade Union Working Committee Representing 95 Trade Unions in Opposition to the Public Security Legislation and the Trade Disputes Ordinance", or in short, the Singapore Trade Union Working Committee (STUWC). This committee had 11 members.⁴⁷ The 95 unions comprised both mother and branch organisations. Although the STUWC made the claim that it represented 95 unions, the authorities doubted that it actually had such a strong following. According to the *TyP*, the 95 unions had a total membership of more than 80,000 workers.⁴⁸

The protest campaign was a vigorous one. In the afternoon of the same day the STUWC was set up, the PAP held a rally in Farrer Park to demonstrate against the new bills. Thousands of people participated.⁴⁹ On

21 September, when the bills were read a second time in the Legislative Assembly, a large crowd of people picketed the Assembly to protest the bills.⁵⁰ From 3-9 October, the STUWC staged a protest week, during which five public meetings were held in various places in the island at which strong speeches were made.⁵¹ On 12 October, the Legislative Assembly met again to pass the bills. The left-wing trade unions called a ten-minute strike among workers when the Assembly opened. On this occasion, vehicles, factories and trade union premises also hung out black banners or flew black flags at half mast as a sign of mourning.⁵²

After the bills had become law, the STUWC agitated for their repeal. On 5 November, the Movement for Colonial Freedom in England held a conference at Margate. Delegates from the PAP attended the meeting and tabled three resolutions, one of which called for the repeal of the new laws.⁵³

The STUWC was created to stop the new security bills from becoming laws, but it failed to achieve this aim. The STUWC was also founded for the purpose of bringing greater unity to the labour movement through securing better co-ordination among the left-wing unions and promoting a united front between these unions and other unions. In this second objective, it achieved success.

Hitherto, co-ordination and liaison between the left-wing unions were secured through the agency of some of the leaders of the SFSWU, who were also holding responsible positions in other unions. With the establishment of the STUWC, the overall machinery to link up the various unions came into existence. Also, in the past, the SFSWU group of trade unions were not associated with unions outside its orbit. However, with the setting up of the STUWC, both the SFSWU group of unions and some of these other unions became members of this body. Thus, an association was built up between the two groups of unions.⁵⁴ The Communists were pleased with the success of the STUWC. The *TyP* stated that the new security laws had brought unity to more than 80,000 workers.⁵⁵

The Communists did not stop with the STUWC in their expansionary efforts. In the month following the establishment of the STUWC, they took steps to bring the Trade Union Congress, which was the mass base of the LF, into their sphere of influence as well. The STUWC approached the TUC to merge into one body. The STUWC wished to fuse with the TUC because this was in conformity with the overall struggle policy of the united front. Another factor which came into the picture was that the TUC and not the STUWC was the mainstream in the trade union movement in Singapore, by virtue of its being allied with the Government. The STUWC desired to replace the TUC as the leader of all trade unions

in the island.⁵⁶ At this point, the STUWC was numerically stronger than the TUC. The TUC led only 44 unions and 40,000 workers.⁵⁷ The greater strength of the STUWC gave it inspiration to embark upon aggressive designs.

In October 1955, the STUWC first approached the TUC to amalgamate all trade unions in Singapore under one central leadership in order to form a federation of Singapore trade unions. The TUC gave consideration to the proposal but in November it reached a unanimous decision to reject the offer. Simultaneously, it continued its expansionary policy of recruiting more workers into its fold through building new unions to blunt the thrust of the STUWC.⁵⁸ In December, the STUWC reopened negotiations with the TUC. During the months which followed, talks continued. At one point, the STUWC threatened that, if the TUC was still not responsive, it would set itself up as an independent federation of trade unions and obtain Government recognition. This threat, however, was not carried out and the STUWC continued trying to woo the TUC into submission.⁵⁹

In April, David Marshall took an all-party delegation to London to negotiate with the British home government for a new constitution for Singapore. The PAP was a member of the delegation. In a joint meeting between the STUWC and the TUC on 17 March, a resolution was passed to request that David Marshall take one representative each from the STUWC and the TUC with him to London for the constitutional talks. The meeting, called "A National Convention of Trade Unions" was convened as a demonstration in support of Marshall's mission,⁶⁰ and an attempt to help the merger negotiations. The Chief Minister, however, declined the request.⁶¹ On 1 May, a joint celebration of Labour Day was held in the morning.⁶² In the afternoon, the SFSWU and its allied unions held a separate function for the occasion and at this meeting the president of the SFSWU attacked the TUC unions as bogus champions of the workers.⁶³ These were obstacles to the merger talks.

In the eyes of the STUWC, the greatest difficulty standing in the way of a fusion between itself and the TUC was the refusal of the latter to amend its constitution so as to allow representation of the different unions in the central authority to be determined on the basis of the respective sizes of these unions, rather than on a basis of equality among the unions, regardless of what membership each had.⁶⁴ The TUC refused to budge on this point because the left-wing unions were larger than its unions. Up to the end of Marshall's administration, the plan of the STUWC to absorb the TUC was a failure.

When Marshall resigned from office, the Communist-controlled/influenced labour movement in Singapore had become a force of great

consequence. Even as early as August 1955, it was reported that the SFSWU had arrived at a point where, to some extent, it could disrupt the economic life of Singapore and cause great inconvenience to the vast majority of the population. The action of SFSWU members could affect the port, passenger and goods transport, the rubber processing industry, the supply of foodstuffs, especially European foodstuffs, and a variety of major and minor industries. The SFSWU also had the strength to provoke riots.⁶⁵

Victories in the Student Movement

During Marshall's Chief Ministership, the student movement also made further progress.

The first gain which the students achieved was a successful resistance against Marshall's attempt to punish them for the part they played in the Hock Lee disturbances. The riots occurred on 12-13 May. Immediately following this, the Government issued the following orders:

1. The Chinese High School and the Chung Cheng High School, the two most important Chinese schools, should be closed for one week as from 14 May;
2. The Management Committee of these two schools, which were the responsible authorities, should show cause why their schools should not be deregistered; and
3. The Principals of the two schools were to dismiss a list of trouble-making students whose names would be supplied to them by the Government.⁶⁶

The students of the two schools protested against the orders. On 18 May, they began camp-ins in their schools. In Chinese High, there were 1,000 students and in Chung Cheng, 600. The assembly in each school was organised by a Committee for the Protection of Chinese Education.⁶⁷

During the stay-ins, the students in the two schools were visited by students from other schools as well as workers. The visitors came with monetary contributions. Lim Chin Siong also put in an appearance in Chinese High and caused the assembly there to pass a number of resolutions, one of which called for the repeal of the Emergency Regulations and another for the non-expulsion or victimisation of students. Through him too, a Parents' Friendly Association, later also known as the Singapore Chinese School Parents' Association, was formed, which was to mobilise parents or guardians to support the cause of the students.⁶⁸

Marshall could have come down on the students with force. However, as in the bus riots and the June sympathy strikes, he was not interested in

doing so. Again, the British refused to give him security information about the assemblies of the students, and he was of the opinion that the police were caught by surprise by the move and did not know how to cope. He felt that the use of an unprepared police force would result in bloodshed to a dangerous extent. This would breed ill-will against his Government and he would lose electoral support.⁶⁹

Instead of taking repressive measures against the students, Marshall got the Legislative Assembly to set up an All-Party Enquiry Commission on Chinese Education to look into the whole problem of Chinese education and make recommendations. The Commission made the suggestion that, pending its findings, the previous orders of the Government to deregister the schools and to expel students be laid aside. Marshall accepted the suggestion.⁷⁰ So the conflict ended in favour of the students. In the Chinese High School, before they broke up, the students staged a victory parade in the school compound.⁷¹ The CPM was pleased with the success of the students.⁷²

Another victory which the students achieved during Marshall's time was the registration of the SCMSSU. During the general elections in April 1955, Marshall had made an agreement with the students that, if they supported him, he would register the SCMSSU if he came into power. The students had given him assistance and now Marshall was obliged to fulfil his promise.⁷³

Marshall faced a difficult problem. If he failed to keep his word, it would create a bad impression of him. On the other hand, if he simply registered the SCMSSU, he would displease the British as well as create trouble for the future. Marshall's way out of the dilemma was to allow the SCMSSU to be registered, but impose upon it a condition so that it should not become a political instrument of the CPM. This condition was that it would not participate in politics or industrial disputes.⁷⁴

The students were not happy with the proposed restriction and for months they held out against it. Finally, however, the CPM gave instructions that the condition be accepted, on the understanding that it could be contravened if and when necessary.⁷⁵ In October 1955, after the students had submitted to the wishes of the Government, their union was registered.⁷⁶

The President of the new organisation was Sun Loh Boon. Sun was not a member of the CPM, but a number of those around him were, such as Ong Gwo Chyun, a Vice-President.⁷⁷ The registration of the SCMSSU was a great step forward for the Communist-led student movement as it gave it the opportunity to engage more easily in development activities. This was possible because such activities could now be carried out in an open and lawful manner.

Gains in the Other Sectors of the Communist Movement

Between 1954 and 1955, the Communists further developed their contact with the rural population on the island. Besides the SWHDA, a new organisation to mobilise the farmers was founded. In June 1955, Lim Chin Siong applied to the Government for the registration of a Singapore Farmers' Association (SFA). The registration was granted two months later.⁷⁸

The SFA and the SWHDA carried out a programme of activities that promoted the interests or welfare of the countryside people, which at times was anti-Government or anti-landlord in nature.⁷⁹ There were floods in October 1955 and more extensive ones in January the next year. These events engendered a great deal of propaganda against the Government.⁸⁰ There were cases of demolition of pig sties by landlords and affected persons were agitated to put up a struggle.⁸¹ For purposes of developing the island, the Government had evicted families from their farms and houses. The SFA fought for compensation for such displacements.⁸² Efforts were also made to secure legal rights to land which the rural folk had been squatting upon.⁸³ At the time, the Government had a plan, called the Master Plan, for the overall improvement of the island. This, if implemented without modification, would cause the countryside population serious difficulties. A strong protest movement was mounted by the two rural associations against the plan.⁸⁴

The activities of the two organisations generated growth in memberships. The SFA expanded by opening branches in different parts of the island, and so did the SWHDA. The former opened its first branch in January 1956, and within three months had seven branches.⁸⁵ The membership of the SFA was probably 5,000 by March 1956 and that of the SWHDA was similar.⁸⁶ The two rural organisations also took measures to develop unity between themselves. In June 1956, they set up a joint action committee to manage opposition against the Government's Master Plan.⁸⁷

The labour movement was founded on the basis of class and the student movement on the basis of occupational status; the rural organisations were created on the basis of class as well as residential criteria. There was at the time another mass movement which came into being on the basis of the kind of activities it carried out. This was the cultural movement.

There were four types of organisation in the cultural movement. The first was old boys' associations (OBAs) or alumnis; the second, societies devoted to the cultivation of the various arts; the third, various publications; and the fourth, educational bodies. The OBAs were actually youth gatherings. However, because the greater part of the activities which they carried out were cultural in nature, they came to be thought of as cultural

bodies. The second and third types were proper cultural organisations. The last type was included because education and culture are closely related subjects.

The cultural activities carried out by the OBAs were aimed at attracting youths to become members. Generally speaking, the activities fell into three categories. The first was recreation for the mind, for example, music and reading; the second recreation for the body, for example, sports and games; and the third, things which were useful like literacy and language classes.⁸⁸ In early 1956, there was a Cheng Hwa OBA which had a choir, a dance group and a basketball team. It also ran Chinese and English tuition classes. This was one case of an OBA carrying out various kinds of cultural activities.⁸⁹ The functions of the second and third types of organisations were distinctly cultural. For instance, there was a Brass Gong Musical Society,⁹⁰ and a *World Bi-Monthly* magazine which put out literary writings such as short stories, poems and reviews.⁹¹ A fourth type of cultural organisation, the educational bodies, were primarily interested in educational matters.⁹²

In 1955-1956, it was not known exactly how many Communist-controlled or influenced OBAs there were.⁹³ There were several of each of the second and third types of cultural organisation,⁹⁴ and there was at least one Communist-controlled educational society.⁹⁵ In March 1956, it was noted that there were altogether 77 left-wing cultural bodies in Singapore. These 77 included the SCMSSU, which was better classified as a student organisation than a cultural one, but which came to be put on the list because it also carried out cultural activities.⁹⁶

As in the case of the trade unions and rural associations, the cultural bodies also made plans to fuse themselves into large organisations so as to foster greater unity in the cultural movement. In September 1955, measures were taken to create a federation of all the OBAs as well as a central body for the second and third types of organisation.⁹⁷ By December, these were already successfully formed.⁹⁸ Following this, the Communists went one step further and took action to bring about unified control of all four types of organisation. In fact, this structure would not limit itself to only the cultural organisations, but would also bring the SCMSSU into its orbit. Eventually, this organ was formed and it was called the Singapore Cultural Society.⁹⁹ The Singapore Cultural Society had 77 constituent members and a probable enrolment of 15,000 persons.¹⁰⁰

During Marshall's Chief Ministership, a women's movement was also created and grew rapidly. There were two organisations in this movement: the Singapore Women's Federation (SWF) and the Women's Section or Women's League of the PAP. The former applied for registration in May 1955 and obtained it a year later.¹⁰¹ The latter was set up in December

1955.¹⁰² The President of the SWF was Chen Mong Hock, a member of the CPM.¹⁰³ This movement set itself the purpose of fighting for the elevation of the status of women. It was interested in such issues as equal pay for equal work and equal opportunities in employment with men, the abolition of polygamy and the protection of mothers and children from want and ignorance.¹⁰⁴ Membership in the two organisations was open to women from all walks of life. Even dance hostesses were welcome to join. Efforts were made to recruit not only among the Chinese-speaking but also the English-educated and the Malays, but these efforts were not entirely successful.¹⁰⁵

Moves were also made to mobilise hawkers and stallholders into the Communist struggle. In July 1955, a meeting of the Singapore Itinerant Hawkers' and Stallholders' Association (SIHSA) was held. Lim Chin Siong spoke at the gathering. Lim's hope was to get all street and market vendors to become members of the association.¹⁰⁶

The PAP at headquarters level, or the level of the Central Executive Committee, was an organ of the united front. At branch level, however, it was a mass organisation. Members of trade unions, student societies, rural associations and other mass movements became members of the PAP by joining its branches.¹⁰⁷ Before the general elections in April 1955, the PAP had no branches. However, immediately after the elections, these subordinate organs began to be set up. By the middle of the year, five units were created,¹⁰⁸ and a year later, the number had increased to ten.¹⁰⁹ In March 1956, the membership of the PAP was estimated to number probably 5,000.¹¹⁰

The *TyP* was quite satisfied with the achievements of the various mass movements during Marshall's time. In an article in issue no. 82 of July 1955, there was a passage which expressed this sentiment. Part of it read:

The workers' movement, the peasant movement, the cultural movement, the women's movement and other mass struggles in Singapore at that time all experienced noticeable growth. A new spirit of life and activeness appeared in the island ...¹¹¹

The Communists had indeed made gains.

Limits to Expansion

Yet, there were limits to the expansion of Communist activities during Marshall's time. When the open united front struggle was launched in 1954, one great desire of the CPM was to get the Emergency Regulations abolished. Another was to get itself recognised. If these two aims could be achieved, opportunities to retrieve fortunes after the failure in the guerilla war would be maximised.¹¹² However, Marshall refused to give way to the Communists on these two issues.

Marshall would not compromise on the questions of the Emergency Regulations and the recognition of the CPM because, basically, he did not like Communism. This might seem strange for, as related, he had refused to deal with workers and student trouble-making as thoroughly as the British had wished him to. However, there was actually no contradiction in his attitude in matters such as these. The fact was that he made a distinction between the Communists and the people who were merely made use of or manipulated by them. Towards the former, he would not be tolerant, but towards the latter, he would.¹¹³

Marshall was also concerned about the feelings of the British as well as of the Malays over the abolition of the Emergency Regulations and the legalisation of the CPM. He knew that on these issues these parties would not tolerate any compromise and he had to respect their wishes.¹¹⁴

During the general elections, Marshall had promised the electorate that he would get the Emergency Regulations abolished if his party came into power.¹¹⁵ The promise had been made only for the purpose of earning votes; Marshall had not expected to win and now had to fulfil his promise.¹¹⁶ He was caught in a difficult position.

Marshall's way out of the dilemma was the following: firstly, he got a number of the regulations which were already dead letters rescinded; then he had the rest of them extended for another three months (the Emergency Regulations, by their enactment, had to be extended periodically). After this, he made arrangements for the extended regulations and a related law to be reviewed exhaustively to see whether or not they should actually be completely abrogated.¹¹⁷ Those regulations which were abolished were Nos. 3, 6, 17, 18, 19, 22, 25 and 32,¹¹⁸ which were designed to prevent demonstrations and riots.¹¹⁹ Soon after, as mentioned earlier, the Hock Lee riots broke out. As a consequence, Regulation No. 6 was first restored by the Governor and then re-adopted by the Legislative Assembly.¹²⁰ The overall review of the Emergency Regulations was completed by August. The decision made with regard to them was to have them replaced with a new set of security laws, the most important of which was the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance.¹²¹ The new laws took effect on 18 October after due parliamentary process.¹²² The changed situation was worse for the Communists.

The Communists were very agitated over the new weapons brought into use against them. In September, as discussed earlier, when the greater number of the proposed new laws were read in the Legislative Assembly a second time, they launched a protest campaign against them.¹²³ Their opposition, however, was futile.

In September too, the *TyP* in issue no. 65 came out with an article against Marshall's offensive.¹²⁴ It attacked particularly the Preservation of

Public Security Bill (in September still only a bill) and another, the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Bill. From what was said, it can be seen how the new order would make things more difficult for the Communists and why they objected to it so passionately. The first criticism against the new legislation was that, like the old Emergency Regulations, it deprived the people (a term which included the Communists and the social groups whom they were supposed to represent) of the basic rights of freedom of speech, assembly, organisation, publication, "reading" and belief. This aspect of the proposed new laws was daunting because it restricted, in a basic way, the expansion effort of the Communists. Secondly, the *TyP* found unpalatable the fact that the powers of the projected laws were based on the authority of only two persons, the Chief Secretary and the Commissioner of Police.

Following this, the *TyP* enumerated some of the provisions, particularly of the Preservation of Public Security Bill, which had the effect of keeping the Communists on the run all the time. These were:

1. The Chief Secretary would be empowered to detain any person for any period of time (for two years initially, but extension was permitted) without having to act on evidence;
2. The police could, without having to give reasons, or produce a warrant, search any place, or detain, interrogate and arrest any person;
3. The police could, also without having to explain themselves, or act on evidence, forcibly (including shooting to kill) arrest any person; and
4. No security cases need be brought to court for open trial but could be dealt with secretly.

The *TyP* found detestable three provisions in the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Bill, which were designed to meet situations such as those experienced by the Government in the Hock Lee riots. These provisions were:

1. The Chief Secretary would be empowered to declare emergencies in the island and order the police to disperse with force any assembly of ten persons or above, as well as to arrest any persons;
2. Workers working in establishments providing essential services and supplies (what such were, were to be decided by the Chief Secretary himself) must give their employers 42 days' notice before they could go on strike on pain of such strikes being treated as illegal; and
3. Illegal strikers would be put into prison for one month, their leaders for one year and those who gave them support, or showed them sympathy by way of money or other means for half a year.

Then, the *TyP* also took note of the fact that the powers of the police to impose curfews, control protected areas, confiscate publications and

editorial mail given to them by the old Emergency Regulations, were also preserved or strengthened in the new legislation.

Finally, the *TyP* made a comparison between the powers of the old Emergency Regulations and the proposed new laws in dealing with situations of the Hock Lee type. It found that the latter had an even wider scope than the old laws. The differences were:

1. Whereas in the past the Chief Secretary could detain any person on grounds that public security and public order had to be protected, now he could do the same for reasons that the security of the Federation of Malaya, that public order or that establishments furnishing essential services or supplies had to be protected; and
2. Under the present circumstances, workers working in places furnishing essential services could go on strike with 14 days' notice, but, according to the proposed new legislation, they could do so only with 42 days' notice and that they, their leaders and their supporters or sympathisers could be treated as criminals.

Thus Marshall did not make life easier but more difficult for the Communists after the substitution of the old regulations by the new laws.

As discussed in Chapter 1, Chin Peng tried to secure legal recognition for the CPM and related concessions at the Baling Talks in December 1955. He and his assistants negotiated with Tunku Abdul Rahman, David Marshall and Tan Cheng Lock. The effort was a failure¹²⁵ and this set the last limit on opportunities for the Communists to manoeuvre in their new course of struggle.

Conflict and Compromise in the PAP

The period of Marshall's administration also saw the militancy of the Communists in the Hock Lee riots and the June sympathy strikes precipitating a conflict between themselves and the non-Communists in the united front machinery, the PAP. The problem was that the forwardness of the Communists could not only lead to their being arrested and their organisations dissolved by the Government, but could also lead to a similar fate befalling the non-Communists in the Party. This caused great anxiety among the non-Communists. The fear of the non-Communists was not completely unfounded. As was seen in the Hock Lee incident, when disturbances reached a peak, the British had wanted to use troops as well as the police to crush the agitators. It was because of Marshall's refusal to co-operate that the scheme was eventually not implemented.¹²⁶ Then, in the June strikes, the British authorities also planned to arrest a great number of people. Again, it was because of Marshall that this did

not come about.¹²⁷ If the British had had their way, not only would the Communists have been punished but possibly also the PAP non-Communists.

During and after the disturbances, the non-Communists took two courses of action to protect themselves and their organisations. One was to show to the Government that they were not party to the schemes of the other group in the PAP. The other was to get the members from the Communist group who were in the leadership of the Party to leave their positions. The Communists did not stand in the way of the non-Communists and so the united front was maintained.

On three occasions during the Hock Lee incident, Lee Kuan Yew made public pronouncements on what the non-Communists in the PAP stood for. The first occasion was 5 May. On that day, he made a statement saying that the PAP was formed with the intention of establishing "an independent, democratic, non-Communist Malaya". A Malaya of this kind would be different from a Communist one.¹²⁸ The second occasion was 12 May, when rioting broke out. On that day, he asserted that the PAP did not believe in the violent method of struggle.¹²⁹ The third occasion was on 16 May in the Legislative Assembly. This time, he reiterated the two basic doctrines of the PAP defined earlier.¹³⁰

On 16 May, in the Legislative Assembly, Lim Chin Siong also made a declaration that he stood for a free and democratic Malaya which should be achieved through peaceful and non-violent methods.¹³¹ Lim Chin Siong was naturally protecting himself and the PAP. However, as explained in the previous two chapters, the short-term aims of the CPM were actually as Lim stated, not to resort to violence.¹³² Rioting in the Hock Lee dispute was only a tactical departure from the basic strategy.

Sympathy strikes led by the SFSWU lasted from 12 to 17 June. They were a by-product of an original dispute between the SHBSA and the SHB. The original dispute had ended in a strike of its own by members of the SHBSA against the SHB. On 27 May, Lee Kuan Yew left for a three-week holiday in Malaya. Because of his absence from Singapore, he could not be construed as having any part in the mischief in June.¹³³

The next step which the non-Communists took to safeguard themselves was to get the Communist group to give up their places in the Central Executive Committee of the PAP. On 26 June, the PAP held its Second Annual General Meeting. In the *pro tempore* Central Executive Committee, which was elected in November 1954, there were three persons from the Communist group.¹³⁴ But on this occasion, the non-Communists insisted that no members from the other group should stand for election to the Committee, which was no longer to be a temporary but a proper one. The Communists accepted the new condition for continued

co-operation.¹³⁵ So, the non-Communists took complete control of the leadership of the PAP.¹³⁶

The situation after June 1955 was actually not completely in favour of the non-Communists. No doubt this group had obtained total control of the Central Executive Committee of the PAP. However, in the branches, it was the Communists who held sway. This was because the non-Communists did not have as many and as good operatives as the Communists had at ground level.¹³⁷

The policy to give way to the non-Communists was communicated to Lim Chin Siong and other Communist open front activists by the underground leadership in issue no. 11 of *Hsioh*.¹³⁸

Marshall Versus the British – Assistance from the CPM

Marshall Requests More

As stated earlier, Marshall had not thought well of the Rendel Constitution.¹³⁹ The powers which it returned to Singapore were too limited. During the slightly more than one year he was in office, Marshall tried to do two things regarding this constitution. The first was that he sought an improvement in his powers and importance as the Chief Minister within the framework of the constitution so that his advice to the British Governor would be accepted. Marshall's second endeavour was to get the British Home Government to give Singapore a new constitution altogether, which would enable the island to enjoy full self-government.

The British gave way to him on the first issue because concessions would benefit only Marshall and not the Communists who were the more dangerous enemy. However, the British refused to entertain Marshall's second request because compromise in this instance would not only be of use to Marshall but would also remove a definite check against the expansionary efforts of the CPM.

The system of government established under the Rendel Constitution was a united front or an alliance of the British and the LF-Alliance against the CPM. The intention of the British was that they should be the major partner and the local component the minor partner in this co-operation. Marshall, however, could not accept this. He wished to correct his inferiority. He aspired at least to equality with, if not superiority over, the British. The CPM gave support to him in this dispute with the British. Victory for Marshall in this quarrel might not be immediately useful to the CPM, but any injury to the British would ultimately be helpful to the long-term struggle. The CPM also shored up Marshall in the second

dispute, since his success there would be of immediate help to the Communist cause.

Marshall's real status was revealed in the very first days after he had become a member of the new government. Although a leading personality in the administration, he was not given an office, or staff or even a piece of note paper to begin his duties. Eventually, he was favoured with some kind of accommodation under a staircase in the Legislative Assembly building, but only after he had threatened to set up office under a tree in a public place where he had carried out his electioneering to arouse feelings over his predicament.¹⁴⁰ It was also indicated to him that he might carry the title of Chief Minister but he was really only the leader of the elected Ministers, was properly only the Minister of Commerce and Industry, and he enjoyed no power of co-ordination over other Ministers.¹⁴¹ One other source of humiliation to him was that in public functions he had to take a place not just immediately after the Governor and before any other official, which to him was proper, but at some distance in the queue.¹⁴²

As stated already, at the beginning of his term of office, Marshall was faced with the problem of having to abolish the Emergency Regulations when he did not wish to and could not do so.¹⁴³ The Governor offered a way out for him by suggesting that he go ahead with revoking the regulations in his name. After this was done, the Governor would re-impose them on his own responsibility. The proposal irritated Marshall a great deal: he considered it a piece of "well-meant hypocrisy" and rejected it.¹⁴⁴

What Marshall resented most about the new order was that he had no control over internal security and yet the British wished to do things in that area in his name. In the Hock Lee incident, as mentioned, both during the time when the disturbances were worst and when the students took occupation of school buildings, the British had wanted to use sheer force to suppress the agitators and carry out the operations under the cover of his name. But they would not let him know the facts which would probably justify the proposed harsh action.¹⁴⁵ A similar difficulty was experienced in the June sympathy strikes.¹⁴⁶

The limitations which Marshall had to endure under the Rendel Constitution impelled him, therefore, first to strive for a rectification of the situation within the framework of that constitution and next to seek to replace this constitution with a better one altogether.

Marshall's opportunity to set things right came in July 1955. That month, he requested the new Governor, Sir Robert Black, to appoint four members of the Legislative Assembly to become Assistant Ministers, ostensibly to help out with the load of governmental work.¹⁴⁷ The Governor, however, agreed to make only two such appointments. Thereupon,

Marshall stirred up a hornet's nest. He made known to the Governor that by the terms of the Constitution, whenever he, the Chief Minister, gave advice to him, the Governor, that advice must be accepted. The Governor replied by saying that the Constitution placed him under no such obligation, upon which Marshall stated his intention,

... [to] work this issue into a major constitutional crisis to keep up the pressure to expedite the grant of complete internal self-government ...¹⁴⁸

He threatened to have all the elected Ministers in the Government resign from their posts if he could not have his way.

Finally, Marshall took the issue into the Legislative Assembly. The purpose of this was to secure the support of the other political parties in establishing a common front against the Governor. Marshall was successful in his purpose. He got the Assembly to pass a motion which required not only the Governor to interpret the Rendel Constitution in his favour but also the British Home Government to give to Singapore a new constitution which would enable the island to enjoy a greater measure of autonomy. Marshall's motion read in part:

... that ... the most liberal construction legally permissible in favour of the elected representatives of the people in the interpretation of the Singapore Colony Order in Council, 1955 [i.e. the Rendel Constitution], should be adopted;

And that where the Governor is required by the provisions of the said Order in Council to consult with the Chief Minister before taking any action, he should act in accordance with such advice;

And that in the opinion of this House the time has arrived for a transfer of power from the Government of the United Kingdom to the people of Singapore ... a new Constitution providing for self-government should be granted immediately ...¹⁴⁹

All the local opposition groups in the Assembly gave support to Marshall. These were the PAP, the PP, the DP and the Independents. Those who did not go along with him were the one nominated non-official, who voted against him, and the three officials, who abstained from voting. All four were British.¹⁵⁰

Communist support for Marshall in the Legislative Assembly was expressed through Lim Chin Siong. Evidence suggests that Marshall had made secret approaches to Lim for the latter's assistance in the fight against the Governor.¹⁵¹ In a certain emergency meeting of the SFSWU in July, Lim disclosed to his followers that Marshall had let him know that at the time the Governor had refused to sanction the appointment of four Assistant Ministers, he had also wanted Marshall to arrest 200 Communists and their sympathisers. Marshall, however, refused to co-operate

and sign the necessary warrants of arrest. Marshall's purpose of divulging the secret to Lim was obviously to influence the latter to stand with him against the Governor.

Lim Chin Siong's speech in the Legislative Assembly in favour of Marshall attacked the Rendel Constitution and stated that the British should give real power to the people and their representatives. In part, Lim said:

We have great pleasure in supporting the Chief Minister's motion, for it is a motion which anyone who believes in democratic principles must support ...¹⁵²

Lim also voted for Marshall's motion.

The Communists gave Marshall a helping hand not only inside the Legislative Assembly but also outside it. At the time when Marshall's dispute was debated in the Assembly, he got members of those trade unions which were allied to the LF to picket the Assembly to demonstrate strength against the British.¹⁵³ The Communists also mobilised the PAP and the various mass organisations to do the same thing. In addition, the Communist group demonstrated at Government House.¹⁵⁴ Regarding the assistance given to Marshall by the Communists, it must be noted that such assistance was extended strictly for this particular occasion alone. Fundamentally speaking, the Communists did not like him, and on a long-term basis there was no question of co-operation between the two parties. This attitude of the Communists could clearly be seen in *TyP*, no. 64, published in August 1955.

TyP, no. 64, had three articles on the Marshall-versus-Governor controversy.¹⁵⁵ On the question of helping Marshall to downgrade the Governor, the following statement was made in one of the essays:

The people are willing to give support to any action which is against colonialism. The people will give support and encouragement to even the dog, Marshall, barking at his master ...¹⁵⁶

On the question of not collaborating with Marshall in the long run, the same article made the point that Marshall was fighting the British because he thought he could make use of the strength of the people, i.e. the Communists and the mass organisations, to exert pressure on them to grant him the concessions which he desired and because he thought he could obtain the trust of and regain his prestige with the people by assuming an anti-British posture. The article said also,

The people absolutely would not be easily led into a trap by Marshall. They have no illusions about him ...

This was the long-term attitude towards Marshall.

Also, all the three essays referred to Marshall in derogatory terms. They called him a "dog" or "running dog" of the British. They mentioned him, too, as "the chief of the puppet 'Labour Government'", and a "nationalist reformer" or "reactionary nationalist reformer".

The great problem between Marshall and the Governor was eventually resolved when the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Allan Lennox-Boyd, arrived in Singapore in August on a tour of British possessions in East Asia. The matter was referred to him. Lennox-Boyd made a decision in Marshall's favour. Over the question of the appointment of the Assistant Ministers, Lennox-Boyd ruled that these should be made, and, over the derived question that the Chief Minister's advice must be accepted by the Governor, such advice must be accepted except in cases where the prorogation and dissolution of the Legislative Assembly were concerned. With regard to the question of giving Singapore a better constitution than the existing one, Lennox-Boyd invited Marshall to London for talks the next year.¹⁵⁷ Marshall also took advantage of the opportunity to press Lennox-Boyd to agree that the offices of the Chief Minister and the Minister of Commerce and Industry should be separate ministries. He also demanded other powers. Lennox-Boyd placated Marshall.¹⁵⁸

Lennox-Boyd gave in to Marshall because he took Marshall's threat of resignation from the Government seriously. If Marshall and his Ministers did resign, fresh elections would have to be held, which would probably bring the PAP into power. Another way out for the British would have been to suspend the constitution which would put them in a very bad light. Lennox-Boyd did not want the PAP coming into power or the British gaining a bad reputation internationally, so he compromised with Marshall.

The CPM was unhappy that a reconciliation came about between Marshall and the British. The reason for this was quite obvious. The CPM was perturbed that there would now again be collaboration between Marshall and the British against itself. The discontent of the CPM could be seen in the article in *TyP* no. 64, quoted above. In the face of the enemies' rapprochement, another article in the paper alerted CPM members that the next thing that could follow was the mounting of another massive attack against the "people".¹⁵⁹

Marshall negotiated with Allan Lennox-Boyd in London for a new constitution for Singapore between 23 April and 15 May 1956. After many bargaining sessions, the two sides failed to reach an agreement.¹⁶⁰ Marshall went with a delegation made up of 13 representatives from all the political parties in the Legislative Assembly. Lim Chin Siong, openly a member of the PAP but secretly a member of the CPM, was included in the team.¹⁶¹

On 5 April, just before the delegation set out for London, Marshall caused the Legislative Assembly to pass the following resolution:

The Assembly instructs its All-Party Delegation to the forthcoming Constitutional Talks in London to seek forthwith for Singapore the status of an independent territory within the Commonwealth and to offer an agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Singapore Government whereby the Government of the United Kingdom would in respect of Singapore exercise control over external defence and give guidance in foreign relations other than trade and commerce.¹⁶²

These were the demands which Marshall would submit to the British Government.

Marshall originally hoped to obtain only full internal self-government from the British which was not given by the Rendel Constitution. However, he revised his demand and requested independence within the British Commonwealth. Marshall was aware that the British would not grant independence to Singapore because of the strategic importance of the island. So he proposed a compromise whereby Singapore would in legal terms become independent, but in practice would allow the British to control the island's external defence and foreign relations, other than trade and commerce, by treaty arrangement. The proposal seemed reasonable. In accordance with this philosophy, the governmental machinery in the island had to be restructured. Marshall made some suggestions in this regard at the London talks:-

In future, Her Majesty the Queen, should no longer be represented by a British Governor in Singapore but by a local Governor-General. But, unlike the present British Governor who exercised real power, the Governor-General should be only a titular head in the government. Relations between Singapore and the United Kingdom should hereafter be transferred to the charge of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in Britain and no longer managed by the Colonial Office. Her Majesty's Government, as different from Her Majesty the Queen, should in future have a High Commissioner in Singapore.

Singapore should have a Legislative Assembly made up of 50 members instead of the present 25. All 50 persons should be elected and there should be no more ex-officio or nominated members. The present Council of Ministers should give way to a Cabinet which should be headed by a Prime Minister instead of a Chief Minister. And there should be no ex-officio Ministers in this body of government.

The United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries should be allowed to station forces in Singapore. A Defence Council should be established which should be made up of the following persons: the British

High Commissioner and three representatives of the Commonwealth forces on the one hand, and the Prime Minister and three other representatives of the local government on the other. This Council could decide on matters connected with the external defence and foreign relations, other than trade and commerce, of Singapore. It could also deliberate on the internal security of Singapore in areas where it would impinge on its external defence and foreign relations. Localities in Singapore where Commonwealth troops would be stationed should not be controlled by the Singapore Government. Commonwealth forces could be furnished by the Defence Council to the Singapore Government to deal with any internal disturbances at the request of the Singapore Government. Internal security as such, however, should be the responsibility of the Singapore Government. Meetings of the Council should be presided over by the British High Commissioner and, if he was absent, by the Singapore Prime Minister. If neither was present at a meeting, those present should elect a Chairman for the purposes of that meeting. Decisions made by the Council should be by majority vote and in case of a tie, the original motion should be considered defeated.

Marshall suggested that the proposed new constitutional arrangement should take effect as from 1 April 1957.¹⁶³ After Marshall had submitted his proposals, haggling between him and Allan Lennox-Boyd followed. Finally, the latter came up with a set of counter-proposals for the consideration of the Singapore delegation.¹⁶⁴

Lennox-Boyd's position, in general, was that there would be no independent status for Singapore. The United Kingdom would take charge of the external defence and the foreign relations of the island. On top of this, it would also have control of its internal security. The counter-proposals stated, in specific terms, that both Her Majesty the Queen and Her Majesty's Government would be represented by a High Commissioner in Singapore. There would be no Governor-General for the island, and it would not be transferred to the charge of the Commonwealth Relations Office from the Colonial Office. Lennox-Boyd agreed to Marshall's ideas about reconstituting the Legislative Assembly and the executive authority of the government. However, the leader of the latter would not be designated a Prime Minister but still only a Chief Minister, although he would now preside over meetings instead of the British High Commissioner (the Governor under the Rendel Constitution).

As to Marshall's idea of a Defence Council, Lennox-Boyd agreed that such an organ should be established, but that it should be called the Defence and Security Council instead. Also, its membership should consist of the British High Commissioner and two other British representatives on the one hand, and the Chief Minister and two of his nominees on

the other. The Council would deliberate on matters pertaining to the external defence and foreign relations of Singapore as well as over "borderline questions" relating to the respective spheres of authority of the United Kingdom and Singapore Governments. The Council would also receive and consider regular reports on the internal security situation in the island. It could, finally, make recommendations to any of the two Governments on any matters brought before it. The British High Commissioner would preside at the meetings of the Council and he would have the casting vote.

Lennox-Boyd also wanted the British Home Government to have the power to make laws and the High Commissioner the power to make regulations for Singapore in relation to its external defence and foreign relations, and in areas of its internal security connected with these two fields, which could override any legislation obtaining in the State. It was also proposed that the British Government should have the right to suspend the constitution of Singapore if the island faced various internal disturbances or if the Government of Singapore acted in contravention of the Constitution.

Naturally, Marshall was not pleased that independence would not be granted to Singapore. However, he was ready to concede on this point. What was really unacceptable to him was that Singapore would not be allowed to control even its internal security. To Marshall, without the British giving way on this, self-government for Singapore was more apparent than real.

The crux of the matter lay in the British High Commissioner having a casting vote in the Defence and Security Council, and the ability of the British Home Government to make laws as well as this officer to make regulations above the powers of the Singapore Government. Marshall suggested compromises: Could the Chairman of the Defence and Security Council be a Malayan instead of the British High Commissioner? Lennox-Boyd rejected this. Could the British then enjoy overriding legislative powers for only two years? Lennox-Boyd also refused this.¹⁶⁵ In face of Lennox-Boyd's unwillingness to come to terms, Marshall, with the support of the majority of his delegation, rejected the former's proposals and terminated the talks.¹⁶⁶

Two days later, Marshall tried to reopen negotiations with Lennox-Boyd. He suggested the idea that if the British Home Government were to enjoy overriding legislative powers above the Singapore Government, could such powers be exercised with the approval of the British House of Commons. On receipt of this, Lennox-Boyd stated that it was a hopeful line of approach, but he would discuss it only if the idea had the endorsement of the whole Singapore delegation, and he wished to meet the

delegation informally first to assess their feelings. However, except for Marshall himself and two of his LF Ministers, the delegation refused to turn up for the suggested meeting. So, Marshall's proposal came to nothing.¹⁶⁷

After the failure of the constitutional talks, Marshall returned to Singapore. In June, he resigned his Chief Ministership. This was in fulfilment of his threat that he would no longer co-operate with the British if they did not co-operate with him.¹⁶⁸ The unreadiness of the British to concede to Marshall a better position in the common front against the Communists showed that they were uncertain that Marshall would help them as much as they wished. So they eventually let him opt out of the partnership. They came to an understanding with another person who was more likely to see eye-to-eye with them on various issues. This man became the new Chief Minister in place of Marshall. He was Lim Yew Hock, the second leader in the LF.

At the beginning of 1956, the PP and DP had merged and become one single party called the Liberal Socialist Party (LSP).¹⁶⁹ Leaders from this new Party went with Marshall to the talks in London as members of his delegation. After Marshall left the Government, the British preference was to form the necessary new partnership against the Communists with this party. The Liberal Socialists themselves, during the time of the constitutional negotiations, had made statements that they were prepared to form a government if the negotiations broke down and the LF withdrew from office.¹⁷⁰ However, there was no real possibility that the British could link up with this party because the LSP was not popular with the majority of the electorate in Singapore and thus such co-operation would not have been fruitful. Therefore, the choice fell on Lim Yew Hock.

About the British abandoning him and taking up Lim Yew Hock, Marshall himself said:

In June 1956, I resigned. Two days after my resignation, Mr Lim Yew Hock formed a new government as planned by Lennox-Boyd whilst we were still in London ...¹⁷¹

So Marshall lost his position in the Government.

An important point about the constitutional talks was the degree of support the Communists gave to Marshall. After Lennox-Boyd had made clear his final stand on the questions regarding the chairmanship of the proposed Defence and Security Council and the overriding legislative powers of the British Government, Marshall had to make a decision as to whether to accept or reject the British proposals. He consulted the members of his delegation on this. According to him, 11 of the 13 persons led by Lee Kuan Yew voted for the British offer and two voted against. The

two against were himself and Lim Chin Siong. When this came about, Marshall told the delegation that he would sign acceptance of the British proposals in deference to the wishes of the majority, but that on his return to Singapore he would resign his Chief Ministership. Lee Kuan Yew, who together with Lim Chin Siong represented the PAP on the delegation, then revised his decision and backed up Marshall and Lim. Following this, all the other delegates except the Liberal Socialists changed their minds and supported Marshall's policy. The Liberal Socialists abstained from voting on the British proposals.¹⁷²

Lim Chin Siong stood with Marshall, of course, not for his sake but for the benefit of the Communist movement. There was a security report at the time which took note of Lim's attitude. This report read:

During the Constitutional Talks in London, it is clear that ... Lim Chin Siong was intent upon either complete success or complete failure.¹⁷³

Complete success was Marshall having his way and complete failure was the frustration of his aspirations. If Marshall had achieved success, opportunities would have been opened up for the greater expansion of the various Communist mass movements in Singapore. When Marshall failed, the feelings of the people against the British would be aroused and this would also provide seeds for the further growth of the left-wing organisations.

The *TyP* published three articles in succession in connection with the failure of the constitutional talks. The first one appeared in no. 73 of May 1956, the second in no. 74 of June and the third in no. 75 of July. The first article stated that the British revealed their true colours by not coming to terms with Marshall, the second made a call upon the people to struggle even harder against the British and the third advocated that Singapore should strive for independence, following the lead given by Marshall.¹⁷⁴

After the collapse of the talks, the British expected riots to break out in the island and they were prepared for such an eventuality.¹⁷⁵ However, the CPM held its hand. Apparently it was afraid that it would lose more than gain from a violent course of action. This was a continuation of the policy of restraint, which was decided upon after the June sympathy strikes a year earlier.¹⁷⁶

Two Other Problems

Other than the problem of more power for the Singapore Government, there were two related issues during his tenure in office that Marshall took up with London which had a bearing upon the outcome of the struggle between the British and the CPM on the island. One was the proposition that the Legislative Assembly should practise multi-lingualism, i.e. allow-

ing other languages to be used besides English. The other was giving franchise rights to alien immigrants who had hitherto no place in the political system. The settlement of the two problems contributed significantly to the political development of the island.

In late 1953, the number of Chinese in Singapore who were qualified to vote was 156,600. Of these, 111,200 were not literate in English. There were similar figures for Indians and Pakistanis combined, with 51,800 eligible to vote and 40,300 not literate in English; for Malays, 50,200 and 44,200 respectively; for Europeans, 10,400 and 0 respectively; for Eurasians, 7,400 and 0 respectively; and for the rest 5,700 and 2,900 respectively.¹⁷⁷ The point was that if the vernacular languages were allowed to be used in the Legislative Assembly, the role in local politics of those Chinese illiterate in English would increase greatly. The non-English-speaking sections of the population were frequently unable to find suitable English-speaking candidates to represent them in the legislature and the English-speaking among them were often unqualified to voice their opinions genuinely.¹⁷⁸

In late 1953, the total population of Singapore was 1,120,700. Of this, the Chinese numbered 859,200; the Indians and Pakistanis together 87,200; the Malays 136,900; the Europeans 15,800; the Eurasians 11,100; and the rest 10,500.¹⁷⁹

In the various communities, the numbers of those who did not have political rights were: Chinese 702,600; Indians and Pakistanis 35,400; Malays 86,700; Europeans 5,400; Eurasians 3,700; and others 4,800. Each of these figures was made up of both the adult population and minors.

The numbers of adults among the Chinese, the Indians and Pakistanis together, and the Malays who were not enfranchised were 221,300; 1,400; and 21,700.¹⁸⁰ Similar figures for the other communities are not available. Adults who did not have the right to vote were alien immigrants. As the number of this section of the population was the largest among the Chinese, that the political importance of this community would be enhanced by alien immigrants getting the right to vote was apparent.

In early 1948, when popular elections were first held in Singapore, the franchise was granted only to British subjects resident on the island.¹⁸¹ Three years later, when elections were held again, the right to vote was extended to all those who were born in the other parts of British Southeast Asia, that was Malaya, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei, and who were resident in Singapore.¹⁸²

Multi-lingualism in the Legislative Assembly and the enfranchisement of alien immigrants were first championed by the CCC, which requested that the Rendel Commission take note of and incorporate these

issues. The request, however, was rejected.¹⁸³ Later on, the CCC formed the DP and the latter agitated on the issues during the general elections in early 1955.¹⁸⁴

After Marshall had won the elections and formed the government, he took over the torch from the DP. He was probably motivated by socialist feelings as well as the desire to earn the support of the Chinese masses. In December 1955, Marshall went to London to fix the agenda for the projected constitutional conference in April the following year. He took the opportunity to impress upon the British Government that there should be multi-lingualism in the Legislative Assembly. The British Government granted him his request.¹⁸⁵ At the constitutional conference in April 1956, the question of giving the franchise to alien immigrants was raised. Marshall proposed that the China-born and persons in a similar position should be made Singapore Citizens. Given such a status, they would be able to vote in elections. Allan Lennox-Boyd agreed to his proposal.¹⁸⁶

Notes

- 1 The number of strikes each year, with resultant man-days lost, which took place between 1949 and 1961, are recorded below. The year 1949 was that which followed the outbreak of the armed struggle between the CPM and the British in 1948. The year 1961 was when the united front between the Communists and the non-Communists in the PAP broke and the former resorted to extremist action again.

Year	No. of Strikes	No. of Man-Days Lost
1949	3	7,074
1950	1	4,692
1951	4	20,640
1952	5	40,361
1954	8	135,206
1955	275	946,354
1956	29	454,455
1957	26	109,349
1958	22	78,166
1959	40	26,587
1960	44	152,002
1961	113	410,889

See Ang Li Choo, *op. cit.*, p. 60 which is based on Singapore Labour Department, *Annual Report*, for the years from 1946 to 1963. That it was the CPM which brought about the strikes in 1955, including the Hock Lee one, is attested to by the following, which is one of the references on the point: "A' ... explained to me in June 1955 that the present wave of strikes in Singapore was led by the Party Organisation. He said that if the MCP did not lead workers in the struggle for betterment of their livelihood, some other political party would take it up. The Hock Lee Bus Strike, he said, was for better wages, but Government helped the employers in order to eliminate the Workers' Movement. Because of Government help, serious consequences developed ...". Cf. "SCT", paragraph 34.

- 2 The Manager of the Hock Lee Amalgamated Bus Company Ltd. was Guok Sing Leong. Guok's political affiliation was with the Kuomintang. This was according to C.V. Devan Nair, who played a part in the dispute. Together with Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan and others, Nair was one of the leaders of the left-wing trade union movement. The group, as seen, also constituted the Communist faction in the PAP. Cf. "M-L Course", Handout no. 74, p. 19. See also *Fong*, p. 33.
- 3 *LAD*, vol. 1, col. 204, Lee Kuan Yew speaking. *TyP*, no. 59, March 1955, p. 2 and no. 60, April 1955, p. 2, "Min-tsu Tzū-pên-chia Ying-kai Kan K'uai Chio-wu (The National Capitalists Should Wake Up Quickly)". Goh Hwee Jiang, "The Hock Lee Bus Riots, 1955", Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Singapore, 1973/74, p. 11.
- 4 *LAD*, vol. 1, col. 204. *TyP*, no. 61, May 1955, editorial (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 61, editorial), "T'i Kao Ching-t'i, Chan-wên Li-ch'ang, Kêng Chien-chüeh Yung-kan ti Chin-hsing Chan-tou - Chi-nien 'Wu-i' Kuo-chi Lao-tung-chieh (Raise Your Vigilance and Be Firm in Your Stand, and Prosecute the Struggle More Resolutely and Courageously - in Commemoration of '1st May' International Labour Day)". "LJP", paragraph 29. Lim Chin Siong, "The Facts behind the Crisis", *Fajar*, no. 20, 30 June 1955, p. 4. Goh Hwee Jiang, op. cit., p. 11.
- 5 *LAD*, vol. 1, col. 204. "HLBR", pp. 2-8. "FSS", appendix 'B', p. 3. *TyP*, no. 61, editorial. Goh Hwee Jiang, op. cit., p. 11.
- 6 *LAD*, vol. 1, col. 205, Lee Kuan Yew speaking. "HLBR", p. 8. "FSS", appendix 'B', p. 3. *TyP*, no. 61, editorial. Goh Hwee Jiang, op. cit., p. 11.
- 7 "HLBR", pp. 8-10. "FSS", appendix 'B', pp. 3-4. *TyP*, no. 61, editorial. "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 3. *Fong*, p. 34. Goh Hwee Jiang, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
- 8 "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, pp. 3-4 and no. 73, pp. 1-2. *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 176-177 & 187, Chief Secretary, W.A.C. Goode, speaking; cols. 206-207, Lee Kuan Yew speaking; and col. 235, David Marshall speaking. "HLBR", pp. 10-12. "FSS", appendix 'B', p. 5. *TyP*, no. 61, editorial. *Fong*, p. 34. Goh Hwee Jiang, op. cit., p. 12.
- 9 "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 4; no. 73, p. 2; and no. 74, p. 20. *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 178 & 188-192, Chief Secretary speaking; cols. 207-209, Lee Kuan Yew speaking; and cols. 235-239, David Marshall speaking. "HLBR", pp. 13-19. *IJ*, no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraphs 10-18 and appendices 'C', 'D' & 'E'. "FSS", appendix 'B', p. 7. *TyP*, no. 61, editorial. *Fong*, p. 34 and pictures between pp. 96-97. Goh Hwee Jiang, op. cit., pp. 12-14.
- 10 *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 208-209; and vol. 15, cols. 1414 & 1455, Lee Kuan Yew speaking. "HLBR", pp. 19-20.
- 11 "M-L Course", Handout no. 73, pp. 2-3. *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 178-179, Chief Secretary speaking. "HLBR", pp. 22-23. *TyP*, no. 61, editorial.
- 12 "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 4; and no. 73, p. 3. *LAD*, vol. 1, col. 179.
- 13 "M-L Course", Handout no. 70, p. 4; no. 73, p. 3; and no. 74, p. 21. *LAD*, vol. 1, col. 179. "FSS", appendix 'B', p. 5. *TyP*, no. 61, editorial. *Fong*, p. 36 and pictures between pp. 96-97. Goh Hwee Jiang, op. cit., p. 15.
- 14 "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 4; no. 73, pp. 4-9; and no. 74, p. 21. *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 179-184, Chief Secretary speaking. "HLBR", pp. 25-26. *TyP*, no. 61, editorial. *Fong*, pp. 36-37 and pictures between pp. 96-97. Goh Hwee Jiang, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
- 15 "M-L Course", Handout no. 73, pp. 7-9; and no. 74, pp. 22-23. *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 183-185. "HLBR", p. 26. *TyP*, no. 61, editorial. *IJ*, no. 5/1955, paragraphs 144-144¹; and no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraph 43. "FSS", appendix 'B', pp. 5-6. "HS". *Fong*, p. 37. There was a comment by the underground on this incident of the

- wounded student being carried around town: "... the procession headed by the wounded student on a stretcher had no organised leadership. The people broke up under police charges and were not able to congregate again. Should there be organised leadership, the affair would have become more serious and Government would find great difficulty in dealing with it". Cf. "SCT", paragraph 34.
- 16 "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 4; and no. 73, p. 8. *LAD*, vol. 1, col. 184. "HLBR", p. 27. *TyP*, no. 61, editorial. *IJ*, no. 5/1955, paragraphs 144 & 144^c; and no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraphs 40-41. *Fong*, p. 37. Goh Hwee Jiang, op. cit., p. 16.
 - 17 C.V. Devan Nair. "M-L Course", Handout no. 74, pp. 23-24.
 - 18 David Marshall, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
 - 19 "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 4; no. 73, p. 9; and no. 74, p. 23. *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 185, 212 & 240. "HLBR", pp. 27-29. *TyP*, no. 61, editorial. "FSS", appendix 'B', p. 6. "WS", paragraphs 42-45. *Fong*, p. 37. Goh Hwee Jiang, op. cit., p. 17.
 - 20 *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 9, 156-157, 174-175 and 244-246. *TyP*, no. 61, editorial. "HLBR", p. 29. "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 4. Goh Hwee Jiang, op. cit., pp. 17-19.
 - 21 *TyP*, no. 61, editorial. David Marshall, op. cit., p. 9. *IJ*, no. 4/1955, Supplement no. 1, appendix D and appendix D(a); no. 10/1955, Jamit Singh's "Who's Who", p. 2. "SJ", paragraph 16. Ang Li Choo, op. cit., p. 57. Teo Kah Beng, op. cit., p. 50.
 - 22 *IJ*, no. 4/1955, paragraph 134 and Supplement no. 1, pp. 61-62; and no. 10/1955, Jamit Singh's "Who's Who", p. 2. "SJ", paragraph 17. "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 4.
 - 23 *IJ*, no. 6/1955, paragraph 183^c; and no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraph 45. Lim Chin Siong, op. cit., p. 4. "SJ", paragraph 18. "LCS", pt. 2, Folios (62)¹, (62)² and (67)². "DM", pt. 2, Folios (129)¹, (129)⁴ and (129)⁶.
 - 24 "WS", paragraphs 46-47.
 - 25 "WS", paragraphs 47-48. Lim Chin Siong, op. cit., pp. 4-5. "LCS", pt. 2, Folio (68)³. *TyP*, no. 62, p. 1, article 2 entitled "Fan-tui 'Chin-chi Fa-ling' Tou-chêng ti I Ko Shêng-li (A Victory in the Struggle against the 'Emergency Regulations')", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 62, p. 1, article 2).
 - 26 "WS", paragraph 48. Lim Chin Siong, op. cit., p. 5.
 - 27 David Marshall, op. cit., p. 9. Lim Chin Siong, op. cit., p. 5. "DM", pt. 2, Folios (134)² & (135)¹.
 - 28 *IJ*, no. 6/1955, paragraphs 183^p & 183^h; and no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraph 46. "FSS", paragraphs 6, 31 & 43. "WS", paragraphs 49. Lim Chin Siong, op. cit., p. 5. *TyP*, no. 62, p. 1, article 2. "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 5.
 - 29 *IJ*, no. 6/1955, paragraphs 183^h & 183^q; and no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraphs 47-48. "WS", paragraphs 49-50. Lim Chin Siong, op. cit., p. 5. "LCS", pt. 2, Folio (70)³. *TyP*, no. 62, p. 1, article 2. "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 5.
 - 30 *IJ*, no. 6/1955, paragraph 183^q. "DM", pt. 2, Folio (132). *TyP*, no. 62, p. 1, article 2.
 - 31 *IJ*, no. 6/1955, paragraph 183^q. "LCS", pt. 2, Folios (79)² & (79)⁶. Lim Chin Siong, op. cit., p. 5. "WS", paragraph 49. "DM", pt. 2, Folio (132). *TyP*, no. 62, p. 1, article 2. "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 5.
 - 32 *IJ*, no. 6/1955, paragraphs 183^q-183^h; no. 7/1955, paragraph 217^o; and no. 10/1955, paragraph 349^h. *TyP*, no. 62, p. 1, article 2. "FSS", paragraphs 6, 31 & 43. "WS", paragraph 50.
 - 33 *IJ*, no. 10/1955, Jamit Singh's "Who's Who", p. 2. "SJ", paragraph 17.
 - 34 *TyP*, no. 67, November 1955, p. 2, article 2 entitled "Kung-jên Chiaì-chi Shih Hèh Pu T'ui, Ya Pu Tao ti (The Working Class Cannot be Frightened or Repressed)", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 67, p. 2, article 2). Lim Chin Siong, op. cit., p. 5.

- 35 Lim Chin Siong, op. cit., p. 5. Lim gave an explanation of why he called off the strikes after only five days. His explanation is the same as that given here, but from a different perspective.
- 36 *TyP*, no. 62, June 1955, p. 1, article 2. *TyP*, no. 67, p. 2, article 2. A police report stated that in July, an attempt by the Malay and Indian elements in the STCEU to oust Lim Chin Siong's faction from the committee of the union, which it dominated, failed miserably. Cf. *IJ*, no. 7/1955, paragraph 217.
- 37 *TyP*, no. 62, June 1955, p. 1, article 2.
- 38 Article entitled "Chu-i Fang-chih ho Chiu-chêng Kuo Tso P'ien-hsiang (Pay Attention to Preventing and Correcting Over-left Tendencies)", (hereinafter article 2), in the journal refers.
- 39 "SCT", paragraphs 56-63.
- 40 The editorial of no. 64 was entitled "Ma-lai-ya ti Kê-ming Chêng Tsai P'êng-pê, Hsin-su ti Hsiang Ch'ien Fa-chan (The Malayan Revolution is Striking Forward Vigorously and Rapidly)" and that of no. 65 "Chia Chin Nu-li, Ts'u-shih Kê-ming Kao-ch'ao ti Tsao Jih Tao-lai (Strive Harder and Quicken the Earlier Arrival of the High Tide of the Revolution)". *IJ*, no. 9/1955, paragraph 290.
- 41 "HoL", paragraph 114. Comments by "HS".
- 42 *IJ*, no. 8/1955, paragraph 254^b; and Supplement, paragraphs 49-51. On 18 March 1956, there was a rally at the Old Kallang Airport which ended in rioting and violence. Marshall had organised the gathering to meet a delegation of British MPs to demonstrate to them that Singapore wished to have a better constitution than the existing one, the Rendel Constitution. A great many Communist mass organisations, as well as the PAP, took part in the rally. The leftists disturbed the meeting until rioting and violence ensued. However, the disturbances were not planned by the Communist high command. They were the spontaneous outbursts of those who joined in the rally. Cf. *Fong*, pp. 42-43 and pictures between pp. 96-97. *IJ*, no. 3/1955, paragraphs 43 & 44.
- 43 *IJ*, no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraphs 19-27.
- 44 *IJ*, no. 3/1956, Supplement no. 1, p. 33.
- 45 *IJ*, no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraph 4; no. 3/1956, Supplement no. 1, p. 33; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, appendix L.1, paragraph 4.
- 46 *IJ*, no. 3/1956, Supplement no. 1, pp. 33-34. The five unions which were strongly sympathetic to the SFSWU were: SBWU, STCEU, Singapore Machine & Engineering Workers' Union, Singapore Spinning Workers' Union, and Amalgamated Malayan Pineapple Workers' Union. The 13 sympathetic unions were: Naval Base Labour Union, Federation of City Council Labour Union, Army Civil Service Union Industrial Group, SHBSA, Singapore Bookshop Workers' Union, Singapore Barbers' Assistants' Union, Singapore Hotel & Restaurant Workers' Union, Singapore European Employees' Union, Singapore Woodworkers' Union, Singapore Rattan Workers' Union, Singapore Coffeeshop Employees' Union, Singapore Tailors' Union, and Singapore Cycle & Motor Workers' Union.
- 47 *IJ*, no. 9/1955, paragraphs 324 & 324^b; no. 10/1955, paragraph 344; and no. 11/1955, Supplement no. 4, paragraph 52. *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 564-565, 695-758 & 761-779. *TyP*, no. 65, September 1955, p. 1, article 2 entitled "Tuan-chieh Ch'i-lai, Fan-tui Hsin 'Chin-chi Fa-ling' (Unite and Oppose the New 'Emergency Regulations')", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 65, p. 1, article 2). "SJ", paragraphs 19-22. "WS", paragraph 51. "LCS", pt. 4, Folios (156) & (156)¹; and pt. 5, Folio (190).
- 48 *IJ*, no. 11/1955, Supplement no. 4, paragraph 52. *TyP*, no. 67, p. 2, article 2.
- 49 *IJ*, no. 9/1955, paragraph 324^c; and no. 11/1955, Supplement no. 4, paragraph 52.

- 50 *IJ*, no. 9/1955, paragraph 324^D.
- 51 *IJ*, no. 10/1955, paragraph 371. "LCS", pt. 4, Folios (174)¹-(174)³; (175)-(175)¹, (176), (177)¹-(177)⁴, (178)²-(178)³ & (179)². "WS", paragraph 51.
- 52 *IJ*, no. 10/1955, paragraph 371^B. *TyP*, no. 66, October 1955, p. 2, article 2 entitled "Chi-hsü Chien-chüeh Chan-k'ai Fan-tui Chin-chi Fa-ling ti Tou-Chêng (Continue Resolutely to Unfold the Struggle against the Emergency Regulations)", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 66, p. 2, article 2). "LCS", pt. 5, Folio (198)³.
- 53 *TyP*, no. 66, p. 2, article 2. "LCS", pt. 5, Folios (198)³ & (200)². *IJ*, no. 11/1955, paragraph 401.
- 54 *IJ*, no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraph 34; no. 10/1955, paragraph 348^E; and no. 11/1955, Supplement no. 4, paragraph 52.
- 55 *TyP*, no. 67, p. 2, article 2.
- 56 *IJ*, no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. II, appendix N. 5. "SJ", paragraph 24.
- 57 *IJ*, no. 10/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. II, appendix N. 5.
- 58 *IJ*, no. 10/1955, paragraphs 344 & 348^E; and no. 11/1955, paragraphs 381^E-381^G. "SJ", paragraph 24. "LCS", pt. 5, Folio (198)¹.
- 59 *IJ*, no. 12/1955, paragraphs 407, 413 & 413^A; no. 1/1956, paragraph 12^B; and no. 2/1956, paragraph 27^C. "SJ", paragraph 24. "LCS", pt. 5, Folio (220)².
- 60 *IJ*, no. 3/1956, paragraph 46. "WS", paragraph 55.
- 61 *IJ*, no. 3/1956, paragraph 46.
- 62 *IJ*, no. 4/1956, paragraph 65^A; and no. 5/1956, paragraph 81.
- 63 *IJ*, no. 5/1956, paragraph 81^B.
- 64 *IJ*, no. 5/1956, paragraph 81^D. "SJ", paragraph 24.
- 65 *IJ*, no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraphs 71, 74 & 75.
- 66 *IJ*, no. 5/1955, paragraph 145. *TyP*, no. 61, May 1955, p. 2, article 2 entitled "Min-tsu Chiao-yü ti Yen-chung Wei-chi (A Serious Crisis in National Education)", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 61, p. 2, article 2). "DM", pt. 2, Folio (120)¹. "SCT", paragraph 35. "KTE (10.56)", paragraph 69.
- 67 *IJ*, no. 5/1955, paragraphs 145^A & 145^B. *TyP*, no. 61, p. 2, article 2. "SCT", paragraph 35. "KTE (10.56)", paragraphs 69-71. "LWK", paragraph 48. In 1954, the Government wished to enact a Chinese Schools Registration (Amendment) Bill. The Committees for the Protection of Chinese Education were organised by the students to protest against the bill. Eventually, the bill went only as far as a second reading in the legislature and did not come into force. However, the Committees remained. Their continued function was to protest against any other bill or action of the Government which could be considered to be injurious to Chinese education. They were dissolved only when the SCMSSU was allowed official registration by the Government in October 1955. Cf. *IJ*, no. 4/1955, Supplement no. 1, p. 56. "KTE (10.56)", paragraphs 66-68.
- 68 *IJ*, no. 5/1955, paragraphs 145^B & 145^C; and no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraph 44. "SCT", paragraph 36. "KTE (10.56)", paragraph 73.
- 69 David Marshall, op. cit., p. 9.
- 70 David Marshall, op. cit., p. 9. *IJ*, no. 5/1955, paragraph 145^A. *TyP*, no. 62, June 1955, p. 3, article 1 entitled "Yü-hui Chin-kung Hua-hsiao ti Hsin Yin-mou (The New Conspiracy to Attack Chinese Schools in a Zigzag Way)", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 62, p. 3, article 1). *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 225-274. "KTE (10.56)", paragraph 72.
- 71 *IJ*, no. 5/1955, paragraph 145^D.
- 72 "SCT", paragraph 36.
- 73 See chapter II, section "Genesis of the Mass Movements".

- 74 *Sing Cmd 53 of 1956*, pp. 2-3. "SCMSSU", p. 7. *IJ*, no. 4/1955, paragraph 107^A. "SCT", paragraph 42. "KTE (10.56)", paragraph 77. "LWK", paragraph 41.
- 75 *Sing Cmd 53 of 1956*, p. 3. "SCMSSU", p. 10. *IJ*, no. 4/1955, paragraph 107^A; no. 6/1955, paragraph 184⁰; no. 7/1955, paragraph 218^A; no. 10/1955, paragraph 349⁰¹; and no. 11/1955, paragraph 382. "SCT", paragraph 42. "KTE (10.56)", paragraph 77. "LWK", paragraph 41. John Drysdale, op. cit., p. 125.
- 76 *Sing Cmd 53 of 1956*, pp. 2 & 4. "SCMSSU", p. 12. *IJ*, no. 10/1955, paragraph 349⁰¹. "KTE (10.56)", paragraphs 77 & 80. "LWK", paragraph 41.
- 77 "SLB". "OGC", paragraph 17.
- 78 *IJ*, no. 6/1955, paragraph 185; no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraph 37; and no. 3/1956, Supplement no. 1, p. 34.
- 79 *IJ*, no. 12/1956, Supplement no. 4, paragraph 38; and no. 2/1956, paragraph 28^A. "CCT (64)", paragraph 25. CCT was the Paid Secretary of the SFA.
- 80 *IJ*, no. 10/1955, paragraph 350; and no. 2/1956, paragraph 28.
- 81 *IJ*, no. 2/1956, paragraph 28^A.
- 82 *IJ*, no. 3/1956, paragraph 47^A. "CCT (63)", paragraph 16.
- 83 *IJ*, no. 12/1955, paragraph 414⁰. "CCT(63)", paragraph 16.
- 84 *IJ*, no. 3/1956, paragraph 47; and no. 6/1956, paragraphs 95 & 95^A. "CCT(63)", paragraph 17.
- 85 *IJ*, no. 1/1956, paragraph 13; no. 2/1956, paragraph 28^A; no. 3/1956, paragraph 47^A; no. 5/1956, paragraph 82; and no. 7/1956, paragraph 111^B.
- 86 *IJ*, no. 3/1956, Supplement, no. 1, p. 34.
- 87 *IJ*, no. 6/1956, paragraph 95. "CCT(63)", paragraph 17.
- 88 Personal communication from "AC" and "HS".
- 89 "CYP", paragraph 14.
- 90 "HS". In March 1956, this society wished to stage a variety concert of songs and dances to raise money for a student fund. This was one example of the activities of this organisation. Cf. *IJ*, no. 2/1956, paragraph 25⁰.
- 91 "PTT", paragraph 24.
- 92 "HS".
- 93 OBAs which were heavily penetrated by the Communist underground were known to be the following: Arts Association of 1953 Graduates of Singapore Chinese Middle Schools (a youth organisation very much like an OBA although not assuming the name of one because it was not limited to only one school - comment by "HS"), Chung Cheng Alumni Association, Sin Min OBA, Nan Chiau Girls' High School Alumni Association, Industrial & Commercial OBA, and Yoke Min School OBA. Cf. *IJ*, no. 12/1956, Supplement no. 4, paragraph 31.
- 94 The heavily penetrated ones of the second type were: Brass Gong Musical Society and Kang Leh Musical Society. Cf. *IJ*, no. 12/1956, Supplement no. 4, paragraph 31. Those which carried out propaganda on exactly Communist lines of the third type were: *World Bi-Monthly*, *Literary Post*, *Life Fortnightly*, *The Hui Liu* and *Times Fortnightly*. Cf. *IJ*, no. 12/1956, Supplement no. 4, paragraph 32. "PTT", paragraphs 23-27.
- 95 This was the Singapore Chinese Primary School Teachers' Association. There is recorded evidence that this organisation was founded, on exact instructions from Ng Meng Chiang, by some members of the CPM who were school teachers. Cf. *IJ*, no. 12/1956, Supplement no. 4, paragraph 31. "LSG", paragraph 161. "OHS", paragraphs 21-25. "LSK(63)", paragraphs 15-19. "LSK(65)", paragraph 16.
- 96 *IJ*, no. 3/1956, Supplement no. 1, p. 32.

- 97 *IJ*, no. 9/1955, paragraphs 292^K & 292^M. "LSC", pp. 14-15.
- 98 *IJ*, no. 12/1955, paragraph 414^F. "LSC", pp. 14-15.
- 99 *IJ*, no. 12/1955, paragraph 414^G; no. 1/1956, paragraph 10^H; and no. 3/1956, paragraph 44 & Supplement no. 1, pp. 30 & 32. "PTT", paragraphs 28-29.
- 100 *IJ*, no. 3/1956, paragraph 44 and Supplement no. 1, p. 32.
- 101 *IJ*, no. 6/1955, paragraph 186; no. 3/1956, Supplement no. 1, p. 34; and no. 5/1956, paragraph 83. "CMH", p. 16. "LSG", pp. 55-56.
- 102 *IJ*, no. 12/1955, paragraph 433^A; and no. 3/1956, Supplement no. 1, p. 34. *PAP 1979*, pp. 52-53.
- 103 "CMH", p. 16.
- 104 "CMH", p. 15. *PAP 1979*, p. 53. "CH", p. 4.
- 105 "CMH", pp. 15-16. "CH", p. 4.
- 106 *IJ*, no. 7/1955, paragraph 217^K; and no. 8/1955, Supplement, paragraph 39. "LCS", pt. 3, Folio (96)^O.
- 107 Comments by "HS".
- 108 *PAP 1979*, pp. 47 & 59. *Fong*, p. 33. The five branches were: Tanjong Pagar, Farrer Park, Punggol-Tampines, Bukit Panjang and Bukit Timah.
- 109 *PAP 1979*, pp. 49 & 59. *Fong*, pp. 33, 41 & 45. The five additional branches were: Whampoa, Queenstown, Paya Lebar, Changi and Sembawang.
- 110 *IJ*, no. 3/1955, Supplement no. 1, p. 32.
- 111 The article is on page 2 of the issue and its title is "I Ch'ieh-shih Chū-ti ti Hsing-tung Chien-li Hsing-chou T'so-p'ai T'ung-i Chan-hsien (To Establish the Left-Wing United Front in Singapore with Practical and Concrete Action)".
- 112 See pp. 18-19.
- 113 Marshall was lenient to mere workers and students also because of a practical need. He wished to obtain their support for both his Party and his Government. Marshall made a distinction between the pawns of the Communists and the Communists themselves. In his own words: "A little later a Singapore Harbour Board strike was blown up into a general strike that sought to cripple our daily life. I remember the agony of patience, of waiting for our people to learn and understand and reject Communist sacrifice of the workers. To have used truncheons and bullets would have resulted in the chaos we sought to avoid and played into the hands of the enemy. The people of Singapore responded magnificently.
- Then we had Communist fomented troubles in Chinese secondary schools and Communist organised seizure of school buildings ... The police were seemingly very much taken by surprise and did not know how to cope. I believed the use of an unprepared police force would have resulted in bloodshed to a dangerous extent and would have antagonised our people against their government and destroyed a burgeoning hope in the possibility that existing partial democracy might lead us to freedom and healthy government. Instead of taking a firm stand, I capitulated to the Chinese middle school students ...".
- Cf. David Marshall, *op. cit.*, p. 9. For Marshall's antipathy towards Communism, see also C. Mary Turnbull, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-261.
- 114 The following actual evidence is available to show Marshall's deference to the attitudes of the British and the Malays on at least the issue of the Emergency Regulations: "It was reported on the next day after the results of the election was announced, Marshall expressed the view regarding the Emergency Regulations, that it would be possible to come to some 'arrangement'. The Labour Front was not aiming to make revolutionary changes. [During the general elections, the LF had told the voters that it would get the Emergency Regulations abolished if it came into power.] His government would not

- make trouble and to begin with things would go on as they were. He would not act irresponsibly but would set up commissions and committees to investigate various points in issue which were brought up during the election campaign." Cf. "DM", pt. 2, Folio (100)². And: "... The Federation Government made strong representations pointing out that abolition of the Emergency Regulations would create an R and R centre for Communists in Singapore and would make Singapore a springboard for their activities in Malaya." Cf. David Marshall, *op. cit.*, p. 10. See also his "MDS(O)", pp. 93-95.
- 115 See p. 62. According to David Marshall, it was not he who decided that the LF should advocate the abolition of the Emergency Regulations during the elections but Lim Yew Hock. He was committed to it by Lim. See his "MDS(O)", p. 58. See also Drysdale, *op. cit.*, chapter 12, note 1.
- 116 See p. 64.
- 117 *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 9, 141-144 & 156-158.
- 118 *LAD*, vol. 1, col. 157.
- 119 See p. 84.
- 120 *Ibid.*
- 121 The other new laws were: Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Ordinance, Penal Code (Amendment) Ordinance, Arms and Explosives (Amendment) Ordinance, Corrosive Substances Ordinance, Protected Places and Areas Ordinance, Undesirable Publications (Amendment) Ordinance, Police Force (Amendment) Ordinance and Registration of Persons Ordinance. Cf. *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 564-565, 694, 803 & 877.
- 122 *LAD*, vol. 1, col. 877.
- 123 See pp. 89-90.
- 124 The article was on p. 2 of no. 65 and its title was "Tuan-chieh-ch'i-lai, Fan-tui Hsin 'Chin-chi Fa-ling' (Unite and Oppose the new 'Emergency Regulations')".
- 125 See pp. 18-19.
- 126 See p. 83.
- 127 See p. 85.
- 128 *PAP 1960*, p. 16. *PAP 1964*, p. 206. *PAP 1969*, p. 127. *Plebeian Express*, Special Hong Lim by-election issue, no. 1, 2 July 1965, "The Truth about Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP".
- 129 *PAP 1960*, p. 16. *PAP 1964*, p. 206. *PAP 1969*, p. 127. *Fong*, p. 38.
- 130 *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 200-202. *Fong*, p. 38.
- 131 *LAD*, vol. 1, col. 225.
- 132 Chapter I, pp. 16 & 18-19; and chapter II, pp. 54-56.
- 133 See pp. 84-86. "Capture", p. 16. "DM", pt. 2, Folio (134)². "LCS", pt. 3, Folios (86)¹ & (91)¹. *IF*, no. 6/1955, paragraphs 183^k & 183^l. "WS", paragraph 799.
- 134 See p. 59.
- 135 The persons elected to the new CEC were:
- | | | |
|----------------|---|-----------------|
| Toh Chin Chye | — | Chairman |
| Lee Kuan Yew | — | Secretary |
| Ong Eng Guan | — | Treasurer |
| Abdul Latiff | — | Ordinary Member |
| S.W. Dagoon | — | do |
| Ismail Rahim | — | do |
| K.A. Ahad | — | do |
| Lee Gek Seng | — | do |
| S. Sockalingam | — | do |
| Tann Wee Keng | — | do |

Tann Wee Tiong — do

P. Tehlin — do

Cf. "LCS", pt. 3, Folio (89)⁶². *Fong*, pp. 39 & 267. According to *Fong*, Abdul Latiff "resigned later" his position and S.W. Dragoon did the same in October 1955. According to him again, an A.D. Steward was co-opted into the organ to become a member, but on which date he does not tell. The latter also resigned his place in November.

The persons from the Communist faction who were persuaded not to stand for election to the CEC were: Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan, C.V. Devan Nair, Chan Chiaw Thor, Abdul Samad and S. Woodhull. Cf. "LCS", pt. 3, Folio (88). "WS", paragraph 800. "Capture", pp. 18-19. *IJ*, no. 6/1955, paragraph 183^N. *Plebeian Express*, special Hong Lim by-election issue, no. 1, 2 July 1965, "The Truth about Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP".

- 136 S.W. Dragoon was actually close to one of the most important members of the Communist group, C.V. Devan Nair. He was accepted by the non-Communists on this occasion. However, only a few months later, he resigned from his position. Cf. "Capture", pp. 19 & 21.
- 137 *PAP 1979*, p. 59. Around mid-1956, the PAP had 13 branches. Nine of these were dominated by the Communists. Only the rest were influenced by the non-Communists. Cf. *PAP 1979*, p. 56.
- 138 Article 2.
- 139 See p. 62.
- 140 David Marshall, op. cit., p. 8. "MDS(O)", pp. 75-77. John Drysdale, op. cit., p. 103. *LAD*, vol. 1, col. 406.
- 141 "MDS(O)", pp. 75-76. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., p. 62. John Drysdale, op. cit., p. 102. Navtej Singh, "Singapore's Fight for Self-Government under David Marshall, 1955-1956", Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Singapore, 1972/73, p. 29.
- 142 "MDS(O)", pp. 77-79. Yeo Kim Wah, op. cit., p. 63, footnote 31, citing *New Nation* of 20 July 1971.
- 143 See p. 97.
- 144 David Marshall, op. cit., p. 10.
- 145 See pp. 83 & 92-93.
- 146 See p. 85.
- 147 The four persons whom Marshall wished to be appointed Assistant Ministers were Mak Pak Shee, A.R. Lazarous, Mohamed Sidik bin Abdul Hamid and M.P.D. Nair. The first two were members of the LF, the third of the Alliance and the last was an Independent. According to Lee Kuan Yew, Mak and Lazarous had both insisted on cabinet jobs in April. Marshall had managed to fob them off with a promise to find something for them in three months' time. With the three months over, they demanded fulfilment. Consequently, Marshall put forward his request to the Governor for more junior ministers. As for Sidik, Marshall wanted to find a job for the man because he needed the latter's support in his citizenship schemes. Marshall wanted to include Nair so as to gain one more Independent vote. Cf. "DM", pt. 3, Folio (163)⁷. "LCS", pt. 3, Folio (114)⁶.
- 148 David Marshall, op. cit., p. 11.
- 149 *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 401-402, 404-462 & 465-506. *TyP*, no. 64, August 1955, p. 1, article entitled "Fan Chih-min-chu-i Shih-wei shih Jên-min ti' Hsin Shêng-li (The Anti-Colonial Demonstration was a new Victory for the People)", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 64, p. 1, article 2); p. 2, article entitled "Ma-shao-êrh ti Chien-cha Tsou-kou Chû-

lien (Marshall's Crafty Running-Dog Face)", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 64, p. 2, article 1); and p. 2, article entitled "Chih-min Chêng-ch'üan ti Ku-li ho Tung-yao (The Colonial Regime is Isolated and Shakey)", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 64, p. 2, article 2).

150 *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 453-455.

151 "DM", pt. 3, Folios (161)¹, (166), (167)¹ & (170)¹.

In July too, Marshall had made an attempt to get the leading non-Communists in the PAP to join his government so that the whole lot could take on the British together. However; his invitation was rejected. Marshall's efforts to get Lee Kuan Yew to join hands with him, also for other purposes, in fact did not begin or end only in July 1955. Before that date, he had already made repeated offers to Lee Kuan Yew, and he continued trying to court him into the next year. At one point, he even got the British Labour Party to match-make the desired marriage. Cf. David Marshall, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10. "DM", pt. 2, Folios (128)² & (149)²; pt. 3, Folios (198), (231), (233)², (237), (238) & (240); and pt. 4, Folios (244) & (245)¹.

152 *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 453-455.

153 "DM", pt. 3, Folios (159)³, (159)⁴, (162), (164) & (165)¹.

154 *TyP*, no. 64, p. 1, article 2; and p. 2, articles 1 and 2.

155 *Ibid.*

156 *TyP*, no. 64, p. 2, article 1.

157 *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 516-534 & 536-563. "DM", pt. 3, Folios (154), (168)¹ & (179)².

158 Yeo Kim Wah, *op. cit.*, p. 67, footnote 42, citing *Singapore Standard* of 17 December 1955.

159 Article 2 on p. 2.

160 *Sing Cmd. 31 of 1956*, pp. 4-15.

161 *Sing Cmd. 31 of 1956*, pp. 2-3.

During the month before the delegation was scheduled to leave for London, that was in March, Marshall organised a Merdeka [Malay word for independence] Week to demonstrate strength to help him in the coming talks. All the political parties, including the PAP and their supporting organisations, took part in the campaign.

The highlight of the week was a rally held in Kallang Airport on 18 March. This wound up the campaign and coincided with a visit to the island by a British Parliamentary Delegation which had come to assess the political situation.

The gathering developed into riots. There was fighting between rally participants and the police in which dozens of people were hurt and damage done to property. The disturbances diminished Marshall's credit with the British rather than enhanced it. Marshall failed to obtain satisfaction for his demands in the constitutional talks later on and the rioting on this occasion was one of the factors which contributed to the failure.

The ignition point of the riots was when Marshall stood on the rally platform to speak: it collapsed. Some of the crowd had jumped on to it and the structure was unable to bear the weight. Later on, rain set in and the demonstrators broke up in confusion to take shelter in the airport building. Fights between some of the crowd and the police then broke out. There were more than 35,000 people at the gathering. Some suggested that the mischief was planned by the CPM as such. The Communists, on their part, put out the story that it was the police who were the manufacturers of the commotion. Their aim was to sabotage the demonstration. The Communist statement was published in *TyP*, no. 71. In the view of the police, however, the disturbances were a spontaneous outburst of the crowd. There was no hidden hand behind them.

The theory that the CPM was responsible for the disorder is weakened by the observation that it was not in the interests of the CPM to weaken Marshall but rather to shore him up in the forthcoming constitutional talks. The strategy was that there

should be a strong united front of all local political forces against the British. Therefore, the Kallang incident could not have been the handiwork of the CPM.

After the incident, the British told Marshall that they believed that it was the Chung Wah Institute, a left-wing organisation, which was actually responsible for the unrest. Later on, Marshall leaked the information to a delegation of Lim Chin Siong's trade unions. Marshall's move, apparently, was to win the support of Lim and his group in the coming London talks. The British were annoyed with him for this. Cf. *Fong*, pp. 42-43. *TyP*, no. 71, March 1956, p. 2, article entitled "Ying-ti P'o-huai Tu-li Yüntung ti Yin-mou (The Plot of the British Imperialists to Sabotage the Independence Movement)". *IJ*, no. 3/1956, paragraph 43. "DM", pt. 4, Folios (252) & (252)^a. "CKF (3.56)", pp. 1-4. *LAD*, vol. 1, cols. 1743-1747. Navtej Singh, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

162 *Sing Cmd. 31 of 1956*, p. 2.

163 *Sing Cmd. 31 of 1956*, annexure D.

164 *Sing Cmd. 31 of 1956*, annexure L. David Marshall, op. cit., p. 12.

165 *Sing Cmd. 31 of 1956*, annexure M. David Marshall, op. cit., p. 12.

166 *Ibid.*

167 David Marshall, op. cit., pp. 12-13. "LYH", pt. 6, Folio (475)^o. Navtej Singh, op. cit., p. 55.

168 David Marshall, op. cit., p. 13. Navtej Singh, op. cit., p. 55.

169 *IJ*, no. 1/1956, paragraph 15^a.

170 *LAD*, vol. 2, cols. 91-92.

171 David Marshall, op. cit., p. 13.

172 David Marshall, op. cit., p. 12. "MDS(O)", p. 56. *Sing Cmd. 31 of 1956*, p. 15.

173 *IJ*, no. 5/1956, paragraph 79^a.

174 No. 73, p. 1, article entitled "Che Chiu Shih Ying-kuo Chih-min-chu-i-che ti Chên Mien-mu (This was the True Face of the British Colonialists)". No. 74, p. 1, article entitled "I Kéng Chien-chüeh ti Tou-chêng Lai Hui-ta Ti-jên (Answer the Enemy with Even More Resolute Struggles)". No. 75, p. 2, article entitled "Hsing-chou Jên-min Chéng-ch'ü Tu-li ti Chi-ko Wên-t'i (The Problems of the Struggle of Independence by the People of Singapore)", (hereinafter *TyP*, no. 75, p. 2, article 1).

175 *TyP*, no. 75, p. 2, article 1.

176 Certain groups in the trade unions were interested in resorting to extra-constitutional means of struggle. Lim Chin Siong, however, held them back. Lim said that there should be no talk of violent means when constitutional avenues were open. Besides, through constitutional means, it was possible to unite all sections of the people into a formidable anti-colonial force. Cf. "WS", paragraphs 797-798. The reason for the Communists adopting a conservative attitude was, of course, because they were not really in a position to be violent. They could by no means match the British in strength. On this point, Lim Chin Siong, at a joint conference of "The Important Working Personnel from the Various Districts" on 13 September 1956, made the following remark: "After the failure of the April Talks, it can be said that the people's movement met with a temporary set back. Since it was decided that the central point of struggle in Singapore should be achieved by constitutional means, the struggle becomes necessarily a long and difficult one. The work of organising the masses is a decisive factor. It was because the masses were not well organised that we could not resort to armed struggle after the failure of the Talks". Cf. *IJ*, no. 3/1957, paragraph 37.

177 *Rendel Report*, p. 29.

178 *Ibid.*

179 *Ibid.*

- 180 *Rendel Report*, p. 30. This source gives the numbers of minors for the Chinese, the Indians and Pakistanis, and the Malays. The figures for the un-enfranchised adults are obtained by subtracting the numbers of the minors from the respective total populations of each of the communities.
- 181 F.G. Carnell, *op. cit.*, p. 216.
- 182 F.G. Carnell, *op. cit.*, p. 217.
- 183 *Rendel Report*, pp. 3-4, 7-9 & 29-31.
- 184 See p. 59.
- 185 Navtej Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 45. Colony of Singapore, *Government Gazette*, Supplement no. 19, 9 March 1956, *The Singapore Colony (Amendment) Order in Council, 1956*.
- 186 *Sing Cmd 31 of 1956*, annexures D and L. Yeo Kim Wah, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-153.



IV

Temporary Reverses and Electoral Victories

Lim Yew Hock was Chief Minister from June 1956 to June 1959. There were, in the interest of this study, three important developments during this period of time. The first was the continued onward movement of the Communist organisations. Lim Yew Hock, unlike Marshall, took strong security action to interrupt the process. He did not, however, achieve success. A second feature was the conflicts and reconciliations between the two wings in the PAP. In the course of development of these conflicts and reconciliations, the non-Communists evolved an alliance with the British against the Communists while allowing the Communists to take shelter under their wings. The third development was that the British returned more powers to Singapore on both local and central levels of government. Elections were subsequently held in which the PAP dislodged Lim Yew Hock from power.

The Mass Organisations - Disasters and Recoveries

During the third quarter of 1956, the Communists launched an anti-yellow culture campaign, as well as continued their efforts to engulf the TUC. From September till November, the Government attacked the Communists and their organisations, resulting in widespread rioting. The Communists suffered serious losses. The period which followed saw them recuperating and reorganising. Around mid-1957, they made attempts again to capture the TUC. In response, the Government arrested dozens of their activists. The damage was absorbed, however, and the Communist movement continued to wax in strength for the rest of Lim Yew Hock's administration.

Anti-Yellow Culture Campaign

The anti-yellow culture campaign began in July and ended in September 1956. Yellow culture, as viewed by the Communists, was pornographic culture. It was the opposite of red culture which was regarded as healthy culture. The Communists wanted to eradicate yellow culture and replace it with red culture.

In 1953, the CPM had already run an anti-yellow culture campaign. In that year, a young girl was raped and strangled. The Communists attributed the incident to the influence of yellow culture. Consequently, a movement was launched in the Chinese secondary schools against this kind of culture. Simultaneously, red culture was promoted. The campaign also earned the support of community leaders and the newspapers. Some students gathered together yellow culture books and destroyed them by fire.¹

In early 1956, the anti-yellow culture movement was resumed. The sponsors were the various cultural organisations and school students. Activities, however, were sporadic.² In July the same year, the SWF decided to take over leadership of the movement. The anti-yellow culture effort was to be made into a major campaign in mass and united front activities. This was the SWF's first contribution to the Communist revolution after its registration with the Government.³

According to the President of the SWF, Chen Mong Hock, this organisation had three aims in taking over and managing the anti-yellow culture movement. The first was that women were considered the victims of vice. If the SWF could lead in the movement, it would create for itself a good impression amongst the female community in the island and would thus be able to draw members of this community to its ranks. Secondly, the movement was an opportunity to bring together various organisations, whatever their ideological or racial characteristics. This would help the expansion of the united front. And thirdly, the SWF could press the Government to relax prohibitions against the importation and publication of left-wing literature.⁴

To begin the campaign, the SWF and 12 other organisations sponsored the formation of an Anti-Yellow Culture Council. Of the 12 other organisations, eight came from the Communist apparatus, three were Malay associations and one was Indian.⁵

On 19 August a mass meeting was called by the Council. The occasion was attended by more than 1,000 people who were supposed to represent 295 organisations.⁶ Among other things, the meeting elected a 17-member Executive Committee for the Council, and the President of the SWF was also to be President of the Council.⁷ A set of resolutions which aimed at putting a stop to yellow culture and releasing red culture were passed.⁸ One action of the anti-yellow culture campaign was the holding of a picnic by the SFSWU during which 2,000 yellow books were burnt.⁹

The Council made an appointment to see Lim Yew Hock, the Chief Minister, on 18 September 1956. Government security action, however, frustrated the meeting.¹⁰

Eyes on the TUC

At the time Marshall resigned his Chief Ministership, the Communist unions made moves to get closer to the TUC.¹¹ The Communists were eager for Marshall's assault against the British to be continued and they were ready to give him full support. Both while still in London after the failure of the constitutional talks and after having returned to Singapore, Lim Chin Siong had given indications to Marshall that he would support the latter in continuing to lead the anti-colonial struggle.¹² After Marshall had left the administration and Lim Yew Hock had become the Chief Minister, the *TyP* expected that the new leader would continue the course of his predecessor.¹³ Attempts by the left-wing unions to develop a closer association with the TUC were made against this background.

In the middle of June, the National Convention of Trade Unions, which consisted of members from both groups of unions and which had been formed several months earlier to support Marshall's fight for a new constitution, met to discuss the failure of the constitutional talks.¹⁴ Leaders of the two groups also met on a separate occasion to discuss fostering co-operation amongst themselves.¹⁵ Government offensives interrupted this course of development.

Confrontation

The action taken by the Government against the Communist movement from September till November 1956 consisted of arresting and neutralising nearly 300 Communist activists, and banning ten of the most important of the mass organisations and a few publications. Three parties were involved in the operation against the Communists – the British authorities, Tunku Abdul Rahman, representing the Government of Malaya, and Lim Yew Hock, representing the LF-Alliance. There was a common interest among them in having the Communists checked.

Lim Yew Hock adopted a bolder attitude than Marshall had against the Communists. In the opinion of the public, according to a non-Communist PAP assemblyman at the time, Lim was motivated by either one of two considerations. Some said that he wished to demonstrate co-operativeness with the British. Like Marshall, he was interested in obtaining a better constitution for Singapore. Where Marshall had failed, he would succeed. A second view was that Lim was interested in doing away with all opposition to the LF, including the PAP, so that victory in the next general elections would be assured. An assemblyman passed the remark that probably both interpretations of Lim's feelings were true.¹⁶

Unlike Marshall, Lim did not shy away from taking strong action against the Communists and also assumed responsibility for such action. For instance, on 4 October, in a meeting of the Legislative Assembly, he

stated that, although internal security was in the charge of the Chief Secretary, police decisions were not made by this person alone but by the whole Council of Ministers.¹⁷ As Chief Minister, therefore, Lim stood out in front to take on the Communists.

What took place in the later part of 1956 was a continuation of trends from Marshall's time. As related in the last chapter, around the middle of the previous year, there were already ideas of having a great number of people of the Communist organisations put away. In May that year, the British raised the point with Marshall¹⁸ and repeated the request the following month.¹⁹ However, Marshall refused to sign the necessary warrants of arrests and the plans were, therefore, not implemented.

On 18 and 19 September 1956, the Government ordered the arrest of seven persons. These were leaders in the Communist women, student, cultural, worker and peasant movements, including Chen Mong Hock. Simultaneously, the Government deregistered the SWF and the Chinese Brass Gong Musical Society, a cultural organisation.²⁰ On 24 September, the SCMSSU was also dissolved.²¹

In a significant response from the Communists Lim Chin Siong led a delegation to see Lim Yew Hock on the morning of 28 September. Available data do not say what transpired at the meeting. In the evening of the same day, an inaugural meeting of a Civil Rights Convention was held. This Convention was formed by the STUWC to sponsor a protest movement against Lim Yew Hock. Judging from the demands raised by this Convention against the Government, it could be assumed that Lim Chin Siong had asked the Chief Minister to release the arrested persons or have them put on trial as well as to restore the banned organisations or have the case against them proved in court. Lim Yew Hock ignored the demands of the Convention. On 30 September, at a joint meeting of the SBWU and the STCEU, Fong Swee Suan said in a speech that Lim Chin Siong had challenged Lim Yew Hock to resign from office for his acts and stand for re-election in his ward, and Lim Chin Siong himself would also resign from his Legislative Assembly seat and stand for re-election in his own ward. The Chief Minister refused to accept the challenge. There is no report of another meeting between the two Lims on 29 September, so the challenge must have been given in the meeting on 28 September. The issuance of the challenge was indicative of Lim Chin Siong's hardened attitude after the Chief Minister had refused his initial demands. Lim Chin Siong's posture intensified the conflict.²²

On the night of 28 September, the Civil Rights Convention held its inaugural meeting. It was reported that altogether 700 persons attended, representing 106 organisations which had a combined following of 200,000. Not only did members of the STUWC participate but also those of Lim

Yew Hock's own labour organisation, the TUC. The Malays came along too. It was a new united front against the Chief Minister. The Convention passed a number of resolutions which focused on attacking Lim Yew Hock. The resolutions also demanded the release of the arrested persons or their public trial and the lifting of the ban on the proscribed organisations or its justification. Sometime after the inaugural meeting, the Convention escalated its demand to one of calling upon the Government to hold a referendum on its acts, or resign and call a general election to test the will of the people.²³

On 1 October, the Government made a further move by arresting Sun Loh Boon, the ex-President of the SCMSSU. The next day, an official of the SFSWU who was simultaneously a member of the Central Executive Committee of the PAP was also taken into custody.²⁴ The non-Communists in the PAP now also came out in opposition against the Government because the Government had hit directly at the PAP by arresting a member of its leadership.²⁵

On 10 October, there was further Government action when four more former leaders of the SCMSSU were arrested. The Chinese High School and the Chung Cheng High School were also required to expel 142 students who had previously been active in the SCMSSU.²⁶

The students reacted defiantly. On the night of 10 October, large numbers of them assembled in the two schools and began a stay-in campaign as in 1954 and 1955. They made three demands on the Government: the registration of the SCMSSU was to be restored; students who had been arrested were all to be released unconditionally; and the orders to expel the 142 students were to be withdrawn. They would not break camp unless these demands were satisfied. The Chinese High School assembly had banners and portraits of student leaders collected together for use in a victory parade later on. The expectation was that the students would win against the Government.²⁷ The students were massively supported morally and materially by the Communist trade unions and other organisations.²⁸

On 12 October, the Government had the Chinese and the Chung Cheng High Schools declared closed, and the following day, opened two schools of its own to accommodate those students who wished to escape from the influence of the Communists and leave the two affected schools.²⁹

On 15 and 16 October, the Government arrested two employees of the *Nanyang Siang Pau*, a major Chinese newspaper. The two men were responsible for having brought this publication under the influence of the Communists and turning it into the latter's mouthpiece.³⁰

On 22 October, the Communists initiated action to enforce a general strike by all Chinese secondary school students in the island. On that and

the following day, large numbers of students from the two stay-in schools visited other schools and picketed them so as to dissuade the pupils of these schools from going to class. It was also indicated that attempts would be made to frustrate a successful development of the two Government schools.³¹ On the same day, there was a meeting of the Civil Rights Convention. As a representative of the workers, Fong Swee Suan spoke. He dwelt on the unity and solidarity between the students and the workers and intimated that a general strike of workers must be called if other forms of protest against the Government did not achieve results.³² On the next day, at another meeting of the Convention, it was noted that speeches, which were more inflammatory than usual in nature, were given by Lim Chin Siong and others.³³

On 23 October, the Government made a decision to disperse the students in the Chinese and the Chung Cheng High School by force. The next day, at 7 pm, a warning was issued to parents that they must take their children away from the two schools by 8 pm on 25th. The Government would take the necessary action to clear the schools if this was not done.³⁴ Simultaneously, between 24 and 25 October, the Government dissolved four cultural societies and arrested eight persons who were connected with them. The four organisations were the Singapore Chinese High School Graduates of 1953 Arts Association, the Singapore Chung Cheng High School Alumni Association, the Singapore Chinese Primary School Teachers' Association and the Singapore Chinese School Parents' Association.³⁵

On 25 October, parents and guardians turned up in the two schools to take their children away. However, some parents and guardians, who were officials of the Singapore Chinese School Parents' Association, dissuaded them from doing so. Propaganda efforts on the part of student leaders maintained the morale of the students and prevented them from breaking up.³⁶

On the same day, between 5 and 7 pm, Lim Chin Siong and others held a protest meeting at the market place which was the heart of his constituency, Bukit Timah, and two miles north of the Chinese High School. Fiery speeches were made. After the meeting, a number of those who had attended went down to the school and joined with the crowds who had earlier assembled outside the school.³⁷

When the gathering at the market place was over, the Committee of the Civil Rights Convention immediately held a meeting at the headquarters of the SFSWU in Middle Road. At this meeting, Fong Swee Suan again spoke, stating that he was afraid that there would be bloodshed at the schools after 8 pm. He also said that after the students, the Government would go for the trade unions. He then proposed that there should

be a complete stoppage of work for one day among the workers in the island. After that, there would be a review of the situation.³⁸

At 8 pm, the police at the two stay-in schools did not take action to disperse the students. With the large crowds assembled outside the schools, the Communists had presented the Government with a situation in which it would have to be the first party to use force to resolve the conflict or to submit to their demands. To take a forceful course of action would result in loss of public goodwill and to surrender would result in material loss. Therefore, the police did nothing for the time being. The Communists, on their part, also preferred not to be the side first to use violence. Eventually, the first to use force were some of the crowd outside the Chinese High School, who could be considered sympathisers of the students. They attacked the police with missiles and overturned and burned vehicles.³⁹

After the initial skirmish at the Chinese High School, widespread rioting followed. This lasted for three or four hours.⁴⁰ At daybreak on 26 October, the police acted. They got into the schools and shot teargas at the students, breaking them up.⁴¹

The students who were evicted from the Chinese High School then made their way to town and re congregated at the Hokkien Association in Chinatown, or the headquarters of the SFSWU. The Hokkien Association was an organisation of the Hokkien community, which was the largest section of the Chinese population in Singapore. Tan Lark Sye was the leader of this organisation. The purpose of the students in re-assembling at this association was to draw Tan Lark Sye out to settle the dispute.⁴² Those students who were ejected from the Chung Cheng High School regrouped at another school in the same neighbourhood, the Kong Hwa School.⁴³

The assembly at the Hokkien Association lasted only a day and a night before being dispersed by the police.⁴⁴ At Kong Hwa School, in the afternoon of the same day, the police managed to get most of the students to come out and surrender themselves. The next morning, the police were not at the school and the remaining students left of their own accord.⁴⁵

Also on the morning of 26 October, the left-wing unions launched their strike.⁴⁶ The SFSWU also gave orders to its members, who were working in factories in Lim Chin Siong's constituency and in an area further north, Bukit Panjang, to group themselves together and march in procession down to the Legislative Assembly in town to present demands to the Chief Minister. This was to be a demonstration of sympathy for the students. The attempted procession was, however, interrupted by police action and eventually did not take place. The SFSWU instructed that another attempt should be made the following day.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, rioting had resumed, this time all over the island. Re-ignited at the two schools when the students were driven out, it spread, following the path of the escaping students. In 1955, fighting was localised. However, on this occasion, the violence fanned out far and wide. Particularly significant were disturbances in Jurong, an area adjoining Bukit Timah, where members of the SFA burnt down an English school and attacked a police station.⁴⁸ The police reacted by imposing a curfew on the city.⁴⁹

On the night of 26 October, the leftists held large scale meetings in the headquarters and the branches of the SFSWU. In the Bukit Timah branch, the gathering numbered more than 300 persons. The branch of the SBWU in the Hock Lee Bus Company and the branch of the SFA in Jurong also held meetings. These large groups had come together in order to spread the rioting.⁵⁰

In the early hours of 27 October, the police raided all these meetings. The aim was to arrest all the prominent leaders of the Communist trade unions and peasant societies. Altogether, 219 persons were taken away. This number included Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan.⁵¹ Later on, 37 more persons were detained.⁵²

In November, the SFA and the SWHDA were dissolved, and five publications were banned. The SFSWU was also given notice to explain within a given period why it should not be deregistered and was accordingly banned in February the following year.⁵³

Organised disturbances in the island died down after the action of the police on 27 October. Life returned to normal on 30 October, after an intermittent period of curfew.⁵⁴ The loss of personnel and organisations was a drastic blow to the Communists. What had with great pains been built up since 1954 had now almost come to nothing. A great effort was wasted. Both the police and the Communists themselves commented on the disaster. Observations of the police ran thus:

The Communists have ... been deprived of their major platform, which they have been at such pains to construct with a legal facade, and the whole classic technique of preying upon the young students and the immature or simple peasants, workers and women has been exposed ...⁵⁵

Issue no. 79 of *TyP* carried an article which encouraged sympathetic readers to continue the Communist struggle in spite of the recent incident. In one place, the essay admitted to the losses which had been suffered. It said:

The anti-colonial strength of the people of Singapore, and the various mass movements and mass struggle suffered a great setback.

Progressive organizations and societies were nearly all dissolved without reason and a great number of the leaders of the masses were detained with brute force. This has brought about serious losses to the progressive forces.

The independence movement and the mass struggle of the people of Singapore were faced with difficulties [ahead] and will enter into a period of low tide ...⁵⁶

The CPM acknowledged an unpleasant fact.

Another important action which Lim Yew Hock took in the 1956 confrontation with the CPM, besides closing down a number of its open organisations and arresting its activists, was to encourage non-Communist trade unions to appear to take the place of the Communist ones. An existing Trade Union Ordinance had a provision which allowed any seven persons to form a trade union. A literal interpretation was given to this provision. Consequently, a great number of small unions came into existence between 1956 and the end of his regime. By the time of the next general elections in mid-1959, it was found that there were altogether more than 200 unions in Singapore island and more than 50 per cent of them were small ones, each with less than 250 members.⁵⁷

A New Caution and Reorganisation

In April 1957, the CPM circulated a document among its members which gave a review of the Government purge.⁵⁸ Among other things, it explained how the Communist movement had been so badly crippled by Government action by putting the blame on a wrong struggle policy pursued at the time.

The first mistake made by the comrades, the paper asserted, was to focus attacks on Lim Yew Hock and his colleagues. The chief enemy was the British and not Lim. Lim should actually have been treated so as to lessen his hostility against the Communists rather than be so pushed towards the British that he stood solidly with them against the Communists. This error was due to an inadequate conception of the tactic of the united front. Who was the main enemy and who was not, was not properly seen.

Next, there was an inflexibility in the demands made on Lim Yew Hock. First, there was a clamour that arrested persons should be released or tried in court and banned organisations should be restored or the charges against them proved publicly. When these demands were unheeded, they were inflated to clamours for the Government to go back to the people and face an election. It was not perceived that after the Government had set itself on a course to attack the Communists, it would not easily submit to such demands. The comrades should not have clung on to these demands. They should have remembered that the objective of the struggle was the accumulation of strength for the movement. To

demand this and that was only a means to achieving this end. Now because of an inflexibility in attitude, a deadlock between the two sides had been reached. This led to resolution of the conflict by force, which was welcomed by the British. Actually, the comrades should have called for an end to the strife. During the meeting between Lim Chin Siong and the Chief Minister on 28 September, a total satisfaction of their demands should not have been insisted upon. Some concession from the opposite side should have been accepted. If such a policy had been followed, the process of destruction would have been halted.

Summing up, the document stated that the basic error committed by the comrades was left-wing adventurism. It was now emphasised again that, in future, there must be patience in work. The objective of the present struggle was only the building up of strength. There should be no decisive engagement with the enemy until there were real opportunities.

The criticism made in this review of the comrades might or might not have been fair. The fact was that the attitudes adopted in 1956 had precedents. What brought about failure in 1956 had reaped successes in earlier years. In 1954, there was the anti-National Service agitation. In 1955, there were the Hock Lee riots and the June sympathy strike. All these had brought dividends to the Communists. The policy pursued in 1956 fell into a natural sequence with the earlier events. Actually, the factor which brought a change in the situation was Lim Yew Hock and not so much the comrades' attitudes. As seen, in 1954, the comrades took on the colonial authorities and in 1955, David Marshall. The colonial authorities, if having to act on their own without a united front partner, and David Marshall, both felt that it would be counter-productive to push the other side too hard. However, this was not the thinking of Lim Yew Hock.

Regardless of what could be said about the 1957 document, it was to have a profound influence upon the behaviour of the Communists in the years which followed. At the time when the document was circulating in the party, other important things were also happening. These were the cessation of the *TyP*, the disbandment of the SPABL and the taking over of organisational responsibilities from Ng Meng Chiang by Fong Chong Pik. A reorganisation took place in the Communist movement.

The *TyP* came to an end in April 1957. Its last issue was no. 84, which was brought out in that month.⁵⁹ The *TyP* was an illegal publication. Before the Rendel Constitution, it was not easy to bring out publications but since then, the Government had relaxed its attitude and things could be printed more easily. Therefore, the *TyP* could be dispensed with.⁶⁰

The main factor which brought about the demise of the *TyP* was its superfluity. Another cause which led to its winding up was the question of security. If a person was found to be in possession of it he could be punished by the Government. However, if he had with him only permit-

ted literature, then no accusation of having violated the law could be brought against him. This fact was of paramount importance to members of the CPM, especially to those who operated in the legal and open mass organisations and political parties.⁶¹

Advice about the dissolution of the SPABL was given to different units and different individuals in the CPM at different times. This was because of difficulties in communication.⁶² As in the case of the *TyP*, the SPABL was an illegal society. If a person was discovered by the Government to be a member of the SPABL, he could be punished. On the other hand, if he was arrested at any time and was found to be simply no more than a member of an organisation which was legal, then he could not be charged with having committed an offence.⁶³ It was, as explained in Chapter I, an instrument for mobilising and organising the masses as well as being a vehicle for united front activities.⁶⁴ Before the implementation of the Rendel Constitution, it was not easy for mass and united front activities to be carried out, but the situation had now changed as student associations, trade unions and so on could more easily obtain registration. Therefore, the SPABL could be abandoned without affecting the Communist movement.⁶⁵

After the SPABL was closed down, those members who were found to have the necessary qualities were absorbed into the CPM to become its members. Those who could probably make it to CPM membership sometime in the future but who were not yet ready, were treated as sympathisers of the Party. They were to be observed for another period of time. If, finally, they measured up to expectations, they would be accepted into the CPM. Otherwise, they would be discarded. The last group of persons were regarded as not having the potential to become members of the CPM at all. The former SPABL superiors of such persons should straightaway discard them. All rejected former members of the SPABL should be viewed in the same light as any ordinary member of any of the legal and open mass organisations or political parties, if such former members still chose to be active in such organisations and parties.⁶⁶

In 1954, when the open united front struggle began, there were only two groups of the Communist Party in Singapore which still functioned. The rest had already been eliminated by Government security action. These two groups were respectively responsible for student and propaganda work. Ng Meng Chiang was the head of the student division, and Fong Chong Pik, head of the propaganda section.⁶⁷ From 1954 until the reorganisation of the Communist apparatus in 1957, Ng Meng Chiang directed the development of the various mass organisations and the united front, and resolved all the problems which these faced. The reorganisation in 1957 gave stress to legal and open rather than illegal and underground work. Fong had been in charge of the *TyP* and other underground

propaganda. Now that only lawful propaganda would be carried out, that Fong should be given charge of it was only natural.⁶⁸ Since Fong had to manage open propaganda work, he would also take over control of open organisational work so that the two parts of the Communist movement could be co-ordinated.⁶⁹ There is also an opinion which suggests that Ng Meng Chiang had to hand over organisational work to Fong Chong Pik because of the misadventure in 1956.⁷⁰

The reorganisation undertaken in early 1957 was actually the implementation of the directive which had come from Ho Lung, the Secretary of the South Malayan Bureau. In early 1956, Ho received a letter from Yeong Kwo, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Party. In the letter, Yeong strongly disapproved of the violent tactics of struggle pursued by the student movement in Singapore at that time. This referred to the anti-National Service episode in 1954 and probably also to the Hock Lee riots in the following year. Yeong expressed the opinion that by being extreme the students were only giving themselves away. On the basis of Yeong's letter, Ho sent a directive to Singapore which instructed that from henceforth all leftist tendencies must be squashed. Emphasis must definitely be given to the legal and open mode of struggle. The aftermath of the 1956 disaster served to drive home to the comrades in Singapore the point made by Yeong Kwo and Ho Lung.⁷¹

The Communists Rebuild the Open Mass Organisations

The misfortune which befell the Communist movement in late 1956 was great but not, however, fatal. The truth was that most of the persons who were arrested were not members of the CPM or even of the SPABL. The majority of these had remained underground. If the CPM and the SPABL remained intact, fresh blood could be recruited to start the various mass movements once again. The organisations and the publications which were banned were also important but their loss could be tolerated. Replacements could be created. The ordinary members of the mass organisations and such organisations themselves were like the leaves of the lallang whereas the underground components of the movement were like the roots. The leaves could be destroyed, but, if the roots were untouched, new leaves would grow again when conditions were right.⁷²

The police at the time did not judge the 1956 debacle of the Communist movement to be the final solution of the Communist problem by any means.⁷³ In certain quarters close to the non-Communists in the PAP, there was the feeling that the persons who were neutralised in the arrests were only those who were known to the public. Besides these, there were the less publicised who could reorganise before long.⁷⁴

Along with reorganising the underground part of their apparatus, therefore, the Communists took immediate steps to reconstruct the vari-

ous open mass movements. In the labour field, the first thing which had to be done was to find a replacement for the SFSWU. The Communists successfully solved the problem. They took over an organisation which belonged to a different group of people and converted it to their own use. The captured trade union subsequently became the leading element in the left-wing labour movement.

The organisation that the Communists acquired was the Singapore General Employees' Union (SGEU). After deciding that the SGEU could substitute for their lost organisation, former leaders of the SFSWU entered into negotiations with the office-bearers of this union about co-operation between the two groups. An agreement was reached in March 1957. Eventually, the leftists were allowed to occupy 18 out of the 21 seats on the Central Executive Committee of the organisation. Thus, the SGEU became an instrument of the Communists.⁷⁵ After the SGEU was taken over, the ex-leaders of the SFSWU encouraged their followers to join this organisation. By early June, the enrolment of the union had reached 2,000 and two months later, 3,000.⁷⁶

The SGEU was only one, although the largest and most important, of many left-wing trade unions. Before the 1956 incident, there were 95 such unions. These 95 were unified and led by the STUWC after the 1956 event. Because of the arrest of a great number of their leaders and the dissolution of the SFSWU, the unions, together with the STUWC, were thrown into disarray. Therefore, the second task facing the Communists in the labour movement after the 1956 purge was to rally the unions and revive the STUWC.⁷⁷

Early in November 1956, soon after Government security action was over, there appeared in the press a statement made by left-wing unions attacking the Government. Ten organisations signed the statement.⁷⁸ This was the beginning of the return of the unified trade union movement. The call to rally progressed step by step. By February the next year, activities were carried out in the name of 17 organisations and by March, 20. By May, this number had increased to 26, and, a month later, to 32. These unions called themselves the Leftwing Trade Union Group.⁷⁹ The STUWC was eventually also successfully revived. In June 1957, the 32 unions met and elected seven from among themselves to constitute the committee of the new STUWC.⁸⁰

The third task taken in hand by the revived Communist trade union movement was the resumption of the effort to assimilate the mass base of the LF, the TUC. In April, the 32 left-wing trade unions approached the TUC to arrange for a joint celebration of May Day in the following month. The latter was interested, but insisted on controlling the proceedings. In the face of this, the leftists gave up the attempt to woo the TUC and instead held a separate celebration of their own on 1 May.⁸¹

A more basic attempt to engulf the TUC was to have the Communist unions join the TUC as members and then to take over the leadership of this organisation. As soon as the STUWC was properly revived, plans to do this were discussed.⁸² On their part, the leaders of the TUC were also interested in accepting the left-wing unions into their fold. Two of their leaders had just been to China on May Day to participate in the celebrations of the occasion at the invitation of the Chinese Government. The feeling was that the Communist unions could be made use of.⁸³ In July and August, meetings between representatives of the two sides took place. Government security action against the leftists on the night of 22 August, however, interrupted the progress of the negotiations.⁸⁴

The Communist labour movement had suffered a great disaster in 1956, but by August 1957, recovery had become significant.⁸⁵ In 1957, the Communists also successfully rebuilt the open peasant movement. At the close of 1956, a Singapore Country People's Association (SCPA) was formed. This was organised by supporters of the Assistant Minister to the Chief Secretary and former members of the SFA. Among the sponsors were members of the CPM and the SPABL.⁸⁶ The Assistant Minister to the Chief Secretary himself became the adviser of the organisation. However, some members of the committee were cadres from the Communist underground.⁸⁷ At first the union did not attract very much attention from the countryside residents. However, after the Communists had the committee enlarged and brought in their friends to fill up the new vacancies, the Association achieved rapid growth. Branches were soon established in various rural areas in the island, for instance, in Potong Pasir and Paya Lebar.⁸⁸

After the SCMSSU was closed down in late 1956, the focus of open Communist activities in the student field shifted from the secondary schools to Nanyang University. Nanyang University was a Chinese-medium university established for the further education of the graduates of the Chinese secondary schools. It was inaugurated in March 1956.⁸⁹ As soon as the university had started, the students began to get themselves organised. In May, it was observed that they were forming an Undergraduate Self-Governing Society,⁹⁰ but there were no further reports about this organisation. In August, the existence of a Nanyang University Students' Union (NUSU) was mentioned,⁹¹ and by July the next year, NUSU was in the process of applying for registration with the Government.⁹²

There was also a recovery in the cultural movement during the first half of 1957. The part of the movement which captured the greatest attention was the propaganda section of the PAP.⁹³ More will be said about this in the next section of this chapter.

Before the 1956 incident, the women's movement consisted of the SWF and the Women's League of the PAP. No replacement was found for the former after it was banned. The latter alone continued the work of championing the interests of women in the island. Between the last quarter of 1956 and the third quarter of 1957, the number of branches of the PAP increased from 10 to 13.⁹⁴

Government Security Action, 1957

In August 1957 and subsequently, the Government purged the Communist movement again. This was the second major offensive against the Communists carried out during Lim Yew Hock's administration.

The Government struck again for the simple reason that the Communists had once more become too strong and were posing a threat to its security. In particular, the attempt of the STUWC to subvert the TUC was regarded as serious.⁹⁵ Simultaneously, the Government was also concerned that the Communist wing in the PAP was gaining dominance in that organisation. This will be explained fully in the next section of this chapter.

The seriousness of the Communist problem by August 1957, was observed in a police report which stated:

The Communists had, by the middle of August 1957, largely regained their hold on the trade union movement and with growing confidence were steadily expanding their Communist United Front. There were many known Communists holding important posts in the trade unions. They had also gained the upper hand in the PAP and women, students, and farmers were again being organised as a Communist United Front. It was clear that if these activities were allowed to go unchecked the Communist Front would shortly become, once again, a most serious threat to the security of Singapore ...⁹⁶

So the Government moved to act.

The Communists scented the danger that was ahead of them. At the end of July, a delegation from the STUWC saw Lee Kuan Yew and tried to persuade him to take the PAP into the LF-Alliance Coalition Government. The PAP should become part of the establishment. The primary aim of the move was to forestall the purge that was coming. A secondary aim was to gain a position from which they could demand the release of leaders who were detained in 1956. At this time, Lim Yew Hock had just got the British to agree to give Singapore a new constitution. One clause in the proposed new constitution provided that ex-detainees would not be allowed to take part in the next general elections which would be held under this constitution. If Lim Ching Siong and his associates could be released from prison before the implementation of the proposed constitu-

tion, then this clause could be bypassed. Lee Kuan Yew, however, was non-committal in his reply to the request.⁹⁷

The Government offensive came on the night of 22 August 1957, when 39 persons were arrested. There was one case of mistaken identity and the man involved was subsequently released. Among those who were effectively detained, 15 were leaders of ten of the 32 trade unions under the STUWC. Another 19 were members of the PAP. Of these, five were from the Central Executive Committee of that Party and the rest from its branches. Four of the 38 arrested persons were members of a newspaper which was part of the cultural movement.⁹⁸ In the following month, on the 25 September, the Government also arrested 48 students. After the banning of the SCMSSU in the previous year, large scale underground activities had continued in the Chinese schools.⁹⁹

There was a significant difference between the Government operations in 1956 and 1957. In the earlier year, as seen, not only were persons taken to prison, but also organisations were banned. In the later year, however, there were only arrests of people and no organisations were touched. How did the Communists react to the second attack by the Government? In 1956, there was widespread rioting and violence. This time, however, the Communists eschewed all these.

On 23 August, representatives of eight of the ten unions, some of whose leaders were arrested, held a meeting. A number of resolutions were passed, one of which was that protest meetings should not be organised without first ascertaining the attitude of the TUC on this. Another resolution demanded the open trial of detainees.¹⁰⁰ In the next month, another meeting of the left-wing trade unions reiterated the decision not to hold any mass meetings. It was clear that protest meetings of the masses could lead to clashes with the police. A petition however, was to be sent to the United Nations.¹⁰¹ Two instances of statements to the press were noted, one on 28 August and the other on 3 September. On the latter occasion, the document which was given out in the name of all 32 Communist trade unions clamoured for the open trial or release of the detainees and non-banishment from Singapore of persons eligible for citizenship rights.¹⁰²

On 7 September, a delegation from the SGEU visited the Chief Minister and asked for clarification on his recent action. Lim Yew Hock gave a reply which was felt to be unsatisfactory.¹⁰³ Fiery speeches against the Government were also made on 15 September and on 20 October, which were anniversary celebrations of two left-wing trade unions.¹⁰⁴ This was all that the Communists dared to do *vis-à-vis* the Government's recent punitive action. By October, even this mild show of discontent and

frustration had died down. In that month, the situation was observed to be peaceful:

Singapore continued to enjoy a period of 'peace'. There was an almost complete absence of covert or overt Communist Front activities in all fields ...¹⁰⁵

The Communists lay low.

It was obvious that the Communists did not hit so hard at the Government this time because of the April 1957 directive after the 1956 incident which had counselled the utmost restraint.

Continued Growth of the Mass Organisations

The Communist open mass organisations continued their growth from August 1957 till the end of Lim Yew Hock's administration, but provocative activities were avoided. They became even more restrained than after the 1956 incident. On the other hand, growth was significant enough to be able to bring to an end Lim Yew Hock's Government in mid-1959.

In September 1957, a month after the government operation, the Communists still had 32 trade unions in the labour movement. This number remained constant until the eve of the general elections in 1959. Judging from this figure, the labour movement had not grown. However, the memberships of the different unions might have increased. Information on this point has not come to hand. If indeed more persons had joined the left-wing trade unions after August 1957, then the Communist labour movement had increased.¹⁰⁶

The left-wing unions resumed their effort to woo the TUC after the misadventure in August 1957. In both 1958 and 1959, Labour Day was jointly celebrated by these unions and the TUC. On the first occasion, 27 left-wing and 41 right-wing unions participated. On the second occasion, a total of 72 unions took part.¹⁰⁷ The joint celebrations were possible because, unlike previously, the Communist unions allowed the right-wing unions to lead in the proceedings. A thoroughly compromising policy was adopted.¹⁰⁸ However, this happened in the context of representatives from the TUC going to China to take part in the celebrations there.¹⁰⁹

The Communists, meanwhile, made progress amongst the peasants by penetrating another rural organisation set up by other people besides the SCPA. This was the Singapore Rural Residents' Association (SRRA). This organisation was founded in 1957 by an Independent Assemblyman and was backed by Marshall.¹¹⁰ It had branches in various parts of the island.¹¹¹ In January 1958, there was an election to its executive committee and people with extremist backgrounds, among others, won office. There was also infiltration in the branches.¹¹²

In the student field, two developments were notable in the period between 1957 and 1959. One was the recognition by the Government of the NUSU and the activities it carried out. The other was the appearance of other student societies at Nanyang University. The NUSU obtained recognition from the Government in April 1958.¹¹³ One of its activities was the attempt to foster united fronts with other student bodies. In June of the same year, there was a move to form a union between the NUSU and the University of Malaya Students' Union (UMSU), which was an organisation of the students of the University of Malaya, an English-medium institution.¹¹⁴ In November 1957, there was also a Choral Society formed at Nanyang University.¹¹⁵ During the next month, an Education Society, a Dramatic Society and a Wireless Society applied to the Government for registration, and in the following month a Social Science Society did the same.¹¹⁶ In April 1958, a Film Society was reported to have screened a leftist picture.¹¹⁷ Other organisations which were reported to be already in existence at the time were, for example, History, Geography, English and Biological Societies.¹¹⁸ Early in 1958, a Political Science Society was formed and was given recognition by the Government the next year.¹¹⁹ At the time when the NUSU was approved by the Government and the formation of the Political Science Society was suggested, it was reported that from henceforth the students in Singapore could be expected to become increasingly active in politics and a growing danger to internal security.¹²⁰

For the remainder of Lim Yew Hock's administration after the 1957 security action, there was an impressive increase in the number of branches of the PAP. In 1958, there were reports of the activities of 22 such branches and in 1959, there were reports of 20. Between June and November 1958, the membership of the Party was said to be 14,000.¹²¹

Internal Contradictions in the PAP

Parallel to the ups and downs in the various mass movements, the three years between mid-1956 and mid-1959 also saw the Communists fighting and making up a number of times with the non-Communists in the PAP.

The Communists Assert Themselves

On 8 July 1956, the PAP held its 3rd Annual General Meeting. A new Central Executive Committee was elected. Four persons from the Communist group, including Lim Chin Siong, got into the new leadership.¹²² When the PAP was founded, it was understood that the Communist wing should have about one-third share of the leadership of the Party.¹²³ On this

occasion, they claimed that right. The Communists took only one-third of the total number of seats on the committee. According to one of the leading non-Communists at the time¹²⁴ they could have gone further if they had wished to. However, they stopped at this point.

The election of a new Central Executive Committee in the PAP came only two months after the failure of the constitutional talks in London between Marshall and the British Home Government. The return of the Communists to the leadership of the PAP in July probably had something to do with Lee Kuan Yew's action at the constitutional talks. Although he eventually gave support to Marshall, as Lim Chin Siong did, at the beginning his position was different. The Communists operated a united front with him only to make use of him. Now that he had shown that he could come to terms with the British, they would have to assert themselves a little. Their return to the Central Executive Committee of the PAP was probably an indicator that this Party had to be their instrument.

According also to a leading member of the Communist group, the way the Central Executive Committee of the PAP was reconstituted in July 1956 had nothing to do with any decision made on the part of this group. He stated that an Assemblyman at the time, whose status in the Legislative Assembly was that of an Independent but who was actually working with the PAP,¹²⁵ told him that after Lim Yew Hock had taken over from David Marshall as the Chief Minister, Lee Kuan Yew felt that the Government might move against the trade unions, the students and other groups, but would leave the PAP alone, thereby discrediting the leadership of this Party, which was made up of only non-Communists, and throwing it open to public suspicion. Lee Kuan Yew wished Lim Chin Siong and his nominees to join the Central Executive Committee to ensure that the PAP would not be left untouched. The arrest of PAP leaders would reflect well on the PAP. Consequently, Lee Kuan Yew invited Lim Chin Siong and a few of his followers to re-enter the Central Executive Committee of the PAP. Lim was also asked to become the Assistant Secretary.¹²⁶

After the Annual General Meeting, there was a committee to redraft the constitution of the Party. The need arose because membership of the Party had by this time increased to such an extent that its organisation had become inadequate.¹²⁷ There were representatives from both wings of the Party in the committee. The Communists took the opportunity to press for a new version of the constitution, which would enable them to gain a majority of the leadership in the Party.¹²⁸ At that point, the Central Executive Committee of the Party was elected by all Party members together at an Annual General Meeting. This was no guarantee for the Communist group that it would be able to win majority seating in this

body. The leftists proposed that in future the Central Executive Committee should be elected by delegates from the various Party branches at an Annual Delegates' Conference. The delegates from each branch, in their turn, should be elected by all the members of a branch also at an annual conference. The number of delegates each branch could elect should vary in accordance with the size of its membership. The PAP had 14 branches at this time. Of this number, probably not more than four would return non-Communist delegates. Therefore, if the new proposal was accepted, the leadership of the Party would fall into Communist hands. Naturally, the non-Communists felt unhappy about the suggestion. However, the Government's purge of the Communists took place at this time, interrupting deliberations about a new constitution for the PAP.¹²⁹

Along with securing a place in the Central Executive Committee and making an attempt to persuade the Party to adopt a new constitution favourable to their interests, the Communists also gained domination in the new propaganda and indoctrination machinery at headquarters level which was created in 1956-1957. The name of this organ was the Central Educational and Cultural Committee. In early 1957, as mentioned, the CPM closed down the *TyP*, for propaganda would now be carried out only in the open and legal arena. The decision of the PAP to establish the Central Educational and Cultural Committee was made almost half a year before the cessation of the *TyP*. However, this organ came into effective operation only in early 1957. Thus, by coincidence, this propaganda instrument became an implementation of policy changes which arose out of other causes.

Since the founding of the PAP, its branches had carried out propaganda and indoctrination activities which were normally referred to as educational and cultural activities. Included under the educational category were items such as Chinese, Malay and English language classes, current affairs classes, wall news, blackboard news and library services. Cultural activities included group singing, harmonica bands, folk dancing, picnics, concerts and film shows.¹³⁰ Such educational and cultural activities in the branches were the responsibility of the leadership of the different branches. The Central Executive Committee was not in control of them and did not have them co-ordinated.¹³¹ Because of this, the propaganda and indoctrination efforts did not achieve maximum results.

Before the Government purge of 1956, the Communist group had already proposed to the Party that a central propaganda unit be organised. The suggestion had been accepted and on 16 October 1956, the Central Executive Committee decided that an Educational and Cultural Committee should be created. Representatives from both factions of the Party were to sit on the committee, with Lim Chin Siong as the Chairman.¹³²

Government security action interrupted the actual formation of the committee. However, between the end of 1956 and early 1957, persons were selected to set up the committee. Tan Chong Kin, a member of the CPM, was nominated as the Chairman in place of Lim Chin Siong. The other appointees were also mostly from the left-wing group.¹³³

The Central Educational and Cultural Committee launched its activities with fiery enthusiasm. For instance, it organised a harmonica band, a choir and a folk dancing group, each a hundred-strong. Then it produced common materials for the wall news and the blackboard news in the various branches. It improved the current affairs classes. One very significant project was the publication of the *Action Express* which sought emphatically to condition the thinking of the party-members.¹³⁴

The non-Communists were far from happy with all the activities of the committee. It was discovered that the current affairs classes and the *Action Express* were preaching unacceptable ideas. Because of this, the non-Communists, through the authority of the Central Executive Committee, had the latter suspended after only two issues.¹³⁵

The Non-Communists Poise to Break with the Communists

By 1957 the non-Communists were poised to break up with the Communists in the PAP.¹³⁶

In March 1957, Lim Yew Hock went to London with an All-Party Delegation from the Legislative Assembly to hold constitutional talks with the British. Besides himself, the team included two other members from the LF-Alliance, and one representative each from the LSP and the PAP. Lee Kuan Yew was the member from the PAP. An agreement was reached on a new constitution for the island. The proposals were targeted against the CPM and were essentially along the same lines as those which emerged during the final stages in the previous constitutional talks held in 1956. Lee Kuan Yew made substantial contributions to the negotiations.¹³⁷

Playing a leading role in the formulation of the proposed new constitution and agreeing to it, Lee Kuan Yew, along with the other members of the Singapore delegation, established a united front with the British Government against the CPM. The instrument in the proposed new constitution designed especially to deal with the Communists was the Internal Security Council. On this organ of government would sit British, Malayan as well as Singaporean representatives. In accepting this council, Lee Kuan Yew, besides entering into an alliance with the British, allied with Malaya against the CPM. It appeared at the time that the political group from Malaya most likely to be able to send a person to become a member of the council was the UMNO. Malaya was scheduled to become independent in August, and the UMNO, together with the MCA and the

MIC, would be the political party likely to form the new government. The proposed Internal Security Council would, in fact, be a tripartite common front of the British, the UMNO and the ruling political party in Singapore against the CPM.

There will be a full discussion of the proposed new constitution in the next section of this chapter. Meanwhile, for the purpose in hand, reference will be made to only those points which created controversy between the two factions in the PAP.

The Communists took the non-Communists to task for the following. Firstly, the proposed new constitution would grant Singapore only internal self-government. The Communists demanded that independence should be given instead. Secondly, Singapore would have an Internal Security Council. The Communists would have nothing of this. And thirdly, the new constitution would be implemented and general elections held only at a date after a quarter of a million aliens, who were mostly recent Chinese immigrants, had been given Singapore citizenship and enfranchised. This would be sometime in 1958 or a year later. The Communists opposed this. Lim Yew Hock had earlier promised that the change would be effected in August 1957. Now, they insisted that there should be no going back on the undertaking.

There was also disagreement between the two wings of the PAP with regard to one other point in the proposed new constitution. This was the stipulation that detainees would not be allowed to participate in the projected general elections. The delegates, including Lee Kuan Yew, opposed this condition imposed upon the Singapore delegation by the British. Unlike Lee Kuan Yew, however, the leftists in the PAP did not wish to fight the British over this.¹³⁸

The Communists rejected internal self-government and demanded independence because it would give them greater immunity from British power. They also opposed the Internal Security Council which was specifically for the purpose of dealing with them. The Communists wanted an earlier implementation of the new constitution, if such could not be done away with, and the earlier calling of general elections because they felt a left-wing victory would be surer in this case. In the 1956 incident, as will be shown more fully in the next section of this chapter, Lim Yew Hock had tarnished his image with the Chinese-speaking community by attacking Chinese school students and the others. An earlier election would ensure that Lim Yew Hock would suffer the consequences of his action. A later election would be to his benefit because memories of the incident would have faded.¹³⁹

Regarding the ban on detainees from participation in the coming elections, Lee Kuan Yew opposed it because, had he not done so, he

would have lost popularity in the PAP as well as with the electorate. Lim Chin Siong and the other detainees were fellow leaders in the left-wing movement and the non-Communists had to stand by them. For the CPM, however, whether or not Lim Chin Siong and the others could stand in the elections was not a matter of crucial importance. If Lim and his friends were debarred, the Party could always find other cadres and sympathisers to take their place.¹⁴⁰

Of all the issues, eventually, the one concerning the date of the next elections became the immediate problem between the non-Communists and the Communists in the PAP. If early elections were held and the left-wing gained control of the Legislative Assembly, then it would repudiate the tentative agreement reached between the British Government and the Singapore delegation, and re-open negotiations with the former on a fresh basis. If that happened, the release of Lim Chin Siong and other detainees could also be urged.¹⁴¹

The disagreement over the terms of the proposed new constitution soon led to confrontation between the two PAP factions. In this, Marshall was involved and he took the side of the Communists. Lee Kuan Yew was poised for a break with the Communists and Marshall readied himself to step into his shoes.

Whilst the Singapore negotiating team was still in London, a delegation from the left-wing trade unions met non-Communist members of the Central Executive Committee of the PAP to talk about the proposed new constitution. A memorandum setting out the views of the delegation was presented, the main point being that there should be early general elections. The confrontation was inconclusive as each side held to its view.¹⁴² Two weeks later, after Lee Kuan Yew's return from London, he also met the trade unions and was quizzed as to what he had agreed on with the British.¹⁴³ Another meeting between the PAP branches and the non-Communist leaders in the Party took place. In this encounter, neither side would budge an inch.¹⁴⁴

In the constitutional talks in 1956, the British refusal to accede to the requests of David Marshall had made him resign his Chief Ministership. This preceded a change in his political tactics for he was seen to be leaning to the left to press his points home. In August and September 1956, Marshall went as adviser with a trade delegation to China. The group was warmly welcomed by the Chinese Government. From China, the delegation went on to Japan to ensure that there would be no misunderstanding of its real intentions.¹⁴⁵

From 26 to 30 April 1957, the Legislative Assembly debated a motion put forward by Lim Yew Hock on accepting the proposed new constitu-

tion agreed to in London. On the first two days of the debate, Marshall launched a massive attack on what was brought back.¹⁴⁶ Marshall's offensive initiated a new turn in the great controversy regarding the constitutional proposals between the Communists and the non-Communists in the PAP. On 26 April, Marshall challenged Lee Kuan Yew to resign his Assembly seat and return to his constituency, Tanjong Pagar, to face him in a by-election. Marshall himself would resign from his own Cairnhill constituency for the fight. Lee promptly accepted the challenge. Marshall thought that he would be supported by the Communists against Lee.¹⁴⁷ The by-elections were held on 29 June.¹⁴⁸ In the Tanjong Pagar constituency, there were three candidates: Lee Kuan Yew, one Independent and one member from the LSP. In Cairnhill, there were five rivals: two Independents and one representative each from the LF, the LSP, and the SMU.¹⁴⁹

In the event, David Marshall did not stand in the Tanjong Pagar by-election. In fact, only two days after he had challenged Lee, he announced that he would not engage after all and would even retire from politics. The reason for this sudden change on his part was that he discovered that the Communists would not adopt him in place of Lee. It was not yet their policy to abandon Lee. They were actually dismayed that a fight had broken out between Lee and Marshall.¹⁵⁰ At this time, there was a difference between the non-Communists and the Communists in the PAP in their attitudes towards each other. The non-Communists were ready to break with the Communists, but the latter were still interested in maintaining the existing relationship.

Evidence indicates that one of the top leaders in the non-Communist group, Dr Goh Keng Swee, at the time considered it an auspicious moment for the group to take a tough line against the Communists. It was said that he felt it better to have an open break with them than to allow the ambiguous position of the group to continue indefinitely. The group would be weakened by a separation, but would survive as a force which could rebuild itself without being encumbered by the left-wing.¹⁵¹

In sharp contrast to this, a document which was transmitted to a Communist underground unit at this time advised that assistance must be given to Lee Kuan Yew in the Tanjong Pagar by-election. An explanation was given of why this policy must be followed: if Lee lost in the by-election and the right-wing won, then work all around would become more difficult; injury would befall "the progressive strength", i.e. the various mass organisations, and "the unity of the leftist group", i.e. the united front. To go along with the PAP non-Communists was actually against "the people's will", i.e. the will of the Communists themselves, but it had

to be done. Among all the political groups, the PAP non-Communists were still the most useful to work with. Lee Kuan Yew was stable and had "clearer and more correct ideologies and is a progressive neutralist".¹⁵²

Because of the new policy which they had adopted, the non-Communists, however, declined to accept offers of assistance from the Communists in electioneering. In the past, the non-Communists had leaned heavily on the other party for grassroot support. Now they intended to fall back upon their own resources. The Communist group wished to speak at by-election meetings, but they were told not to do so.¹⁵³

In the Cairnhill contest, the non-Communists hoped for a LF victory. However, Communist underground instructions advised that support should be given to one of the Independent candidates, who was Chinese and who was vigorously attacking the new constitutional proposals. The PAP non-Communists pleaded that Communist intervention on behalf of the Independent would only split left-wing votes. The cry was ignored.¹⁵⁴

In the electioneering in Tanjong Pagar, Lee Kuan Yew defended his position with regard to the proposed new constitution. He also took the opportunity to restate his long-term aims of achieving an independent, non-Communist, socialist Malaya.¹⁵⁵ In Tanjong Pagar, Lee Kuan Yew won with a decisive majority, and in Cairnhill, the LSP candidate was returned.¹⁵⁶

One other manifestation of the readiness of the PAP non-Communists in 1957 to sever links with the Communist group and work with the British against them, was a sustained attempt to convert to their own political ideology some of the leading members of the Communists who were arrested by the Government in 1956 and imprisoned. They continued with this strategy from soon after the 1956 event until the middle of 1959, when the PAP won the general elections held under the new constitution which Lim Yew Hock obtained from the British Government. They worked on Fong Swee Suan, the Chinese leader of the SFA and three Indians, of whom two were leading members of the SPSWU and the other a member of the Singapore Naval Base Labour Union.¹⁵⁷ After they were persuaded, Lim Chin Siong was brought in to join them so that he could be influenced by them.¹⁵⁸

There were good reasons for trying to win these people over. One was that they were leaders of the mass movements. If they could be converted, then the non-Communists would be sure of the support of these movements. Another consideration was that these persons would be requested to issue public statements about their new beliefs after their conversion. Should they at some future date revert to their original stand, their statements could be held against them and this could have an effect on their political credibility.¹⁵⁹

It was mainly Lee Kuan Yew who talked to the leftists. He visited them frequently in their confinement.¹⁶⁰ The conversations involved not only Lee Kuan Yew trying to convince the other side that his way was right, but also the Communists trying to show him that they were correct. Ultimately, Lee prevailed. They agreed to forego Communism for democratic socialism.¹⁶¹

The Communist group sent letters to Lee Kuan Yew on two occasions to show their new beliefs. One occasion was in early 1957 and the second was in September of the same year. The first letter was signed by all the persons concerned except Lim Chin Siong, but the other by only one of them.¹⁶² Then, after the general elections in 1959, all six issued a statement to the press declaring their new beliefs.¹⁶³ Lee Kuan Yew was convinced of the genuine change only on the part of the less important five. He had no confidence in Lim Chin Siong.¹⁶⁴ Lee Kuan Yew's hope was to have Fong Swee Suan as an alternative to Lim Chin Siong to lead the Chinese-speaking masses. He needed the Indian leftists to lead Indian workers.¹⁶⁵

There is a source which says that British intelligence officers who had been sceptical of Lee Kuan Yew's activities at first had by about 1956 become convinced that he was not a Communist. They were convinced also that he was the man they should help to lead Singapore.¹⁶⁶ This could have come about after the constitutional talks held in London in that year. After similar talks the following year, the Governor at the time, Sir Robert Black, who had participated in the talks, felt too that Lee Kuan Yew "was going to emerge", that he was the man to cope with Communism and that "he was the best bet".¹⁶⁷ As a result of the changed attitude of the British, in 1957 and 1958, Lee Kuan Yew was at times fed information about Communists in his Party by the police.¹⁶⁸

Breakup

After the Tanjong Pagar and Cairnhill by-elections, the Communists made a bid to become the majority group in the Central Executive Committee of the PAP by taking most of the seats. That the non-Communists accepted the new constitutional proposals was felt to be insufferable. As a minority, the Communist group would only be made use of by the non-Communists; as a majority, however, the situation would be reversed. A plan was also under way to form a new political party with another political group if control of the PAP could not be secured.

Another Annual General Meeting of the PAP was due on 4 August 1957, and a new Central Executive Committee was to be elected. The tacit understanding about the number of seats each faction should have on

this organ would have to be abandoned. The Communists wished to take eight of the 12 seats on the committee and leave only four for the non-Communists. There were currently eight non-Communists on the committee, so half of these would have to go, but Lee Kuan Yew would be among the four to be retained.¹⁶⁹ In contrast to the Communists, the non-Communists wanted all their representatives on the present committee to be re-elected.¹⁷⁰ Each side knew that the other was plotting to sabotage it. Consequently, both parties resorted to a great deal of manoeuvring to ensure that their respective list of candidates would be accepted and chosen by the conference.¹⁷¹

The Annual General Meeting was finally convened. Voting for the new committee ended in a tie between the two groups, with each side winning six seats. Among the non-Communists, Lee Kuan Yew was re-elected.¹⁷² Hitherto, not only most of the seats in the Central Executive Committee were held by the non-Communists, but also the most important offices were occupied by them. The Communists took no exception to this. On the contrary, they wished the non-Communists to continue to occupy the front seats. In this way, should the Government mount any attack on the PAP, it would be the non-Communists who would be the first to face the onslaught. After the election, Lee Kuan Yew and his followers, however, refused to take up any office in the new committee. They felt, or perhaps they knew, that Government punitive action against the PAP was imminent, since besides increasing their share of power in the PAP, the Communists were simultaneously, as mentioned, manoeuvring to absorb the mass base of the LF, the TUC.¹⁷³

The Communist group made great efforts to persuade the non-Communists to resume the leading positions in the Central Executive Committee. But despite concessions being offered, the latter stood their ground and the negotiations led to nothing.¹⁷⁴ In the face of the intransigence of the non-Communists, the Communist group eventually took office themselves. Tan Chong Kin became the Chairman and T. T. Rajah the Secretary of the Party.¹⁷⁵ The Communist group then issued a call to Lim Yew Hock to convene a conference of left-wing parties so as to form a united front. This move was an attempt to prevent the Government from striking against them.¹⁷⁶

On the night of 22 August, however, as related previously, the Government attacked the Communists. Among all the persons arrested were five of the six leftists newly elected to the leadership of the PAP. The one person left untouched was T. T. Rajah. However, soon after the Government arrests, Rajah resigned his secretarial post and the Central Executive Committee of the PAP was left completely in the hands of the non-

Communists.¹⁷⁷ Thus, the attempt of the Communists to gain control of the Central Executive Committee of the PAP proved abortive.

While the Communists manoeuvred to capture the PAP, they also took steps to form a new political party. The new organisation was named the People's Alliance, later changed to People's Front and yet again to People's League. It was suggested that the Chinese Independent candidate in the recent Cairnhill by-election should be made the head of this party. In July, a Preparatory Committee for the new party was formed. In the following month, a meeting to elect office-bearers was held. The meeting was a failure, however, because attendance was poor. When the government offensive against the Communists was launched, a number of the trade unionists who had led in the formation of the new political party were amongst those arrested.¹⁷⁸

In July 1957, there were also reports that in Tanjong Pagar, Lee Kuan Yew's constituency, a People's Justice Party was in existence, organised by members of the former SPABL. This party had circulated a political programme and an open letter to the people.¹⁷⁹ There was no connection between the People's League and the People's Justice Party.¹⁸⁰ Subsequently, nothing more was heard of either organisation.

The August 1957 experience of the PAP was a turning point in its history. Before then, there was no certainty that the non-Communists could make more use of the Communists or vice-versa through the instrumentality of this organisation. After that experience, however, the non-Communists took a number of measures which guaranteed that the Communists would serve their purposes rather than the other way around.

In early September, after the Communist group in the new Central Executive Committee of the PAP had been eliminated by Government arrests and by resignation, the non-Communists in the committee formed themselves into an Emergency Council to take temporary charge of the Party.¹⁸¹ Late in the following month, a Special Party Conference of members was convened. The Emergency Council recommended to the meeting a list of 12 persons to be voted *en bloc* as the new Central Executive Committee. The recommendation was accepted, and the Council dissolved itself on the election of the new committee. Thus, the leadership of the PAP returned completely to the hands of the non-Communists.¹⁸² The practice of an outgoing leadership recommending a slate of designated persons for election to replace itself as a new leadership was an innovation. This was one defence against the possibility of the Communists channelling their men into the Central Executive Committee.¹⁸³

In late 1957, there was a growing tendency among the PAP non-Communists to co-operate with Lim Yew Hock. The Communists were

anxious about this and were keen that Lee Kuan Yew should continue to be friendly to them rather than lean over to Lim Yew Hock. To ensure that there would be no alliance between the two parties, David Marshall was utilised to drive a wedge between them. Members of the CPM themselves alleged that there was this trend of increasing friendship between the PAP non-Communists and the LF-Alliance Government. However, nothing more was said about the fact than the mere mention of it.¹⁸⁴ That the CPM was concerned that Lee Kuan Yew and Lim Yew Hock should not come together and that Marshall should be made use of to achieve this was shown in instructions given to a member who was detailed to work on Marshall. At this juncture, Marshall was trying to form a new political party, the Workers' Party (WP). Elections were scheduled to be held in December 1957 for an organ of local government, the City Council, of which more will be said presently. Marshall wished to take the opportunity of the elections to make a comeback to politics. For the purpose, he planned to form the WP. Besides getting some member unions of the TUC to give him support, he also made overtures to the Communist unions. The Communists responded to his call. After Lim Yew Hock had replaced him as the Chief Minister and more so after he had left the LF, Marshall had developed an antagonism towards Lim. The Communists hoped to get Marshall to attack the incompetence and corruptness of Lim Yew Hock's regime to impress upon Lee Kuan Yew that it was not in his interest to team up with him. The manoeuvre proved a success in the end.¹⁸⁵

Besides being hostile to Lim Yew Hock, Marshall was a rival of Lee Kuan Yew, whom, it was expected, he would also fight. However, he was influenced into taking a softer line, so that Lee would not become exasperated and move even nearer to Lim.¹⁸⁶

Marshall made known his intention to form a new political party in June 1957.¹⁸⁷ Initially, he had the support of a very important member of the TUC group, the Army Civil Service Union. The Vice-President of this union was a member of the CPM.¹⁸⁸ After Lim Yew Hock's purge of the Communists in late August, contact was made with a left-wing union, the Radio and Wireless Technicians' Union to support the new party. The Secretary of this union was Cheng Yuet Tong, who was also a member of the CPM.¹⁸⁹ After Cheng had agreed to join Marshall, he persuaded many other Communist unions, including the SGEU, to follow his lead.¹⁹⁰ Cheng and the other Communist were actually members of the same underground cell.¹⁹¹

The WP was inaugurated in early November. At the first meeting of its Council, Marshall was elected Chairman of the Party, Cheng Yuet

Tong the Vice-Chairman and the other Communist one of the Councillors. On the occasion, Marshall delivered a speech in which he made caustic remarks about the LF and the Government on various issues, including the prosecution of Chinese-speaking Chinese under the PPSO and other laws.¹⁹²

Elections for the City Council were held in December. The candidates of the WP upbraided the Government. During the electioneering, it was reported that the theme of their speeches focused on the inequity of the PPSO and the continued detention of Chinese educationists.¹⁹³ During the campaign, there was an agreement between the PAP and the LF not to field candidates in wards in which the other already had persons competing. Cheng Yuet Tong was aware of this collusion but he seemed unable to do anything about it.¹⁹⁴ Cheng on his part, on the other hand, together with the other Communist, exerted influence on the WP not to field candidates in constituencies in which members from the PAP were standing. They were successful in this except in one case where a WP man could not be prevented from challenging a PAP man.¹⁹⁵ Both WP and PAP candidates were massively assisted by Chinese school students, which was an indication of support from the CPM.¹⁹⁶

As will be shown in the next section, most of the WP and PAP candidates were returned in the elections. In fact, the PAP won the greatest number of seats. The LF was defeated. The CPM was satisfied with the outcome of the contest: Cheng Yuet Tong's underground superior, reviewing the situation with him after the event, commented that "the adept arguments and sharp words of Marshall" had rendered the LF helpless. He believed that after the LF's defeat "the PAP would also dare not openly co-operate with the 'Labour Front'" any more.¹⁹⁷

Because the PAP won most of the seats in the City Council, it became the leading party in that Council. Instructions were given to Cheng that he should influence other WP councillors to support PAP policies and measures. At the beginning, there was an election of a Mayor for the Council. Both Cheng and the other WP councillors backed up the choice of a PAP man for the post. In this, Cheng was abiding by orders not only from the CPM but also from Marshall, for Marshall was of the opinion that a PAP man should be chosen. The PAP man elected Mayor was Ong Eng Guan, a non-Communist. Later on, Ong implemented a great number of measures which pleased the masses but which damaged the efficiency of the Council's administrative machinery. In these things, Cheng continued to go along with the PAP but the other WP councillors were upset. Cheng tried to influence his comrades to follow but was unsuccessful.¹⁹⁸

Renewed Co-operation

In May 1958, Lim Yew Hock went again with an All-Party Delegation to London to finalise talks with the British Government for a new constitution for Singapore. As on the previous occasion, Lee Kuan Yew went with the team, representing the PAP.¹⁹⁹

Sometime before the delegation left Singapore, a meeting took place between Fong Chong Pik and Lee Kuan Yew, at the request of the former. The conflicts between the two factions in the PAP in 1957 had spoiled relationships between them. Fong Chong Pik wished to renew the disrupted united front between the two factions against the common enemies. He had come to talk terms with Lee. After this initial encounter and before the implementation of the new constitution, the two men were to meet again a number of times.²⁰⁰

In the negotiations, Lee Kuan Yew seemed to have got more from Fong Chong Pik than Fong got from him. Lee wanted the CPM to give up using the WP as a hold on him. This was to be done by getting Cheng Yuet Tong to resign his positions both in the WP and in the City Council. With Cheng gone, the WP would, quite clearly, lose most of its mass support. Fong agreed to this demand. Subsequently, Cheng Yuet Tong was instructed to leave both the WP and the City Council. On the other hand, Lee was indifferent about the united front and he did not promise Fong anything.²⁰¹ It is apparent that Fong Chong Pik was especially conciliatory because of the influence of the 1957 review of the 1956 disaster.

The constitutional talks in London reaffirmed the agreement reached in the previous year. The most important part of the projected new constitution was the tripartite common front between the British, Malaya and the Government of Singapore against the CPM. Malaya had already become independent by the time of the talks and the UMNO, together with its allied parties, had formed the new government. By agreeing to the final drafting of the proposed new constitution for Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew showed once again that if his group came into power in the island when the new constitution was implemented, it would be willing to work with the British and the UMNO against the CPM. It was held in Communist circles in Singapore that during the talks Lennox-Boyd was particularly attentive to Lee Kuan Yew. The friendship between the British and the PAP non-Communists was cemented.²⁰²

The months following the talks saw Lee Kuan Yew, in preparation for the implementation of the new constitution and the holding of a general election, taking certain actions, only one of which could be interpreted as likely to be of benefit to the Communists.

In June, Lee Kuan Yew stated to the public that, if the PAP won the next general elections, it would assume power only on the condition that Lim Chin Siong and his associates were released from prison. The new constitution had a stipulation which barred these people from participating in the elections. Lee Kuan Yew also hinted that by-elections could be engineered after the general elections were past so that the ex-detainees could still find their way into the Legislative Assembly.²⁰³ These pronouncements, however, might have been more for the purpose of winning electoral support for the non-Communists than to advance the interests of the Communists. It has already been seen that in 1957, when it was first suggested that political subversives should be barred from the coming elections, the Communists did not oppose this proposal. This was because they could field other cadres in the elections in place of the detainees. Therefore, Lee Kuan Yew's declaration might not have been for their sake.

In October and November, two events took place which showed that if the PAP non-Communists were faced with the choice of having to work with the UMNO of Malaya against the CPM, or with the latter against the former, they would choose the first option.

In October, there was a debate in the Legislative Assembly on the PPSO. At the time, it appeared that the PAP would be the political party to win the next general elections held under the new constitution. The question as to what the non-Communists would do about the PPSO if it actually came into power was asked. Lee Kuan Yew took a definitive stand in the Assembly on this question. He declared that so long as security laws against the CPM were found to be necessary in Malaya, then similar laws in Singapore would be retained.²⁰⁴

In November, the PAP celebrated its fourth anniversary, and the non-Communists issued a policy statement entitled "The New Phase after Merdeka - Our Tasks and Policy". "Merdeka" referred to the fact of Malaya having become independent, *merdeka* being the Malay word for independence. The statement explained how Singapore should try to achieve independence in the context of Malaya having already become an independent country. During the general elections in 1955, the PAP had stated that the way for Singapore to end British rule was to merge with the peninsula. The policy statement now reiterated this stand. It went on to explain that, if merger was to be possible, the friendship of the UMNO must be won. The UMNO wished to destroy the CPM. Therefore, the Communist problem in the island must be resolved. It was made clear to the Communists that either they convert to the ideology of the non-Communists or there would be no way out for them.²⁰⁵

After the great conflicts between the two PAP factions in 1957, the non-Communists had already, in October that year, taken one step to ensure that in future the leadership of the Party would never come under the control of the other group. In November 1958, another step to this end was taken. This time, the protection was even more foolproof.

On the fourth anniversary of the Party, the PAP non-Communists also convened a Special Party Conference. At the meeting, an innovation was announced: from henceforth, membership in the Party would be divided into two types – one type would be cadre membership and the other ordinary. Who could and who could not become a cadre of the Party would be decided by the Central Executive Committee. In the future, only cadre members could elect or be elected into the Central Executive Committee. Ordinary members of the Party would not have these rights. Through this means, the Communists were debarred forever from being able to infiltrate their men into the PAP leadership.²⁰⁶

An interesting point was that the CPM did not stand in the way of the non-Communists trying to monopolise the PAP. In June 1958, several months before the Special Party Conference met, the non-Communist leaders gave orders to all members of the Party to re-register themselves. The purpose of the operation was to assess all of them so that a classification into the two categories could be made. At the beginning the instructions went unheeded. However, after some time, there was response and finally the majority of the members submitted the necessary particulars about themselves. The thaw first came in the Bukit Timah branch, which was a Communist stronghold. The police observed that eventually the leftists offered co-operation because Lee Kuan Yew made the promise that if the PAP came into power in the next elections, Lim Chin Siong and the other detainees would be released and the CPM had also advised its open front operatives to give way.²⁰⁷ Whether or not Lee Kuan Yew's other promise, that by-elections would be engineered after the general elections to enable Lim Chin Siong and others to get into the Legislative Assembly, also had a favourable impact on the attitude of the left-wingers is not known.

In 1959, the non-Communists erected even more fences to safeguard their position *vis-à-vis* their friends-cum-rivals. Reorganisation in the party so far secured only control at the level of central leadership. At the branches, the other faction still had the field. In order that this component of the party machinery could also be properly shepherded, full-time paid staff were appointed to become Organising Secretaries to take charge of them. The branch committees, which consisted mostly of Communists, worked only on a non-professional basis. The new appointees were ex-

pected to be able to counterbalance the committees. They were hand-picked by Lee Kuan Yew and two other leading non-Communists. All in all, 23 appointments were made.²⁰⁸

In the same year, general elections were to be held. The non-Communists also selected only persons whom they considered were with them to be candidates of the Party. If the Party won the contest, the candidates elected would form the government. By no means could governmental power be allowed to fall into Communist hands. This consideration led even to the choice of persons who were at the time not yet members of the PAP but who enrolled on being chosen as election candidates.²⁰⁹

Finally, the new constitution for Singapore was implemented and general elections took place. By that time, the British Government preferred to work with Lee Kuan Yew and his PAP non-Communists than with Lim Yew Hock and his group. Simultaneously, the CPM gave full support to Lee in the elections.

It is on record that in May 1958, when Lim Yew Hock went to London with a parliamentary delegation to meet Alan Lennox-Boyd to finalise the proposed new constitution, the latter gave hints that Lim might not be the person who would win the next general elections. On the other hand, Lennox-Boyd behaved towards Lee Kuan Yew, a member of the Singapore delegation, as if "an agreement" had already been reached between them.²¹⁰ It has also been suggested by a scholar that from about the middle of 1958 onwards, Lee was in close contact with Sir William Goode, the then Governor of Singapore, who supplied him with information privy to the Council of Ministers to use against the LF.²¹¹ The CPM, on their part, felt sure only in early 1959 that the British would accept the PAP non-Communists as a government if they won the coming elections. There was an instance of a member of the CPM who wished to join the PAP to engage in open front work in the latter half of 1958. His superior disapproved of his intention because the Government might make a security sweep of the Communist organisations before the elections took place and this person could be lost. A security sweep would be mounted only if the British did not have full confidence in the PAP non-Communists. At the beginning of the next year, however, permission was given to that particular Communist to join the PAP as the CPM felt sure that there would be no government purge. This showed that the PAP non-Communists were no longer doubted.²¹² During electioneering in 1959, the CPM gave orders to all its members to give a helping hand to the PAP non-Communists. No other party was to be given any assistance.²¹³

One of the political parties participating in the elections was a Partai Rakyat (PR), which was a Malay-based organisation. Four candidates

were fielded by this party, two Malays and two Chinese. The two Chinese were Pang Toon Tin and Tng Yoong Chiaw, both of whom were members of the CPM. The two men had participated in the election contest of their own accord without prior clearance with their underground Party. When the fact of their participation in the elections became known, their CPM superiors instructed them to withdraw their candidatures. However, their Malay colleagues would not let them do so. They resolved their dilemma by merely making a show of their electioneering. The result was that they were defeated by the PAP non-Communist candidates who stood against them.²¹⁴

Before he became an election candidate for the PR, Tng Yoong Chiaw's arena of activity was in a trade union called the National Union of Building Construction Workers. After the elections, the CPM considered that since Tng had already got involved in direct politics, he should henceforth devote himself more to political than to trade union work. He was instructed to remain and become active in the PR. The significance of this development was that the CPM was attempting to foster a united front between Chinese and Malays through the agency of Tng. This united front was to have great importance in the years ahead.²¹⁵

Pang Toon Tin also remained in the PR after the elections. However, the CPM turned against him after he had participated in the elections, for, apart from the fact that his involvement in the elections was at the invitation of Malay friends, he was considered to have thirsted for the limelight for himself. His party connection was severed. He was left to play politics in the PR in his own right.²¹⁶ Besides Tng Yoong Chiaw, the CPM planted other men in the PR.²¹⁷

New Constitutions and Left-Wing Electoral Successes

Lim Yew Hock displayed greater readiness than David Marshall in cooperating with the British Government against the CPM in the security operations against that Party in 1956 and 1957. His motive was to persuade the British Government to return more power to Singapore. Lim's desire for a better constitution than the 1955 one was fulfilled.

Parallel to the trend to give Singapore a more autonomous central government was the effort to give the people a greater role also in local government. This, however, was a consequence of the total policy to decolonise Singapore rather than a response to pressures from the LF. In having the local government of Singapore reconstituted, the British Government probably entertained the hope that this authority would come

into the hands of the LSP or the LF. However, it was instead captured by the non-Communists in the PAP. At that point of time, this group was trying to develop closer relations with the British and weaken its links with the Communists. In giving Singapore a more autonomous central government, the British were at first more in favour of Lim Yew Hock coming into control but later reversed their preference. So the PAP non-Communists won again, and at the point of victory they were friendly with both the British and the CPM.

Democratisation in the City Council and Left-Wing Electoral Victories

Between 1946 and early 1949 the downtown area of Singapore was administered by a Municipal Commission. This authority comprised 24 members who were appointed to their posts by the Governor. The head was the President.²¹⁸ In April 1949, a change was introduced in the Commission. Its membership was increased to 27 persons and, simultaneously, 18 of those were allowed to be elected by popular franchise.²¹⁹ In 1951, the Commission was renamed the City Council, and was no longer referred to by its old title. This change occurred because in that year Singapore was granted city status by Her Majesty's Government.²²⁰ In 1957, the Council underwent another transformation: its membership was now enlarged to 32, all of whom were allowed to be popularly elected. Furthermore, the President gave way to a Mayor, who would be elected from among the Councillors themselves.²²¹

In 1949, when elections were first introduced for the Municipal Commission, the PP won 13 of the 18 elected seats. The SLP won one, and Independents took the rest. Thus, the PP dominated the Commission.²²² In 1957, elections were held again for a further democratised city administration. The PP had by now combined with the DP to form the LSP. Would the LSP or Lim Yew Hock's group, then running the central government, be able to carry the voters with them? The political parties which ran in the 1957 elections were the LSP, the LF, the UMNO, the PAP and a number of Independents.

The WP was a newcomer on the electoral scene. As explained by Marshall himself, this party was to be made up of workers and would serve only the interests of workers. Marshall declared at the time of the founding of the WP that there was then no political group in Singapore, including the LF and the PAP, which genuinely championed the interests of the workers. The WP would be the true representative of the lower classes, which was why it was named the Workers' Party. The WP was also to be a multi-racial organisation.²²³ In formal terms, the WP would be

devoted to the pursuit of three basic goals, which were Merdeka, Democracy (Parliamentary) and Socialism. A set of what it called aims and another set of objects gave concrete expression to these ideals.²²⁴

Polling in the elections was conducted in December 1957. The number of candidates which each political party fielded and the number of seats each won were as tabulated:²²⁵

<i>Political Parties</i>	<i>No. of Candidates Fielded</i>	<i>No. of Seats Won</i>
LSP	32	7
LF	16	4
UMNO	3	2
WP	5	4
PAP	14	13
Independents	11	2

Thus, the PAP triumphed over the LSP and the LF in the elections. The explanation for such election results was that a great number of Chinese-speaking Chinese of the poorer classes had become voters. Neither the LSP nor the LF represented their interests, but the PAP did.

In 1949, when elections were held for the Municipal Commission, the franchise was given only to persons who were British subjects or were citizens of Malaya. The voter had also to have certain property qualifications.²²⁶ In 1957, the electorate was widened to include citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, or those born in Malaya and British North Borneo who had resided in Singapore for one year, as well as all other persons above the age of 21 who had lived in the island for five years. At the same time, voters did not need to be property-holders. The reform gave the right to vote to 250,000 China-born Chinese and a great number of hitherto alien Indians, Pakistanis and Ceylonese. The China-born Chinese were non-English-speaking.²²⁷

According to one source, class-wise, the composition of the electorate in Singapore at about this time was 75 per cent workers, 5 per cent cultural and educational circles, 10 per cent businessmen and 10 per cent others.²²⁸

Actual voting by eligible voters was also different in 1949 and 1957. In 1949, there was no automatic registration of voters and so the number of persons who actually exercised the vote was smaller than it ought to have been. In 1957, automatic registration of eligible voters was introduced, making effective voting stronger. In 1949, only 8,688 out of a potential 100,000 eligible voters put their names on the electoral register. In 1957, however, all eligible voters were registered.²²⁹ This brought

more of the weight of the Chinese-speaking poor to bear on the election scene.

The LSP was made up of the former PP and DP. The PP was a party of the wealthy English-speaking, and the DP of the wealthy Chinese-speaking. In the general elections in 1955, when the Chinese-speaking poor were not yet a significant proportion of the voters, the PP and the DP were already rejected. That the LSP should lose the City Council elections in 1957 was, therefore, no matter for surprise.

The LF was English-speaking and pro-labour. In general terms, it was less distant than the LSP from the Chinese-speaking poor. However, Lim Yew Hock's actual performance in 1956 and 1957 gave this community plenty to complain about. He was felt to care neither for their interests as Chinese nor for their interests as an under-privileged group in society.

The riots in late 1956 were first sparked off at the Chinese High School. Punishment of the students came to be looked upon by the Chinese community as an attack on Chinese education, language and culture, which were matters of vital importance to them. After that occasion, whatever goodwill there was between Lim Yew Hock and this community evaporated. Both the CPM and the PAP non-Communists formed the conclusion that Lim Yew Hock was on his way out.²³⁰

In April 1956, Marshall's Government presented to the Legislative Assembly a White Paper on education policy. On the occasion of the Hock Lee riots of the previous year, Marshall had appointed an All-Party Enquiry Commission to look into the problem of Chinese education and make recommendations. The White Paper was based on the report submitted by this Commission. The trouble with the Chinese schools was that they were orientated towards China. The White Paper proposed that from henceforth Chinese education should be Malayanised (including "Singaporeanised"); the content of teaching and other things had to be adjusted. In exchange for the sacrifice of their "Chineseness", the Chinese schools were to be given financial assistance equal to that granted to schools of other language media, as well as other compensations. Marshall resigned from office in June 1956. It was left to Lim Yew Hock to implement his new policy. In August, the Chinese schools were told to accept the proposed conversion. They complied, but with great reluctance. The Chinese-speaking community were very unhappy that their schools were to be changed, and in consequence, a grudge was harboured against Lim Yew Hock.²³¹

In 1956 and 1957, security operations were targeted against the leaders of the Communist group of trade unions, peasant associations and other organisations. These persons were regarded by a great number of

the Chinese-speaking poor as their champions. Thus, Lim Yew Hock also came to be regarded as an enemy of the lower economic classes.

Two serious problems plagued the under-privileged in Singapore at the time of Lim Yew Hock's administration. One was unemployment and the other was inadequate housing. The labour force in 1957 was 471,600 and the number of persons who were jobless was 23,000 or 4.9 per cent.²³² In 1957 too, it was estimated that, beginning from that year, 160,000 units of new houses had to be built each year until 1972 before there would be enough houses for the population to live in. Yet in that very year, only 3,369 new houses were constructed.²³³ Therefore, at the time of the City Council elections, many people in Singapore had no income and many were living in slums. Naturally, some of them blamed the Government for their misfortunes.

While the LSP and the LF were held in dim regard by the Chinese-speaking lower classes, the PAP was treated as their own party. Both factions in this party defended their educational and other interests, and so the people voted for this party.²³⁴

There is no information about how the British reacted to the defeat of the right-wing and the victory of the left-wing forces in the City Council elections. As regards the Communists, it could be safely assumed that they must have been satisfied because it was their policy to get their united front partners into the City Council.²³⁵

In the struggle for power in the City Council, the right-wing forces were defeated not only in 1957 but also in the following year. Cheng Yuet Tong resigned from the WP and the City Council in May 1958. His leaving the City Council brought about a by-election in Kallang, the constituency which he represented.²³⁶ The by-election was contested by four persons. The LSP and the LF jointly fielded a candidate. There was one representative each from the PAP and the WP, and one Independent.²³⁷

During the elections in 1957, the LF and the PAP had acted as friends and had joined hands to fight the LSP. However, because of the results of the previous elections, on this occasion, the LF linked up with the LSP to fight the PAP instead. The PAP had become too serious a menace to the LF. The coming together of the LF and the LSP was a union of right-wing against left-wing forces. When the joint candidate of the two parties was nominated, Lim Yew Hock announced simultaneously that two or three months after the by-elections he would create a new political party, a United Socialist Front.²³⁸

On the part of the left-wing forces, there was also a change in alignment. In the 1957 elections, as seen, the CPM influenced the WP to avoid fielding candidates in constituencies where the PAP was competing. After

the departure of Cheng Yuet Tong from the WP, this party became less a creature of the CPM. In this by-election, therefore, a follower of Marshall fought the PAP candidate and with great intensity.²³⁹

The PAP non-Communists observed that the Kallang by-election was really a trial of strength between the proposed United Socialist Front and the PAP. Both sides treated it as such and they threw everything they had into this competition.²⁴⁰ Behind the two forces and making use of them were, of course, the British and the CPM. The by-election was held in July, with victory going to the PAP.²⁴¹

The reason why Lim Yew Hock lost again in the by-election is evident. On the one hand, memories of his security actions against the Communists and the new education policy had not been forgotten. On the other hand, in 1958 more people were without jobs and the housing problem still remained acute. At that time the labour force was estimated to be 481,400 of whom 53,000 were unemployed, which was 11 per cent;²⁴² 16,000 new houses still needed to be built, but only 6,037 units were completed.²⁴³

Self-Government and Further Left-Wing Successes

Lim Yew Hock obtained from the British a new constitution for a central government of Singapore. What the British refused to concede to David Marshall, they more or less gave to Lim Yew Hock.

Lim had first talked to the British in March and April 1957. In May, the following year, he met them again and proposals agreed to previously were finalised.²⁴⁴ In broad principles, Singapore was to become a self-governing state. There would be a division of governmental responsibilities between Singapore and the British. All internal matters would come under the charge of the former. External defence and foreign relations would be reserved for the latter. Security was an internal affair. However, in certain areas, it would overlap with external defence and foreign relations. In such aspects, there should be joint instead of sole control. In the case of disagreement arising between the parties in areas where there was joint control, a representative from the Malayan Government would be invited to join the teams as an arbiter. CPM activities especially were a subject which had implications for external defence and foreign relations.²⁴⁵

On the basis of these general terms, the machinery of government in Singapore had to be reconstituted. The proposals made on this question were as follows.

The office of the Governor should be abolished. In his place, there should be appointed a Yang di-Pertuan Negara and a British High Commissioner. The former would be the head of the local sphere of

government as well as being the representative of Her Majesty the Queen. The latter should be responsible for the second sphere of administration and should be the representative of Her Majesty's Government.²⁴⁶

The Legislative Assembly, which was within local government, would be reorganised. The share which the British had in this organ of government under the old constitution, by way of ex-officio and nominated seats, would be abolished. Henceforth, all members would become elective. Also, their number should be increased from the present 25 to 51.²⁴⁷

In the executive department of government, the British role by way of ex-officio members should be abolished. Hereafter, all members must come from the Legislative Assembly. Furthermore, the Chief Minister would be renamed the Prime Minister.²⁴⁸

In place of a British presence in the Council of Ministers, the new constitutional proposals now required that the British High Commissioner should have access to the agenda of meetings of this Council as well as any papers which had a bearing upon the external defence and foreign relations of Singapore.²⁴⁹

There was also a specific recommendation for the joint control of internal security. An Internal Security Council (ISC) was to be created. This should be made up of the British High Commissioner and the Singapore Prime Minister, together with two other representatives from each side. The last member of this organ should be the nominee from the Malayan Government. The British High Commissioner would be the Chairman of the Council. Decisions arrived at by the Council should be by majority voting. If, after any matter had been decided upon and the Singapore representatives refused to play their part in having the decision implemented, the British High Commissioner could advise the Yang di-Pertuan Negara to give it effect, and the latter would have to oblige.²⁵⁰

The functions of the ISC were to be:

1. To consult on all questions of policy relating to the maintenance of public safety and public order;
2. To maintain the efficiency of all organs of the Singapore Government concerned with internal security; and
3. To ensure equal access by both governments to the services of these organs and to all information at their disposal.²⁵¹

It was envisaged that sometimes the Singapore Government, relying only on its own resources, would not be able to fully control internal disorders. In such situations, request for British troops to assist could be made.²⁵²

It was also provided that known political subversives should be debarred from taking part in the first general elections to be held under the

new constitution. This ruling, however, could be reviewed by the first Legislative Assembly after it had been elected.²⁵³

The above were the principles and the mechanics by which an alliance was to be created between the British, Singapore and Malaya against the CPM. The British sought one ultimate guarantee that things would not unexpectedly go wrong. A provision was made that if the internal situation in Singapore deteriorated to the extent that it threatened the ability of the British Government to carry out its responsibilities for the external defence or foreign relations of the island, or if the Government of Singapore acted in contravention of the constitution, then the British Government could suspend the constitution of Singapore and assume its administration.²⁵⁴

Marshall had also fought for political rights to be conferred upon recent immigrants from China and elsewhere. The new constitutional proposals confirmed what was conceded to Marshall. All aliens who had resided in Singapore for ten years and who would disclaim allegiance to another country would be conferred citizenship status.²⁵⁵

The proposed new constitution naturally provoked adverse criticism from the Communists. The *TyP* of April 1957 gave a long list of what it considered were the items in the proposals which limited the powers and the status of Singapore. In sum, it considered that Singapore, in spite of the change, would still live under colonial rule and would not really enjoy self-government. Its words to this effect were:

... people will be able to understand whether, after all, Singapore still remains a colony or has already shaken off colonial rule, whether she is being ruled over or has already realised self-government.

... Despite the fact that Singapore will have a Legislative Assembly of 51 elected members, a Prime Minister ... she will have no freedom and no independence, and she will not have realised real self-government.²⁵⁶

This was the judgement of the CPM on the new order which would come into existence in Singapore.

In 1959, the new constitution came into effect and general elections were held on 30 May.²⁵⁷ The main contenders for power were the Singapore People's Alliance (SPA) and the PAP. The LSP also participated in the struggle in a big way. The other contenders were the Katong United Residents' Association (KURA), the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), the SMU, the UMNO/MCA, the MIC, the PR, the Singapore Citizens' Party (SCP), the WP and the LF. There were also a number of Independents. Some of these organisations had already made their appearance in the elections in 1955, while others were newcomers to the scene, forming the middle ground between the British and the CPM.

The SPA, formed by Lim Yew Hock, was a united front of several political groups targeted against the PAP. In the Kallang by-election for the City Council in July 1958, Lim had announced that in due course he would form a new political party, the United Socialist Front. Later on, he renamed his intended organisation the United Socialist Movement. Finally, he called it the SPA, established in November 1958.²⁵⁸ The SPA was made up of persons who were formerly members of the LF, the LSP and the WP. Lim Yew Hock's original hope was to get these three parties to dissolve themselves and all their members to join the new party. In the end, however, he was able only to attract some individuals from each of the three parties, the rest being unwilling to close down their organisations.²⁵⁹

The LF was a left-wing party, as was the WP. But the LSP represented the interests of the upper classes in society. Because the SPA was made up of former members of the LF, the WP and the LSP, its nature was rather complex. It was not really clear-cut what kind of political philosophy it professed.²⁶⁰ In fact, soon after its formation, cleavages began to appear. Two factions, one made up of ex-LF and WP elements and the other consisting of ex-LSP members, were detected as existing in the party.

KURA was formed by a former female leader of an LSP branch in the Mountbatten district of Singapore, who had seceded from the LSP. She took with her the whole committee of the Mountbatten branch, except for one person, to start the new party. KURA first appeared in 1959.²⁶¹ This woman's party was actually only a social organisation founded to take care of the interests of residents of the Katong district. A police note about it said:

Membership confined to those residing, trading or working within the Katong area. All individuals, above 17, regardless of race, political allegiance or religious leanings, are eligible.²⁶²

Politically speaking, therefore, KURA was an amorphous organisation.²⁶³

The PMIP was an organisation which had branches—both in Malaya and in Singapore, its headquarters being in the peninsula. It was founded in November 1951.²⁶⁴ The PMIP was a Malay party,²⁶⁵ even more racialist in character than the UMNO. The UMNO co-operated with the MCA which was a Chinese party and the MIC which was an Indian party, but the PMIP was antagonistic towards all non-Malays in the country. As the Malays were largely Muslims, the PMIP also leaned heavily upon the religion of Islam. Because the PMIP was a purely Malay and Islamic party, it found its ground support mainly among the peasants and fishermen in Malaya, who were mostly Malays and Muslims. The political

philosophy of this party was, therefore, one which sought the advancement of the interests of this group.²⁶⁶

The MIC was an off-shoot of the Congress Party of India, and had organisations in both Malaya and Singapore. It was established in August 1946.²⁶⁷ The MIC was meant to be a party for all Indians, regardless of religious or economic divisions within that community.²⁶⁸ However, in practice, most of its members were rich Hindus. Indians of the Muslim faith and of the labouring classes shied away from it.²⁶⁹

The PR was founded by ex-members of two other political organisations, the Angkatan Pemuda Insaf and the Malay Nationalist Party. These two organisations were partners of the CPM in a united front against the British during the immediate post-war years. When the CPM was banned in 1948, they were also proscribed.²⁷⁰ The PR first appeared in Malaya in December 1955. Later on, a branch was opened in Singapore.²⁷¹ Like the UMNO and the PMIP, the PR was a political party of the Malay peasants and fishermen. However, while as a Malay party, UMNO could cooperate with non-Malay ones and the PMIP could not, the PR could even admit non-Malays into its membership. Also, while UMNO depended on Islam to foster links with the masses and the PMIP even more so, the PR preferred to base its appeal on socialism. The PR called itself an agrariaian socialist party.²⁷² Thus, the PR was a left-wing party.²⁷³

The SCP was formed by a group who were at one time members of the WP. When Cheng Yuet Tong resigned from the WP, these persons had followed him out of that party. In November 1958, when Lim Yew Hock was organising the SPA, he invited the members of the WP to dissolve their organisation and join his new party. Lim's proposal was discussed by the Executive Council of the WP. The majority of the councillors came out in favour of accepting Lim Yew Hock's proposal. David Marshall, however, objected. The result was that those who favoured union with the SPA resigned from the WP and joined that party.²⁷⁴ After this split in the WP, the persons who had earlier left with Cheng Yuet Tong saw Marshall and negotiated with him about rejoining the WP, but simultaneously took steps to establish a new political party as an alternative course of action.²⁷⁵ The conversations with Marshall proved fruitless in the end and so a new party was formed. The name of this new organisation was the SCP.²⁷⁶ Because of its origin, the SCP was leftist in character. According to its constitution and rules, it was founded upon the principles of "Socialism, Democracy and Equality". It declared that it would pursue a set of objectives which were manifestations of these basic ideals.²⁷⁷

Other than the question of basic philosophies, the different parties proposed to push further the political development of Singapore beyond

the 1959 constitution. An explanation may, therefore, be given of these issues. However, discussion will be limited to the SPA and the PAP, as the only two parties of real importance to the 1959 elections.

Neither the SPA nor the PAP was contented with the 1959 constitution. Both considered that Singapore should eventually become independent. The way in which Singapore could totally free herself from British rule was to merge with Malaya. During electioneering, therefore, this subject was hotly debated.²⁷⁸ Lim Yew Hock claimed that he could more easily than Lee Kuan Yew bring about merger between Singapore and Malaya because he had a deep friendship with Tunku Abdul Rahman, the leader of the UMNO. He stated that Lee Kuan Yew was disliked by the Tunku.²⁷⁹

The next question was the economic development of Singapore. There were serious problems of unemployment, insufficient housing and other ills. Entrepot trade had hitherto sustained the population, but this source of livelihood was now no longer sufficient. Both the SPA and the PAP stated that there should be industrialisation. However, they differed on how to go about it.²⁸⁰ The SPA advocated that industrialisation should be through foreign investments. In the long-term, Singapore should take the road of Hong Kong. In the short-term, the Government should undertake a bold programme of public housing and public works construction.²⁸¹ The PAP also believed that foreign capital should be invited to come to Singapore to set up factories. However, it had no faith that foreigners would easily respond. Therefore, reliance should be put on local capital instead. Because this would be the line taken, the people should be prepared to undergo a period of austerity and hardship. To see to it that commodities produced could be sold, the PAP proposed that Singapore should have a common market with Malaya.²⁸²

The general elections were won by the PAP. The figures below show how many candidates each party fielded and how many constituencies each won:²⁸³

<i>Political Parties</i>	<i>No. of seats contested</i>	<i>No. of seats won</i>
SPA	39	4
PAP	51	43
LSP	32	0
KURA	2	0
PMIP	3	0
SMU	3	0
UMNO/MCA	13	3
MIC	2	0

<i>Political Parties</i>	<i>No. of seats contested</i>	<i>No. of seats won</i>
PR	4	0
SCP	5	0
WP	3	0
LF	3	0
Independents	34	1

The defeat of the SPA was crushing and the victory of the PAP was overwhelming.

The election results were not hard to explain. The basic factor in the situation was that a great number of the Chinese-speaking Chinese of the lower economic classes had become enfranchised and they had actually exercised their right to vote. In municipal elections in 1949, very few alien Chinese could vote, but 250,000 were permitted to do so in 1957.²⁸⁴ Similarly, in the elections for the central government, by virtue of Marshall's negotiations with the British in 1956 and Lim Yew Hock's negotiations in the following two years,²⁸⁵ 220,000 Chinese who were treated as aliens in 1955 were now given citizenship status in 1959.²⁸⁶

Actual exercise of the franchise also improved over the years. In the general elections in 1955, as seen, automatic registration of voters was introduced. This was to ensure that eligible voters would go to the polls. However, the result was disappointing, in spite of the innovation, for effective participation was only 53 per cent. In 1957, automatic registration of voters was also introduced for the City Council elections. Now in 1959, a further device was created to better performance. This was compulsory voting. The technique was successful in that 89.4 per cent of eligible voters cast their votes.²⁸⁷

The SPA and the PAP competed for the support of the same electorate. The former had further alienated its sympathisers since the City Council elections and by-election, while the latter had won more and more public goodwill.

Lim Yew Hock had allowed unemployment and other problems to remain unresolved. In 1959, the labour force in Singapore was 491,300. Of these, 65,000 were without jobs, which was 13.2 per cent. The situation had clearly become worse than in previous years.²⁸⁸ Whether housing difficulties in 1959 had eased or otherwise, there is no data to tell.²⁸⁹ However, it is probably safe to assume that there was also no improvement in this area.

Accumulated grievances against Lim Yew Hock were aggravated by one new development in 1959. During electioneering, the PAP revealed to the public that Lim's Minister for Education had received a gift of

\$500,000 from a foreign country. Indirectly, admitting his guilt, the affected Minister resigned from office. The ruling party was thus shown up to be corrupt and venal. The PAP stepped up propaganda on the issue and drove home its attack.²⁹⁰

In contrast to the SPA, the PAP worked for the welfare of the people. This it did on a large scale through the agency of the City Council which it controlled. A great deal of mass support was therefore earned for the elections in 1959.

There was a Singapore Hawkers' Union (SHU) which supported the LF in the City Council elections in 1957. After Ong Eng Guan had become Mayor in the Council, he brought about a great number of reforms which improved the lives of the hawkers. The consequence of this was that the SHU shifted its loyalty from the LF to the PAP. Ong was reported to have launched at different times a street-cleaning campaign and a campaign to help fire victims. The SHU responded to his call for assistance in these movements. Finally, when the 1959 General Elections came, the union called upon all the hawkers in Singapore to cast their votes for the PAP. This was one instance of how the PAP won the favour of the electorate.²⁹¹

How did the British react to the results of the elections? Were they a success or a failure for them? And what did the CPM think? It has already been explained that, in the beginning, the British had preferred Lim Yew Hock to win. However, by the middle of 1958, the PAP had become acceptable to them.²⁹² Therefore, the PAP victory in the general elections was no cause for dismay. On the part of the CPM, the PAP's accession to power was an event to be celebrated, but with reserve. There would be greater opportunities to develop the various mass movements. However, such opportunities would not be unlimited.

On 1 June 1959, a Communist newspaper which was produced in the Kedah/Penang region of Malaya called the *Awakening News* published an article which carried the title of "Comprehension of the People's Action Party's Victory in the General Elections".²⁹³ The essay expressed the views of the Central Committee of the CPM on the PAP's success.²⁹⁴

On the benefits which the PAP victory could possibly bring to the Communist movement, the paper said:

It can be estimated that, in the course of the PAP administration, objective conditions will be more favourable to the people of Singapore (to a certain degree, to the Malayan people) than before for their righteous struggle for realization of Malaya's complete independence, democracy, peace and a Singapore/Federation merger. Since the struggle of the people of Singapore could make great strides despite the destructive measures of the British Imperialists and the rightist Government of Lim Yew Hock, we have reason

to believe that under the administration of the leftist PAP, it certainly can make even more headway.

The prospects were good.

On the limited nature of the possibilities, the article continued:

However, it is undoubtedly wrong to consider that with the assumption of power by PAP, the Singapore peoples' struggle will sail on without hindrance. After the implementation of the new Constitution, Singapore ... its defence and foreign affairs are still in the grasp of the British Imperialists; the British Imperialists have the right to dissolve the elected Assembly and Cabinet; ... continue control of Singapore's "Internal Security" ... Internal Security is anti-Communism; ... It is an impediment to the just struggle ... to realise a completely independent, democratic, peaceful Malaya embodying a merger of Singapore and the Federation ... Singapore is still basically a colony ...

The rightist elements of the Federation will most probably continue to hold the reigns of administration ... They still persist in the war policy ... They are willing ... to support the British Imperialists, and through the so-called Internal Security Council, oppose the Communist Party in Singapore ...

The rightist bourgeoisie of Singapore and the Federation may attempt to harrass the PAP Government in the economic and other fields, in order to force the latter to compromise with them.

The People's Action Party is not a proletarian Marxist political party; it has its wavering character and weakness. With intensified pressure brought to bear on it by the British Imperialists and bourgeois rightists, it may waver, or compromise at certain times or on certain problems.

So the British, the rightist elements in Malaya, the right bourgeoisie in Singapore and in Malaya, and the weakness of the PAP would be obstructions to the unhindered accumulation and expansion of Communist strength.

Finally, the essay summed up the new situation in the following words:

Therefore, while being definite that the PAP is progressive and that the objective conditions will be favourable for the peoples' struggle to continue making considerable headway, we should not lose sight of the possibility that the PAP may waver or compromise under circumstances and of the future complexity of the righteous struggle of the people of Singapore.

This was a note of caution.

Notes

- 1 "CYF(72)", paragraph 71. "LSC", p. 7. *IJ*, no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix V, annexure 7, p. 2.
- 2 *IJ*, no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix V, pp. 2-4. "LSC", p. 15. "CMH", p. 17.

- 3 "CMH", p. 17. *IJ*, no. 7/1956, paragraph 107^c; and no. 8/1956, paragraph 128.
- 4 "CMH", p. 17.
- 5 *IJ*, no. 7/1956, paragraph 107^c; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix V, pp. 4-6. The eight Communist organisations, besides the SWF were: Art Association of 1953 Graduates of Chinese Middle Schools, Singapore Chinese Schools Students Parents' Friendly Association, Singapore Chinese Primary School Teachers' Union, SCMSSU, Chung Cheng Old Boys' Association, SFSWU - Propaganda & Educational Committee, SBWU - Propaganda & Educational Section, and Singapore Bookshop Workers' Union. The Malay and Indian societies were: Malay Cultural Association, Association of May Writers of 1950, Malay Artists Association, and Indian Fine Arts Society. The Chung Cheng Old Boys' Association is called the Chung Cheng Alumni Association in p. 117, note 93.
- 6 *IJ*, no. 8/1956, paragraph 125^a; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix V, p. 5. "CMH", p. 18.
- 7 *IJ*, no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix V, annexure 3, pp. 3-4. "CMH", p. 18. The 17 members of the Executive Committee of the Council were:
- Malay organisations*
 Malay Cultural Association, Federation Malays Union, Malay Welfare Association and Federation of Singapore Malay Unions.
- Chinese organisations*
 Chinese School Parents Association [same as the Singapore Chinese Schools Students Parents' Friendly Association in note 5], The Middle School Students Union [same as the SCMSSU in note 5], The 1953 Arts Association [same as the Art Association of 1953 Graduates of Chinese Middle Schools in note 5] and The Chung Cheng Old Pupils' Association [same as Chung Cheng Old Boys' Association in note 5].
- Trade Unions*
 Bookshop Workers' Union, Printing Workers' Union, Factory & Shop Workers' Union [same as the SFSWU in Note 5] and SBWU.
- Women's organisations*
 SWF and The Malay Women's Association.
- Farmers' organisations*
 SFA.
- Indian organisations*
 Reserved for two Indian public bodies.
- Since the 13 sponsoring organisations, there had been a change. Not all the 13 remained to become members of the Executive Committee of the Council. On the other hand, new organisations had become involved.
- 8 *IJ*, no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix V, p. 5 & annexure 3, p. 3. *IJ*, no. 9/1956, paragraph 143^b.
- 9 *IJ*, no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix V, p. 7.
- 10 "CMH", p. 18. *IJ*, no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix V, annexure 6, p. 1.
- 11 *Lee*, p. 25. "WS", paragraph 57.
- 12 "WS", paragraphs 794-796.
- 13 As seen in *TyP*, no. 77, September 1956, p. 1, article entitled "Shua Shou-tuan, P'ien Jên-min, Chiang Yao Tê Pu Ch'ang Shih (Playing Tricks and Cheating the People Will Be Counterproductive)".
- 14 *IJ*, no. 6/1956, paragraph 94.
- 15 "WS", paragraph 57.
- 16 Goh Chew Chua in the Legislative Assembly on 4 October 1956. See *LAD*, vol. 2,

col. 376. See also *Petir*, no. 5, vol. 1, November 1956, p. 1, which stated that Lim's aim in making a sweep of the Communists was to prevent the PAP or some other party which collaborated with the Communists from toppling the LF in the next general elections. *Petir* was the official organ of the PAP.

- 17 *LAD*, vol. 2, col. 339.
- 18 See p. 83.
- 19 See p. 85.
- 20 *JY*, no. 9/1956, appendix; no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^a; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 1. "OK", paragraphs 9-14. "LCS", pt. 9, Folio(424). "CMH", p. 18. "SLB", paragraphs 9-11 & 13. *PAP 1979*, p. 51. The Chinese Brass Gong Musical Society is identical with the Brass Gong Musical Society on p. 95 and p. 117, note 94.
- 21 *JY*, no. 9/1956, appendix; no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^b; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 1. *Sing Cmd 53 of 1956*. "SLB", paragraphs 14-16. *PAP 1979*, p. 51.
- 22 "LCS", pt. 9, Folios (428), (429), (430) and (430)².
- 23 *JY*, no. 9/1956, paragraph 140; and no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^c. No. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 1 and appendix "U", pp. 1-4 & annexures 1-8. "CCT(63)", paragraphs 18-19; and "CCT(64)", paragraphs 32-34. "SJ", paragraph 27. "WS", paragraph 59. "LCS", pt. 9, Folio (430)¹. "HHC", paragraphs 4-9. "OK", paragraphs 15-17. "FSS", pp. 10 & 12. "LJP", paragraphs 34-37. *PAP 1979*, p. 51. *Fong*, p. 47. The 11 organisations which sent representatives to sit on the Committee of the Convention were: SFSWU, SFA, Singapore Chinese High Schools Graduates of 1953 Arts Association, Singapore Chinese Primary School Teachers' Association, Malay Teachers' Union, Singapore Printing Workers' Union, Singapore Naval Base Labour Union, SHBSA, Singapore Traction Company Employees' Union, SBWU and Singapore City Council Labour Unions Federation. The third and fourth organisations are identical with those with similar names in notes 5 and 7 above.
- 24 *JY*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^d & appendix "A"; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 1. "SLB", paragraphs 7-22. *PAP 1979*, p. 51. *Fong*, p. 46.
- 25 *JY*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^e; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 1. "LCS" pt. 10, Folios (438), (439), (441), (442)¹, (442)² & (442)³. *PAP 1979*, p. 51.
- 26 *JY*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^f & appendix "A"; no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 1. "LCJ", p. 6. "MSS", p. 1. *PAP 1979*, p. 51.
- 27 *JY*, no. 10/1956, paragraphs 158^g & 158^{gg}; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, pp. 1 & 8. "LSG", pp. 56-57. "LCJ", pp. 6-7. "HPS(64)", paragraph 68. "SKK", paragraph 6. "MSS", pp. 1-2. "LTH", paragraphs 26-29. "CHH", paragraphs 37-41. *PAP 1979*, p. 51. *Fong*, p. 46.
- 28 *JY*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^h; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 2. "LSG", p. 57. "OK", paragraph 18. "HHC", paragraphs 16-20. "LSC", pp. 21-22. *PAP 1979*, p. 51.
- 29 *JY*, no. 10/1956, paragraphs 158ⁱ & 158^j; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 2. *Fong*, pp. 46-47.
- 30 *JY*, no. 10/1956, paragraphs 158^k & appendix "A"; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 2.
- 31 *JY*, no. 10/1956, paragraphs 158^l & 158^{ff}; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 2.
- 32 *JY*, no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 2. "HHC", paragraphs 21 & 23.

- 33 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^Q; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 3.
- 34 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraphs 158^M, 158^N & 158^P; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 3. "CHH", paragraph 41. *PAP* 1979, p. 51.
- 35 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^O & appendix "A"; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 3. The four organisations are the same as those with similar names in notes 5, 7 and 23 above.
- 36 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^R; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 3.
- 37 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^S; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, pp. 3-4. *PAP* 1979, p. 51. *Fong*, p. 48.
- 38 *IJ*, no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, pp. 4-5. "LJP", paragraphs 38-41. "HHC", paragraphs 22-28.
- 39 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^U; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 4. *LAD*, vol. 2, cols. 479 & 576. *PAP* 1979, p. 51. "LTH", paragraph 31.
- 40 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^V; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 4.
- 41 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^W; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 5. "CHH", paragraph 42. "LCJ", p. 7. "MSS", p. 2. "HFS(64)", paragraph 73. "LTH", paragraph 32. "SKK", p. 3. *Fong*, pp. 48-49.
- 42 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^X; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 6. "CHH", paragraphs 41-42. "LCJ", p. 7. "MSS", p. 2.
- 43 "HFS(64)", paragraph 73. "LTH", paragraph 32. *Fong*, p. 48.
- 44 "MSS", p. 2. "LCJ", p. 8.
- 45 "HFS(64)", paragraphs 75-78. "LTH", paragraph 32.
- 46 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^X; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 6. "HHC", paragraph 30. "LJP", paragraphs 42-44.
- 47 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^X; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, pp. 4 & 6, and appendix "S". *Fong*, pp. 49-50. "CYP", paragraphs 22-23 & 26-27.
- 48 "LCS", pt. 10, Folio (450)⁵. *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^Y; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 6. "HFS(64)", paragraph 7. *Fong*, p. 49. "CCT(64)", paragraph 11.
- 49 "HFS(64)", paragraph 76. "CYP", paragraph 24. "HHC", paragraph 30.
- 50 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraphs 158^Z & 158^{BB}-158^{DD}; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, pp. 6-8.
- 51 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^{AA} & appendix "A"; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 7. "LCS", pt. 10, Folios (448) & (450).³ *PAP* 1979, p. 51. *Fong*, p. 50. "LJP", paragraph 47. "HHC", paragraphs 32-33. "OK", paragraph 22.
- 52 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^{II} & appendix "A".
- 53 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^{HH} & 158^J; no. 11/1956, appendix "A"; no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 10; and no. 6/1958, Supplement no. 3, paragraph 8. "PJJ", paragraph 20. "CCT(63)", paragraph 20. "FSS", paragraph 56. "WS", paragraph 59. "LCS", pt. 10, Folio (451). *Fong*, p. 50. The five publications were: *World Bi-monthly*, *Hui Liu*, *Life Fortnightly*, *Literary Post*, and *Times Fortnightly*.
- 54 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraphs 158^{CC} & 158^{EE}. "LCS", pt. 10, Folio (450)⁵. "HHC", paragraphs 35 & 37. *PAP* 1979, p. 51.
- 55 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^{KK}; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 10.

- 56 Published in November 1956. The article is on p. 2 and entitled "Chêng-ch'ueh Jèn-shih Chih-min-chu-i-che ti Hs'üeh-hsing Pao-hsing (Understand Correctly the Bloody Violence of the Colonialists)".
- 57 "WS", paragraphs 199 & 200. *LAD*, vol. 11, col. 173; and vol. 12, cols. 753 & 765. Ang Li Choo, op. cit., pp. 8, 10, 15 & 16.
- 58 The title of the document was "Fan Pê-hai Tou-chêng ti Ching-yen Tsung-chieh (A Summing Up of Experience in the Struggle against Persecution)". For circulation of the directive among Party members, see for instance: "M.C.P. - Organisation - 'A' Branch (Coronation Group) - Documents seized at Coronation Road on 18 September 1957", pt. 3, Supplement "A"; "LSK(65)", paragraph 27; and "PTT", paragraph 31.
- 59 *TyP*, no. 84. "CPM, 1960", p. 91.
- 60 Comments by "HS".
- 61 Comments by "HS". "CPM, 1960", pp. 74-75.
- 62 For instance, there was a Party member who was told as early as probably March 1957. See "CPM, 1960", p. 114. There was another person who got the information as late as what he said to be "sometime" in 1958. See "CYF(72)", paragraph 34.
- 63 Comments by "HS".
- 64 See p. 28.
- 65 Comments by "HS".
- 66 "CYF(72)", paragraphs 35-38. "LSG", pp. 42-43. "LSK(65)", paragraph 28. "PTT", paragraph 36. "HFS(64)", paragraphs 157-160. "OHS", paragraphs 42-43.
- 67 See p. 47 & p. 69, note 32. The head of the propaganda group was originally an Eu Chooi Yip, who was Fong Chong Pik's superior. In mid-1953, Eu went away to Indonesia. The then leader of the student division, Wong Mau Choong, also assumed control of the propaganda section. Wong Mau Choong was arrested by the Government in January 1954. After this, Ng Meng Chiang took over Wong's duties in the student field and Fong Chong Pik in the propaganda field. Cf. "WMC", paragraphs 42-43, 45-46 & 48. "HoL", paragraph 125. Comments by "AC" and "HS".
- 68 Comments by "HS".
- 69 Comments by "HS".
- 70 "CPM, 1960-68", p. 10.
- 71 Specifically, the instructions given by Ho Lung to Singapore were:
- "To cease publishing illegal publications. Instead, try to use legal publications, such as the vernacular press, weekly, monthly, etc., as media to publish their articles in disguised form. Party members must try and seek out leftist documents to read and not necessarily depend on Party documents to educate them."
- "To disband all illegal ... organisations forthwith."
- "All Party members shall try to infiltrate into any legal association or organisation irrespective of whether it be left-wing or right-wing, feudalistic or otherwise."
- "Every Party member shall work for the welfare of the masses through legal means in order to win their respect for him."
- "Every Open Party member must try to make as many friends as possible. He must devote more time to his studies if he is a student. If he is a worker he must work hard in order to build up the personal respect of his colleagues".
- "No meetings must be held and contact will only be made individually with the maximum security."
- "All acts of terrorism such as assassination of Government employees must be stopped immediately."

- Ho Lung made the following observation on his own instructions: "It was my conviction that if the above work had been carried out well, we would have embedded ourselves in amongst the masses and we could never have been beaten." Cf. "HoL", paragraphs, 114-115. *IJ*, no. 12/1959, Supplement, paragraph 19. The points made by Ho Lung in his instructions were not originally in the order as presented here. The author has re-arranged them so that they read in a more structured form.
- 72 That the underground component of the Communist movement was largely untouched was confirmed to the author by "HS".
 - 73 *IJ*, no. 10/1956, paragraph 158^{KK}; and no. 1/1957, Supplement no. 1, pt. III, appendix R, p. 10.
 - 74 "LCS", pt. 10, Folio (450)^S.
 - 75 *IJ*, no. 6/1958, Supplement no. 3, paragraph 11. "SGEU", pp. 2-4. *Sing Cmd 33 of 1957*, paragraph 19.
 - 76 "SGEU", pp. 8(b) and 10.
 - 77 Comments by "HS".
 - 78 *IJ*, no. 6/1958, Supplement no. 3, paragraph 13.
 - 79 *Ibid*, paragraphs 14, 19, 24 & 31. The 32 unions in June 1957 were: SGEU; National Union of Building Construction Workers; SBWU; Singapore Spinning Workers' Union; Singapore Taxi Drivers' Union; Singapore Coffeeshop Employees' Union; STCEU; Amalgamated Malayan Pineapple Workers' Union; Singapore Textile & General Merchants' Employees' Union (also known as the Singapore Shop Assistants' Union); SHBSA; Singapore Cycle & Motor Workers' Union; Singapore Motor Workshop Employees' Union; Singapore Machine & Engineering Employees' Union; Singapore Tailors' Union; Singapore Bookshop Workers' Union; Singapore Shoe Makers' Union; Singapore Gold & Silver Smiths Employees' Union; Singapore Barber Assistants' Union; Naval Base Labour Union; Singapore Post & Telegraph Workers' Union; Singapore Woodworkers' Union; Singapore Restaurant, Bar, Eating & Coffeeshop Employees' Union; Singapore Transport, Vessel Workers' Association; Singapore All-Races Seamen's Union; Singapore Brickworkers' Union; Singapore European Employees' Union; Singapore Radio & Wireless Technicians' Union; Singapore Metal Manufacturing Workers' Union; Singapore Union of Brewery, Confectionery, Bakery & Drink Workers; Singapore Marine Products Workers' Union; Singapore Union of Boat Building Industry Workers; and Singapore Rubber Employees' Union. Except for the first and latter five, all were members of the old 95-organisation grouping. The others were new creations after the 1956 incident. Cf. *IJ*, no. 6/1958, Supplement no. 3, paragraph 5.
 - 80 *IJ*, no. 6/1958, Supplement no. 3, paragraphs 31 & 34. *Sing Cmd 33 of 1957*, paragraph 18.
 - 81 *IJ*, no. 6/1958, Supplement no. 3, paragraph 24. *Sing Cmd 33 of 1957*, paragraph 23.
 - 82 *IJ*, no. 6/1958, Supplement no. 3, paragraph 31.
 - 83 *IJ*, no. 4/1957, paragraph 57^F. "LCJ", p. 10.
 - 84 *IJ*, no. 7/1957, paragraph 113^A; no. 8/1957, paragraph 134^B; and no. 6/1958, Supplement no. 3, paragraph 36. "LCJ", pp. 10-11. *LAD*, vol. 4, cols. 2597-2606. "PTT", paragraphs 40-41.
 - 85 The Government observed that by August 1957, "The Communists have largely regained their hold on the trade union movement ...". Cf. *Sing Cmd 33 of 1957*, paragraph 25.
 - 86 "PSS", paragraph 44. *IJ*, no. 6/1957, paragraph 96; no. 7/1957, paragraph 107; and no. 8/1957, paragraphs 126 & 135.
 - 87 "PSS", paragraph 44. *IJ*, no. 8/1957, paragraph 135; and no. 11/1957, paragraph 195^B.

- 88 "PSS", paragraph 44. *IJ*, no. 7/1957, paragraph 114; and no. 8/1957, paragraphs 126 & 135^A.
- 89 Tan Eng Leong, "The Establishment of Nanyang University, 1953-1956", Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Singapore, 1972/73, p. 58.
- 90 *IJ*, no. 5/1956, paragraph 80^f. "LSC", p. 19. The *IJ* reported that the students had organised class committees. These committees had sent representatives to form a Preparatory Committee for an Undergraduate Self-Governing Society. LSC also mentioned class committees, but said nothing about an Undergraduate Self-Governing Society.
- 91 *IJ*, no. 8/1956, paragraph 124. "LSC", pp. 19-20. The *IJ*, in its reports, did not mention the Undergraduate Self-Governing Society again but referred to the NUSU instead. LSC said that the class committees elected a Preparatory Committee to form NUSU.
- 92 *IJ*, no. 7/1957, paragraph 112.
- 93 *IJ*, no. 4/1957, paragraph 54^p.
- 94 *PAP* 1979, pp. 49, 56, 57 & 59.
- 95 The Government gave a statement on the growing strength of the Communists in *Sing Cmd* 33 of 1957 which explained why they had to be purged. Lee Kuan Yew gave particular stress to the fact of the STUWC trying to subvert the TUC in his comments on *Sing Cmd* 33 of 1957 in a meeting of the Legislative Assembly on 12 September, 1957. See *LAD*, vol. 4, cols. 2597-2606. See also *PAP* 1960, p. 21; *PAP* 1979, p. 56; and *Fong*, p. 61. There is a view which attributes only moderate importance to the fact of the STUWC trying to subvert the TUC as a factor for the Government's security action. See "TSH(O)", p. 15. TSH was Tay Seow Huah who was Director of the Special Branch of the Singapore police force from 1965 to 1966.
- 96 *IJ*, no. 6/1958, Supplement no. 3, paragraph 41.
- 97 *Ibid.*, paragraph 34.
- 98 *IJ*, no. 8/1957, paragraphs 130-130^c & 134^d; and appendix "A". "LCJ", p. 11. *PAP* 1960, p. 21. *PAP* 1964, p. 207. *PAP* 1979, p. 57. *Fong*, pp. 60-61. "SGEU", pp. 11-12.
- 99 *IJ*, no. 8/1957, paragraphs 121, 133 & 133^d; no. 9/1957, paragraphs 150^b; and no. 10/1957, paragraphs 162^a, 171 & 174-174^f.
- 100 *IJ*, no. 8/1957, paragraph 134^d.
- 101 *IJ*, no. 9/1957, paragraph 154^d.
- 102 *IJ*, no. 8/1957, paragraph 134^e; and no. 9/1957, paragraph 154^c.
- 103 *IJ*, no. 9/1957, paragraph 154^e.
- 104 *IJ*, no. 9/1957, paragraphs 143 & 154^f; and no. 10/1957, paragraph 175^g.
- 105 *IJ*, no. 10/1957, paragraph 162.
- 106 *IJ*, no. 9/1957, paragraph 143; and no. 3/1959, paragraph 38^c.
- 107 *IJ*, no. 3/1958, paragraph 47ⁱ; no. 5/1958, paragraphs 72 & 86-86^b; no. 4/1959, paragraph 54; and no. 5/1959, paragraph 65.
- 108 *Ibid.*
- 109 *IJ*, no. 5/1958, paragraphs 86^c & 102^j; and no. 3/1959, paragraph 38.
- 110 *IJ*, no. 1/1958, paragraph 11; and no. 6/1958, paragraph 103. "CYP", paragraph 41. "LCS", pt. 14, Folio (700). The Independent Assemblyman was Lim Cher Keng.
- 111 For instance, there were the Changi, Jurong and Paya Lebar branches. Cf. *IJ*, no. 8/1958, paragraphs 135 & 135^a; and no. 2/1959, paragraph 17^e. "LCS", pt. 14, Folio (700).
- 112 *IJ*, no. 1/1958, paragraph 11; no. 6/1958, paragraphs 97^b & 103; no. 8/1958, paragraphs 135 & 135^a; no. 2/1959 paragraph 17^e; and no. 3/1959, paragraphs 30^a & 33. "CYP", paragraphs 41-44. "LSG", paragraph 132. "LCS", pt. 14, Folio (700).

- 113 *IJ*, no. 4/1958, paragraph 56^H.
- 114 *IJ*, no. 6/1958, paragraph 101.
- 115 *IJ*, no. 11/1957, paragraph 196^C.
- 116 *IJ*, no. 12/1957, paragraph 213^H; and no. 1/1958, paragraph 9^A.
- 117 *IJ*, no. 4/1958, paragraph 64^A.
- 118 "LCL", paragraph 78.
- 119 *IJ*, no. 4/1958, paragraphs 56^H & 64^A; and no. 5/1958, paragraph 85^A. "LCL", paragraphs 78-83.
- 120 *IJ*, no. 4/1958, paragraph 56^H.
- 121 The 22 branches in 1958 were: Bukit Panjang, Bukit Timah, Cairnhill, Changi, Crawford, Delta, Farrer Park, Geylang, Geylang Serai, Jalan Besar, Jurong, Kampong Glam, Kampong Kapor, Nee Soon, Paya Lebar, Ponggol-Tampines, Queenstown, Rochor, Sembawang, Serangoon, Tanjong Pagar and Whampoa. Cf. *IJ*, 1958, index. The 20 branches in 1959 were: Bukit Panjang, Bukit Timah, Cairnhill, Changi, Farrer Park, Geylang, Jalan Kayu, Jurong, Kallang, Kampong Kapor/Jalan Besar, Nee Soon, Paya Lebar, Ponggol, Queenstown, Rochor, Sembawang, Tanjong Pagar, Toa Payoh, Upper Serangoon Road and Ulu Pandan. Cf. *IJ*, 1959, index. Between June and November 1958, the PAP had a membership of 14,000, according to *Fong*, p. 69.
- 122 *PAP 1979*, p. 51. "CET", pp. 21-22. "GBT", paragraph 11. "LCS", pt. 8, Folios (380)² & (384)¹. *Lee*, p. 25. *IJ*, no. 7/1956, paragraph 108 & appendix "A". *Fong*, pp. 44-45 & 267. "M-L Course", Handout no. 66, paragraph 22. The new Central Executive Committee which was elected was made up of the following:
- | | |
|----------------------|------------------|
| Chairman: | Toh Chin Chye |
| Vice-Chairman: | Haron bin Kassim |
| Secretary: | Lee Kuan Yew |
| Assistant Secretary: | Lim Chin Siong |
| Treasurer: | Ong Eng Guan |
| Assistant Treasurer: | P. Tehlin |
| Ordinary Members: | Tann Wee Tiong |
| | Ismail Rahim |
| | Chia Ek Tian |
| | C.V. Devan Nair |
| | Goh Boon Toh |
| | T.T. Rajah |
- The four left-wingers were Lim Chin Siong, Chia Ek Tian, C.V. Devan Nair and Goh Boon Toh.
- 123 *PAP 1979*, p. 51.
- 124 *Ibid.* The leading non-Communist was Ong Pang Boon.
- 125 Ahmad Ibrahim.
- 126 "WS", paragraphs 803-804. The leading member of the Communist group referred to here was S. Woodhull.
- 127 "PJJ", paragraph 43. *PAP 1979*, p. 56. *Lee*, p. 25.
- 128 "PJJ", paragraph 43. *PAP 1979*, p. 56. *Lee*, p. 25. *Petir*, 25th anniversary issue, November 1979, pp. 56-57. "LCS", pt. 8, Folio (388)³. *IJ*, no. 8/1956, paragraph 123^C.
- 129 *PAP 1979*, p. 56. *Lee*, p. 25.
- 130 *PAP 1979*, p. 48. "TnKG", pp. 6-9. "OCA", paragraphs 22-30 & 32-33.
- 131 *PAP 1979*, pp. 49 & 53.
- 132 *PAP 1979*, p. 53. "GBT", paragraph 15. "CCK(57)", paragraph 35.
- 133 *PAP 1979*, p. 53. "GBT", paragraphs 15-18. "CCK(57)", paragraphs 35-36. *IJ*, no. 3/1957, paragraph 38^A.

- 134 *PAP 1979*, p. 53. "GBT", paragraphs 15-18. "CCK(57)", paragraphs 37-41, 43-47, 50-54, 85-93, 98-103 & 108. "OCA", paragraph 31. *Sing Cmd 33 of 1957*, paragraph 28. *IJ*, no. 3/1957, paragraph 38^a; and no. 5/1957, paragraphs 73 & 73^c.
- 135 *PAP 1979*, p. 53. "CCK(57)", paragraph 51. *IJ*, no. 5/1957, paragraph 73^b.
- 136 At the end of March, 1957 the Singapore police assessed that Lee Kuan Yew and other non-Communists in the PAP like Toh Chin Chye considered it best to break immediately with the Communists. However, this line of action was fraught with danger and difficulties especially when the organisation of the Communist group was better than their own. Cf. "Capture", p. 39.
- 137 *Sing Misc 2 of 1957*, p. 2 & appendix A. "M-L Course", Handout no. 66, paragraph 19. *PAP 1960*, p. 17.
- 138 *PAP 1979*, p. 54. See next section in chapter.
- 139 Lim Yew Hock had, on 5 November 1956, made a statement in the Legislative Assembly that he would hold general elections in August 1957. The assurance was repeated on later occasions. Now he was held to his word. Cf. *LAD*, vol. 3, cols. 1721-1729.
- 140 *PAP 1964*, p. 207. *PAP 1979*, p. 54.
- 141 *PAP 1979*, p. 54.
- 142 According to the *IJ*, this meeting between the Communists and non-Communists took place on 2 April, vide no. 6/1958, Supplement no. 3, paragraph 21. On the other hand, according to *PAP 1979*, p. 54, it occurred on 24 March. On this confrontation, see also *PAP 1960*, p. 17; *PAP 1964*, p. 207; and *Fong*, p. 52.
- 143 *IJ*, no. 6/1958, Supplement no. 3, paragraph 21.
- 144 *PAP 1960*, p. 17. *PAP 1979*, pp. 54-55. *Fong*, p. 52.
- 145 "DM", pts. 4 & 5.
- 146 *LAD*, vol. 3, cols. 1673-1738.
- 147 *Ibid.*, cols. 1707-1708. *PAP 1960*, pp. 17-18. *PAP 1964*, p. 207. *PAP 1979*, p. 55. *Fong*, pp. 52-54. Marshall probably felt that he also enjoyed the support of Tan Lark Sye, the leader of the Democratic Party and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. See "LKC(O)", p. 319.
- 148 *Fong*, pp. 52 & 197.
- 149 *Ibid.*, p. 197.
- 150 *PAP 1960*, p. 18. *PAP 1964*, p. 207. *PAP 1979*, p. 55. *Fong*, p. 54. *IJ*, no. 4/1957, paragraph 57^a. Marshall, reminiscing years later about the event, says that he opted out because his Labour Front trade unionists wished to take the occasion to have a showdown with the People's Action Party trade unionists, even to the extent of spilling blood. He did not like that, and so he quit. See his "MDS(O)", pp. 166-167.
- 151 "Capture", p. 41. John Drysdale, op. cit., chapter 16, note 4.
- 152 "CPM, 1960", pp. 92-93. The Communist unit operated from Coronation Road.
- 153 *PAP, 1960*, p. 18. "Capture", p. 40.
- 154 *PAP 1960*, p. 18. *PAP 1979*, p. 55. "CPM, 1960", pp. 92-93.
- 155 *PAP 1960*, p. 18. *PAP 1979*, p. 55.
- 156 *PAP 1960*, p. 18. *PAP 1964*, p. 207. *PAP 1979*, p. 55. *Fong*, pp. 55 & 197. "Capture", p. 41.
- 157 The one other Chinese was Chan Chiaw Thor, and the three Indians were J.J. Puthuchery, C.V. Devan Nair and S. Woodhull. Cf. *Lee*, p. 27. "WS", paragraphs 120 & 125. "PJJ", paragraph 21. C.V. Devan Nair in "M-L Course," Handout no. 70, pp. 11-13. *Plebeian*, Special Hong Lim By-election issue no. 1, 2 July 1965, p. 3.
- 158 "LCS", pt. 13, Folio (570). "WS", paragraphs 130, 151 & 807. "PJJ", paragraph 21. C.V. Devan Nair in "M-L Course", Handout no. 70, pp. 11 & 13. *Plebeian*, Special Hong Lim By-election issue no. 1, 2 July 1965, p. 3.

- 159 *Lee*, pp. 32-33, 41-43 & 131-138. "WS", paragraphs 125, 169, 177-178 & 183-184. *Plebeian*, Special Hong Lim By-election issue no. 1, 2 July 1965, p. 3.
- 160 *Lee*, pp. 18-19 & 27.
- 161 *Lee*, pp. 19, 31-33, 41-43 & 131-138. "WS", paragraphs 125-130, 160-164 & 169-187. "PJJ", paragraphs 27 & 30-36. C.V. Devan Nair in "M-L Course", Handout no. 70, pp. 11-14.
- 162 *Lee*, pp. 41 & 131-138. "WS", paragraphs 125, 130, 160 & 169. "PJJ", paragraph 32. C.V. Devan Nair in "M-L Course", Handout no. 70, p. 13.
- 163 *Lee*, p. 32. "WS", paragraph 172. C.V. Devan Nair in "M-L Course", Handout no. 70, p. 14. "CCT(63)", paragraph 20. *Plebeian*, Special Hong Lim By-election issue no. 1, 2 July 1965, p. 3.
- 164 *Lee*, pp. 32-33. "WS", paragraphs 170-187. C.V. Devan Nair in "M-L Course", Handout no. 70, pp. 11-14.
- 165 *Lee*, pp. 41-43. "PJJ", paragraphs 27-29. "LCS", pt. 13, Folio (624).
- 166 *Straits Times*, 3 April 1988, p. 11. The source is Ahmad Khan who was an officer in the Special Branch of the Singapore police force in the 1950s.
- 167 John Drysdale, op. cit., p. 169.
- 168 *Straits Times*, 3 April 1988, p. 11.
- 169 *PAP 1960*, pp. 18-20. *PAP 1964*, p. 207. *PAP 1979*, pp. 55-56. "M-L Course", Handout no. 66, paragraph 22. *Fong*, pp. 55-56. *LAD*, vol. 13, col. 134. "CYP", paragraphs 32-33. "CCK(57)", paragraphs 65-67, 77 & 104. "OCA", paragraph 54. "WS", paragraphs 141-143. "PJJ", paragraphs 25-26. "LSG", paragraph 84. "AEC", paragraph 49. *IJ*, no. 8/1957, paragraph 131^D. *PAP 1960* states that the Communists wished to have nine persons on the new committee. *PAP 1979*, and *LAD*, vol. 13, col. 134, however, say that the figure was eight. The majority report is here preferred. According to *PAP 1979*, the eight persons whom the Communists wished to have on the new committee were: Tan Chong Kin, T.T. Rajah, Goh Boon Toh, Tan Kong Guan, Ng Keong Huan, Ong Chye Aun, Chen Say Jame, and Neo Chye Beng. See note 122 above for names of non-Communists in the current committee. According to *PAP 1960*, the three non-Communists whom the Communists wished to retain were: Lee Kuan Yew, Toh Chin Chye and Ahmad Ibrahim. Among those to be dropped, they disliked most Ong Eng Guan. This was so because Ong used to attack them the most. See "KKS(O)", p. 8 & "LKC(O)", p. 326.
- 170 *PAP 1960*, p. 20. *PAP 1979*, p. 57.
- 171 *Lee*, pp. 26-27. *PAP 1979*, pp. 56-57. *Fong*, p. 56. "CYP", paragraphs 32-33 & 35. "GBT", paragraph 19. "CCK(57)", paragraph 110. *IJ*, no. 8/1957, paragraph 131^H.
- 172 *PAP 1960*, p. 20. *PAP 1964*, p. 207. *PAP 1979*, p. 57. *Fong*, pp. 56-57. "OCA", paragraph 58. "GBT", paragraph 20. "PJJ", paragraph 25. *IJ*, no. 8/1957, paragraphs 131^C & 131^D. "Capture", pp. 43-44.
- 173 *Lee*, p. 26. Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 66, paragraph 22. *PAP 1960*, pp. 21-22. *PAP 1964*, p. 207. *PAP 1979*, p. 57. *Fong*, p. 57. "GBT", paragraph 20. "CCK(57)", paragraph 68. "OCA", paragraph 58. "CYP", paragraph 37. "PJJ", paragraph 25. *IJ*, no. 8/1957, paragraph 131^E. "Capture", p. 44.
- 174 Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 66, paragraph 22. *PAP 1979*, p. 57. "CCK(57)", paragraphs 77 & 78-80. "OCA", paragraph 58. "CYP", paragraphs 38-39. "Capture", pp. 44-46. *Plebeian*, Special Hong Lim By-election issue no. 1, 2 July 1965, p. 3.
- 175 *Lee*, p. 26. Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 66, paragraph 22. *PAP 1964*, p. 207. *PAP 1979*, p. 57. *Fong*, pp. 60 and 267. "CCK(57)", paragraphs 68 &

81. "CYP", paragraph 39. *IJ*, no. 8/1957, paragraph 131^E. "Capture", p. 46. The line-up in the new Central Executive Committee was:

Chairman:	Tan Chong Kin
Vice-Chairman:	Tan Kong Guan
Secretary:	T.T. Rajah
Assistant Secretary:	Chan Say Jame
Treasurer:	Ong Chye Aun
Assistant Treasurer:	Goh Boon Toh
Ordinary members:	Toh Chin Chye
	Lee Kuan Yew
	Ahmad Ibrahim
	Goh Chew Chua
	Tann Wee Tiong
	Chan Choy Siong

All the office-bearers belonged to the Communist group.

- 176 *Lee*, p. 26. *PAP 1960*, p. 21. *PAP 1964*, p. 207. *PAP 1979*, p. 57. *Fong*, p. 61.
- 177 See p. 139. *Lee*, p. 26. Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 66, paragraph 22. *PAP 1964*, p. 207. *PAP 1979*, pp. 57-58. *Fong*, pp. 60-61. "PJJ", paragraph 25. *IJ*, no. 8/1957, paragraph 131^F & appendix "A"; and no. 9/1957, paragraph 151. "Capture", p. 47. *Plebeian*, Special Hong Lim By-election issue no. 1, 2 July 1965, p. 3.
- 178 *IJ*, no. 7/1957, paragraph 110^B; and no. 8/1957, paragraphs 131 & 135.
- 179 *IJ*, no. 7/1957, paragraphs 103, 104 & appendix "A".
- 180 *IJ*, no. 7/1959, paragraph 103.
- 181 *PAP 1960*, pp. 21-22. *PAP 1964*, p. 208. *PAP 1979*, p. 58. *Fong*, pp. 61-62.
- 182 *PAP 1979*, p. 58. *Fong*, pp. 61-63 & 268. The new Central Executive Committee was:
- | | |
|------------------------------|------------------|
| Chairman: | Toh Chin Chye |
| Vice-Chairman: | Vacant |
| Secretary-General: | Lee Kuan Yew |
| Assistant Secretary-General: | Vacant |
| Treasurer: | Ong Eng Guan |
| Assistant Treasurer: | Vacant |
| Ordinary members: | Ahmad Ibrahim |
| | Tann Wee Tiong |
| | Ismail Rahim |
| | S.V. Lingam |
| | Goh Chew Chua |
| | Chan Choy Siong |
| | Haron bin-Kassim |
| | Wee Toon Boon |
| | Ho Puay Choo |
- 183 *PAP 1979*, p. 58.
- 184 "CYT", paragraph 36.
- 185 "CYT", paragraphs 36, 38, 45-46, 55, 57 & 58. "CYF(72)", paragraph 96. *PAP 1960*, p. 23. *PAP 1964*, p. 208. *IJ*, no. 7/1957, paragraph 110^C; no. 8/1957, paragraph 131^A; no. 9/1957, paragraph 154^I; and no. 10/1957, paragraph 162^F.
- 186 "CYT", paragraphs 37 & 57.
- 187 "DM", pt. 6, Folios (411)-(411)².
- 188 *IJ*, no. 11/1957, appendix.

- 189 "CYT", paragraphs 16 & 36. *IJ*, no. 11/1957, appendix.
- 190 "CYT", paragraphs 39-47.
- 191 "CYT", paragraph 43.
- 192 "CYT", paragraphs 48-52. "DM", pt. 6, Folios (439), (439)⁰¹, (439)⁰⁰¹ & (440). *IJ*, No. 11/1957, paragraphs 194-194^c & appendix.
- 193 *IJ*, no. 12/1957, paragraph 211^M.
- 194 "CYT", paragraphs 57 & 69. See next section, p. 160.
- 195 "CYT", paragraphs 59, 62, 68, 70, 74 & 78. *Lee*, p. 36.
- 196 *IJ*, no. 12/1957, paragraphs 206^A, 211^A, 211^E & 211^M.
- 197 "CYT", paragraph 83.
- 198 "CYT", paragraphs 84, 86 & 92-108.
- 199 *LAD*, vol. 6, cols. 442-445. *Lee*, p. 34.
- 200 *Lee*, pp. 34-37. "KSH", paragraphs 22 & 25.
- 201 *Lee*, pp. 35-37. "CYT", paragraphs 110-123.
- 202 *IJ*, no. 8/1957, paragraph 132^B.
- 203 *IJ*, no. 6/1958, paragraphs 93^D & 99. *PAP 1960*, p. 28. *PAP 1964*, p. 212.
- 204 *LAD*, vol. 7, col. 805.
- 205 *PAP 1958*, pp. 2-11. *Fong*, p. 68. The PAP statement was discussed by the members of the CPM. An instance of a discussion could be found in "LHK", paragraphs 129-139.
- 206 *PAP 1979*, p. 58. *Fong*, pp. 63, 65 & 68-69.
- 207 *IJ*, no. 5/1958, paragraphs 83^A; and no. 6/1958, paragraphs 93^E, 99 & 99^A. *Fong*, p. 65.
- 208 Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 7. Pang Cheng Lian, op. cit., p. 15.
- 209 Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 7.
- 210 John Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 198-201.
- 211 The scholar is Thomas J. Bellows. See his *The People's Action Party: Emergence of a Dominant Party System* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1970), p. 35. But Dennis Bloodworth, former chief Far East Correspondent of the *Observer* and author of *The Tiger and the Trojan Horse* (Singapore: Times Books International, 1986), communicates to the author: "... When talking to me last July [1982], Sir William Goode [last British Governor in Singapore] denied this [Bellows' story], saying he could not possibly [have] connived with Lee Kuan Yew to this extent, since there was no guarantee Lee would win the elections. If the LF were returned to office he would have been completely compromised if he had confided secrets to Lee ...".
- 212 "CYW", p. 9.
- 213 An instance of Fong Chong Pik giving instructions to a subordinate that support should be given to the PAP in the elections reads: "... he [i.e. Fong] ... analysed to me the coming general election. He said that the Liberal Socialists Party was rightist and reactionary. Lim Yew Hock's Labour Front was also rightist, and in addition, it had already lost its prestige. The Party Rakyat was too leftist and would create confusion and commotion. Only the PAP was basically leftist, and that it was the objective we could strive to co-operate at present. Therefore we should give our wholehearted support to the PAP". Cf. "LSK(65)", paragraph 41. Further evidence of the CPM's policy of support for the PAP non-Communists can be seen in: "LHB", paragraph 64; "LSG", paragraphs 102 & 163; "LHK", paragraph 140; "CYW", p. 9; "CSC", paragraphs 55 & 61; "CHH", paragraph 62; "CYT", paragraph 136; "LTH", paragraph 69; "HYM", paragraph 30; "TBK", paragraphs 63-65; and "CYK", pp. 12-13.

- 214 "PTT", paragraphs 60-74. "TYC", paragraphs 49-60. *Lee*, p. 37.
 215 "TYC", paragraphs 61-62.
 216 "PTT", paragraph 73.
 217 "Draft Paper", chapter 3.
 218 Then Lian Mee, "The Singapore Municipality", Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Malaya in Singapore, 1960/61, pp. 1-3 & 5.
 219 *Ibid.*, pp. 8 & 10-12.
 220 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
 221 *Ibid.*, pp. 34 & 35.
 222 *Ibid.*, pp. 10-12. C. Mary Turnbull, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-237.
 223 "DM", pt. 6. Folios (411)-(411)² & (429).
 224 The aims and objects of the WP, as given in its Constitution and Rules, were:

Aims

- (1) The elimination of man's exploitation of man.
- (2) The general recognition in practice of the basic equality of all human beings.
- (3) Equalisation of opportunities for the individual for full and free development within the framework of respect for the rights of all.
- (4) Racial equality in practice in all spheres of public activity and equal respect in law for all racial cultures.

Objects

- (1) To organise and maintain a political party to give effect to the three-fold principles of Merdeka, Democracy (Parliamentary) and Socialism.
- (2) To seek union of Singapore with the Federation on a basis of equal respect for all races, and until this is achieved
 - (a) to seek the elimination of colonial exploitation of Singapore and its people;
 - (b) to secure and maintain in Singapore the establishment of a Government based on Parliamentary Democracy and Socialism;
 - (c) to seek the unity of the workers of Singapore;
 - (d) to promote the political, social and economic emancipation of the people of Singapore, and particularly of the workers who depend directly on their exertion for their livelihood;
 - (e) to improve the food and living conditions of the workers to a standard compatible with human dignity and the exceptional wealth of Singapore.
- (3) To promote national unity of the Malayan people and the establishment of a united Socialist Malaya.
- (4) To co-operate with all and every lawful association where practicable for joint political and other action towards the achievement of the Party's aims and objects including organisations in other countries and international organisations, and associations, and to seek in common with such organisations the promotion of peace and the establishment and defence of basic human rights and the radical readjustment of existing social and economic standards on equitable human principles.

The Constitution and Rules of the WP are found in "The Workers' Party, Singapore", pt. 3, Folio (113)^A.

- 225 "City Council Elections", pt. 11, Folio (656)¹. *PAP 1960*, p. 23. *PAP 1964*, p. 208.
 226 Then Lian Mee, *op. cit.*, p. 8, note 6.
 227 *Ibid.*, pp. 44-46.
 228 This source was the *Yeh Teng Pao*, a Chinese newspaper. The information was given on 5 April 1958. Cf. "LYH", pt. 5, Folio (463).

- 229 Then Lian Mee, op. cit., pp. 12 & 44.
- 230 A senior member of the CPM said to one of his subordinates that, because of the incident, "... The PAP had thereby killed the political status of the Labour Front ...". And a senior PAP non-Communist also remarked that, "... By using colonial troops against young students whose cause had come to be identified in the public mind with the preservation of Chinese language, education and culture ... the Lim Yew Hock Government caused itself to be totally discredited in the eyes of the people. Its fate was sealed." Cf. "LSG", paragraph 82 and *PAP 1979*, pp. 51-52.
- 231 Loh Mun Loong, op. cit., chapter 3.
- 232 D.J. Blake, "Employment and Unemployment in Singapore", in W.E. Chalmers, (ed.), *Crucial Issues in Industrial Relations in Singapore* (Singapore, 1957), quoted in Loh Mun Loong, op. cit., p. 73, appendix 4/2. Chapter 4 of Loh's paper has a good discussion of the unemployment problem.
- 233 Loh Mun Loong, op. cit., pp. 53 & 75. Chapter 4 of Loh's paper also discusses the housing problem.
- 234 *PAP 1979*, p. 51.
- 235 Cheng Yuet Tong's superior had a conversation with him after the elections were over. From the general trend of what this man said, it could be inferred that his Party was pleased with the results on the occasion. Cf. "CYT", paragraphs 82-84.
- 236 *PAP 1960*, pp. 23-24. *PAP 1964*, p. 209. *Fong*, pp. 66-67. "City Council Elections", pt. 12, Folio (704)¹. "CYT", paragraphs 119-123.
- 237 *PAP 1960*, pp. 23-24. *PAP 1964*, p. 209. *Fong*, p. 66. "City Council Elections", pt. 12, Folio (726)³. *IJ*, no. 7/1958, paragraph 116^a & appendix "B".
- 238 *PAP 1960*, p. 23. *PAP 1964*, p. 209. "City Council Elections", pt. 12, Folio (726)³. *IJ*, no. 7/1958, paragraph 116.
- 239 "CYT", paragraphs 114-115. *Lee*, p. 36, *IJ*, no. 7/1958, appendix "B".
- 240 *PAP 1960*, p. 24. *PAP 1964*, p. 209.
- 241 *Lee*, p. 36. *PAP 1960*, p. 24. *PAP 1964*, p. 209. *Fong*, p. 67. "City Council Elections", pt. 13, Folios (749) & (749)^a; and pt. 14, Folio (753). *IJ*, no. 7/1968, paragraphs 108^a & 116^b; and appendix "B".
- 242 D.J. Blake, "Employment and Unemployment in Singapore", in W.E. Chalmers, (ed.), *Crucial Issues in Industrial Relations in Singapore* (Singapore, 1967), quoted in Loh Mun Loong, op. cit., p. 73.
- 243 Loh Mun Loong, op. cit., p. 75.
- 244 *Sing Misc 2 of 1957*, p. 2. *LAD*, vol. 6, cols. 442-444.
- 245 *Sing Misc 2 of 1957*, p. 6.
- 246 *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
- 247 *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 248 *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
- 249 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- 250 *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
- 251 *Ibid.*, p. 6.
- 252 *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- 253 *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- 254 *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.
- 255 *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.
- 256 No. 84, Editorial. The copy of no. 84 which the author had access to was mutilated. The title of the editorial was missing.
- 257 *PAP 1960*, p. 28. *PAP 1964*, p. 211.

- 258 *PAP 1960*, p. 24. *PAP 1964*, p. 209. *Fong*, pp. 67-68. "LYH", pts. 5 & 6. "Singapore People's Alliance, formerly known as United Socialist Front, Singapore", pt. 1, *Folios* (34)¹, (36), (36)^A & (37). *Petir*, vol. II, no. 1, January 1959, p. 1.
- 259 *Fong*, pp. 67-68. "LYH", pts. 5 & 6. "Singapore People's Alliance, formerly known as United Socialist Front, Singapore", pt. 1, *Folios* (34)¹, (36), (36)^A and (37).
- 260 The PAP had called the SPA a "rojak party". Rojak is a Malay food which is a mixture of fruit and vegetables served with sauce and spices. That the SPA was a "mixture" was the point made. Cf. *Petir*, vol. II, no. 1, January 1959, p. 1. The objectives of the SPA, according to its constitution and rules, were the following:
- (A) Political stability, economic security, and social justice for all;
 - (B) An improved standard of living and better social services and education for the workers and the poor;
 - (C) Complete freedom from dictatorship and fear;
 - (D) The just rights of all workers with full employment for all;
 - (E) The elimination of all forms of exploitation;
 - (F) Inter racial and communal harmony and the preservation and promotion of all existing cultures;
 - (G) Independence and a merger with the Federation;
 - (H) Parliamentary democracy based on socialistic principles; and
 - (I) Every other object which from time to time will further and promote the interests and welfare of the workers and people of Singapore.
- Cf. "Singapore People's Alliance, formerly known as United Socialist Front, Singapore", pt. 2, *Folio* (52)^A.
- 261 "Singapore United Asian Residents' Association, formerly known as Katong United Residents' Association", pt. 1, *Folio* (3).
- 262 *Ibid.*, a note dated 23 March 1959 before *Folio* (1).
- 263 According to one source, the main "objects" of KURA were:
- "To foster and maintain healthy relationship among the residents of the Katong area.
 - To investigate and wherever possible provide better living conditions and social facilities for the members.
 - To take active part in preserving political rights of the residents in the area.
 - To hold regular meet-the-people session.
 - To provide better social benefits to members."
- Cf. "Singapore United Asian Residents' Association, formerly known as Katong United Residents' Association", pt. 1, *Folio* (3).
- 264 "Persatuan Islam Se-Malaya (PIS)", pt. 1, *Folios* (8) & (9). *IJ*, no. 12, December 1951, pp. 7-8.
- 265 The characterisation of the PMIP given here is based on Gordon P. Means, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-232.
- 266 The "objects" of the PMIP were said to be:
- (a) To establish a community of Muslims for a concerted effort in dealing with the demands of Islam and democratic politics.
 - (b) To strive for unity in the constitutional development and administration of Islamic affairs throughout Malaya.
 - (c) To safeguard and defend the rights, interests and honour of Islam and the Muslims.
 - (d) To cooperate with all other political organisations in the country whose policies and objects were not contrary to the teachings of Islam in achieving democracy, social justice and human dignity.

- Cf. "Persatuan Islam Se-Malaya (PIS)", pt. 1, Folios (8) & (9). *IJ*, no. 12, December 1951, p. 8.
- 267 "Malayan Indian Congress", pt. 1, Folio (1) and appendix A to Folio. *IJ*, no. 8/1946, pp. 4-5. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 108.
- 268 See for example a statement made by one of its leaders, Budh Singh, published in the *Pardesi Khalsa Sewak* on 18 April 1947 found in "Malayan Indian Congress", pt. 1, Folio (40).
- 269 That the MIC did not live up to its original intention was pointed out by an outgoing President of its Singapore office, R. Jumabhoy, in October 1947. Cf. "Malayan Indian Congress", pt. 1, Folio (127).
- 270 "Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya", pt. 1, Folios (1), (3)¹ & (5)¹. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 239.
- 271 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 239.
- 272 "Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya", pt. 1, Folio (5)¹. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 240-241.
- 273 One source says that the "objects" of the PR were:
- (a) To oppose any form of Imperialism in politics, economy and society;
 - (b) To struggle for full independence of Malaya by constitutional means;
 - (c) To establish a sovereign and democratic Independent State of Malaya, within and without, and guarantee the security and prosperity of the people.
- Cf. "Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya", pt. 1, Folio (11)^A.
- Another source reports that among some of the specific measures advocated by the PR was the establishment of an educational system in which equal treatment would be given to all streams of education, both English and vernacular. It also advocated an immediate improvement and expansion of the country's social services and greater security for farmers, labourers, peasants and other groups among the masses. Cf. "Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya", pt. 1, Folio (5)¹.
- 274 *IJ*, no. 11/1958, paragraphs 178^A & 178^B.
- 275 *IJ*, no. 11/1958, paragraphs 178^A & 178^B; and no. 12/1958, paragraph 194^f.
- 276 *IJ*, no. 1/1959, paragraph 8.
- 277 The "objects" of the SCP were:
- (1) To seek and secure by constitutional means the independence of Singapore;
 - (2) To struggle for the merger of Singapore with the Federation of Malaya for the purpose of establishing a united independent Malaya so as to achieve our common objects;
 - (3) To eliminate racial discrimination and colonial exploitation;
 - (4) To seek the elimination or amendment of all unjustifiable ordinances which are against human rights;
 - (5) To secure and maintain the equal position of racial cultures and languages;
 - (6) To provide education of different races on an equal basis and to exterminate illiteracy;
 - (7) To seek to raise the standard of living of the people, particularly of the workers to a standard compatible with human dignity;
 - (8) To seek the amendment of Labour Ordinance, Trade Dispute Ordinance and Shop Assistants Ordinance, with a view to stabilise social conditions;
 - (9) To seek the means to guide the harmonious co-operation between the employer and the employee;
 - (10) To promote industries and enterprises and develop national economy with a view of establishing a high level of employment;

(11) To maintain Singapore as a free port so as to increase entrepot trade with other countries all over the world.

Cf. "Singapore Citizens' Party", pt. 1, Folio (24). *IJ*, no. 3/1959, paragraph 35^E.

- 278 Ong Chit Chung, op. cit., pp. 74-77. *Fong*, p. 71.
- 279 Ong Chit Chung, op. cit., pp. 74-77. *Fong*, pp. 71-72.
- 280 Ong Chit Chung, op. cit., p. 77. *Fong*, pp. 71-72.
- 281 Ong Chit Chung, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
- 282 Ong Chit Chung, op. cit., pp. 77-79. *Fong*, pp. 71-72.
- 283 Colony of Singapore, *Government Gazette Extraordinary*, no. 51, vol. XIV, 2 June 1959, in "Legislative Assembly Elections - 1959", pt. 19, Folio (1389). *IJ*, no. 4/1959, paragraph 51; and no. 6/1959, paragraphs 70 & 73. *PAP 1960*, p. 28. *PAP 1964*, p. 211. *Fong*, pp. 75 & 202-208. Ong Chit Chung, op. cit., p. 81. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., p. 193.
- 284 See p. 160.
- 285 See pp. 112 & 165.
- 286 Besides the 220,000 Chinese, 104,000 Indians and others were also made citizens on this occasion. Cf. Colony of Singapore, *Annual Report, 1958* (Singapore, 1959), pp. 297-298.
- 287 Ong Chit Chung, op. cit., p. 62. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., pp. 67-68.
- 288 Loh Mun Loong, op. cit., p. 75.
- 289 *Ibid.*, p. 40.
- 290 *PAP 1960*, p. 26. *PAP 1964*, p. 210. *Fong*, pp. 69-70. Ong Chit Chung, op. cit., pp. 64-70. Loh Mun Loong, op. cit., pp. 62-63 & 66.
- 291 The story was told by the "Paid Secretary" of the union who was a member of the CPM. Cf. "CKY", p. 12.
- 292 See p. 157.
- 293 "CPM Relations with and Penetration of other Parties - PAP", pt. 1, Folio (75)^A. The original language of this (75)^A article is in Chinese. It has been translated into English by some agency or person. The language of the translated piece is left as it stands and the author has not attempted any corrections.
- 294 According to the opinion of the Special Branch of Malaya at the time. Cf. "CPM, 1960", p. 94.

Realignments

The first two years the PAP was in office, from mid-1959 to around mid-1961, saw the non-Communists and Communists in this party finally repudiating each other. The former intensified co-operation with the British and the UMNO, and the latter formed a new open front political party with a dissident group of non-Communists from the original party. There was forward movement in the various mass organisations when there was unity in the PAP, but they broke up into two camps following the Party split.

The Split in the PAP and the Formation of the BSS

The alliance between the two factions in the PAP was an uneasy one. When circumstances became unfavourable, the ties became impossible and battlelines were re-drawn.

The Inevitability of Separation

After the 1957 clash between the two wings in the PAP, friendship was restored in a meeting in the following years between Lee Kuan Yew and Fong Chong Pik. However, both sides knew that the renewed alliance was of only limited tenure and that one day there would again be a split.

Each side needed the assistance of the other in the effort to capture state power. For the non-Communists, success had already come with the victory in the 1959 general elections. For the Communists, however, ambitions would be fulfilled only after the governing regime in Malaya and the newly acquired power of the non-Communists in the island had been overthrown. Therefore, the non-Communists took the initiative to cut themselves off from the Communists.¹

The inevitable division between his group and the Communists was publicly hinted at by Lee Kuan Yew as early as the election campaign in 1959. On 26 May, in a speech made at Clifford Pier, he said,

In this fight the ultimate contestants will be the PAP and the MCP – the PAP for a democratic, non-Communist, socialist Malaya, and the MCP for a Soviet Republic of Malaya ...²

The position was stated with great frankness.

Many years after the split between the two groups had taken place, Dr Goh Keng Swee, one of the leaders of the non-Communists and the Minister of Finance in the Government in 1959, recalled the nature of the united front:

Now, I might end by referring to what people had been describing the situation at that time – the PAP was riding a tiger – which I think is a fair description. So when we won the General Elections and formed the government in June 1959, we knew that we had to dismount from the tiger and fight the tiger. We could not flee away ... And finally we had to see to it that the animal was caged.³

A parting of the ways eventually had to come.

The Communists, on their part, also had in mind that one day they would purge Lee Kuan Yew's faction from the PAP and take over the party. On 30 May, the PAP won the elections. On 4 June, Lim Chin Siong and some of his close associates were released from prison. About a week after this, it transpired that the Communists had their own masterplan:

Lim Chin Siong was heard to have told a few PAP leftist leaders that it was rather unwise at the present moment to go against the moderate faction led by Lee Kuan Yew, which is now at the height of its power. Nevertheless, the leftist faction will tag along until such time when it is appropriate for the leftists to take over the leadership in the PAP from the moderates. The emergence of a new political party is very likely in the future.⁴

Thus after the general elections and the formation of the PAP government, the two factions in the party were both biding their time to get at each other's throats.

A Period of Sweet Reasonableness

For three-quarters of a year after the PAP's accession to power, there were good relations between the two factions in the party. The non-Communists took steps to circumscribe the danger from the Communists and the latter accepted an unavoidable situation. The defences of the non-Communists could be seen to fall into several areas.

The PAP non-Communists had always advocated that Singapore should one day merge with Malaya to become one country. This proposition formed one of the most important items in their election platform in both the elections in 1955 and 1959.⁵ After they had formed the government in Singapore in mid-1959, they made immediate approaches to the UMNO-led government in Malaya to have this dream fulfilled.

There were a number of motives behind the merger idea. One of these was to cope with the Communist problem.⁶ The new 1959 Constitution had established, through the agency of the Internal Security Council, a

tripartite alliance of the British, the UMNO and the PAP non-Communists against the CPM. However, in any action they took against the Communists, both the British and the PAP non-Communists had to take into account the reaction of the Chinese-speaking lower classes who formed the majority of the population. Generally speaking, the sympathies of this community at the time were more with the CPM than with any other political group. Because of this, the Internal Security Council had only limited capabilities. Unlike both the British and the PAP non-Communists, the UMNO depended only on the Malays in Malaya and Singapore for its support, and this grassroots base was at least indifferent, if not hostile, to the Communists. Under the 1959 Constitution, sovereignty over Singapore still rested in the hands of the British. If the island could be merged with Malaya, then ultimate control could be transferred to the charge of the Malayan Government. The Internal Security Council could be abolished and the Malayan Government could have sole responsibility for dealing with the CPM. In this way, the Communist problem could be more effectively solved.

The UMNO at this stage was not keen about merger. It had two fears. Firstly, Singapore had too large a Chinese population. If the island joined up with the peninsula, the Chinese population in the two regions together would outnumber all the Malays. Secondly, Singapore had also too many leftists. The war against the CPM in Malaya was just then reaching its final stages. Merger would start trouble all over again for Malaya. Therefore, Malaya would gain nothing by fusing with Singapore.⁷

The PAP non-Communists tried hard to persuade the UMNO. With regard to the first problem, measures were put into effect in Singapore which sought to reduce the Chineseness of the Chinese by "Malayanising" them. The second obstacle was approached by trying to show UMNO that there was a difference between Communists and democratic socialists. While the former were a danger, the latter were not. All these efforts, however, failed to evoke the desired response.⁸ The Communists were not unduly worried about the merger enterprise because it was not showing any result.

A second area in which the non-Communists took action to deal with the Communists was to have the PPSO amended so that the Communists would be more restricted. The PPSO, as seen, was a substitute introduced by David Marshall when he was Chief Minister to replace the Emergency Regulations originally adopted by the British. Under the latter, reviews of doubtful cases of detention were undertaken by an advisory committee. The PPSO had changed the advisory committee for an Appeal Tribunal. Now the PAP amendment abolished the Appeal Tribunal and reinstated the advisory committee. Whilst the existing PPSO had the power to

impose restrictions on the movement, etc. of persons only after they had been detained and freed, a second amendment permitted such limitations on people even when they had never been imprisoned. All these amendments were passed by the Legislative Assembly a few months after the PAP assumed power.⁹

The third area in which the non-Communists pitched themselves against the Communists was over the matter of detainees. As we have seen, immediately after the new constitution for Singapore was finalised in London in May 1958, the PAP non-Communists announced to the public that should they take part in elections under this constitution and win power, they would assume office only if persons who were previously detained by Lim Yew Hock were released from prison.¹⁰ After the new government was formed in mid-1959, this undertaking was fulfilled. However, the non-Communists did not deem it wise to set free each and every detainee, and precautions were taken against those who were released to ensure that they did not become politically dangerous.

In June 1959, there were 49 persons from the PAP Communist group in prison.¹¹ On 4 June, Lim Chin Siong and seven of his close followers were set free.¹² At the end of the month and in early October, two batches of four each were also released.¹³ However, after this, the pace of releasing prisoners slowed down. As late as 1961, there were still 18 persons who were kept in custody.¹⁴

The Communists were extremely unhappy over the behaviour of the Government and criticism was voiced in underground meetings.¹⁵ Open front men, like Lim Chin Siong, stepped up pressure on Lee Kuan Yew to have all the comrades released.¹⁶ Discontented though they might be, however, the Communists did not see any advantage in breaking company with the non-Communists over the issue and they controlled themselves.

When Lim Chin Siong and others were let out of jail, the non-Communists made them issue a public statement which declared that henceforth they would support the political programme of the PAP but not that of the CPM.¹⁷

Just before the detainees were set free, the non-Communists got a new Central Executive Committee elected for the PAP for a new term. The election was conducted this way, perhaps, because it would preclude the possibility of any of the detainees from being chosen to join the committee.¹⁸ None of them was allowed to become a cadre member of the Party either.¹⁹ Nor were citizenship rights given to those of them who were not already in possession of such rights, Fong Swee Suan being one such case.²⁰ Finally, some of them, like Lim Chin Siong, were appointed to official posts as Political Secretaries to various ministries. In such positions, they were given no useful work to do except to earn mass support

for the government by virtue of the respect and following they enjoyed among a large part of the population.²¹ All these measures were taken to blunt the dangerous potentialities of the ex-detainees. Naturally, the affected persons were not pleased with the restrictions, but they endured them.

Another area in which the non-Communists imposed control upon the Communists was in the trade union field. During the election campaign in 1959, the PAP had advocated industrialisation in Singapore to solve the island's economic problems. Industrialisation necessitated private investment, which in turn necessitated industrial peace.²² In principle, the left-wing trade unions relied heavily upon the method of "economic struggles" to expand and maintain their memberships. Such struggles were considered able to promote the welfare of the workers. The most important weapon was strikes.

In early 1960, the Legislative Assembly passed an Industrial Relations Bill which was later assented to by the Yang di-Pertuan Negara and became an ordinance. This law sought to promote industrial peace with justice to the workers, to be achieved through collective bargaining, conciliation and, in the last resort, the Minister for Labour and Law having the power to refer disputes between employees and employers to settlement by an Industrial Arbitration Court. The Minister was to act as a balancing factor between quarrelling parties.²³ The Communists leaders of the trade unions were not happy with the legislation. What they resented most was that the Minister for Labour and Law and not they themselves had the right to refer problems to the industrial court for resolution. This deprived them of a great deal of initiative in the labour movement. They also viewed the extensive powers given to the court with disfavour.²⁴

Parallel to the Industrial Relations Bill, the Legislative Assembly passed a Trade Union Ordinance (Amendment) in September 1959 and a Trade Unions Bill, which replaced this, in May 1960. The aim of these two laws was to get all trade unions unified into one whole. Where there was unity there would be easier direction and control.

A number of steps were soon taken among the trade unions to implement the new laws. Among them was the cancellation of a number of Lim Yew Hock's unions which were small in size and referred to as "yellow" or splinter unions. The rest of the unions were required to regroup themselves into 19 categories, each of which initially was to become a federation and finally a single organisation. The TUC was then reorganised so that it could more properly function as the central authority of the trade union movement.²⁵

Both factions of the PAP worked side by side in this effort to restructure the trade union movement. However, very soon the comradeship was breached. In forming federations of unions, Lim Chin Siong and his associates proceeded with rapid action. They came up with a number of new creations and reorganised an old one in a short time. Up to May 1960, the PAP non-Communists, through the Government, gave recognition to three of the new organisations, but then the registrations were withdrawn. This happened because, at this point, the non-Communists discovered that the co-operation of Lim Chin Siong's group was not reliable. Under such circumstances, the federations of unions would become liabilities rather than assets.²⁶ More will be said about this trade union unification issue later in this chapter.

The non-Communists knew that when another break came about between themselves and the other faction, they could not rely on the branches of the party or the greater part of any of the mass organisations for popular support. To provide for such a contingency, they set up two governmental bodies to develop and maintain contact with the masses. One was the People's Association (PA) and the other was the Work Brigade (WB).²⁷

The task of the PA was to manage a chain of community centres which provided services of various kinds, like the branches of the PAP. Should the branches one day break away from the non-Communists and work for the Communists, the community centres would be able to keep the masses for the non-Communists. At the time when the association was formed, there were 28 community centres scattered in various parts of the island. The PAP Government quickly increased their number and by 1961 there were 54. The association was directly controlled by the Prime Minister himself.²⁸

The WB comprised unemployed youths and its function was to provide such persons with employment as well as to break strikes which the Communists might mount, as in 1955 and 1956 when the expected crisis came. The Brigade was directed by the Minister for Labour and Law.²⁹

A last, but most important measure which the non-Communists took to pre-empt the Communists from becoming a serious threat in the future, and which was simultaneously an end in itself, was, after having formed a new government, to attend immediately to the socio-economic problems which had brought the Lim Yew Hock administration down. These problems were mainly the lack of employment and adequate housing for the people. The merger with Malaya would enable the island to form a common market with the peninsula, which would, in turn, enable

Singapore to industrialise successfully and so create work for the unemployed. Other steps, parallel to the merger talks, were also immediately taken to improve things.³⁰

The first nine months after the PAP had come into power was a period of good relations between the two wings of the PAP. In the words of Lee Kuan Yew, during this time, Lim Chin Siong and his friends behaved with "sweet reasonableness".³¹ After March 1960, however, the situation became different. Mention has been made of the fact that while Lim Chin Siong and his close associates were imprisoned in 1956 to 1959, Lee Kuan Yew spent a great deal of effort trying to persuade the group to abandon Communism for democratic socialism. The enterprise was apparently successful, but Lee had reservations about the genuineness of Lim's conversion. He had hoped that if Lim eventually proved unrepentant, he could have Fong Swee Suan replace Lim as the leader of the trade union movement.³² However, in March 1960, there were indications that Fong Swee Suan had reverted to Lim Chin Siong's way. Also, the leftist leaders began quietly speaking ill about the non-Communists to the trade unions.³³ After the early part of 1960, therefore, Lee Kuan Yew braced himself for another showdown with the other side.

Of all the persons whom Lee Kuan Yew had tried to convert, only C.V. Devan Nair turned out to be a success. Even in his case, the Communists made efforts to win him back into the fold. In May 1960, Nair and two other persons representing the TUC went to China to participate in the Labour Day celebrations there. While in that country, Nair's former superior in the SPABL, who was then stationed in Beijing, worked on him to resume the Communist cause. At the same time, he requested Nair to persuade Lee Kuan Yew not to break with the Communists but to continue the alliance. Nair, however, was not amenable to his suggestions.³⁴

At the juncture when relations between the two factions in the PAP were thoroughly sour, a separate conflict arose within the ranks of the non-Communists themselves to become a factor which precipitated an immediate split between Lee Kuan Yew and Lim Chin Siong.

The Ong Eng Guan Affair

The conflict which arose within the non-Communist group itself was a division between Lee Kuan Yew and Ong Eng Guan.

As related earlier, Ong Eng Guan became Mayor of the City Council in 1957.³⁵ He held this position until 1959 when he was made a Minister of National Development in the island's central government after the general elections of that year. In the PAP, he had been a Treasurer since 1954.³⁶

It was said that what Ong did for the ordinary people in Singapore during his tenure in the City Council made a significant contribution to the success of the PAP in the 1959 elections.³⁷ This fact had a great influence upon the psychology of Ong. In 1959, after the elections were over, according to some reports, Ong Eng Guan was nearly chosen by the party to become the Prime Minister of Singapore instead of Lee Kuan Yew. In the original voting for the position, both Ong and Lee got the same number of votes. Then, Dr Toh Chin Chye, the Chairman of the party as well as of the meeting, exercised his casting vote in favour of the latter.³⁸ Thus, since the beginning of the PAP administration, difficulties had existed between Ong Eng Guan and Lee Kuan Yew, and by March 1960, the two were unable to tolerate each other any longer. Three months later, at a conference of the PAP, Ong openly mounted an offensive against Lee.³⁹

The June conference was convened for the purpose of reviewing the performance of the PAP both as a government and as a party during the past year. At this meeting, Ong Eng Guan, in the name of the party branch which was under his chairmanship, the Hong Lim branch, tabled a set of 16 resolutions for adoption by the conference, voicing criticism against both the government and the party lines of Lee Kuan Yew.⁴⁰ The aim of Ong in tabling the resolutions was to make an appeal to the Communists and that part of the Singapore electorate who were under their influence, as well as other anti-Lee-Kuan-Yew elements to side with him or become his allies in the struggle against Lee.⁴¹ Lee Kuan Yew countered Ong with a recommendation made by a party member to the Central Executive Committee to have him expelled from the party. This was subsequently effected.⁴² At the same time, Ong was also dismissed from his ministership in the Government.⁴³

After Ong had lost his party membership and his cabinet post, he joined the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly as an Independent member. In this arena, he continued his fight against Lee which degenerated into mutual mud-slinging in a law court. Finally, Ong resigned from the Assembly and challenged his opponent to fight him in a by-election in Ong's constituency in order to test which side had the support of the people.⁴⁴ The by-election in Hong Lim was duly held in April 1961. The result was that Ong won against the candidate from the PAP, Jek Yuen Thong.⁴⁵

The significance of the Ong-Lee rift was the attempt by the former to win the support of, or to forge a united front with, Lim Chin Siong in the party against Lee. The Communists and their supporters actually did not treasure the friendship of Lee Kuan Yew as such, but they had even less liking for Ong Eng Guan. They considered Ong an opportunist.⁴⁶ Because

of this, they did not give Ong the help which he hoped for. However, they did take advantage of the quarrel between Ong and Lee to put pressure on the latter to fight against the British. Lim Chin Siong's fishing in troubled waters naturally irritated Lee Kuan Yew a great deal.

Ong Eng Guan formed a new political party two months after the Hong Lim by-election, on the anniversary of his raising the 16 resolutions. He called his organisation the United People's Party (UPP) and had it registered with the Government a month later.⁴⁷ From the circumstances of its birth, the UPP was quite obviously pitted against the PAP. When announcing the formation of his party, Ong declared that his goals were, in the short-run, to strive for the fulfilment of the various tasks enunciated in his 16 resolutions and, in the long-run, to create a more just and equal society.⁴⁸

From the Split between Ong Eng Guan and Lee Kuan Yew to the Latter's Announcement that He Would Resign

Even before the open split between Ong and Lee had occurred in June 1960, in so far as is known, there had already been one occasion on which Lim Chin Siong had taken the opportunity of their cleavage to influence Lee into giving him more co-operation in his fight against the British. This was just soon after the PAP had assumed power in mid-1959. According to Lee Kuan Yew himself, Lim Chin Siong one day visited him and offered him help in his struggle against Ong. Lee, however, declined the assistance.⁴⁹

After Ong and Lee had broken up openly in the party conference in June 1960, Communist policies towards the two persons remained supportive of Lee against Ong and bargained in return for a more intense anti-British line. This could be seen in various directives given at this time to members of the CPM working in the open front by their party superiors, who remained underground.

Tng Yoong Chiau, the member of the CPM who was operating in the PR, received the following views and instructions from his superior concerning Ong's actions in tabling the 16 resolutions at the PAP conference:

[The] Ong Eng Guan ... row with the PAP is basically due to his strive for power and position. Ong Eng Guan is an opportunist. The 16 Hong Lim motions are opportunistic, merely for the purpose of satisfying the sentiments and demands of the people. Though some of the measures taken by the PAP, such as the measure of taxes on cigarettes, petrol, etc., are prejudicial to the interests of the people, basically it is still the target of the Party's United Front. Hence, in principle, the Party should support the PAP and it is necessary for the Party to spread propaganda among the masses with a view to exposing the true opportunistic features of Ong Eng Guan ...⁵⁰

This was the CPM's attitude towards Ong and Lee.

In August 1960, in a debate on a motion of thanks to the Yang di-Pertuan Negara for his address on Government policy, Lee Kuan Yew referred to possible collusion between Ong Eng Guan and the CPM against his group. He gave indications that he would fight back against any such attack.⁵¹ In response to this, Fong Chong Pik wrote him a letter which declared that his party had nothing to do with Ong Eng Guan and his 16 resolutions. The CPM was not interested in overthrowing Lee. On the contrary, it was keen to continue the alliance with him.⁵²

Members of the CPM in the various mass organisations were soon found to be issuing public statements or engaging in other activities rejecting Ong Eng Guan and supporting Lee Kuan Yew. One instance of this was a statement made to the press in the same month by a group of trade union leaders headed by Lim Chin Siong which said:

If anyone imagines or hopes that we will lend our support to Mr Ong Eng Guan in order to undermine or challenge the authority of the PAP he is in for a serious disappointment ... It is a waste of time imagining or hoping that we would associate ourselves in any way with Mr Ong.⁵³

Another point which Lim and his friends made was that they were of the opinion that the current policies of the PAP were correct as against the 16 resolutions of Ong Eng Guan.

When the Hong Lim by-election came along in April the next year, instructions were passed to the front activists that support should be given to Jek Yuen Thong against Ong Eng Guan. Simultaneously, the cadres were told, however, that they should exploit the opportunity to make Lee Kuan Yew move more to the left. There is a report of a discussion held in a Communist cell about the coming by-election. The cell consisted of three persons, the most junior of whom was in charge of a branch of the PAP as its Secretary and the most senior in direct contact with Fong Chong Pik as his subordinate. The report reads:

[The] Lee Kuan Yew faction was confronting the Ong Eng Guan clique resulting in a Hong Lim by-election ... We wanted to call upon the masses not to give their support to Ong Eng Guan ... we ... regarded the PAP to be still a leftist political party ... We should support the Lee Kuan Yew faction ... Our object was to urge the PAP to continue moving to the left to carry out its anti-colonial struggle.⁵⁴

The effort to have the PAP continue moving to the left to carry out the anti-colonial struggle, according to another source, was to have:

... the PAP ... cooperate with us in the next constitutional talks.⁵⁵

The next constitutional talks between Singapore and the British were scheduled for 1963. The Communists were interested in pressing the British to give Singapore a more autonomous constitution than the one granted in 1959. In pursuit of this policy, during the early part of 1961, Communists in the various mass organisations voiced support for the PAP against Ong Eng Guan. Various persons and bodies issued public statements to this effect: in January, Lim Chin Siong and his group;⁵⁶ in February, 32 left-wing trade unions and two rural organisations;⁵⁷ in February and March, the PR;⁵⁸ and in April, two conventions of left-wing mass organisations.⁵⁹ These were important instances of the Communists throwing their weight behind Lee in his dispute with Ong.

The Communists also made attempts to extract concessions from Lee Kuan Yew. Lim Chin Siong seemed to have asked for different things at different times.⁶⁰ He was noticed to have made the demand that more democratic rights be given to Singapore.⁶¹ At other times, he asked that the Internal Security Council be abolished.⁶² But the most serious thing which he agitated for was independence for Singapore. On this point, Lee Kuan Yew said:

Lim Chin Siong began to talk about anti-colonialism and the struggle for freedom without any reference to merger with the Federation. His talks meant struggle for an ultimate independent Singapore and he never mentioned merger as part of the objective ...⁶³

And an independent Singapore was desired because through such a Singapore:

... the Federation could be subverted to Communism ...⁶⁴

In response to Lim's challenge, Lee stated that he did not believe in an independent Singapore.⁶⁵

On his part, Lee seemed specifically at this time to have taken the decision to break with the Communists regardless of the outcome of the by-election. Although in this conflict between Ong and Lee, Lim Chin Siong came out on the side of the latter, the possibility that he might in the end move over to side with Ong could not be ruled out.⁶⁶ The threat was too great. There is a report which says that before the poll at Hong Lim was taken, Jek Yuen Thong told Lim Chin Siong that if the PAP lost to Ong Eng Guan "serious consequences" would follow.⁶⁷ There is also another report which states that Lee Kuan Yew did not want the Communists to back him up in the by-election. He wanted to win the fight on the strength of his own mass support. After the victory, Lim Chin Siong's group would be on the way out.⁶⁸

The Communists seemed to have sensed that a break between themselves and the non-Communists was imminent. During electioneering, other than asking that more powers be given to Singapore by the British in the next constitutional parley, Lim Chin Siong had also spoken with strength on the theme that unity within the left-wing movement should be maintained. However, Lee Kuan Yew responded to this by saying that the advice would be accepted only if such served the purpose of advancing the programme of the non-Communists rather than that of the CPM.⁶⁹ The conflict between the non-Communists and the Communists in the PAP was very deep and once the common fight against Ong was over, the two sides could not arrest a showdown.

It was noted earlier on that as soon as the PAP had come into power in mid-1959, it opened talks with the Alliance Government in Malaya about fusing Singapore with the peninsula.⁷⁰ This merger effort was stepped up during the period between Ong's open split with Lee and the Hong Lim by-election.⁷¹ When the merger talks first began, the frame of reference was only Singapore and Malaya. By now, however, the perspective had widened. British possessions in northern Borneo, namely Sarawak, North Borneo or Sabah, and Brunei, were also to join the proposed new state. The larger union was to be called Malaysia.

The reason why it was now proposed also that the Borneo territories should join to become parts of the new country was to allay the fears of the Tunku with regard to Singapore merging with Malaya. The majority of the population in those territories were jungle tribes and Malays. If such territories could participate in the union, then their population could cancel out the threat which the Chinese from Singapore would pose to the Malays in the peninsula.⁷²

For the British to relinquish these territories to the UMNO of Malaya at this time was sound policy. Firstly, there was, of course, the Communist problem in Singapore. In the second place, a similar danger had developed in Sarawak. As will be explained in some detail in the next chapter, a political party called the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) had come into existence in 1959 and was an open united front organisation of the Communists in that state, just like the PAP in Singapore.⁷³ Thirdly, Indonesia was at that point trying to take over West Irian from the Dutch and was showing indications that it would later be interested in British Borneo too.⁷⁴ To allow the UMNO of Malaya take over possession of the Borneo territories was, therefore, a sensible way of resolving these problems.

The initial effort of the PAP non-Communists in trying to persuade Tunku Abdul Rahman to accept Singapore into Malaya had not led to any

tangible result. This time, however, there was a change in the Tunku's attitude. In February 1961, the Tunku went to London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. While there, the British Prime Minister, Harold MacMillan, spoke to him about the merger and Malaysia plans. When he returned from London, he confided to a friend that he was interested in forming Malaysia.⁷⁵

The fresh developments regarding merger and Malaysia soon got to the ears of the Communists. They were just now working towards an ultimately independent Singapore in the electioneering for the Hong Lim by-election. The news of the new turn of events plagued them with anxiety. As a consequence of this, Fong Chong Pik sought a meeting with Lee Kuan Yew in March to clarify matters.⁷⁶

The result of the Hong Lim by-election had an appreciable impact on both Tunku Abdul Rahman and the Communists, for after the defeat of the PAP non-Communists, Lee Kuan Yew announced that his party would resign from office and let another political party take over.⁷⁷ This made both the Tunku and the Communists in Singapore apprehensive. To the Tunku, the vacuum which would be left behind by Lee Kuan Yew's resignation would possibly be filled by a left-wing group. This would make Singapore a greater security threat to Malaya.⁷⁸ To the Communists, Lee Kuan Yew could very well be replaced by right-wing forces and they feared that under such a regime they would suffer severe repression as in 1956 and 1957.⁷⁹ Consequently, after the Hong Lim affair, the UMNO became more inclined towards accepting Singapore into Malaya. The movement to bring about merger and Malaysia took another step forward.⁸⁰

Communist behaviour, growing out of their fear, was a little more complicated. The first action the Communist group took was to persuade Lee Kuan Yew not to vacate office but to carry on as usual.⁸¹ This was, of course, for the purpose of keeping him as a cover to protect themselves. At the same time, they took the opportunity to exert greater pressure on him to become more malleable. The effort seemed to have been very serious. It was reported that before the Hong Lim by-election, Lim Chin Siong had always avoided exerting pressure on Lee Kuan Yew. However, after the by-election, Lim began to assert himself.⁸² The Communists wanted to make more use of Lee rather than be used by him. In specific terms, they clamoured for a greater say in decision-making in the party. Part of Ong Eng Guan's 16 resolutions had capitalised on this grievance of theirs. Along with this, the Communists criticised Lee Kuan Yew for the governmental policies which he was then pursuing. They began what was called a rectification movement against him. The issues were thrashed out in the party at two meetings of the Central Executive Committee with repre-

sentatives from all the branches. At the end of the sessions, the decision was taken to defer further discussions of the matter until after another by-election was held. This second by-election was to be held in July in the Anson constituency.

Following Lee Kuan Yew's announcement that he wished to resign, the Communist faction got a number of persons from among the non-Communist faction to come together and stand by to take over office from Lee and his cabinet should he actually leave the post. This was a group of Assemblymen, some of whom were Parliamentary Secretaries. These men were also not consulted by Lee Kuan Yew in the formulation of party policies and were involved in the rectification movement. If Lee and his Ministers refused to be front men any longer, this new group might cooperate. Along with this move, approaches were made to men close to the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, and to the Commissioner-General himself, to find out whether the new PAP non-Communist group would be acceptable to the British side to form a new government. The first sounding, according to sources available to the author, seemed to have been made in the same month in which the Hong Lim by-election was held. The most important person in the new non-Communist group was Dr Lee Siew Choh.⁸³ Dr Lee was one of those who were originally not members of the PAP but who were chosen by Lee Kuan Yew to be his candidates in the 1959 elections and who joined the PAP on that occasion.⁸⁴

Open Split between the Non-Communists and the Communists

The conflict between the two wings in PAP was further deepened when there was an announcement to the public that a merger between Singapore and Malaya would now take place, and that the Borneo territories would also join up to form Malaysia. The reaction of the Communists in Singapore to this was, on the one hand, to state, in contrast to the announcement, the kind of constitutional future they wanted for the island, and on the other, to make attempts to oust Lee Kuan Yew from office so that his effort to get the Government of Malaya to deal with them could be halted.

It was stated that when Fong Chong Pik got wind of the Malaysia plan, he sought an interview with Lee Kuan Yew. Accordingly, the two met on 11 May.⁸⁵ Fong was concerned to find out whether or not the Tunku would soon agree to accepting Singapore into Malaya. Lee Kuan Yew stated that there was no immediate likelihood of the prospect but he hoped that Singapore could form a common market with the peninsula. Fong then tried to get Lee Kuan Yew to agree to requesting from the British in the constitutional talks scheduled for 1963 a greater measure of

self-government for the island through the abolition of the Internal Security Council. Meanwhile, the question of obtaining independence for Singapore through merger with Malaya, which was Lee Kuan Yew's position, or by itself, which was the Communist stand, should be deferred. To these, Lee Kuan Yew gave no positive response.

Fong also spoke to Lee on the latter's intention to resign from government. He stated too that the PAP Government should grant citizenship to persons prominent in the anti-colonial struggle, allow the trade unions to amalgamate, permit more democratic rights, relax immigration control, tolerate easier importation of books, and so on. It was a bargaining session between the two persons. Fong Chong Pik was trying not only to save the Communist movement from destruction but also to obtain greater opportunity for development.

On 27 May, Tunku Abdul Rahman announced to the international press in Singapore that he favoured the idea of bringing the five Malaysian territories together. A relevant part of his speech, which has often been quoted, stated:

Sooner or later, Malaya should have an understanding with Britain and the people of Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak. It is premature for me to say now how this closer understanding can be brought about but it is inevitable that we should look ahead to this objective and think of a plan whereby these territories can be kept closer together in a political and economic co-operation.⁸⁶

This meant that the Malaysia plan was on.

When the announcement was made, the Communists felt that what Lee Kuan Yew had told Fong Chong Pik was an untruth. This might or might not have been so. According to the investigation of one scholar, Tunku Abdul Rahman took this step forward in the Malaysia plan only some time between 6 and 26 May.⁸⁷ Lee and Fong met on 11 May. It could have been that on the day they met, the Tunku had not yet made up his mind, or if he already had, Lee Kuan Yew might not have been informed about it.

Statements made by the Communists and their supporters of what they wanted the future constitution of Singapore to be and related matters were issued on a number of occasions in the months following the Tunku's announcement. The PAP non-Communists also defined their position more clearly.

On 2 June, Lim Chin Siong and five other leaders of the TUC published a statement which called upon the Government to strive for genuinely full self-government for Singapore via the abolition of the Internal Security Council in the coming constitutional talks in 1963. They also wanted the powers of the British High Commissioner to override the

decisions of the Legislative Assembly and supervise the transactions of the Cabinet to be withdrawn. In exchange for this, they would give support to the PAP non-Communist candidate in the coming Anson by-election against candidates from other political groups.⁸⁸ Lim's motive was to tell Lee Kuan Yew that if Lee continued to serve the interests of the CPM, the CPM would continue to give him mass support. What Lim was demanding in public was what Fong Chong Pik had requested from Lee Kuan Yew in private.

The Anson by-election was occasioned by the death of the Assemblyman for that constituency. The writ of election was issued at the end of May and polling was to be carried out on 15 July. Five persons joined in the contest. The PAP non-Communists fielded the President of the TUC. Marshall, representing the WP, also joined in.⁸⁹

In response to Lim Chin Siong's demands, on 9 June, Dr Toh Chin Chye declared that the line the PAP would follow was to seek independence for Singapore through merger with Malaya, or within a larger federation.⁹⁰ In face of the tough attitude of the non-Communists, Lim Chin Siong and his group came out with a new statement on 12 June,⁹¹ which made four demands on the Government and indicated a hardening of attitude on the part of the leftists. These demands summed up all the major grievances which this group held towards their united front partners since the PAP came into power. The demands were that all political detainees should be released immediately, the trade unions should be unified, citizenship should be given to persons loyal to the anti-colonial struggle, and there should be more freedom of speech, press, assembly and organisation. These demands also echoed requests which Fong Chong Pik had urged on Lee Kuan Yew in private.

According to both Fong Chong Pik and Lee Kuan Yew, the stand taken by Dr Toh Chin Chye on 9 June, which expressed support for the Tunku's wish to establish Malaysia, was the immediate factor which brought to an end the united front between them. The declaration amounted to a public confirmation of the non-Communists' line and the CPM had to accept the reality.⁹² The practice of making statements in public by each side on what each wanted for the future of Singapore was accompanied by intense struggles within the party. Such struggles deepened as time went on.⁹³

The first step the Communist group took in this direction was to press for the right to be consulted by Lee Kuan Yew on the merger and Malaysia issues. Specifically, it was demanded that the Central Executive Committee of the party must meet with the branches to thrash things out. The agitation began after Lim Chin Siong and his friends had issued their 12 June statement.⁹⁴ This consultation dispute was another instance of the

rectification problem. Their demand for rectification was first initiated after the Hong Lim by-election and, to date, there had been no settlement of the issue.⁹⁵

The leftists' next move was to ask Lee Kuan Yew to step down as Prime Minister in favour of Dr Toh Chin Chye or Dr Goh Keng Swee. But this was to no avail.⁹⁶ In early July, the dissidents took the quarrel one step further by demanding that the whole cabinet should vacate office and be replaced by the Parliamentary Secretaries led by Lee Siew Choh. Again, there was no response to this agitation.⁹⁷ Because of the inability of the Communist group to shake Lee Kuan Yew and his followers, a decision was then made not to give support to the President of the TUC in the Anson by-election.⁹⁸

On 8 July, Lim Chin Siong and his group issued another statement which declared that the merger and Malaysia schemes had never been defined. They demanded to know what these would be in actual form and content. The point was also made that the objective of the constitutional struggle in Singapore should be the abolition of the Internal Security Council. The statement, according to observers, was a signal to the left-wing movement to abandon support for the non-Communists in the Anson by-election in favour of Marshall.⁹⁹ On 13 July, eight PAP Assemblymen led by Dr Lee Siew Choh and 43 trade unions issued separate statements to voice support for Lim Chin Siong and his demands. These had a great impact on the electorate.¹⁰⁰ The by-election was carried out on 15 July. The President of the TUC was defeated by Marshall by a small margin of votes.¹⁰¹

After the Anson clash, the leftists moved in two directions to tame or overthrow Lee Kuan Yew. One was to continue the attempt to have the officials of all the branches of the PAP confront the Central Executive Committee in a meeting. If this could be engineered, Lee Kuan Yew could be brought under intense pressure to fall into line and submit.¹⁰² The other line of attack was to persuade as many as possible of the PAP Assemblymen who had not yet defected to forsake Lee Kuan Yew and join up with Dr Lee Siew Choh. If there could be a minimum of 26 persons in Lee Siew Choh's company, then they could take over from Lee Kuan Yew's group as the government. The Legislative Assembly had 51 members. The effort to detach followers from Lee Kuan Yew was pursued with great determination.¹⁰³

The leftists had a meeting with the British Commissioner-General on 18 July. This was a continuation of their previous efforts to come to an agreement with him about Lee Siew Choh's group replacing Lee Kuan Yew's as the government. They promised the Commissioner-General that the new group would not touch the military facilities of the British on the island and would also keep to constitutional as opposed to violent meth-

ods of struggle. Would this be acceptable to the Commissioner-General? In reply to the query, the Commissioner-General stated that if what was requested was not contrary to the constitution, he would have no objection to the new hands taking over the administration.¹⁰⁴

Lee Kuan Yew refused to hold a party conference. Instead, he called the Legislative Assembly into session. The effort of the other side in winning over Assemblymen had not yet become serious. If the fight was in the Legislative Assembly, victory was more likely. The purpose in engaging in the Legislative Assembly was to get its vote on a motion of confidence in the Government. If the vote was secured, the dissidents could all be thrown out of the PAP. Henceforth, there would be no more co-operation with the CPM and its followers. The united front was to come to an end.¹⁰⁵

Accordingly, the Legislative Assembly met on 20-21 July. The motion of confidence was tabled. When division was called, 26 PAP members and one Independent voted for the Government. Thirteen other PAP members, Lee Siew Choh's original eight who had opposed Lee Kuan Yew in the Anson by-election and five new ones abstained from voting. Ong Eng Guan and his two followers also adopted a neutral attitude. Seven persons from the SPA, led by Lim Yew Hock, and Marshall from the WP voted against the motion.¹⁰⁶ The Assembly voting was a defeat for the leftists. The attempt to get more PAP Assemblymen to desert Lee Kuan Yew had also not achieved any result. The fact that 26 PAP members stood with Lee Kuan Yew in the voting and only 13 adopted a negative attitude was an indication of the failure.

After the Legislative Assembly meeting, Lee Kuan Yew proceeded with his plan to break up the united front. He had the 13 Assemblymen who abstained from voting and all persons who were connected with them expelled from the PAP. The policy of the CPM was to maintain the united front with Lee Kuan Yew so as to have him as a shield against the British as long as possible. However, Lee Kuan Yew had now taken the step to separate. Accordingly, Fong Chong Pik gave orders that a new proxy political party be formed. All members of the CPM were to leave the PAP and join the new party. Therefore, following Lee Kuan Yew's expulsion of some PAP members, other members left of their own accord. This included 19 of the 23 Organising Secretaries in the various branches, whom Lee Kuan Yew had appointed to become bulwarks against the Communists. There were also some who allowed their memberships to lapse. According to police estimates, 60-70 per cent of the PAP membership left on this occasion.¹⁰⁷

The name of the new party which the expelled and departed leftists formed was the Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS). It was said that Lim Chin Siong had expected, at the time of his release from prison in June

1959, that one day there would be a split in the PAP and he would found a new party to further the purposes of the Communist movement. In practical terms, it was at the time of the campaign for the Anson by-election that the leftists had first thought about forming a new party. Two or three days after the by-election, meetings were held in which a decision was taken to form the party if Lee Kuan Yew pressed for a showdown. Then two or three days after the Legislative Assembly sessions, another meeting was held at which a resolution was taken henceforth to form the new party. The BSS finally came into existence. On 30 July, it applied for registration with the Government and, on 13 August, this was granted. It was inaugurated on 17 September.¹⁰⁸

After the BSS had been formed, the Communists unsuccessfully continued with the effort to get more PAP Assemblymen to abandon Lee Kuan Yew and join their side.¹⁰⁹ One last method to dislodge Lee Kuan Yew from power was attempted. The BSS clamoured for general elections to be held. The PAP, however, refused to oblige.¹¹⁰

In addition to taking action to break with the Communists in the PAP, Lee Kuan Yew took similar steps in the trade union movement. Two warring camps emerged.

Unification and Division in the Mass Movements

During the first two years of the PAP administration, there was a unification drive in the mass movements and there was also an increase in memberships. However, when the split occurred, the various organisations were again divided into two camps.

The Trade Unions

The new Legislative Assembly passed a Trade Union Ordinance (Amendment) in September 1959 and a Trade Unions Bill which replaced it in May 1960 to facilitate the unification of the trade union movement. Measures taken to implement the new laws included the deregistration of "yellow" and splinter unions, the amalgamation of unions into federations and higher unions, and the reorganisation of the TUC.¹¹¹

The cancellation of "yellow" and splinter unions was aimed at Lim Yew Hock's unions. It was related in the last chapter that after Lim Yew Hock had closed down the SFSWU in 1956, he gave easy registration to new trade unions so as to take the labour field away from the Communists.¹¹² The result was that a great number of small unions came into existence. The PAP referred to these small organisations as "yellow" or splinter unions. As soon as the Trade Union Ordinance (Amendment)

was enacted in late 1959, action was taken to eliminate Lim Yew Hock's trade unions. By the end of the year, such unions were already de-registered.¹¹³ Further action continued into the following year.¹¹⁴ In conjunction with this move, the Government stipulated that hereafter, only organisations with at least 250 members could be registered.¹¹⁵ After the unwanted trade unions had been disposed of, unification proceeded one step further with the regrouping of the remaining unions into 19 categories and the formation of a federation for each category and ultimately a single organisation for all.¹¹⁶

Lim Chin Siong's group proceeded with speed in this field. By the end of May 1960, five new federations were formed or were in the process of being formed and an existing one was revamped. The five new organisations were for land transport workers, building construction workers, factory and shop workers, general merchant employees, and catering and entertainment workers. The existing one was for water transport workers.¹¹⁷ The first two new federations were registered in February and the third in May 1960. The fourth one applied for registration in March. The existing one also applied for permission to have its name changed.¹¹⁸

At the end of May, only a few days after the third federation was registered, the Government suddenly withdrew all the registrations and rejected the application of the existing federation for a change of name.¹¹⁹ Prior to this action, the Yang di-Pertuan Negara had withheld giving his assent to the Trade Unions Bill becoming an ordinance.¹²⁰ This sudden change in the attitude of the Government came about because the non-Communists were discovering that their control over the Communist group was uncertain. Under such circumstances, the federations were not likely to become useful instruments.¹²¹ The Communists were upset that their efforts in this field were aborted. However, they controlled their discontent and continued their co-operation with the non-Communists. Lim Chin Siong gave advice to his supporters in the affected federations not to resort to unconstitutional methods in their protest against the Government.¹²² The campaign by the Communist group to form federations seems to have discontinued after the above incident.¹²³

Under the unification plan, the TUC was also reorganised. While Lim Yew Hock was the Chief Minister, the TUC had been his instrument. Now the organisation was to be taken over by leftist personnel and made to serve their purposes.¹²⁴ The new TUC would be the directing organ of the new trade union movement. After the reorganisation, the TUC or STUC (S standing for Singapore) had the following authorities:¹²⁵

The Executive Council which was made up of one President, three Vice-Presidents, one Secretary-General and nine Secretaries. The

Secretary-General and the nine Secretaries constituted a Secretariat. The nine Secretaries were in charge of nine different departments. The first five officers were to be elected by an Annual Delegates' Congress and the nine Secretaries appointed by the Secretary-General. There was also a Central Council comprising the above 14 persons and 38 others who would be representatives of the 19 projected federations. In addition, there was an Annual Delegates' Congress in which representation would be on a basis of graduated scale of union membership.

Late in April 1960, the Annual Delegates' Congress met. The President, the Vice-Presidents and the Secretary-General were elected. The man chosen to be the Secretary-General was G. Kandasamy, a non-Communist. A few days after the congress, the Secretary-General appointed his nine Secretaries. Among the nine persons were four ex-detainees who came out from prison in June 1959. Of the four, three were Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan and C.V. Devan Nair.¹²⁶

During the first two years of PAP government, the trade unions, along with unification, also experienced numerical growth. The achievements of the Communist wing of these unions was striking. In the view of the police at the time, the 19 categories of projected federations of trade unions fell into three types. The first type were those which were not Communist-penetrated or controlled, and were not likely to be easily penetrated. There were six categories of this type. The second type consisted of those which were penetrated. There were seven categories of this type. The last type was composed of unions which were Communist-controlled. Six categories fell within this group.¹²⁷ Numerical growth was the most pronounced in the last group.

At the end of 1959, there were 176 unions, which had a membership constituting 24.5 per cent of employed labour. During the next year, the number of unions fell to 130. However, the membership of this smaller number of unions rose to 33.7 per cent of all persons who were working. In 1961, the number of unions was further reduced to 124, but their membership shot up even further to become 37.7 per cent of all working personnel.¹²⁸ From 1959 to 1961, the number of trade unions became smaller and smaller because of the drive to eliminate "yellow" and splinter unions, and to combine small unions into big ones. But the unions were able to get an increasingly larger percentage of employed labour to join them. This apparently was the result of the Government's efforts to unionise as many working men as possible.

At the time when the PAP came into power, there were 32 left-wing unions.¹²⁹ This figure remained constant.¹³⁰ However, on the eve of the Anson by-election, it suddenly jumped up to 43.¹³¹ This was a reflection

of the changing relationship between the two factions in the PAP. The status quo was maintained at first because the Communist group did not seek to expand at the expense of the non-Communists or other groups. During the by-election, however, they changed their attitude and persuaded almost a dozen normally non-committed unions to join their cause.

The core of the left-wing unions was the SGEU. In terms of increase in membership, it was this union which showed the most striking results. In May 1959, this union was reported to have only 3,000 members.¹³² By January the next year, its members numbered 18,000¹³³ and by May, 22,000.¹³⁴ In July 1961, its strength reached 30,000.¹³⁵ Lim Chin Siong became Adviser to the SGEU on his release from prison in June 1959.¹³⁶

Following the break-up between the non-Communists and the Communists in the PAP in July 1961 there was also a division in the trade union movement. On 25 July, the Minister for Labour and Law dissolved the STUC at the request of its Secretary-General.¹³⁷ The STUC was not only an organisation of Communist unions as included in its fold were also right-wing and neutral unions; its dissolution had an effect upon these also.

On 2 August, a group of unions of all three types held a meeting to form an organisation to replace the STUC. There were 82 members in the group, not including those unions which followed the leadership of the PAP non-Communists. The meeting decided to form a new umbrella organisation which was later called the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU).¹³⁸ On 16 August, SATU applied to the Government for registration.¹³⁹

The unions which were loyal to the PAP non-Communists also created a replacement for the STUC. The new organisation was called the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC). There were 27 individual unions in this cluster. The NTUC applied to the Government for registration on 17 August.¹⁴⁰

As the SATU was made up not only of their unions but also those of others, the Communists felt that they must have an organisation separate from the SATU to direct and control their own unions. Thus, besides the SATU, a Working Committee for the Communist unions was also formed. Initially, the members of this committee were representatives of the various federations of trade unions which were aborted by the Government in May 1960. Later on, the circle was enlarged to include leaders of those unions which had not been members of the various federations. Cheng Yuet Tong was the leading personality in this Working Committee.¹⁴¹

The SATU and the Working Committee supported the BSS, and the NTUC supported the PAP.

The Other Mass Organisations

After the PAP had come into power, unification was undertaken in the peasant movement as in the trade unions. The two left-wing peasant organisations were the SCPA and the SRRA. In May 1960, the latter resolved that it should form a Joint Action Committee with its sister organisation. It was considered that this would facilitate the formulation of common policies and action.¹⁴² The rule of the PAP also provided stimulus for the numerical growth of the two organisations. In 1959, the SCPA had an enrolment of 2,500 and the SRRA 3,000. Two years later, the enrolment for the SCPA increased to 4,500, but information on the enrolment of the SRRA is unavailable.¹⁴³ After the split in the PAP in mid-1961, the SCPA and the SRRA joined up with the BSS.¹⁴⁴

Another organisation which made progress from mid-1959 to mid-1961 was the SHU. The hawkers were reported to be overjoyed when the PAP was elected into office. They rushed to join this organisation and very soon its membership stood at 3,000. The year 1960 was also one of marked expansion for this union.¹⁴⁵ After the Hong Lim by-election, schisms developed in the SHU. Two persons were dismissed from the leadership by their colleagues. One of these soon founded a rival Association of Singapore Hawkers (ASH), and the other, later on, also formed a Hawkers' and Petty Traders' Union (HPTU).¹⁴⁶ In the latter part of 1961, the SHU opted to support the BSS. The HPTU sided with the PAP. In fact, the latter was formed only at this time at the suggestion of the PAP.¹⁴⁷ The rival organisations competed keenly with the SHU for membership.¹⁴⁸

In the student field, the trend for the students of Nanyang University and the University of Malaya to come together continued.¹⁴⁹ In July 1960, the NUSU and the UMSU set up a Preparatory Committee to form a central organisation for all students. Leadership in this effort was assumed for a while by the Socialist Club of the University of Malaya. However, up to July 1961, when the left-wing camp broke up, no concrete results had been achieved, despite the many meetings and discussions.¹⁵⁰ In May 1961, there was also in existence a Joint Committee of the Socialist Club and the respective Political Science Societies of Nanyang University and the Singapore Polytechnic. In the same month, the committee applied to the Government for a permit to publish a paper called *Bersatu* (Unity).¹⁵¹ These were attempts to put connections between the Chinese-stream and English-stream students on a permanent footing. Besides these, there was a great deal of *ad hoc* trafficking between the two groups of students.¹⁵²

In the cultural movement there seemed to be two significant developments during the period under review. One was the formation of an alumni for Nanyang University graduates and the other a national body

for journalists. The first batch of students at Nanyang University completed their studies at the end of 1959. In the following year, a Guild of Nanyang University Graduates (GNUG) was formed to keep them together as a body.¹⁵³ In August 1959, the Singapore Chinese Journalists' Association made a decision to join forces with the Singapore Union of Journalists. In October the following year, the two major Chinese newspapers tried to form a Singapore National Journalists' Association. In February 1961, it was reported that a National Union of Journalists (NUJ) had held its inaugural meeting and elected office-bearers. This union consisted of members from newspapers of all the major languages in Singapore.¹⁵⁴ After the BSS had appeared on the political scene in Singapore, both the GNUG and the NUJ gave support to this party.¹⁵⁵

The PAP's accession to power also induced people to join it as members. Soon after the elections in 1959, this party received more than 100 membership applications daily.¹⁵⁶ Circumstances were so favourable that it was able to establish branches in electoral constituencies where it did not have such before and ultimately it built up a strength of 51 branches.¹⁵⁷ After the mid-1961 division, most of the members of the 51 branches of the PAP deserted their original leaders and joined up with Lim Chin Siong. The BSS was able to begin life with a strength of 33 branches.¹⁵⁸

Like the PAP, the PR also registered growth. In October 1959, it had a membership of 400. By March the next year, this had increased to 500 and by July to 800. The PR was both a Malay and a Chinese party. The Malay share of the membership at the different intervals remained constant at 300. The Chinese membership, however, climbed from 100 to 200 and then to 500.¹⁵⁹ The enlargement of Chinese participation in the PR showed the hand of the CPM at work. In the confrontation between the PAP and the BSS, the PR sided with the latter.¹⁶⁰

The New United Fronts

After the split in the PAP, the CPM made use of the BSS and the PR as open and legal political parties.

The BSS

Owing to its origins, there were two factions in the BSS. One was led by Lim Chin Siong and the other by Dr Lee Siew Choh. Lim's was the Communist group and Lee's the non-Communist one.¹⁶¹ Lim Chin Siong collaborated with Dr Lee Siew Choh on the same grounds that he had with Lee Kuan Yew at one time.

The CPM and Lee Kuan Yew's non-Communist group had co-operated in the first place because, at the time when co-operation was established, both sides were concerned about creating in the immediate future a government without the British. The existing structure in society would otherwise be left untouched. The Communists called this path the new democratic stage of Communism. The non-Communists also let it be understood, without theorising about it, that it was a step in democratic socialism. This was one point where the original two wings in the PAP found concordance.¹⁶² When Lim Chin Siong entered into an alliance with Dr Lee Siew Choh, the CPM was still wedded to the temporary goal of forging a new democratic revolution. The BSS non-Communists, on their part, showed that their main interest was fighting the British and declared their ideology to be democratic socialism.¹⁶³

A second area of agreement between the Communists and the PAP non-Communists was about the method to be used to fight the British. Both sides considered that only constitutional processes should be exploited and there should be no resort to violence.¹⁶⁴ When the BSS came into being, the Communists still talked of the peaceful path of struggle. Dr Lee Siew Choh's group also professed their faith in non-violence.¹⁶⁵ In the matter of ideology, it was similarities which brought the two factions in the PAP as well as those in the BSS together. In another area, however, it was differences which made them useful to each other.

The Communists in the PAP had mass following in the Chinese-speaking trade unions, and among Chinese school students and Chinese-speaking rural residents. The non-Communists, on the other hand, had connections with some English-speaking trade unions and left-inclined students in the University of Malaya. Each faction's interest in mobilising the strength of the mass base of the other to serve its purpose became a bridge which linked the two parties.¹⁶⁶ In the BSS, Dr Lee Siew Choh and his associates did not have much of a trade union following, but they had the Socialist Club of the University of Malaya. In spite of this, Lim Chin Siong, was still interested in them. Lee Siew Choh was keen on having Lim Chin Siong as a partner because the latter's mass support could bring political power.¹⁶⁷

Finally, in so far as the BSS was concerned, there were also certain tactical considerations which made an alliance between the Communists and non-Communists possible. After the Ong Eng Guan affair, when continued co-operation with Lee Kuan Yew was no longer possible, the Communists had to find another person to take Lee's place as their front man. Their choice fell on Dr Lee Siew Choh. Dr Lee Siew Choh and his group, on the other hand, were interested in developing a friendship with the Communists because of their conflict with Lee Kuan Yew. They did

not get the kind of respect from Lee Kuan Yew in the PAP to which they considered they were entitled. Most importantly, they were not consulted in policy-making. Thus, they had become dissatisfied. Earlier on in the chapter, it was mentioned that a rectification movement had been conducted in the PAP against Lee Kuan Yew. There was an attempt as well to have him replaced by Dr Goh Keng Swee or Dr Toh Chin Chye as the leader of the party and the government. Besides Lim Chin Siong's group, Lee Siew Choh and his associates had a big hand in these anti-Lee Kuan Yew enterprises.¹⁶⁸

After the BSS was formed, Lim Chin Siong and Dr Lee Siew Choh devoted all their energies to preventing a merger between Singapore and Malaya.¹⁶⁹

The PR

After the Ong-Lee rift had broken out in the PAP and was likely to lead to a division between the Communists and the non-Communists in that party, the CPM seemed to have taken a decision to develop the PR into a weapon against Lee Kuan Yew. A little before the Hong Lim by-election in April 1961, the CPM restored its contact with Pang Toon Tin. A man was sent to see Pang and told him that in view of the fact that the PAP non-Communists were turning to the "right", Pang should conduct the affairs of the PR¹⁷⁰ so that it could function effectively against them.

Notes

- 1 In August 1959, a Communist cell reviewed the situation after the PAP had come into power. One of the members of the unit worked in the open front as the Secretary of a branch of the PAP. The group went into both the favourable and unfavourable aspects of the situation for the Communist movement. Among the latter was the following: "The PAP leadership was intoxicated by victory and had become arrogant. It ignore the masses and had broken away from the masses, and were even afraid that the mass movement would flourish ...". The PAP leadership mentioned here was, of course, the non-Communists and the masses were the Communists. In the original draft of this book, the reference for this quotation was missed out. The mistake was not discovered until 1996. But, by then, the author has no more access to the files of the Internal Security Department, Ministry of Home Affairs. Hence, the omission cannot be rectified.
- 2 Lee, p. 39.
- 3 Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 66, paragraph 33.
- 4 "LCS", pt. 14, Folio (649).
- 5 See pp. 57 & 168.
- 6 T.J. Bellows, op. cit., pp. 12-14 and M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 104-107. Both have discussions of the motives.
- 7 The two fears of the UMNO were mentioned in the PAP's "The New Phase after Merdeka - Our Tasks and Policy", a policy statement published in *PAP 1958*, pp. 2-11. See also Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., pp. 77-79 and M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 107-110.

- 8 *PAP 1958*, pp. 2-11. M.N. Sopice, op. cit., pp. 118-124. *Petit*, (Chinese edition), no. 47, 5 July 1960, p. 6.
- 9 *LAD*, vol. 11, cols. 659-699.
- 10 See p. 155.
- 11 According to Lim Chin Siong, after he and seven others were released, there were still 41 persons in jail. Therefore, the total number of detainees at that time was 49. Cf. "PAP", pt. 28, Folio (1453)². But, according to Dr Toh Chin Chye, the number was 61. See John Drysdale, op. cit., p. 282.
- 12 *Lee*, p. 31. "LCS", pt. 14, Folio (634). "WS", paragraphs 191-192.
- 13 *LAD*, vol. 11, cols. 663-664.
- 14 "PJJ", paragraphs 52, 58 & 59.
- 15 An example of an underground meeting was: "... my superior pointed out that the CPM was not satisfied with the way the PAP handled the matter. He said that the PAP leadership had promised, before the General Election, to release all political detainees when they came into power. But they did not honour their promise because only a few VIP's like Lim Chin Siong ... and Fong Swee Suan ... were released. This clearly indicated that the PAP top-notchers were opportunists and anti-leftwing movement elements...". The superior referred to here was Chan Hock Wah, an underground cadre. The subordinate was Koo Young, who was at this time functioning in the open in one of the sub-branches of the PAP. Cf. "KY", paragraph 57.
- 16 "PJJ", paragraphs 52, 58 & 59. "WS", paragraphs 191-192. "KY", paragraph 57. *Plebeian*, Special Hong Lim by-election issue no. 1, 2 July 1965, p. 4 & [no.?] 7 July 1965, p. 3.
- 17 See p. 149.
- 18 "LSC(O)", pp. 79-81. "LKC(O)", pp. 373-374.
- 19 *Lee*, p. 33. "PJJ", paragraph 60.
- 20 *Lee*, p. 33.
- 21 *Ibid.*, *Fong*, pp. 80-81. Lim Chin Siong was appointed Political Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, of which Dr Goh Keng Swee had become Minister. A Deputy Secretary in the Ministry at that time was George E. Bogaars. On Lim's situation in the Ministry, Bogaars recalled: "... Lim Chin Siong was released [from prison] ... came to the Ministry of Finance as a Political Secretary ... the things that Goh Keng Swee told me about what was the work he had to be given, how he had to be kept away from the unions and all that ... Dr Goh felt that we just had to give him stuff to do, to keep him ... out of mischief, out of contact with his old trade union buddies. Give him things to do which would keep him going. But the fellow never appeared to do anything. I mean he never appeared physically in the Ministry so that he could be given things to do." Cf. "GEB(O)", pp. 47-48.
- 22 See p. 168.
- 23 *LAD*, vol. 12, cols. 14, 149-202, 221-310, 313-344 & 398. *If*, no. 2/1960, paragraphs 15^p & 27-27^p. "LCS", pt. 15, Folios (736)-(739)², (740)¹, (742), (746)¹ & (775)¹. "CYT", paragraphs 176-183. "WS", paragraphs 193-195 & 232-236. "TS", pp. 8-9.
- 24 *Ibid.* That industrial disputes could be referred for arbitration by the Minister for Labour and Law was galling not only to workers but also to management. On this, the said Minister, when commenting on the Industrial Relations Bill on its second reading in the Legislative Assembly, remarked: "... Compulsory arbitration ... I can well understand any reservations about it, and indeed any opposition to it that may be expressed. On the employers' side, it invades, for example, their liberty to engage labour at the rates established in a free market that is, it may force them to pay more than they would otherwise have to pay. And equally, on the employees' side, it implies

- limitation on the right to use direct action to obtain the limit of what can be obtained by trial of strength, that is, awards must be accepted ...". Cf. *LAD*, vol. 12, col. 151.
- 25 *LAD*, vol. 11, cols. 23, 417-456, 461-478, 554 & 635; and vol. 12, cols. 423 & 745-797. *IJ*, no. 7/1959, paragraph 88; no. 1/1960, paragraphs 9^B & 9^C; no. 3/1960, paragraph 39^D; and no. 4/1960, paragraphs 45^B, 51^D & 51^F. "LCS", pt. 15, Folios (775)¹ & (780). "CYT", paragraphs 141, 146-152; 163 & 170-175. "WS", paragraphs 199 & 218-221. "TS", pp. 6-9. Ang Li Choo, op. cit., p. 15.
- 26 *IJ*, no. 5/1960, paragraphs 57 and 65^U-65^M; and no. 6/1960, paragraphs 83-83^U. "LCS", pt. 15, Folios (786)¹, (787)² & (787)⁴. "CYT", paragraph 175. "WS", paragraphs 222-231 & 813. "TS", p. 9. "Draft Paper", chapter 1, paragraph 13.
- 27 Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 8. "LCL(O)", p. 41.
- 28 Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 8.
- 29 *Ibid*.
- 30 "LKC(O)", p. 417.
- 31 *Lee*, p. 41. Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 10.
- 32 See pp. 148-149.
- 33 *Lee*, pp. 33, 41, 43 & 44. *PAP 1964*, p. 212. Also as revealed by Ahmad Khan, formerly of the Special Branch of the Singapore police force, in *Straits Times*, 3 April 1988, p. 11.
- 34 "Draft Paper", chapter 1, paragraphs 14-15 & appendix "F".
- 35 See p. 153.
- 36 *PAP 1964*, p. 212. *Fong*, pp. 80 & 267.
- 37 See pp. 170.
- 38 See T.J. Bellows, op. cit., p. 36. In the opinion of Lee Khoo Choy, a senior member of the PAP, the story was put out by Ong Eng Guan himself. Probably, no voting was carried out. Cf. "LKC(O)", pp. 375-376.
- 39 A member of the PAP, Tan Gark Eng, was Ong Eng Guan's chief campaigner in both the City Council elections in 1957 and the general elections in 1959. Tan was one day dismissed from party membership by Lee Kuan Yew. Cf. "OEG", pt. 7, Folios (23), (24) & (24)¹. In March 1960, Ong Eng Guan tendered his resignation from the PAP at a meeting of the Central Executive Committee, but Lee Kuan Yew stated that the matter should be discussed only after a coming Budget meeting of the Legislative Assembly. Ong wanted to resign either because most of his powers as Minister of National Development were taken away from him or because he was unable to account for a problem involving about a million dollars in the City Council. Cf. "OEG", pt. 7, Folios (25)² & (26)². *LAD*, vol. 13, col. 568. In April 1960, Hong Lim Park was opened. Ong was given only a secondary place in the opening ceremony even though Hong Lim was his own constituency. Cf. "OEG", pt. 7, Folio (29).
- 40 The sixteen resolutions were:
1. The party re-affirms its faith in the 1954 revolutionary "party manifesto".
 2. The party reaffirms its firm stand in the anti-colonial struggle.
 3. Fresh talks should be held with the United Kingdom in order to revise the Singapore Constitution. One year's experience has proved that the present Constitution cannot meet the demands of the people.
 4. Persons who have been detained under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance before 3 Jun, 1959, should be released.
 5. The Singapore Government should hold talks with the Federation Government on matters relating to the reunification of the two territories.
 6. It is unreasonable to cancel the registration of trade unions only several days after their registration.

7. The Government should take immediate steps to Malayanise all expatriate administration officials.
8. The Government should call a mass rally in support of the Federation Prime Minister's policy on South Africa and should boycott South African goods.
9. Measures to increase taxation such as taxes on tobacco, petroleum and betting are aimed at taxing the poor. The Government should place more emphasis on rich men's taxes.
10. The Gambling Bills should be repealed.
11. The campaign against the yellow culture should be intensified uncomprisingly.
12. The promotion of Party members to cadres should be based on a set of principles to be made known to all members. It is detrimental to the interest of the Party to oust activists and enlightened members.
13. The cadre membership of over 500 cadres who attended the Party conference held at the Hokkien Huay Kuan on 31 May 1959, should not be cancelled because:-
 - a) Their membership cards are chopped "cadre";
 - b) They are not so-called "probationary" cadres, because such a type of membership is not provided for in the Party Constitution;
 - c) The Central Executive Committee is elected by cadre members.
14. The proper method of appointing Party cadres should be as follows:-
After the principles governing promotion to cadre membership are announced, nominees should be submitted by the respective branches, recommended by the Central Executive Committee and approved at a meeting of the "basic cadre membership" before they become cadres.
What is the basic cadre membership? All the 500 odd cadre members who attended the cadres' conference at the Hokkien Huay Kuan on 31st May, 1959, should be considered basic cadres of the Party. Any member whose cadreship had been confirmed in accordance with the above procedure shall be a cadre forever, unless he has broken the Party rules and is expelled from the Party. The membership cards of cadres should not be subject to alteration and renewal from time to time, as licences are.
15. A Party policy committee should be set up to study and approve all measures and bills proposed by the Cabinet. This committee should comprise members of the Central Executive Committee and representative from each of the 51 branches. These 51 representatives should be elected through democratic secret ballot at special meetings of branch members rather than by appointments. The term of office should be one year.
16. A meeting of cadre members should be convened with full power to decide on policy matters for the purposes of reviewing Party policy and deciding on the revolutionary plans of the Party. The conference should be attended by the basic cadre membership who were present at the cadres' conference held at the Hokkien Huay Kuan on 31st May 1959. The present meeting is only for making suggestions.

These sixteen resolutions together with a reply to them by the Central Executive Committee of the PAP were published in the PAP Party paper *Petir* (Chinese edition), no. 47 of 5 July 1960, p. 6. Later on, Ong Eng Guan responded to the reply of the Central Executive Committee of the PAP to his resolutions during electioneering for the Hong Lim by-election in April 1960. Cf. "Legislative Assembly Elections - Hong Lim By-Elections, 1961", Folio (202). "LSC(O)", vol. I, pp. 97-101, 104 & 106.

- 41 It was reported that in April 1960, two months before the occasion of the party conference, Ong and his wife paid a visit to Lim Chin Siang's house, but Lim was not in at the time. "OEG", pt. 7, Folio (26)¹. See also *Fong*, p. 87. "TSH(O)", pp. 26-27.
- 42 *Petir* (Chinese edition), no. 47 of 5 July 1960, p. 1. "OEG", pt. 7, Folio (43). "PJJ", paragraph 50. "LSC(O)", vol. I, pp. 102-103 & 107. *Fong*, p. 87. The party member who made the recommendation was Lee Khoon Choy.
- 43 "OEG", pt. 7, Folio (37). *IJ*, no. 6/1960, paragraph 74.
- 44 "OEG", pt. 8, Folios (115), (116), (132)¹, (142), (143), (157)¹ & (173). "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 115. *Fong*, pp. 89-92. *LAD*, vols. 13 & 14.
- 45 Ong Eng Guan got 7,747 votes, while Jek Yuen Thong got 2,820. Cf. "Legislative Assembly Elections - Hong Lim By-Elections, 1961", pt. 4, Folios (197) & (203). *IJ*, no. 4/1961, paragraphs 49 & 51. *Fong*, pp. 92-93 & 208. The view of a member of the CPM on why, in spite of the fact that the Party gave its support to the PAP candidate, Ong won the by-election was the following: "Probably ... the image of Ong Eng Guan is quite established there when he was the Mayor of City Council and also all along time, we're [CPM] supporting Ong Eng Guan in the Hong Lim constituency. And also another thing is the leadership style of Ong Eng Guan they go to the ground to meet the people ...". Cf. "LCL(O)", p. 36. LCL is Lam Chit Lee who had a part in the Communist open united front at this time.
- 46 There is a record of what Fong Chong Pik thought of Ong Eng Guan: "In or about October 1959, after the General Elections when Ong Eng Guan ... became the Minister for National Development, [A] used to write articles in the newspapers, praising Ong Eng Guan sky high. Peter Lee [one of Fong Chong Pik's many adopted names] was not happy about this. After discussion with me, he ... wrote a letter to the Editor of *Nanyang Siang Pau*, passing remarks on [A] ... the letter was handed down to [A] subsequently. I was told to observe the reactions of [A] who was stung by Peter Lee's insults. Peter Lee ... commented that Ong Eng Guan was a small fry who goes for himself and not for the people in general. Ong was not worthy to be praised or supported". Cf. "NTH", paragraph 45.
- Ong Eng Guan was the Treasurer of the PAP from its very first days. In August 1957, when the Communist wing manœuvred out most of the non-Communist group from the Central Executive Committee of this party, they took the decision to get rid of Ong Eng Guan but keep Lee Kuan Yew. See p. 180, note 169 and *Lee*, p. 27.
- 47 "United People's Party, Singapore", pt. 1, Folios (1), (1)^A, (2) & (9)^A.
- 48 *Ibid.*, Folios (1), (1)^A, (2) & (19). According to its constitution, the UPP had three objectives, viz:
1. To end colonialism and establish an independent national state of Malaya.
 2. To abolish the unjust inequalities of wealth and opportunity inherent in the present system; to establish an economic order which will give to all citizens the right to work and full economic returns for their labour and skill; to ensure a decent living; and social security to all those who through sickness, infirmity or old age can no longer work.
 3. To infuse into the people a spirit of national unity, self-respect and self-reliance, and to inspire them with a sense of endeavour in the creation of a prosperous, stable and just society.
- 49 *Lee*, p. 44. "WS", paragraph 812.
- 50 "TYC", paragraph 79. Koo Young received similar views and instructions from his own superior, Chen Hock Wah. See "CHW", p. 58.
- 51 *LAD*, vol. 13, cols. 55-56, 542-543, 568, 589 & 591-598.

- 52 "Draft Paper", chapter 1, appendix E.
- 53 "LCS", pt. 16, Folio (813)¹. *IJ*, no. 8/1960, paragraph 109².
- 54 The junior person was Chia Yam Wee and the leader was Chiam Chong Chian. The third cell member was Chen Hock Wah. Cf. "CHW", p. 54. See also "CYW", p. 27; "LHK", paragraphs 173-175; "TBK", paragraphs 109-112; "KY", paragraph 59; and "LSC", p. 24.
- 55 "PTT", p. 21.
- 56 "LCS", pt. 17, Folio (859)².
- 57 "LCS", pt. 17, Folio (878). *IJ*, no. 2/1962, paragraphs 18^D & 25.
- 58 "LCS", pt. 17, Folio (878). *IJ*, no. 3/1961, paragraphs 34^A & 38^C. "PTT", p. 21.
- 59 "LCS", pt. 17, Folios (889), (892)¹, (901)², (907)⁴, (907)^{5A} & (908). *IJ*, no. 3/1961, paragraph 38; and no. 4/1961, paragraph 54.
- 60 J.J. Puthuchery who was close to both Lim Chin Siong and Lee Kuan Yew, said: "Lim, when offering support for the fight against Eng Guan, has tried to get concessions for himself ...". Cf. "PJJ", paragraph 72.
- 61 *Lee*, p. 60. "LCS", pt. 17, Folio (898)¹. "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 117.
- 62 "LCS", pt. 17, Folios (889), (892)¹ & (901)². "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 117.
- 63 *Lee*, p. 45. "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 117.
- 64 *Lee*, p. 45.
- 65 *Ibid. Fong*, pp. 93-94.
- 66 In note 41 above, there was mention of Ong already once trying to make contact with Lim Chin Siong. Other occasions of a similar attempt are reported in "OEG", pt. 8, Folios (102), (104)², (108), (140) & (199)³. Lee Kuan Yew was apprehensive of a collusion between the two factions. On this, see *LAD*, vol. 13, cols. 57-58 & 542.
- 67 "LCS", pt. 16, Folio (888).
- 68 "PJJ", paragraphs 51 & 52. "PJJ(O)", reel 7.
- 69 *Lee*, p. 45. "LCS", pt. 17, Folios (879), (879)¹, (881), (891) & (910). *IJ*, no. 3/1961, paragraph 38.
- 70 See pp. 189-190.
- 71 "It was about this time [during the Ong-Lee rift] that Lee Kuan Yew started talking about merger. That was the first time the merger issue was brought into the open, though not as a main issue ...". Cf. "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 111.
- 72 "ES(O)", pp. 8-9. M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 125, 133-134 & 143-145. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 293-294.
- 73 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 299.
- 74 See pp. 252-253 of this volume.
- 75 M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., p. 138.
- 76 In late 1960 or early 1961, Lee Kuan Yew discussed the question of Malaysia with some members of his party. Among such persons were members of the CPM, for example Leong Keng Seng. Therefore, information about the proposal very quickly reached the ears of Fong Chong Pik. This, however, applied to many other things besides the Malaysia issue. Because the PAP was full of CPM members, there was no way of completely preventing the leadership of the CPM finding out what was afoot in the PAP. Cf. *Lee*, p. 46. "WS", paragraphs 92-95 & 195. "PJJ", paragraphs 11-115. There is another version of how the news could have leaked to the Communists. In 1961, Lee Kuan Yew took a trip to the Cameron Highlands. There he met Tunku Abdul Rahman to discuss the merger issue. The fact came to be known to one of his Parliamentary Secretaries, Low Por Tuck, who could have leaked it to the Communists. See "LSC(O)", vol. I, pp. 154-155, 170 & 174.

- 77 *Lee*, pp. 50-53. "TYC", paragraph 89. "PJJ", paragraph 73. "LSC(O)", vol. I, pp. 113-114. Alex Josey, *Lee Kuan Yew* (Singapore: Times Books, 1968), pp. 167-170.
- 78 One source stated that shortly after the results of the Hong Lim by-election were announced, Lee Kuan Yew mentioned to Tunku Abdul Rahman, during a visit, the PAP Government's intention of resigning en bloc. The Tunku advised him against such a move as it would precipitate a constitutional crisis. Cf. "Capture", p. 98. See also M.N. Sophe, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-145 on point.
- 79 "CYW", pp. 28-29. According to CYW, Chiam Chong Chian stated that Lee Kuan Yew should be persuaded not to resign because, if the PAP left, Lim Yew Hock would take over and the Communists would be in a bad situation. Also *Lee*, pp. 50-53. Lee Kuan Yew stated that the Communists did not want him to resign because they feared in that event there might be no single political party which could win fresh elections and form the government. Because of this, a coalition would be formed which would eventually be manipulated by the British into an anti-Communist front and the Communists would be purged and suppressed. Also "TYC", paragraph 90. TYC was told by his superior in the CPM that, if the PAP resigned, a provisional government would take over, and the right-wing reactionary forces and reactionary capitalists would collaborate to resume oppressing the workers on the strength of the British. Other references on this point are "PJJ", paragraph 73 and *PAP 1964*, p. 213.
- 80 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79. "WS", paragraph 521. M.N. Sophe, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-139. T.J. Bellows, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42.
- 81 *Lee*, pp. 50-53. *PAP 1964*, p. 213. "CYW", pp. 28-29. "TYC", paragraph 9. "LSP(63)", paragraph 30. "WS", paragraphs 451, 453, 458, 460, 497 & 811-817. "PJJ", paragraph 73. "TS", pp. 10 & 12. "LSC(O)", vol. I, pp. 113 & 118-119. Around this time, Fong Chong Pik had a meeting with one of his subordinates, Chan Yean Fock. The following was part of what transpired at this meeting: "My second meeting with Fong Chong Pik ... was in early 1961 ... he told me that the differences in the PAP between the leftwing group and the group led by Lee Kuan Yew were getting worse each day. He said that although such differences existed and the rift between the two groups was getting worse, the United Front ... must be maintained as the leftwing group in the Party was gaining strength day by day and would eventually be strong enough to overthrow Lee Kuan Yew and seize leadership of the Party ...". Cf. "CYF(72)", paragraph 109.
- 82 "WS", paragraph 817.
- 83 "WS", paragraphs 519-521. "PJJ", paragraphs 73-74, 76 & 102. "TS", pp. 10 & 12. "LSC(O)", vol. I, pp. 16, 116-117, 166-174, 195, 198-203, 206-213 & 245. *Lee*, pp. 73 & 76. Alex Josey, *op. cit.*, p. 184. *PAP 1964*, p. 214.
- 84 "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 56.
- 85 *Lee*, pp. 46-47 & 89. Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, p. 5. Aloysius Chin, *op. cit.*, p. 140. On one occasion, Fong Chong Pik expressed his views on the Malaysian plan in a conversation with one of his subordinates: "Regarding Malaysia, he said the idea was given by Britain to the Tengku and Lee Kuan Yew. The Tengku and Lee Kuan Yew had already colluded with the British, who mooted the Malaysia plan so as to continue maintaining the military base in the State and economic interests in Singapore and Borneo. At the same time, this plot was put forward in order to ease and suppress the rising tide of the movement of the people of Singapore and Borneo demanding for independence & sovereignty. He said that the Party's advocacy was that Singapore should strive for the abolition of the Internal

Security Council (because the Internal Security Council was absolutely in the hands of the British; this was because the Federation representatives in the ISC listened to the views of the British), and full autonomy for Singapore and let the people carry out discussion themselves and decide whether or not to have a merger in an environment of absolute freedom". Cf. "LSK(65)", paragraph 65.

In another meeting between another two members of the CPM at a lower level, there was also a discussion of why the Communists settled for only "self determination" for Singapore and did not push for "independence". The "situation was not conducive". Cf. "KKS", paragraph 26.10.

Fong Chong Pik's superior Chin Peng also considered the scheme of Malaysia to have originated from the British. "Chin Peng alleged that the formation of Malaysia was initiated by the British to serve her interest as she controlled 60 per cent of the wealth in Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. The formation of Malaysia would strengthen British economic interest. If Sabah and Sarawak were to become independent separately, there was the possibility that these two British colonies would either be absorbed by the Philippines, which was under American influence, or by Indonesia." Also Aloysius Chin, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

86 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

87 M.N. Sopiee, *op. cit.*, p. 139. On this problem, see also Lee, pp. 55-56; Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 14; and "WS", paragraphs 430-438.

88 "LCS", pt. 18, Folios (920) & (925). "Capture", p. 95. "WS", paragraphs 439-442. "TYC", paragraphs 123-124. "TBK", paragraphs 126-129. "KY", paragraph 62. "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 154. Lee, p. 53. Fong, p. 95.

89 Fong, p. 208. The other three candidates were all Independents.

90 "WS", paragraph 446. "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 154. Lee, p. 53. Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85. *PAP 1964*, p. 213. Fong, p. 95. Quek Ser Hwee, "The Singapore Referendum on the Merger Question, 1962", Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Singapore 1975/76, p. 5.

91 "LCS", pt. 18, Folios (926)², (928) & (928)¹. "WS", paragraphs 447-448 & 526. "TS", pp. 10-11. "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 177. "Capture", p. 96. Lee, pp. 54-55. *PAP 1964*, p. 213.

92 "LHK", paragraph 193: "Wong See Meng [i.e. Fong Chong Pik] told me that our split with the PAP started from the day when the PAP announced its support for the proposed Great Malaysia Plan. According to Wong's ... views, its support for the Malaysia Plan indicated that the PAP had become more and more right-inclined. In the past, we shared a common basic principle with the PAP in that we were all anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist forces. But now with their support for the reactionary's design, it was impossible for us to form a United Front with them because the Malaysia Plan was anti-people and undoubtedly anti-Communist in content ...". LHK was a close subordinate of Fong Chong Pik. Lee, p. 47: "... On June 9, we announced our programme that in the 1963 constitutional talks we would ask for independence through merger with or without the Borneo territories. This was how the fight started."

93 "WS", paragraphs 195-196.

94 "WS", paragraphs 449, 453, 458 & 475. "LSC(O)", vol. I, pp. 188-195 & 217-229.

95 "WS", paragraphs 451, 453, 458, 460 & 497. "TS", p. 12.

96 "WS", paragraphs 453-455, 458, 467, 512 & 918.

97 "WS", paragraphs 467 & 513.

98 There is information about Fong Chong Pik's policy towards the Anson by-election in "LSK(65)", paragraph 64 which says: "... Li [i.e. Fong Chong Pik] ... said that

- support should be given to Marshall in the Anson by-election. Although Marshall was an opportunist, the PAP had already leaned towards the rightists and supported the Tengku's proposed Malaysia plan ... Therefore a blow must be given to the PAP to let it know that if it continued to turn right, it would lose its political power and prestige ...". Other references on the Anson by-election are: "TYC", paragraphs 120-121 & 123-130. "CYW", p. 30. "LSC", p. 24. "TBK", paragraphs 130-131. "WS", paragraphs 457, 459-460, 471, 473-476 & 514. "TS", p. 14.
- 99 "LCS", pt. 18, Folios (939), (940), (940)^A & (940)^B. "Capture", p. 100. *Fong*, p. 96.
- 100 "OCS", paragraph 21. "Capture", p. 102. *Lee*, p. 74. *PAP 1964*, p. 213. *Fong*, pp. 96-97. The eight Assemblymen were: Lee Siew Choh, S.T. Bani, Lim You Eng, Fong Ying Ching, Teo Hock Guan, Tee Kim Leng, Wong Soon Fong and Tan Cheng Tong.
- 101 The President of the TUC polled 3,052 votes while Marshall polled 3,598. Cf. *IJ*, no. 9/1961, paragraphs 80 & 82. "Capture", p. 104. *Lee*, p. 74. *PAP 1964*, pp. 213-214. *Fong*, p. 208.
- 102 "TS", p. 14. "WS", paragraphs 480 & 721. "PJJ", paragraph 85.
- 103 *Lee*, pp. 76-79 & 81. *PAP 1964*, p. 214. *PAP 1979*, pp. 128-130. *Fong*, p. 99. "WS", paragraphs 470 & 501-511. "LSC(O)", vol. I, pp. 240-242, 244, 252-253, 273-275 & 284-286.
- 104 "PJJ", paragraphs 74, 80-81 & 102. "WS", paragraphs 481-496. "LSC(O)", vol. I, pp. 235-237. *Lee*, pp. 48-50 & 73. *LAD*, vol. 14, cols. 1667-1669. *PAP 1964*, p. 213. *Fong*, pp. 99-101.
- 105 *PAP 1964*, p. 214.
- 106 *LAD*, vol. 14, cols. 1664-1852. *Lee*, pp. 74-75. Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 18. *PAP 1964*, p. 214. *Fong*, pp. 98-99. *IJ*, no. 7/1961, paragraphs 80^A, 80^B & 82^B. "Capture", pp. 107-109. "OCS", paragraph 24. "WS", paragraphs 479-480 & 497. "PJJ", paragraphs 82 & 86. "TS", p. 15. The 13 PAP Assemblymen who abstained from voting were the eight who had issued a statement against Lee Kuan Yew during the Anson by-election and five others. These five others were Sheng Nam Chin, Chan Sun Wing, Leong Keng Seng, Lau Por Tuck and Ong Chang Sam.
- 107 Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 18. *Fong*, p. 10. "LCS", pt. 19, Folio (963)². "CYF(72)", paragraph 110. "CHW", pp. 54-55. "LSP(63)", paragraphs 30 & 33. "TBK", paragraph 132. "KY", paragraphs 63-66. "LSK(65)", paragraphs 72-75. "LSC(O)", vol. I, pp. 230, 291-292 & 311-316. "Capture", pp. 108 & 134. Pang Cheng Lian, op. cit., pp. 38-41. The figure 60-70 per cent is according to "Capture" which is based on police reports. Pang Cheng Lian gives an estimate of 80.4 per cent. See also Aloysius Chin, op. cit., p. 122.
- 108 *PAP 1964*, p. 214. "WS", paragraphs 457-458, 477-478, 497-499 & 514-518. "LSC(O)", vol. I, pp. 229-232, 282-283 & 287-307. "PJJ", paragraphs 83-84 & 87-89. "TS", pp. 15-16. "CYW", pp. 31-33. "LSP(63)", paragraphs 33-34 & "LSP(65)", paragraph 42. "OCS", paragraph 28. "Capture", pp. 114-115 & 136-137. "LCS", pt. 26, Folio (1287)². *IJ*, no. 9/1961, paragraph 108. The Central Executive Committee of the BSS was as follows:
- | | |
|--------------------------|----------------|
| Chairman: | Lee Siew Choh |
| Vice-Chairman: | S. Woodhull |
| Secretary-General: | Lim Chin Siong |
| Asst. Secretary-General: | Poh Soo Kai |
| Treasurer: | Lau Por Tuck |
| Asst. Treasurer: | Wong Soon Fong |

Publishing Secretary:	Chan Sun Wing
Organising Secretary:	Fong Swee Suan
Administrative Secretary:	Sheng Nam Chin
Ordinary Committee Members:	Jokri
	Cheok Koh Thong
	Lim Shee Ping
	Lim Hock Siew
	S.T. Bani
	Dominic Puthuchearry
	Tan Yam Seng
Auditors:	Leong Keng Seng
	Ong Chang Sam
Advisers:	T.T. Rajah
	Tann Wee Tiong
	J.J. Puthuchearry

- 109 *Lee*, pp. 76-79 & 81. *PAP 1979*, pp. 128-130. "WS", paragraphs 503, 505-506 & 516. *If*, no. 8/1961, paragraphs 94^c & 94^p. According to WS, the leftists had never really expected to be able to win enough PAP Assemblymen to join their ranks. Said he: "There was no question of winning over sufficient seats in the Assembly as it then stood in order to topple or form the Government. We had analysed this at the time of the Anson By-election and it was clear to us that at the very outside we would command nineteen seats. This, together with the three seats of the Singapore United People's Party ... would give us a total of twenty-two seats. We needed twenty-six seats to obtain a majority. After the Assembly meeting on 20 Jul 61, only thirteen PAP Assemblymen were clearly on our side. With David Marshall ... and the three SUPP Assemblymen, the total effective opposition to Mr Lee ... was seventeen. The SPA-Alliance, we felt certain, would vote with the PAP in view of the Malaysia plan."
- 110 *Lee*, pp. 79-80. "WS", paragraphs 479, 514-515, 517-518 & 568. Pang Cheng Lian, *op. cit.*, p. 42. The BSS was confident that the PAP would lose if general elections were held. "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 311: "... if the PAP had called for a general elections at that stage, the PAP would at most, win only a few seats. And Lee Kuan Yew himself, would definitely not be returned as an Assemblyman ...".
- 111 See p. 192.
- 112 See p. 132.
- 113 Singapore Labour Department, *Annual Report 1959*, (Singapore, 1961), p. 15. Cited in Ang Li Choo, *op. cit.*, p. 16. "WS", paragraph 200.
- 114 *LAD*, vol. 12, col. 753.
- 115 *Ibid.*, cols. 753 & 765.
- 116 (1) Government and public employees' unions, (2) Armed services' unions, (3) Harbour Board unions, (4) Seamen's unions, (5) Land transport worker's unions, (6) Air transport workers' unions, (7) Water transport workers' unions, (8) Shop assistants' unions, (9) Petroleum workers' unions, (10) Teachers' unions, (11) Commercial and technical staff unions, (12) Catering and entertainment services' unions, (13) Musicians' and artists' unions (14) Printing, publishing and allied occupation unions, (15) Factory workers' unions, (16) Construction and building material workers' unions, (17) Journalists' unions, (18) Fishermen's and agriculturists' unions and (19) Domestic servants' unions. Cf. "LCS", pt. 15, Folio (775)¹. "CYT", paragraph 141.
- 117 The names of the six new organisations were the Federation of Land Transport Workers' Unions, the National Federation of Building Construction & Woodworking Workers' Unions, the Singapore Federation of Factory & Workshop Employees'

Unions, the Federation of General Merchants' Employees' Unions, which seemed to have been known also as the Federation of Shopworkers' Unions, and the Federation of Catering & Entertainment Services' Unions. The original name of the existing federation was the Transport Vessel Workers' Association. It was proposed that its name be changed to the Singapore Waterfront Workers' Union after reorganisation. Cf. "LCS", pt. 15, Folio (780). "CYT", paragraphs 141, 146-150, 152, 163, 170-175 & 216. "TBK", paragraphs 95-102. "WS", paragraph 220. "TS", p. 9. "LJP", paragraphs 82-83. The member unions of the various federations are given below:

Federation of Land Transport Workers' Unions

SBWU, STCEU and Taxi Drivers' Union.

National Federation of Building Construction & Woodworking Workers' Unions

National Union of Building Construction Workers, Wood Workers' Union, Sawmill Workers' Union and Union of Boat Building Industry Workers.

Federation of Factory & Workshops' Employees' Unions

SGEU; Amalgamated Malay Pineapple Workers' Union; Singapore Tailors' Union; Singapore Spinning Workers' Union; Singapore Shoe Employees' Union; Singapore Motor Workshop Employees' Union; Singapore Machine & Engineering Employees' Union; Singapore Metal Box Workers' Union; Singapore Rattan Workers' Union; Singapore Rubber Employees' Union; Singapore Metal Manufacturing Workers' Union; and Singapore Union of Brewery, Bakery, Confectionery, Canning & Drinks Workers.

Federation of General Merchants' Employees' Unions, probably known also as the Federation of Shopworkers' Unions

At first it consisted of only the following seven members: Singapore Cycle & Motor Workers' Union; Singapore Electrical & Wireless Employees' Union; Singapore Textile & General Merchants' Employees' Union; Singapore Restaurant, Bar, Eating & Coffeshop Employees' Union; Singapore Coffeshop Employees' Union; Singapore Fish Merchants' Employees' Union; and Singapore Hairdressers' Union. Later on, three more members were added: SCSSWTU, SEEU and SGEU (full names not given by source).

Federation of Catering & Entertainment Services' Unions

Breakdown not given by source.

Singapore Waterfront Workers' Union

Breakdown not given by source.

Sources for the breakdown of the various federations are: "LCS", pt. 15, Folios (780) & (780)^a; *IJ*, no. 3/1960, paragraph 39^b & no. 5/1960, paragraph 65^c; "CYT", paragraphs 141, 146-150, 152 & 170-175; "TBK", paragraphs 95-102; and "SGEU", pp. 47, 51 & 63.

There is a difficulty here with the Federation of General Merchants' Employees' Unions. This federation was given this name in "LCS", pt. 15, Folio (780). However, it was referred to as the Federation of Shopworkers' Union in "CYT". The first source reported that it was made up of seven individual unions. "CYT" gave the same list of seven also at first. Later on, it gave three more names, increasing the total to ten. The author feels that there must be some mistake in "CYT", but this cannot be checked.

- 118 The first organisation was registered on 5 February 1960, the second on 19 February 1960 and the third on 20 May 1960. The exact dates of the applications for registration and approval for change of name of the fourth and existing federations are not available. Cf. "Trade Union Act - Paper re.", pt. 1, Folios (32)¹, (32)², (41)³ & (49). "LCS", pt. 15, Folio (780). "TS", p. 9.
- 119 The registrations of the first three federations were withdrawn on 23 May 1960. Simultaneously, the application of the existing one was also rejected. Cf. "Trade Union

Act - Paper re.", pt. 1, Folios (32)¹, (32)², (41)⁸ & (49). "LCS", pt. 15, Folios (781)¹, (786)¹, (787)², & (787)⁴. "TS", p. 9. "WS", paragraphs 220 & 222-231. "CYT", paragraph 175. "LJP", paragraphs 84-85. "TBK", paragraph 101. "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 132. *IJ*, 1960, Supplement no. 1, paragraph 31; and no. 5/1960, paragraphs 57 & 65^H.

120 Ang Li Choo, op. cit., p. 41. "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 132.

121 "WS", paragraph 223.

122 "LCS", pt. 15, Folio (787)⁴. "WS", paragraphs 225, 229 & 231. *IJ*, 1960, Supplement no. 1, paragraph 31; no. 5/1960, paragraphs 57 & 65^{1-69M}; and no. 6/1960, paragraphs 83-83^B.

123 There is a report that in the middle of 1961, the non-Communists suggested to catering workers that they form a federation. Discussions were held on this. However, ultimately the project did not succeed because the unionists concerned could not work out a way of distributing offices amongst themselves. Cf. "TBK", paragraphs 113-125.

124 On May Day 1960, Fong Swee Suan attacked the former TUC as being "Lim Yew Hock's corrupt TUC". That the re-organisation of the TUC was to expurgate Lim Yew Hock's influence was clear. Cf. *IJ*, no. 5/1960, appendix "B", paragraph 3.

125 "WS", paragraph 201. "LCS", pt. 15, Folio (775)¹. *IJ*, no. 4/1960, paragraph 51¹.

126 "WS", paragraphs 202-209. "TS", pp. 6-8. "LCS", pt. 15, Folio (775)¹. *IJ*, no. 4/1960, paragraphs 51^{1-51N}. The complete list of office-bearers was:

President	Mahmood bin Awang
1st Vice President	Tan Teck Wah
2nd Vice President	K.A. Kurup
3rd Vice President	Ang Kim Thye
Secretary-General	G. Kandasamy
Secretary: Administration	S.T. Bani
Secretary: Political & Information	S. Woodhull
Secretary: Organisation	Jamit Singh
Secretary: Industrial Disputes	Fong Swee Suan
Secretary: Education	Lim Chin Siong
Secretary: Welfare & Social	Dominic Puthucherry
Secretary: Research	C.V. Devan Nair
Secretary: Finance	Ow Keng Tor
Secretary: Accounts	Buang bin Omar Junid

127 "LCS", pt. 15, Folio (775)¹. The three divisions of federations were:

Type 1

(1) Government and public employees' unions, (2) Armed services' unions, (3) Harbour Board unions, (4) Air transport workers' unions, (5) Water transport workers' unions, and (6) Petroleum workers' unions.

Type 2

(1) Seamen's unions (Malay and Pakistani unions were free of Communist control but Chinese ones were penetrated), (2) Teachers' unions, (3) Commercial and technical staff unions, (4) Catering and entertainment services unions, (5) Musicians' and artists' unions, (6) Land transport workers' unions, and (7) Journalists' unions.

Type 3

(1) Shop assistants' unions, (2) Printing, publishing and allied occupations unions, (3) Factory workers' unions, (4) Construction and building material workers' unions, (5) Fishermen's and agriculturists' unions, and (6) Domestic servants' unions.

128 Ang Li Choo, op. cit., p. 58.

- 129 See p. 140.
- 130 For instance, in February 1961, it was still only 32. See *IJ*, no. 2/1961, paragraphs 18^B, 25 & 25^A.
- 131 See p. 204.
- 132 *IJ*, 1960, Supplement no. 1, paragraph 30.
- 133 *IJ*, no. 1/1960, paragraph 9^A.
- 134 According to C.V. Devan Nair in "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 9.
- 135 "SGEU", p. 88.
- 136 *IJ*, no. 6/1959, paragraph 70^B.
- 137 *IJ*, no. 8/1961, paragraph 91. "SATU", p. 1. "WS", paragraph 257. "TS", p. 38.
- 138 *IJ*, no. 6/1961, paragraphs 97 & 97^A. "SATU", pp. 1-5. "WS", paragraphs 259-262. "TS", pp. 38-39. "CYT", paragraphs 197-202. "LSP(63)", paragraph 42. "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 329. "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 10. "Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU)", pt. 1, Folios (3)-(6).
- 139 *IJ*, no. 8/1961, paragraph 97^B.
- 140 "Capture", p. 126. *IJ*, no. 8/1961, paragraph 97^A. "M-L Course", Handout no. 72, p. 11. *Fong*, pp. 97-98.
- 141 *IJ*, no. 7/1961, paragraph 85^F. "CYT", paragraphs 208-209 & 213-222. In November, 1961, a group of 41 unions issued a document entitled "Singapore Trade Unions' Memorandum on Singapore and Federation Merger and Constitutional Advance". Presumably, this group were the flock of the Working Committee. Their names were as follows: The National Seamen's Union; Singapore Tailors' Union; Singapore Transport Vessels Workers' Association; National Union of Building Construction Workers; Singapore General Employees' Union; Confederation of Singapore Engineering Tradesman Workers; Singapore Woodworkers' Union; Singapore Brick-Making Workers' Union; Singapore Coffeeshop Employees' Union; Singapore Gold & Silver Smiths Employees' Union; Singapore Marine Products Workers' Union; Singapore Stevedores' Union; Singapore Taxi Drivers' Union; Singapore Spinning Workers' Union; Singapore Business Houses Employees' Union; Singapore Fish Merchant Employees' Union; Singapore Textile and General Merchants' Employees' Union; Singapore Hairdressers' Union; Singapore Europeans' Employees' Union; Singapore Shoe Employees' Union; Singapore Cycle & Motor Workers' Union; Singapore Rattan Workers' Union; Singapore Rubber Employees' Union; Singapore Commercial House & Factory Workers' Union; Singapore Sawmill Workers' Union; Singapore Metal Manufacturing Workers' Union; Singapore Tong Loke Shoemakers' Union; Singapore Hing Suah Porters' Union; Singapore Union of Brewery, Confectionery, Bakery, Canning & Drinks Workers; Amalgamated Malayan Pineapple Workers' Union; Singapore Bar, Restaurant, Eating & Coffeeshop Employees' Union; Singapore Bus Workers' Union; Singapore Motor Workshop Employees' Union; Singapore Ship Cleansing Workers' Union; Singapore Metal Box Employees' Union; Singapore Catering Services Staff & Workers' Trade Union; Singapore Union of Workers of Boat Building Industry; Singapore Machine & Engineering Employees' Union; Singapore Bookshop, Publication & Printing Press Workers' Union; and Singapore Electrical & Wireless Employees' Union. Cf. *IJ*, no. 11/1961, appendix "C".
- 142 *IJ*, no. 5/1960, paragraphs 57^A & 66^A.
- 143 "PSS", paragraphs 44, 46 & 50. "LOC", paragraph 24. PSS was for a number of years the President of the SCPA and LOC was Paid Secretary of the SRRA.
- 144 As seen in the events recorded in the next chapter.
- 145 "CKY", pp. 13 & 15. CKY was at one time a Paid Secretary of the SHU.
- 146 "CKY", pp. 18-19. *IJ*, no. 1/1962, paragraph 10^F.

- 147 "CKY", pp. 19 & 20.
- 148 "CKY", p. 19. *IJ*, no. 1/1962, paragraph 10^E; and no. 11/1962, paragraph 171^D.
- 149 See p. 141.
- 150 *IJ*, no. 7/1960, paragraphs 95^A & 95^B; no. 10/1960, paragraphs 131^B, 137^B & 137^C; no. 1960, Supplement no. 1, paragraph 26; no. 1/1961, paragraph 7^B; no. 7/1961, paragraph 84^C; and no. 8/1961, paragraph 96^A. "LTH", paragraphs 123-125.
- 151 *IJ*, no. 5/1961, paragraphs 62 & 62^A.
- 152 For example, the students of the two universities had a social gathering on 4 September 1959. Another instance was the Socialist Club and the Political Science Societies of Nanyang University and the Singapore Polytechnic sponsoring a forum in which political leaders spoke on 24 February 1961. Cf. *IJ*, no. 9/1959, paragraph 113^B; and no. 2/1961, paragraph 24.
- 153 *IJ*, no. 10/1959, paragraph 127^D; and no. 4/1960, paragraph 49^D. "OHS", paragraphs 72-75. "HYM", paragraph 32. "LHB", paragraphs 93-94.
- 154 *IJ*, no. 8/1959, paragraph 98^C; no. 10/1960, paragraph 136^B; and no. 2/1961, paragraph 23^B.
- 155 As seen in the events related in the next chapter.
- 156 According to *Peir*, vol. 3, no. 5 (July 1959), p. 2, cited in Pang Cheng Lian, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
- 157 "Capture", pp. 81 & 90. Pang Cheng Lian, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
- 158 "Capture", pp. 115, 141, & 145. "CYW", p. 31. *Fong*, pp. 105-106. Pang Cheng Lian, *op. cit.*, p. 66. The 33 PAP branches which suffered the most serious losses were: Queenstown, Thomson, Toa Payoh, Pasir Panjang, Cairnhill, Joo Chiat, Ponggol, Mountbatten, Jalan Kayu, Stamford, Changi, Havelock, Moulmein, Nee Soon, Upper Serangoon, Serangoon Garden, Chua Chu Kang, Rochor, Kallang, Delta, Jurong, Siglap, Geylang East, Aljunied, Tampines, Sembawang, River Valley, Jalan Besar, Paya Lebar, Bukit Panjang, Ulu Pandan, Redhill and Telok Blangah. Dr Lee Siew Choh, who became Chairman of the BSS, reminisced on the formation of the branches: "... After the split, most of the branches of the PAP became branches of the Barisan. They merely changed the signboard, that's all. So it was the PAP, now it was the Barisan." "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 62.
- 159 *IJ*, no. 10/1959, paragraph 125^E; and no. 7/1961, paragraph 93^A. "Draft Paper", chapter 3, p. 5.
- 160 See next chapter.
- 161 In August 1961, a person who was at one time a Paid Secretary of the Green Bus Branch of the SBWU and who was a supporter of Ong Eng Guan approached the employees of the Green Bus to join Ong's party, the UPP. He told his friends: "... the BSS would not remain a firm party permanently because ... they had 2 cliques: Lim Chin Siong's and Lee Siew Choh's groups. These 2 groups had different ideologies. Also alleged that Lim Chin Siong was merely making use of Lee Siew Choh and the dissident PAP Assemblymen as a front." Cf. "Capture", p. 125. Chan Chiaw Thor, who was at first a leading light in the PAP and later on in the BSS, after the latter was founded, also talked about the two cliques in the BSS. And he forecast: "... I anticipated a crisis might come some day within the BSS over internal disagreements about the whole approach to Malayan politics". Cf. "CCT(64)", paragraph 20. That Lee Siew Choh's group was different from Lim Chin Siong's group is mentioned as well in *Lee*, p. 76 and by Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 7.
- 162 See p. 55.

- 163 In his statement, vide paragraphs 575-584 & 928-935, S. Woodhull, who was the Vice-Chairman of the BSS, had an explanation of the position of his party.
- 164 See pp. 55-56.
- 165 See again "WS", paragraphs 585-587 & 931-933.
- 166 See pp. 57-58.
- 167 *Lee*, p. 76. Alex Josey, *op. cit.*, p. 184. *PAP 1964*, p. 214.
- 168 "WS", paragraphs 453-455. "PJJ", paragraphs 76 & 85. "LSP(63)", paragraph 30. "GEB(O)", p. 126.
- 169 "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 308.
- 170 "PTI", paragraphs 85 & 86.



VI

Withdrawal and Decimation

For two years after the great split between the non-Communists and the Communists in the PAP, the CPM in Singapore moved in two directions to save itself and the mass organisations from destruction. The first was to withdraw from Singapore to safe havens whichever members of the party could and ought to be preserved. This enterprise was largely accomplished. However, the detrimental result was that the struggle in the island was deprived of adequate leadership, which was followed by serious disunity and ineffective performance in the various organisations. The second line of action was to strive to prevent the realisation of the enemies' merger and Malaysia plans. This struggle was a complete failure and consequently the Communist movement was decimated. All in all, the struggle during this period of history saw the effective crippling of the Communist movement in Singapore.

Withdrawal

One avenue of escape for the Communists was to leave Singapore and go elsewhere. This was a very important exercise but there is very little information about it.

The purpose of the CPM in launching the open united front struggle after 1954 was to accumulate manpower and rebuild its strength, which had been all but destroyed during the Emergency. If successful, it would be able to resume its military struggle sometime in the future. When the merger and Malaysia plans were afoot, it was clear that the Communist organisation in Singapore was heading for annihilation. Now, there could be no talk about further development of resources. There would be great difficulties even in maintaining existing strength. This was the consideration behind the withdrawal exercise. Fong Chong Pik had, at various times, explained to different subordinates why some of them had to go away. One of his statements says:

Wong See Meng [one of Fong Chong Pik's aliases] ... said that the decision of our withdrawal was arrived at by the Organisation after a careful consideration of the whole situation ... He said that judging from the recent develop-

ment of the political situation in Malaya, it seemed that the British imperialists and reactionaries were determined to push through the great Malaysia Plan. The PAP raised their hope on having the Tunku's regime to eliminate the leftists in Singapore, while the latter hoped the former would help to clear the leftwing struggle in Singapore ... the implementation of the great Malaysia Plan would be a great blow to the leftwing strength and after an all-out persecution and suppression launched by the enemy, the left-wing movement would for the time being, entered a period of low ebb ... Under the circumstances ... we should make early preparations to avoid or lessen our loss of strength ... the enemy [the PAP non-Communists] had an intimate knowledge of many of our cadres as a result of their active direction and participation in open front activities. Should we fail to withdraw as much as possible of our underground cadres in time, our underground organisation would not only be unable to shoulder the burden but would also suffer heavy losses ... the withdrawal was to be affected for the preservation of the revolutionary forces with the view to protecting and nurturing the cadres.¹

Thus, members of the Party had to leave Singapore.

Leaving Singapore, however, was not to be for good but only for the time being. One day, the evacuees had to return. If there was no return, then there would be no further struggle. Fong also made this point clear to the same subordinate. The record was:

He intimated to me that the withdrawal was only a temporary measure, say about three to five years in a foreign country ...²

When the cadres should return would, of course, depend on circumstances.

The main destination of evacuation was Indonesia. There were many cases of persons being sent to that country.³ Other places to where cadres were transferred were Malaya and the United Kingdom. There were examples too of persons who originally came from the peninsula being returned there. A number of those who went as far away as Britain were from well-to-do families and were allowed to take up studies in that country.⁴

The transfers were not carried out all at the same time but spread over a number of years and in different batches. There seemed to have been two criteria as to who should go at any particular moment: being too "red", that was exposed or being known to the Government, and having for the time being no useful function to perform.⁵ The first departures took place in 1961 itself. Right up to 1964, there were still people leaving. An example of an early departee was Ong Gwo Chyun, one of the ex-Vice-Presidents of the SCMSSU.⁶ One person who left in 1964 was the Secretary of the SRRRA.⁷ Fong Chong Pik himself went away in January or February 1963.⁸

The withdrawal exercise was, by and large, a success. Most of those scheduled to leave were indeed evacuated. However, there were some who were supposed to go but who were eventually unable to escape. Two examples were Tng Yoong Chiaw and Cheng Yuet Tong. Tng should have left in late 1962 and Cheng in early 1963, but both were arrested by the police before they could depart.⁹

When the Communists decided on the withdrawal plan, they thought that this was a correct course of action. This can be seen from Fong Chong Pik's statement on the subject, quoted above. However, the move had also undesirable consequences which were not foreseen at the time. Several years later, when the ill effects had become apparent, Fong also confessed to the same subordinate that the plan was actually a serious mistake:

He ... felt that the Organisation had made a grave mistake by having its cadres withdrawn to Indonesia ... he asked me not to pass his opinion to the others for it could breed confusion among the rank and file ...¹⁰

Why it was a grave mistake was not explained.

The bad consequence of the great escape was that it deprived the struggle in Singapore of adequate leadership. Leadership was provided by the cadres who were deployed in various positions in the mass and united front organisations. Once these persons were taken away, therefore, there would be no more leadership in the movement.¹¹ The lack of leadership bred disunity as the remaining members in the movement could no longer walk in step with one another.

Decimation

The second course of action taken by the CPM was to try to stop the realisation of the merger and Malaysia plans. The fight assumed large dimensions.

Firstly, the PAP attempted to show that a merger between Singapore and Malaya, as arranged by the PAP and the UMNO, enjoyed the support of the electorate. Countering this, the BSS made an attempt to demonstrate that the people were not with the PAP.

In the second place, the project of Malaysia involved not only the British, the UMNO and the PAP on the one hand, and the CPM and her united front partners on the other, but drew also into the conflict all other political forces found in all the Malaysian territories and the whole of the Malay archipelago which were friendly to the first camp or which supported the second. The confrontation eventually escalated into violence which badly mauled the Communist apparatus in Singapore.

Finally, merger and Malaysia were realised. The left-wing camp stepped up its militant activities. The Communists in Singapore came under another round of attack and were even more severely injured. The CPM's second course of action proved a failure.

Battles over Merger

The PAP came to an agreement with the UMNO about the terms of merger between Singapore and Malaya. The Communists and their allies countered with terms of their own. The PAP got its scheme accepted by the electorate through a referendum and the leftists counter-attacked with Gallup-polls. Both the PAP and the Communists engaged in extensive activities to win in the referendum or Gallup-poll battles. The CPM also tried to frustrate the PAP by opening direct negotiations with the UMNO.

The terms of merger between Singapore and Malaya were finalised on 23 August and on 11 November 1961. On the first occasion, a general decision was made between Lee Kuan Yew and Tunku Abdul Rahman on what powers the central Government would enjoy in Singapore and what powers Singapore would retain after merger was effected. A communiqué was issued on this, which read in part:

The Federation and Singapore leaders had a full and frank exchange of views ...

Among many matters examined was the question of Federation responsibility for defence, external affairs and security. The Singapore Prime Minister laid particular stress on the necessity of Singapore retaining local autonomy, especially on matters of education and labour.

Both Prime Ministers had agreed in principle on these proposals ...¹²

Under the existing constitution, it will be remembered, the defence and external affairs of Singapore were in the hands of the British Government and security in the hands of the Internal Security Council.

On 11 November, the terms of merger were worked out in detail. What had been agreed upon previously was now confirmed. In addition, there were also decisions on the citizenship status of Singaporeans in Malaysia and how much representation they could secure in the central parliament. On the question of citizenship, the arrangement was:

All Singapore citizens will keep their citizenship and automatically become nationals of the larger Federation. Citizens of the present Federation will similarly become nationals of the larger Federation. Nationals of the larger Federation, whether Singapore citizens or Federation citizens, will as nationals have equal rights, carry the same passport, enjoy the same protection and be subject to equal duties and responsibilities under the Constitution of the larger Federation. Singapore citizens will continue to enjoy the State rights and privileges within Singapore.

Singapore citizens will vote in Singapore for their representatives to the new Federation Parliament and the citizens of the present Federation of Malaya will vote in the present Federation for their representatives in the same new Federation Parliament.¹³

And on the question of Singapore's representation in the central legislature:

Singapore will be entitled to 15 seats in the House of Representatives.¹⁴

According to the BSS, in later polemics with the PAP regarding the terms of merger, Singapore, on the basis of its population, should have 24 seats instead of only 15.

The terms of merger, as set out here, were actually the conditions for alliance between Singapore and Malaya against the Communists in the island. In relation to the problem of fighting the Communists, the first need was to let Malaya have control of the island's internal security.

The agreement concerning the problems of education and labour in Singapore was to ensure that the Singapore Government, and therefore the PAP, would be able to retain the support of the electorate when the island merged with the peninsula. As explained, the electorate in Singapore was mainly Chinese and left-inclined.¹⁵ The UMNO was pursuing policies in the Federation which disfavoured Chinese or left-wing interests. The two subjects of education and labour touched the core interest of the electorate in Singapore and it was necessary that Malayan policies with regard to these should not be applicable in Singapore. Autonomy in education and labour matters, therefore, was to the benefit of the Singapore Government and the PAP, but also for the good of the citizens of the island.

The further items agreed upon in November were for the assurance of the Government of Malaya, and therefore of the UMNO, that its political position in the peninsula would not be adversely influenced by the electorate in Singapore after merger. The fact was that in 1961 there were 3.6 million Malays in the peninsula and 0.2 million in Singapore. The Chinese populations were 2.6 and 1.3 million respectively.¹⁶ Therefore, if Singapore citizens could also become citizens of Malaya after merger or if they could secure proportional representation in the central parliament, the Chinese as a whole in the new country could adversely affect the position of the UMNO. The UMNO, as mentioned, was based primarily on Malay support.¹⁷

As expected, the Communists reacted very sharply to the understanding reached between the PAP and the UMNO. After the initial agreement on the terms of merger was announced, the PAP had invited all political

parties in the Legislative Assembly to declare their stand on this agreement. The Communists, through the BSS, came out with a statement on 28 August of what they considered should be the condition of exchange between the two countries in a union.

Although at that time the latter agreement between Singapore and Malaya was not yet made known, the Communists seemed to have guessed correctly what could already have been agreed to between the two governments, but which was to be officially announced only on 11 November. The statement of the BSS took into account all the four areas of agreement between the two governments and targeted its counter-proposals accordingly. The BSS statement made the following demands:

The way ahead for reunification for our country and our people is in one of two directions:

- (a) An immediate, full and complete merger, with Singapore joining the Federation as a constituent state, like Penang or Malacca.
- (b) As an autonomous unit within a confederation with the Borneo territories coming in when possible.¹⁸

One detail regarding proposition (a) was:

Singapore citizens automatically becoming Malayan citizens with proportional representation in the Federal Parliament ...¹⁹

And a second detail was:

We believe that this is a vital question that can only be decided by the people of Singapore and the Federation. In Singapore, we believe that the only genuine way of allowing the people to decide is by a general election during which we will be prepared to persuade our people to give us a mandate for a full and complete merger ...²⁰

Following this cry for general elections in Singapore, the BSS made another demand:

We are prepared to accept merger under these conditions [that was, conditions for a full and complete merger] provided it occurs immediately and it is followed by a pan-Malayan general elections ...

Many of the policies of the present right-wing Government in the Federation are unacceptable to us ... Nevertheless, we are willing to accept these disabilities and join up with the Socialist forces in the Federation ... Our Socialist comrades in the Federation have for long been waging a determined struggle against the reactionary policies of the Federation Government. We will strengthen this struggle by joining hands with them.

... We are confident that the people of the present two territories will effect by constitutional means a change in whatever reactionary policies of the Government.²¹

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the Communists were asking for a very high price from Malaya for a merger. Regarding the first detail of proposition (a), the UMNO wished to limit Singaporeans to enjoying citizenship rights only in the island and also to having no proportional representation in the new central parliament, both for the sake of safeguarding its position in the peninsula. But now the BSS asked for what could not be given. The third detail of the first proposition was also inimical to the security of the UMNO. Therefore, it stood to be rejected too.

The second demand raised in connection with proposition (a), if accepted and implemented, would be likely to throw the PAP out of office in Singapore and bring the BSS into power. The BSS was confident at the time that, if a general election was held, it would win. Such a demand naturally would have been unacceptable both to the PAP as well as to its allies.

There was yet another aspect about the demands of the BSS, and this was that at the time they were put forward, they had great attraction for the voters in Singapore. For these people, there would be great benefits. Therefore, when the BSS put forward these proposals, it had the idea that they would rally public support in the island. This second point was of crucial importance to the outcome of the struggle between the two camps, for the side which could earn the goodwill of the voters would be the one likely to secure victory in the conflict.

Regarding the confederation option which it also advocated, the BSS gave details of what it had in mind. It said:

Singapore will be an autonomous unit, with full autonomy in internal matters, including internal security, and conceding by treaty the fields of external affairs and defence to the Federation Government ...²²

This second proposal, like the first one, seemed also to have been suggested so that it would be rejected on the part of those who were opposed to the Communists and their followers. The purpose of bringing Singapore and Malaya together was to give control of the internal security of Singapore to Malaya, so that Communist strength in the island could be eliminated. Naturally, such a demand would be rejected out of hand.

The real interest of the Communists in the issue of a union between Singapore and Malaya was not actually in the proposals which they made but what Fong Chong Pik had sought from Lee Kuan Yew in their private meeting in early May in that year. It will be recalled that what Fong wanted for Singapore in the next step of its constitutional development was full self-government, including powers over internal security and the abolition of the Internal Security Council. This real desire of the Commu-

nists was also revealed in the BSS statement on 28 August. That statement, in part, said the following which seemed to be instructions given to Communist cadres:

The administrative and constitutional difficulties in the way of achieving merger for confederation may cause some delay ... but while this was going on a great anti-colonial struggle must be launched to abolish the Internal Security Council and wrest the right of self-determination from the colonial power in 1963.²³

The real aim of the Communists was to obtain enough freedom in Singapore for expansionist activities.

The BSS then agitated against the PAP on the questions of automatic Malaysian citizenship for Singapore citizens and proportional representation for them in the central parliament. The citizenship question, especially, was the core of the controversy. The cry raised by the BSS was that what the PAP had obtained from the UMNO would turn the people of Singapore into second-class citizens in Malaysia. The BSS chose to labour on this theme because it had the greatest bearing upon the basic interest of the electorate.

The citizenship question was a central problem in the great struggle between the BSS and the PAP, and adjustments and amendments were eventually made to the original positions of both sides on this problem. On 21 September 1961, a radio forum was conducted on the union question. Leaders of various political parties, including the BSS and the PAP, participated. On this occasion, the PAP pointed out to the BSS that its proposal of having Singapore join Malaya along the lines of Penang and Malacca would in no way enable the citizens of Singapore to acquire automatic citizenship of Malaysia, as it was all along assuming. The BSS was ignorant of the fact that the constitution of the Federation of Malaya allowed only those residents of Penang and Malacca who were born locally to become citizens of the Federation automatically when the two territories joined it in 1948. Immigrants from foreign countries had to apply for citizenship, and applicants qualified to obtain citizenship only if they satisfied certain requirements, including passing a test in the Malay language. In the same way, those citizens of Singapore who were not born locally, would not obtain Malaysian citizenship automatically on merger day. There were 650,000 citizens in Singapore. Of these, 325,000 would not have the right to become citizens of Malaysia straight away on merger day but would have to apply for it and many of those who could apply would not be successful because they would not be able to fulfil the conditions for consideration, especially in the matter of passing a test in Malay.²⁴

The purpose of the PAP in singling out this point for attack against the BSS was, of course, to sway the electorate away from the BSS. The BSS got the message: henceforth, it stopped referring anymore to Penang and Malacca, and asked instead for automatic conversion of Singapore citizenship to Malaysian citizenship. The next day after the radio forum, it stated to the Press that the existing constitution of the Federation of Malaya gave room to Singapore representatives to negotiate for non-locally born Singapore citizens to become Federation citizens.²⁵ After having made this adjustment to its original stand on the question of citizenship, the BSS continued with its agitation that Singapore citizens would be turned into second-class citizens in Malaysia if the PAP terms of merger were accepted. The campaign was forceful and caused anxiety in the PAP.²⁶

Eventually, the PAP found it difficult to withstand the pressure from the BSS any longer. Therefore, on 14 August 1962, with the agreement of the Malayan Government, it announced that on Malaysia Day, Singapore citizens would all become Malaysian citizens and would not be referred to as Malaysian nationals. This struck the BSS hard, but they retaliated by pointing out that Singapore citizens nevertheless, would not automatically be allowed to vote or be voted for in elections in the peninsula.²⁷

After the Singapore Government had settled its terms of merger with the Malayan Government, it presented them to the Legislative Assembly for adoption in November 1961. This was followed by a great debate between the BSS and the PAP which lasted many days. The basis of the BSS attack was still that what the PAP had secured from the UMNO would make the citizens of Singapore second-class citizens in the proposed new country. At the same time, the BSS also reclarified its own stand on the question. Despite the BSS assault, however, the Government formula for merger was adopted by the Legislative Assembly on 6 December.²⁸

The sanction given to the Government's proposals by the Legislative Assembly conferred legitimacy upon them. The PAP, however, did not feel that the moral authority it secured on the occasion was sufficient to enable it to safeguard its mass base completely. Because of this, it wanted the people to show directly, rather than through representatives in the Legislative Assembly, what kind of merger they wished to have, the PAP or the BSS type.

To this end, the PAP advocated that a referendum should be held. The BSS, however, championed a general election. If there were to be only a referendum, then this should not be a choice of what kind of merger Singapore should have with Malaya, but whether there should be merger at all. The reason why different methods were proposed was because each

side considered its own option to offer the greatest prospect of victory for itself. In the end, the Government line prevailed. In retaliation, the leftists resorted to yet another method to ensure their own success and this was the Gallup-poll.²⁹

When the referendum was at last held, the electorate was asked to choose not only between the PAP and the BSS types of merger, but also between these and a third type. The type was proposed by Lim Yew Hock, representing the SPA. In July 1962, the Government got the Legislative Assembly to pass a bill authorising the referendum. The three choices presented to the people were called Alternatives A, B and C. "A" was the Government's proposal, "B", the Barisan's and "C", the SPA's.³⁰

As seen, the BSS dropped its reference to Penang and Malacca after it was shown that its proposal for linking Singapore to Malaya would make half of her citizens ineligible for automatic Malaysian citizenship. However, the PAP held the BSS to its original position and the reference to Penang and Malacca was included in the wording of Alternative B. Alternative C suggested that Singapore, on joining Malaysia, should not obtain terms less favourable than those granted to the Borneo territories. At this stage, however, what terms the Borneo territories would obtain were not yet clarified.

The Communists and their supporters considered themselves to have been misrepresented by the wording of Alternative B. Because of this, they called upon the voters to cast blank votes during polling. A blank vote would mean a rejection of all the alternatives and would represent protest. On this matter too, however, they were outmanoeuvred by the Government. Even while the bill was still under debate in the Legislative Assembly, the Government added to it a clause stipulating that blank votes would be taken to mean that the voters concerned were unable to make a decision themselves, in which case, the Assembly, with its PAP majority, would decide on their behalf. This, of course, would be for Alternative A. Later, in the course of the referendum campaign, it was found that Alternative A had a real attraction for the voters. On this account, the BSS declared that even if the electorate wished to choose Alternative A, they should cast blank votes, because such votes would automatically be counted for Alternative A. The PAP countered this move by saying that blank votes might not be taken to mean a choice for Alternative A but rather for Alternative B. This again hit the BSS hard.³¹

The great debate over the terms of merger, what kind of referendum and how to conduct it was accompanied by manoeuvres on both sides aimed at winning mass support for their respective stands. An important step taken by the PAP was Lee Kuan Yew's giving a series of 12 talks over the radio against the Communist movement in September and October

1961.³² The addresses seemed to have two purposes. The first was to tell the people that the BSS and the various mass organisations under its influence were mere instruments of struggle of the CPM. The agents of the CPM in these organisations were Lim Chin Siong and others. The intended effect of this argument was to frighten people away from the BSS and the mass organisations. Thus deprived of the support of the voters and isolated, the BSS complex was likely to lose the merger struggle. The second aim was to persuade the electorate that the terms which the PAP had secured from the UMNO for merger were the best which could be obtained and were of the greatest benefit to them. The talks appeared to have helped the PAP a great deal in later winning the referendum.

As stated, the mass base of the PAP was the PA and the WB.³³ The Communists moved to disrupt these organisations. There were many members of the CPM among the staff of the PA. After the PAP split, the Government soon gave warning to such staff that they must stay neutral and not get involved in the dispute between the PAP and the BSS. The order, however, was quickly contravened. In reaction, the Government dismissed the recalcitrants from office. This gave rise to a movement among the rest of the association's employees to clamour for the reinstatement of their former colleagues. The Government countered this by granting reinstatement only to those who would be investigated and found to be innocent. The petitioners refused to accept this, and launched instead a strike to enforce their demand. The Government chose to ignore the strike, allowing the strikers to wear themselves out as they did not have the financial means to carry on the struggle indefinitely. During the strike, the biggest incident was a procession, staged by the strikers involving two or three thousand people and including members of the public, to the Ministry of Labour. This had to disperse, however, when confronted by the police. The agitation dragged on for months, but eventually some of the strikers broke camp and took up jobs elsewhere or went to work for the BSS. Finally, one day before voting for the referendum was held, those strikers who still persisted called off the protest movement. Thus the struggle ended in failure. During the conflict, the Communist underground had urged the strikers to reach a settlement with the Government even if none of the dismissed persons could return to office. This was to ensure that comrades could remain in the PA for long term benefits to the Party. During the confrontation, the PAP managed to keep the PA functioning by deploying temporary staff.³⁴

Trouble started in the WB in December 1961 when its members wished to form a trade union and the Government refused them permission to do so. As a result, disaffection spread around some of the camps of the organisation. The Government very promptly sent troops to evict

the rebels and the disturbances died down.³⁵ Thus, the CPM was unable to shake the mass base of the PAP Government.

The majority of the electorate in Singapore were workers. The Communists considered it advantageous to stir up industrial unrest amongst these workers to incite anti-government sentiments. As before, agitation was mounted in the Chinese-speaking trade unions, but this time the English-speaking ones were extensively mobilised too. The attack, however, was countered by the PAP unions also provoking strikes of their own to draw the workers to their side. The Government, on its part, stepped in to take security action to dampen the Communist offensive. By late 1961 the CPM felt the impact of the police measures. It then made a call upon its unions to restrain themselves so as to avoid possible serious losses. In the rivalry between the two groups of unions, both in terms of numerical strength and leadership, the leftist group remained the superior of the two up to at least May Day 1962.

How industrial agitation was exploited as a weapon of struggle by the two camps after their split in late 1961 can be seen in figures given here:³⁶

<i>Year</i>	<i>Strikes</i>	<i>No. of workmen involved</i>	<i>Man-days lost</i>	<i>Disputes</i>
Jan-May 1959	2	256	614	2
Jun-Dec 1959	38	1,683	18,212	502
1960	45	5,939	152,005	804
Jan-July 1961	39	2,431	41,126	690
Aug-Dec 1961	77	39,153	369,763	535
1962	88	-	165,124	-

It can be clearly seen that the latter part of 1961 was the period when there was the greatest number of strikes, the greatest number of workmen involved in the unrest and the greatest number of man-days lost due to the agitation.

Between August and December 1961, there were 77 strikes. According to another source, from 1 July 1961 to 31 January 1962, the number of strikes was 96. This source states too that, of the 96 strikes it cites, 69 were brought about by left-wing unions and the rest by PAP and neutral unions, as well as by workers who were not unionised.³⁷ Of the 69 strikes promoted by the leftists, the greater part broke out among Chinese-speaking unions and the rest among English-speaking ones. The SGEU called 31 strikes; the Singapore Textile and General Merchants' Employees' Union, 7; and the Singapore Business Houses Employees' Union (SBHEU), 25. The first and second organisations were Chinese-speaking,

and the third English-speaking. It was the SBHEU which had openly led in the formation of SATU.³⁸

There were good reasons why the CPM also formented trouble for the PAP in the English-speaking trade unions. When the PAP split in mid-1961, the Chinese-speaking unions all went over to the BSS and the PAP only retained the support of some English-speaking unions. The CPM was naturally interested in detaching the residual English-speaking unions from the PAP. If those English-speaking unions already under its influence or control could put up a fight against employers and bring benefits to the workers, then this aim could probably be achieved. In late 1961, Cheng Yuet Tong was told that importance should be given to English-speaking unions and, in January 1962, at a Kuala Lumpur conference of socialist parties from all the Malaysian territories, the BSS presented a paper which echoed this theme. It was also in the general interest of the united front strategy to muster strength from as many quarters as possible.³⁹

The Communists were responsible for 69 of the 96 strikes which occurred between mid-1961 and early 1962, and the PAP unions and others for the rest. The PAP unions also created industrial unrest to fight the Communist ones for the allegiance of the workers. The particular PAP union which was in the forefront in the engagement with the rivals was the Singapore Manual & Mercantile Workers' Union (SMMWU). This provided keen competition for the SGEU and the SBHEU.⁴⁰

Apart from the competition offered by the NTUC unions to blunt the thrust of the Communist ones, the Government was poised to take action to deal with any extremist moves to which the latter might resort. In some of the strikes organised by the SBHEU and the SGEU, instances of strikers assaulting their employers or submitting them to various forms of humiliation occurred. The recalcitrants were dealt with by the police.⁴¹ These were only small scale disturbances. The Government was set to face up to large scale agitation like that in 1955 and 1956.⁴² Because of Government preparedness, the Communists thought it advisable in the end to restrain themselves. An important development was a member of the CPM, Lim Shee Ping, becoming the Research Secretary of the SBHEU in October 1961. Lim's task was to handle all disputes and negotiations with employers. He adopted a policy of settling problems peacefully and avoiding strikes as far as possible. Although he met with strong opposition from fellow union leaders who were not members of the CPM, he stood his ground. Because of the new Communist attitude after early 1962, the strike situation in Singapore, compared to that in the previous year, eased a little, as indicated in the figures given above.⁴³

In the rivalry between two groups of unions, the Communist group was able to maintain its position of superiority. It continued to maintain a larger number of people in its ranks. By May Day 1962, SATU seemed to have shrunk from a membership of 82 unions to 44. The celebration organised by SATU for that occasion was attended by only 44 unions.⁴⁴ Some of the other unions had either turned neutral or joined up with the NTUC. Notable among the latter were the Federation of Government Employees' Union and the Federation of City Council Employees' Union.⁴⁵ However, in terms of the number of persons who were members in the unions, the SATU group was still stronger than the NTUC group. This was clearly evident at the separate celebrations organised for May Day: 16,000 persons attended the one sponsored by the Communists whereas only 4,000 were present at that organised by the NTUC.⁴⁶ Also, the membership of the SGEU was 25,000 and that of the SBHEU 12,000, whereas that of the SMMWU was only 4,000.⁴⁷ SATU was actually so strong that its leaders were in no way perturbed by the competition offered by the NTUC. The latter suffered from one great weakness, which was that it did not have enough cadres to match the leaders of the other group in quality.⁴⁸ Between the second quarter of 1961 and the third quarter of the following year, the CPM had a larger share of the trade union movement in Singapore than the PAP. Despite this, it lost the referendum battle to the PAP.

In addition to inciting the feelings of the masses against the Government along class lines, the CPM did the same over racial issues. It has been explained that during the time of Marshall and Lim Yew Hock there was already a process of Malayanising the Chinese schools and cleansing them of their Chineseness.⁴⁹ This trend continued into the PAP period of administration. Part of the reform was to change the structure of the secondary section of the Chinese system. As it stood, the system had three years for lower secondary and another three for higher secondary. There were examinations at the end of both the three-year courses, conducted by the schools themselves for their own students as well as by the Government for all the students collectively. The schools and the Government awarded separate certificates. A lower secondary student who obtained a certificate from his own school but failed to get one from the Government would not, on principle, be barred from continuing his education in the higher secondary and later on sitting for both the school and Government examinations for this grade.⁵⁰ The change now introduced was to compress the six years of lower and higher secondary into only four years. At the end of this education, the students would sit for a Government sponsored examination called the Secondary IV examination. A candidate

who passed this hurdle would be entitled to continue his studies in a post-secondary course, which would run for two years, but one who failed would not be eligible for promotion. The post-secondary class would be a preparatory course for admission into university.⁵¹ The new type of schooling had already been introduced in early 1959 and the first Secondary IV examination was scheduled to be held at the end of 1961.⁵² The new arrangement was actually in line with the English-medium schools.

In the eyes of the Chinese community the new system was unsatisfactory in many respects. One of the problems was that, of all the students who studied under this system, only 25 per cent would be able to make their way to the post-secondary classes. The rest would fail their examinations or would not obtain certificates with good enough grades to qualify them for promotion. The average age of a Secondary IV student was 17 years. At the time, what would be in store in the future for the failing majority by way of job opportunities, or further education of a different type from that provided by the post-secondary classes, was not spelt out. In 1961 alone, 5,000 persons would finish higher secondary schooling under the old system and 3,000 their four-year course under the new one. For those among the latter who could not go on to study in post-secondary classes, to compete for employment in the market with the former would be no easy task. And there were insufficient technical, vocational or similar training facilities to absorb those among them who would choose not to work just yet but continue their studies.⁵³

Criticism against the new system was rife. The CPM made a decision to take advantage of the discontent to mount an offensive against the PAP. Fong Chong Pik seemed to have in mind two objectives in the campaign. One was to get the electorate to stand with the Communists in the coming merger referendum⁵⁴ and the other was to restart in the Chinese secondary schools the open student movement which was destroyed in 1956 with the banning of the SCMSSU. At that point there was only an open student movement at Nanyang University.⁵⁵

In another respect, according to one report, Fong Chong Pik had two specific reasons why he wished to oppose the new structure for the Chinese schools.⁵⁶ In the first place, he considered that the knowledge gained by the students in four years of schooling would be inadequate to enable them to make a living. Secondly, he was of the opinion that "ideologically, they would also be comparatively immature". This being the case, the students would become corrupt and decadent after starting their working life. As the left-wing movement was mainly built up on the basis of the products of the Chinese schools, this would ultimately weaken the movement. Generally, Fong was also against the new system because it made the Chinese schools follow the practice of the English schools. He

had deep suspicions that the Chinese schools would be subverted step by step until they lost their identity. He wished the Chinese schools to remain Chinese in character.⁵⁷

Several groups of people were involved in the agitation against the Government. One group were rich businessmen who sat as members on the management committees of the various Chinese schools. Another group were the staff of the schools, as well as of Nanyang University, including both principals and teachers. A third group were students who were from the various schools or from Nanyang University. The last group were former students of primary or secondary schools or of Nanyang University who were organised in the various alumni. The CPM manoeuvred these groups through open front cadres planted amongst them. The whole conglomeration served as a broad united front against the PAP.⁵⁸

Comments on the Governments' proposals were first heard in early 1961.⁵⁹ In time, particularly during the second half of the year, the opposition campaign expanded in breadth and depth.⁶⁰ On 5 October, an important stage was reached in the conflict. On that day, a delegation from the management committees and staff of the various schools met the Minister for Education. The team was led by Ko Teck Kin, who was a member of the management committees of a number of schools and President of the CCC. Representations on various issues were made to the Minister and agreements were reached. One of the achievements of the dialogue was that students who failed in the Secondary IV examination would be allowed to join post-secondary classes. However, they would not qualify to sit for the Government-sponsored final examination for these classes.⁶¹ On 16 November, a delegation of student representatives met the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Education. The students submitted to the official a number of demands, one of which was that students who did not possess a Secondary IV certificate should not be barred from sitting in the Government-sponsored final examination for post-secondary classes. Another request was that the first Secondary IV examination, which was scheduled to be held in that month, should be cancelled. The Parliamentary Secretary rejected both the demands.⁶² That the students should see the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Education after school management committee members and teaching staff had seen the Minister showed that there was now a breach in the united front on the educational issue.

The Secondary IV examination was held from 27 November to 1 December.⁶³ The CPM gave directions that affected students should boycott the examination.⁶⁴ The students, however, were divided. Some wished to take part in the boycott while others did not.⁶⁵ Because of this, the Communists had pickets posted around the examination centres to try

to stop the second group of students from taking the examination.⁶⁶ The Government surmised that the Communists had the idea that it would use the police to deal with the picketers. If indeed this did happen resulting in bloodshed, then the Government would incur the wrath of the public. Consequently, the Government refrained from using the police against the picketers. On the contrary, it persuaded parents and guardians to escort the children to the examination centres themselves. A Parent-Student Committee was organised. Should hostilities break out between the picketers and the parents, there would be no reflection on the image of the Government.⁶⁷ As expected, scuffles did take place between the picketers and the escorts and their wards.⁶⁸ In the end, however, the examinations were completed as scheduled. According to the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Education, of a total of 3,171 candidates, only 927 failed to sit for their papers.⁶⁹

In order to win complete success and finally defeat the Communists, the Government held a supplementary examination for the 927 persons from 4 to 8 December.⁷⁰ On the first day of this examination, the picketers were out again at the examination centres to effect blockades. In face of this, the Government took the decision to use the police to give protection to parents and their children so that the latter could get into the examination halls. However, the Government would not take this step solely on its own responsibility, but only together with the authority of the Legislative Assembly which was made up of members of all political parties. Therefore, on that same day, the Government got the Assembly to pass a motion which sanctioned the deployment of the police for the protection of parents and their children.⁷¹ The next day, the picketers disappeared from the examination centres.⁷²

Although picketing at the examination centres was no longer profitable, the Communists refused to give up the fight. As some parents and guardians of the students were now already on the side of the Government, on 3 December, they sponsored their own meeting of parents and guardians in the Chinese High School. The occasion was attended by 1,000 people. An All-Singapore Chinese Secondary School Parents Association was formed.⁷³ On 14 December, the committee of this association saw the Minister for Education and spoke on behalf of the boycotting students, making a number of demands. The Minister, however, refused to give way to them.⁷⁴

For several days, during the time when the supplementary Secondary IV examination was in progress, defiant students held gatherings in Chung Cheng High School and protest meetings in the Chinese High School. The meetings this time, however, were a little different from those held in

the 1950s: the students did not stay overnight in the school premises but broke up at the end of each day when a gathering was held.⁷⁵ In January the next year, a delegation of students visited the Minister for Education and complained to him again about the new system for Chinese secondary schools.⁷⁶

The last part of the conflict saw the Government setting up a commission to inquire into the examination boycott with a view to exposing the hand of the CPM in the incident. This was in April 1962. As expected, the students agitated intensely against the commission but their protest was to no avail.⁷⁷

It is important to ask whether this struggle over an educational issue was a success for the CPM in terms of drawing away public support from the Government to itself. The CPM and the Government each had a different answer to this question. In Fong Chong Pik's view, the movement was a victory for his Party, because it created a bad impression of the Government's educational policy and generated ill feeling against the Government.⁷⁸ In Lee Kuan Yew's estimate, however, Fong was unable to win over those sections of the Chinese population who were only interested in preserving Chinese education but not in any Communist or PAP cause, and Lee carried such people with him.⁷⁹ Such sections of the Chinese population were school management committee members and teaching staff who reached an agreement with the Minister for Education on 5 October 1961, as well as parents and guardians who took their children to the examination halls to sit for the Secondary IV examination.

One outcome of the squabble over the problem of the Chinese secondary schools was that it afforded the CPM the opportunity to bring the student movement in these schools out into the open again. Open and legal left-wing activities among Chinese secondary school students had died with the banning of the SCMSSU in late 1956. On this particular occasion, such activities were revived. A very important development was that the Communists were able to create a leading organ to direct the struggle of the students, as in the case of the anti-National Service movement in 1954. This was the "Singapore Chinese Secondary School Students Working Committee for Conversion".⁸⁰ But circumstances were different in 1961. On the previous occasion, the "All-Singapore Middle-School Students Appealing for Deferment of National Service Delegation" became eventually the SCMSSU.⁸¹ On this occasion, there was no opportunity for a new SCMSSU to come into being for the Government would never have approved its registration.

In addition to all these manoeuvres, the CPM tried to utilise the CCC, which was the representative organisation of what it called the

capitalist or bourgeois class, to fight the PAP over merger between Singapore and Malaya. The CCC, whose President was Ko Teck Kin, felt that what was involved in merger was unclear, especially the citizenship issue. It considered that there was a need to hold a forum in which Government representatives should explain and clarify their proposals before a gathering of delegates from various Chinese organisations.⁸² The CPM decided to get its mass organisations to take part in this meeting.⁸³

The forum was held in January 1962. It was reported that, among all the representatives who attended the meeting, those who came from genuine business organisations reacted favourably to the Government's statement on various questions.⁸⁴ The left-wing participants, therefore, felt unhappy over the outcome of the meeting.

The forum was limited to only the representatives of the Government explaining and clarifying their positions. No provision was made for the delegates from the various public organisations to air their views and make comments on the stand of the Government. After the forum, the Communist mass organisations pressed the CCC to hold a separate meeting so that the various organisations could have their say on the merger problem.⁸⁵ Actually, before the forum was held, organisations such as the GNUG and the old boys' associations had already demanded that free discussion and exchange of views among delegates should be permitted in the forum and that the CCC should convene another meeting for such a purpose after the forum.⁸⁶ The CCC, however, withstood the pressure.⁸⁷

In August, as mentioned, Lee Kuan Yew announced that on merger between Singapore and Malaya, Singapore citizens would become Malaysian citizens instead of Malaysian nationals.⁸⁸ Following this, Ko Teck Kin declared that the concession obtained by Lee from Tunku Abdul Rahman had satisfactorily met the requirements of the CCC. Support, therefore, should be given to the Government's option, that was Alternative A, in the coming merger referendum. Later on, the CCC also passed a resolution along the same lines.⁸⁹ Thus, in the struggle to win the support of the wealthy Chinese, the CPM lost to the PAP.

The Communists went to the extent, too, of forming a united front with a number of opposition political parties against the PAP. As early as October 1961, the BSS had already had talks with the PR and the WP about co-operation.⁹⁰ In July the next year, a Council of Joint Action (CJA), consisting of five members, was established. The five partners were the BSS, the PR, the WP, the United Democratic Party (UDP) and the LSP. Opposition parties which did not join the group were the SPA-UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance and the UPP. The whole CJA was opposed to the terms of merger as obtained by the PAP from the UMNO, as well as the mode of the referendum which was soon to be conducted.⁹¹

That the PR and the WP should become partners of this organisation was no matter of surprise because they were ideologically left-wing parties. Moreover, the PR had members of the CPM in its fold, and since the Anson by-election, the CPM was bent on using the WP again as an instrument to fight the PAP.

The UDP was a new political party founded at this time. When it first appeared, security agencies held the opinion that it was initiated by "some petty bourgeoisie ... and upper class rightist elements".⁹² Specifically, the sponsors of this organisation were a number of ex-leaders of the SPA and professional men who were new to politics.⁹³ Notable among the former were Lim Choon Mong and Tan Chor Yong, who had been Secretary-General and Chairman of the Youth Section of the SPA respectively.⁹⁴ In so far as the question of race was concerned, this group of men came not only from the Chinese community but also from the other ethnic divisions in the Singapore population, including Malays and Eurasians.⁹⁵ Thus, the UDP was multi-racial in character as well. The party subscribed to a set of six objectives, the underlying spirit of which was to champion equality for the Chinese and other non-Malay races *vis-à-vis* the Malays.⁹⁶ These were drawn up in the context of the merger struggle at the time. Actually, the immediate motive behind the formation of this organisation seemed to have been precisely to oppose the PAP's way of taking Singapore into Malaya. The UDP was registered by the Government in June 1962.⁹⁷ There was also a UDP in Malaya, to which this one in Singapore was related.⁹⁸ The LSP had by this time combined with the Singapore Congress.⁹⁹ Like the other partners in the CJA, it declared loudly that it was dissatisfied with the PAP's terms as well as method of merger.¹⁰⁰

The SPA-UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance stayed away from the CJA because it was a sister organisation of the Alliance Party of Malaya and was walking in step with it. The UPP kept aloof too, for the simple reason that its leader, Ong Eng Guan, was an enemy of members of the CPM and a rival of Dr Lee Siew Choh's faction in the BSS.

Soon after the CJA was formed, it called upon the electorate to cast blank votes in the coming referendum. It seemed that this decision was made on the advice of the BSS.¹⁰¹ Later on, it dispatched a delegation to the United Nations to present its case on merger and the referendum on this to the Committee on Colonialism. A request was made that the international body supervise the referendum in Singapore. To fight the CJA, Lee Kuan Yew and Dr Goh Keng Swee also made an appearance at the United Nations. After hearing both the parties, the Committee on Colonialism decided not to take action on the protest of the CJA.¹⁰² The PAP again won a victory. In August, soon after the CJA's failure at the United Nations, the LSP withdrew its membership from the organisation.

Eventually, the referendum on merger was held on 1 September 1962. The results were:¹⁰³

<i>Alternatives</i>	<i>No. of votes cast</i>	<i>Percentages</i>
A	397,626	71
B	9,422) 4
C	7,911)
Blank Votes	144,077	25

In this great battle for survival, therefore, the Communists and their supporters were beaten by the Government.

The CPM's countermove against the PAP's referendum was gallup-polls. These were conducted before the referendum was held, but only in the two election wards of Tanjong Pagar and Kreta Ayer. In the former, voting was held on 15 July, and in the latter, on 12 August. In Tanjong Pagar, the voters were asked to vote yes or no to the agreement on merger reached between the Singapore and the Malayan governments. In Kreta Ayer, the referendum bill's three alternatives for merger were presented for voting. In the latter case, the sponsors of the poll called upon the voters to cast blank votes and explained that such would not count for choice of Alternative A or B. The purpose in having the polls carried out earlier than the referendum seemed to have been to secure a victory earlier than the PAP would in the referendum. It was expected that the PAP would win in the referendum but lose in the gallup-polls. In Kreta Ayer, another purpose seemed to have been to teach the electorate that they should cast blank votes in the coming referendum.¹⁰⁴

The polls were conducted only in Tanjong Pagar and Kreta Ayer because these were the constituencies of Lee Kuan Yew and Dr Goh Keng Swee who were the two most important leaders in the PAP. Success in the polls in these two wards would be extremely significant. The polls were organised not by the BSS but by the Political Science Society of Nanyang University, with a helping hand from the Socialist Club of the University of Singapore.¹⁰⁵ The results of the polls were said to be: in Tanjong Pagar, 90 per cent of the voters voted "No" to the Government's terms, and, in Kreta Ayer, 97 per cent cast blank votes.¹⁰⁶

A word may be offered in comment about the contrasting results of the referendum and the gallup-polls. The results were supposed to show which of the two contending parties enjoyed more support from the people. A point about the referendum was that it had not only a moral effect but also a legal one. The gallup-polls, on the other hand, argued for the position of the leftists only on grounds of legitimacy. Therefore, all

in all, it was the PAP which won against the Communists and their followers.

The result of the referendum was of vital importance to both the PAP and the BSS. In the general election in 1959, the PAP non-Communists won the victory. However, in both the Hong Lim and Anson by-elections in 1961, they suffered defeat. Success or failure at the polls was an indication of the legitimacy of an administration. The achievement of the PAP non-Communists in 1959 gave them the moral right to govern. The setbacks in 1961, however, undermined their authority. Now in the referendum in 1962, they won again. This meant that the tide was turning. The significance of the referendum battle was testified to by the leaders of the PAP themselves. Years later, Dr Goh Keng Swee made the following remark when recollecting about the referendum:

Once we had beaten them in an open fight, in a democratic choice before the people, the rest was purely technical ...¹⁰⁷

The "rest" referred to further engagements with the Communists which followed the referendum. An example of this would be the security operation carried out against them in early 1963, to be mentioned later on.

During the time when the fight over the referendum was in progress and before the referendum and the Gallup-polls were held, the CPM made a separate move to try to avert the disaster that was approaching. In March 1962, Tunku Abdul Rahman happened to be in Singapore. Lim Chin Siong, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the BSS, sought to have a meeting with him to have "a free and frank exchange of views and discussion". In Lim's view, the Tunku should not have talked to only Lee Kuan Yew about the terms of merger between Singapore and Malaya. The BSS should also be given a chance to present its case. Lim stated that if a meeting was not possible on that occasion, he would be ready for an appointment at some future date. Lim's request to the Tunku was conveyed in a letter delivered to him on 28 March. In reply, the Tunku said that indeed he could not see Lim this time but would do so in the future and would let him know when a gathering could be arranged.¹⁰⁸ The CPM's move in this direction was eventually a failure. The Malayan Prime Minister never met Lim Chin Siong at all.

The struggle between the two sides did not cease with the referendum or the Gallup-polls. There was first a fight in the trade unions. The NTUC, led by C.V. Devan Nair, and its affiliates, particularly the SMMWU, stepped up efforts to get members of the left-wing trade unions to change camp. It was reported that, after the defeat of the BSS in the referendum, English-speaking workers who belonged to SATU unions became disheartened. The NTUC worked assiduously upon these

workers.¹⁰⁹ Another example in which rivalry was rife was the case of Chinese-speaking bus workers. The SMMWU went all out to persuade members of the SBWU to defect to its side.¹¹⁰

There was also an area of conflict in the labour field, seen in the case of SHBSA being exposed for unlawful and irregular practices. A fact of the left-wing trade unions at the time was that many of them used to syphon off funds to support various kinds of activities without going through the proper procedures. There were other forms of malpractice, besides. In October 1962, the Government had the Secretary and the Treasurer of the SHBSA tried in court for criminal breach of trust in the use of union funds. The two persons were convicted. At the same time, the Government served notice on the association to show cause why it should not be deregistered and had it deregistered in the following year.¹¹¹ This case against the SHBSA was to demonstrate how trade unions were exploited by the CPM.

The CPM's first response to the challenge from the PAP was to try to prevent defections. For the purpose, it put its trade union movement on a new footing. Hitherto, this movement had been made up of two sections, one, the SATU and the other, the Working Committee.¹¹² Now it was resolved that the latter should be disbanded and its members join the committee of the former. This was, in effect, sacrificing the separateness of unions directly controlled or penetrated by members of the CPM in order to improve relations with unions which were led by persons who were not members of the Party. It was a move to strengthen the united front. The new step was implemented in October 1962. After the change, Fong Swee Suan assumed the post of Secretary-General of SATU.¹¹³

In order to strengthen its hold on the affiliates, the new SATU committee made it a practice to pay them frequent visits. Fong also adopted a policy of making union members happy, more by extracting material benefits for them from employers than by political indoctrination.¹¹⁴

Between the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963, the CPM again worked up a movement against the Government over a certain issue in Chinese education. In December the previous year, it was found that the number of children enrolling in Chinese primary schools had decreased markedly as compared to records in the past. The GNUG, NUSU, the 33 old boys' associations and other culture organisations initiated a "Torch Campaign" to try to get parents to send their children to Chinese schools. The trade unions and the peasant organisations joined in the agitation. The campaign excoriated the Government for discrimination against Chinese education and language. The movement came to an abrupt end in

February 1963 when security action was taken by the Government against the entire Communist apparatus.¹¹⁵

Late in August 1962, just before the referendum was held, the member for the Sembawang constituency in the Legislative Assembly died. He came from the PAP and was a Minister in the Cabinet. A by-election to fill the vacancy had to be held in November. However, the voting was never called.¹¹⁶ It seemed that although the PAP had won the victory in the referendum it was not sure that it could also succeed in the scheduled by-election. It was especially fearful of the SPA splitting what were considered to be right-wing votes. The BSS, on its part, was equally afraid of facing the contest. It was also especially apprehensive of the UPP splitting left-wing votes.¹¹⁷

The Widened Conflict and Decimation of the Communist Movement

As the proposal to merge the territories of Singapore and Malaya led also to the plan to unite them with British possessions in Borneo, the conflict in Singapore eventually widened into one which involved all political forces in all the Malaysian territories and even in the whole of the Malay archipelago. In the larger struggle, one of the units in the left-wing camp escalated the quarrel into armed conflict, which consequently, almost brought about the complete destruction of the open Communist organisations in Singapore.

In the context of the proposed Malaysia, the alignment or united front of forces on one side included the PAP in Singapore, the Alliance Party led by the UMNO in Malaya and the British, as well as a number of political parties from Sarawak and Sabah. The political groups in Sarawak and Sabah were organised along racial lines: jungle tribes, Malays and Chinese. There were many of them. At the beginning, they were reluctant to come together with Malaya and Singapore for they were fearful of domination. In the end, however, the Alliance Party conceded to them generous terms for a union and they were persuaded.¹¹⁸

Brunei at first was also interested in joining the proposed new state. Sarawak and Sabah were British crown colonies, but Brunei had a Sultan. Negotiations were entered into between Alliance leaders and the Sultan on a merger. The talks turned out to be unsuccessful, however, owing to an inability to agree on the terms of a fusion, and so Brunei stayed out of the project.¹¹⁹

The line-up of forces opposed to this camp included the BSS and the PR of Singapore. The WP joined in too. There was also the Labour Party (LPM) and the Partai Rakyat (PRM) of Malaya, which by themselves

constituted the Malayan People's Socialist Front (MPSF), the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) and another Partai Rakyat (PRB) from Brunei. Powers outside the Malaysian territories which also became members of the fraternity were Indonesia and the Philippines.

The LPM was an organisation similar to the BSS in Singapore. It spoke for the middle class and the poor among the Chinese community in Malaya, and its membership included both non-Communists and infiltrators from the CPM.¹²⁰ The PRM was the parent organisation of the PR in Singapore. Its nature and character have already been explained in an earlier chapter.¹²¹ Both the LPM and the PRM subscribed to the view that Singapore and the Borneo territories should attain independence before they join up with Malaya to form Malaysia. In the case of Singapore, if independence could not be obtained before uniting with Malaya, then, on union taking place, its citizens should acquire a status like that of the citizens of Malaya in the larger country and should be given proportional representation in the central parliament.¹²²

The SUPP in Sarawak was the Borneo version of the BSS in Singapore and the LPM in Malaya.¹²³ After the idea of Malaysia was mooted, the British Government appointed the Cobbold Commission to examine whether the people in the Borneo territories were interested in joining Malaya and Singapore. The Commission produced a report which remarked, among other things, that the formation of Malaysia would keep the Chinese community and the Communists in Borneo down — the majority of the Communists were recruited from the Chinese — *vis-à-vis* the other racial groups in the territories. Because of this, the SUPP objected to the Malaysia plan.¹²⁴

The PRB wished to have Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah put together as a country by themselves and not amalgamated with Malaya and Singapore. At the beginning, the Sultan of Brunei was keen on having his state linked up with Malaya and Singapore. The PRB, however, never shared this feeling and from the start, this party was hostile towards the idea of Malaysia. Before the British came to Borneo, Brunei held sway over Sarawak and Sabah; the ambition of the PRB was to restore the boundaries and the sovereignty of the old state. In 1962, elections were held in Brunei for the first time. The PRB won all 16 of the seats open to popular contest in a 33-seat legislature. The leader of this party was A.M. Azahari.¹²⁵

Indonesia was as hostile to the formation of Malaysia as the opposition Malaysian parties. At that time, three forces dominated politics in Indonesia. The first was the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI), the second the Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (PNI) and the third the armed forces. The PNI was led by Sukarno, who was the President of the

country. Together, the three groups had common cause to be against the proposed enlargement of their country's neighbour and, separately, each had its own reasons to be unfriendly. The most important factor which brought about tension between Indonesia and Malaya was the question of who should assimilate the Borneo territories. Indonesia had always had an eye on these. The Malaysia scheme, however, proposed to give them to Malaya. Indonesia was actually interested in having even the Malay peninsula come under its leadership in a grand union of the Malay archipelago called "Indonesia Raya" and therefore opposed Malaya's taking over the Borneo territories.¹²⁶ In Indonesia's view, the Malaysia proposal was also obnoxious because the British and Chinese of the business class in Malaya had a hand in it. These races were aliens and were making a living in Southeast Asia at the expense of the Malay people.¹²⁷

Among the different Indonesian political groups, the PKI was the first to voice opposition to the Malaysia scheme. Firstly, that Malaysia had primarily the purpose of damming the advance of Communism in the Malay archipelago was a sufficient irritant to the PKI, and secondly, a struggle against the proposed Malaysia would afford this political party an opportunity to recruit followers and build up its organisations. Expansion was the condition for a successful seizure of power in the country. On these grounds, therefore, the PKI fought the formation of Malaysia.¹²⁸

Sukarno and the PNI chose to fight Malaysia because this would help them avoid having to solve the economic problems of the country. The economy of Indonesia at this time was in profoundly bad shape. Attempts at reforms would upset existing economic relationships, which would lead to strife and squabbling. Thus, the Indonesians had to be diverted to fight an external enemy in order to keep the peace among themselves.¹²⁹

Since 1958, the army had become a powerful force on the Indonesian political scene. In that year, rebellions broke out in Sumatra and the Celebes which were crushed by the army. Between 1961 and 1962, the country made an attempt to reacquire West Irian from the Dutch and the army bore the brunt of the struggle. After 1962, the armed forces faced the prospect of demobilisation. So that they could preserve their position, the soldiers turned on Malaysia.¹³⁰

In addition to all the above, the Indonesians had a host of other complaints against their neighbours across the border, one of which was smuggling between the two countries at their expense.¹³¹

The Philippines was displeased with the Malaysia Plan because it considered itself to have ownership rights over part of Sabah. It stated that before the British came to Borneo part of Sabah was a portion of the Sultanate of Sulu which was now included in the Philippines. Sulu Sabah

had been leased to the British, but never ceded. Therefore, if Malaya were now to have all Sabah, then the Philippines should be awarded some kind of compensation. However, both the British and the Malays rejected this argument.¹³²

After the two camps had taken up their stands, a great conflict broke out between them. Some of the incidents in the conflict had a direct bearing upon the political scene in Singapore.

There was, as with the right-wing alliance, a great deal of trafficking among the various components of the left-wing united front. An important instance of this was the convening of two conferences by the groups in Malaysia and the establishment of a secretariat to manage their affairs on a permanent basis. The first conference was held in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaya, in January 1962¹³³ and the second in Singapore in August in the same year.¹³⁴ On the second occasion, the secretariat was founded. A. Boestaman was elected Chairman of the secretariat, Lim Kean Siew, Secretary-General and Dr Poh Soo Kai, Executive Secretary and Treasurer. Boestaman was then already Chairman of the PRM as well as of the MPSF and Lim Kean Siew, Secretary-General of the LPM and the MPSF. Dr Poh was then Assistant Secretary-General of the BSS.¹³⁵

In its capacity as a socialist party, the PAP participated in the first conference. It was reported that its delegates spoke up for merger and Malaysia, and attempted to show that there were at least two members of the CPM in the BSS team at the meeting. On the second day of the conference, the PAP party walked out of the meeting on a point of procedure and on the third day the BSS had the conference expel it from the assembly.¹³⁶

An important aspect of the struggle between the two alliances was vying for sympathy and support among the Afro-Asian countries. Indonesia was one of the leading members of the Afro-Asian nations. In February 1962, through its Permanent Secretariat in Cairo, Indonesia got an organisation of the Afro-Asian bloc, called the Afro-Asian Countries Solidarity Council, to issue a statement to condemn the Malaysia plan. In the paper, the leaders of the PAP were criticised.¹³⁷

In response to the attack, Lee Kuan Yew undertook a tour of some of the Afro-Asian countries in April and May to explain the position of his group. During the trip, he met Nehru of India, Nasser of the United Arab Republic and Tito of Yugoslavia. It was reported that these three men responded warmly to the Malaysia plan. The PAP's effort was a success.¹³⁸

Lee Kuan Yew's trip to Afro-Asia in itself evoked retaliation from the BSS. As mentioned earlier, the CJA in Singapore sent a delegation to the United Nations in July 1962 to present its case against merger and the referendum.¹³⁹ After having completed its mission in New York, the team

visited Cairo as well as New Delhi on its way back to Singapore with a view to countering Lee Kuan Yew's earlier persuasion efforts. In Cairo, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation invited Singapore left-wing parties to join it as members so that it could give them assistance in their struggle. In India, however, the policies of the delegation were attacked.¹⁴⁰

On 4 February 1963, an Afro-Asian People's Conference met in Moshi in Tanzania and was attended by 72 nations. Both the BSS of Singapore and the PRB of Brunei sent representatives to the gathering, and the Singapore and Malayan Governments did the same. The BSS delegation was made up of only one person, Lim Shee Ping. In the event, Lim failed to arrive at the conference because his passport was withdrawn by the Malayan Government, he being a Malayan citizen. He was also arrested when he returned home. On their part, the Singapore and Malayan teams were barred from sitting or giving speeches on the Malaysian or other problems. Two resolutions against the Malaysia plan were also passed at the conference without debate.¹⁴¹

An armed PRB uprising in Brunei broke out on the night of 7 December 1962. Azahari's aim was to establish by force a new independent state consisting of Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah. As soon as fighting began, the British airlifted troops from Singapore to the trouble spots and the Alliance Government in Malaya flew in police from the peninsula. After eight days of warfare, the revolt was temporarily put down and 3,000 rebels were captured.¹⁴²

The military showdown in Brunei instantly caused a conflagration in the whole of the Malay archipelago. On 20 January 1963, Indonesia declared that it would give support to Azahari and confront Malaysia. Confrontation involved opposition in various fields of life: political, economic, cultural as well as military. Subversion was also attempted. The Philippines stepped up its claims to Sabah and extended assistance to Azahari too.¹⁴³

Indonesian hostilities in the military sphere took mainly the form of raids by armed units into Brunei, Sarawak and Sabah across the border from the southern part of the island. There were also incidents of Malaysian fishermen being taken into captivity by armed vessels in international waters.¹⁴⁴ The aim was to exert so much pressure on the opposite side that it would abandon the idea of forming Malaysia.

The sparring finally led to an attempt to find a solution to the conflict through negotiations. From 30 July to 5 August 1963, Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaya met Sukarno from Indonesia and Macapagal from the Philippines in conference. After some discussion, the latter two agreed that Malaysia could be established if, through assessment, the United

Nations could confirm that the people of Sarawak and Sabah were really willing to unite their land with Malaya and Singapore.¹⁴⁵ Accordingly, a United Nations team visited the Borneo territories in August and September to ascertain the true state of affairs. The team found that the Malaysia plan was really popular. On the basis of this agreement, the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced on 14 September 1963 that the formation of Malaysia had the support of the people.¹⁴⁶ Indonesia and the Philippines refused on various grounds to accept the verdict of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. They declared that they would continue to oppose the creation of Malaysia. Confrontation was stepped up.¹⁴⁷

When hostilities broke out in Brunei, the CPM in Malaya was as quick as others to react to the new turn of events. It also came out with a declaration of support for Azahari. Front organisations in Singapore soon echoed this and agitation was started. The BSS and the PR led in the fight.

The CPM's statement of support for the PRB in Brunei was issued on 15 December 1962. The concluding paragraph read:

The Communist Party of Malaya calls upon the people of all the national groups and patriotic parties to close their ranks and stand solidly behind the Brunei people in their just struggle. The Communist Party of Malaya also calls upon them to fight perseveringly for the overthrow of the traitorous Abdul Rahman clique and for the complete liquidation of British colonial rule in Malaya.¹⁴⁸

Action taken by the BSS and the PR in Singapore included the issuing of statements as well as the holding of mass rallies. There was also discussion about mobilising volunteers to go to the aid of the rebels. Statements from the BSS and the PR appeared on 9 and 12 December respectively.¹⁴⁹ Two rallies were organised, one by the BSS and the other by the PR. The BSS rally was convened on 23 December and was attended by 5,000 people from the trade unions and other mass organisations.¹⁵⁰ The PR meeting was held on 25 January and attracted a crowd of 300.¹⁵¹ The discussion to recruit and send volunteers to join in the fighting in Borneo was held on 12 December. It was a joint meeting of the BSS and the PR. Agreement was reached that such an effort should be made and that if the Government stood in the way, protest demonstrations should be mounted.¹⁵²

The fighting in Brunei had drawn in the Indonesians and the Filipinos. Now the Communist organisations in Singapore were also on the move and it was possible that disturbances could break out in the island too. The Internal Security Council viewed the situation with anxiety and consequently took a decision to purge them. The Council issued a statement to the press on this, part of which read:

These Communists and their supporters in Singapore, working through the Barisan Sosialis and associated United Front organisations, have done their utmost to sabotage the formation of Malaysia. They have continued these subversive activities even after the referendum in September ... They have professed to be working constitutionally for democratic ends. But their open support for armed revolt in Brunei and their close connections with leaders of the revolt show that they are ready when the opportunity occurs to depart from constitutional methods and to jeopardise national defence and Singapore's security by joining with groups resorting to violence and bloodshed, as in the Borneo Territories.

... All members of the Council agreed that action must be taken to safeguard the defence and security of Singapore and of the territories of the proposed Federation of Malaysia ...¹⁵³

On this occasion, the Council decided to arrest people but not to ban organisations. The action taken against the Communists and their supporters was codenamed Operation Coldstore. It was launched on 2 February 1963. The target was to detain 169 persons. However, up to 28 February, only 116 had been secured, the rest having gone into hiding. Besides the 116, 14 others who were not originally on the wanted list were also arrested. Therefore, 130 persons in all were taken into custody.¹⁵⁴

A breakdown of the 130 shows the various fields of activities from which these persons had come:¹⁵⁵

—	Political	—	31
	Trade unions	—	40
	Educational	—	18
	Cultural	—	11
	Rural and hawkers	—	7
	CPM itself	—	9
	Others	—	14

These statistics show that nine persons from the CPM were arrested. The actual figure, however, was much larger than this. The point was that these nine operated only underground and not in any of the open front organisations. It was because of this that they got classified by the police as members of the CPM itself. Among those who were detained in the political, trade union and other fields were many members of the CPM who functioned in the open and were classified under the other categories. The police at that time made divisions only on the grounds of operational convenience. This judgement has been confirmed by expert opinion.¹⁵⁶ Thus the damage suffered by the CPM as such was actually much more serious than what the numbers here would show.

Because of the actual great number of CPM members put out of circulation on this occasion, Operation Coldstore meant more to the CPM than the government offensives in 1956 or 1957. In 1956, as seen, the purge by and large skimmed off only activists who were members of the various legal mass organisations but who were not simultaneously members of the CPM.¹⁵⁷ This was like the leaves of the lallang being cut down but not the roots dug up. In 1963, however, not only were the leaves scythed off but a great deal of the roots were pulled out too. Therefore, after Operation Coldstore in 1963, it was a much more difficult task for the CPM to revive the open struggle. The Government offensive in 1957 was on a smaller scale than the one in 1956 and so was even less significant than Operation Coldstore.

The CPM itself talked about the telling effects of the action of the Government in 1963. On 5 February that year, the *Awakening News* which was published in the Penang/Kedah region near the headquarters of the CPM at the Malayan-Thai border, made the following comment:

This is the first shocking large scale arrest ever made by the Singapore Police since 20 June 1948 insurrection.¹⁵⁸

On 20 June 1948, it will be recalled, the British Government had declared a state of Emergency in Malaya and Singapore because the CPM had revolted and started an armed struggle. A great number of members of the Party and their followers were arrested in Singapore island. For 2 February 1963 to be compared with 20 June 1948 showed the weight of the former in the thinking of the CPM. Among the 130 persons who were neutralised were Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan.

The Brunei rebellion provoked retaliation not only within Brunei itself and in Singapore, but also in Sarawak and the Malaya peninsula. In Malaya, the most notable person arrested was A. Boestaman.¹⁵⁹ Operation Coldstore was the first step in an effort to eradicate from Singapore the Communist open united front struggle, the career of which had begun in 1954.

On 22 April 1963, some BSS members of the Legislative Assembly led a party of families of Operation Coldstore detainees and sympathisers to present a memorandum to the Prime Minister at his office to protest against alleged ill-treatment of the detainees in prison. The demonstration seemed to have been timed to coincide with a visit by an Under-Secretary of the United Nations to Singapore to impress upon him the unpopularity of merger and Malaysia. The party clashed with the police, and the leaders were arrested and later charged in court with rioting, or incitement to it, and on some other counts. This particular incident did not seem to have been directed by the CPM, but by the non-Communists in the BSS. After

it had taken place, Lim Chin Siong expressed disapproval of it from prison.¹⁶⁰

Intensified Contradictions and Further Decimation of the Communist Movement

Malaysia was proclaimed on 16 September 1963. This was more than a fortnight later than originally planned. At first, the new state was scheduled to be formed on 31 August, the sixth anniversary of Malaya achieving independence in 1957 but this was postponed because of the need to wait for the results of the UN assessment of the feelings of the people of Sarawak and Sabah about joining Malaysia. The assessment was carried out at the insistence of Indonesia and the Philippines. The findings of the United Nations team were released on 14 September.¹⁶¹

The Prime Minister of Singapore was not happy with the deferred inauguration of Malaysia. On 31 August, he declared the island to be *de facto* independent until such time Malaysia was established. The point was that in the event that the merger and Malaysia plans failed, the PAP would lose its credibility and electoral support.¹⁶²

The proclamation of the establishment of Malaysia was unwelcome to both Indonesia and the Philippines. The two countries refused to recognise the new state and broke off diplomatic relations with Malaya. Indonesia stepped up confrontation and launched a "crush Malaysia" campaign.¹⁶³ Heightened confrontation meant, in one respect, greater military activities. The fighting in Borneo increased in severity. Operations were also extended to Singapore and Malaya.

In Sarawak and Sabah the military intrusions increased in frequency and widened in scale. In Singapore, saboteurs landed with missions to destroy or damage important installations and public utilities such as military facilities, power stations and so on. If major sabotage could not be undertaken, at least minor objectives must be secured. The purpose of such attacks was to create panic, chaos and disorder in the island so as to demoralise its people.¹⁶⁴ On 24 September, the first bomb explosion in Singapore occurred at a public park and killed one person. The mischief continued after this, until by the end of the year there had been seven such incidents. More people were killed as well as injured, and property was destroyed or damaged.¹⁶⁵

A problem which cropped up around the time when merger and Malaysia were being effected was when to hold the next scheduled general election in Singapore. In accordance with the 1959 constitution, the PAP could stay in office until 31 March 1964.¹⁶⁶ However, success at the polls could not be assured by waiting until the last minute. As noted, the Sembawang by-election was not held because of uncertainties in the

situation.¹⁶⁷ In the terms of the merger agreed to between Singapore and Malaya, the island was to have 15 seats in the central parliament after the two territories were united. On 24 July 1963, the Singapore Government put forward a motion in the Legislative Assembly to seek approval to hold elections for the central parliament representatives within a short time. The purpose of doing this was to ascertain how the electorate would vote for the different political parties or, in other words, to find out what the strength of each party was at that juncture. This would give an indication of what the likely outcome of the general election would be. The motion, however, was defeated by the BSS and other opposition parties. The BSS advocated that the scheduled general election should be held first. Voting on the Government proposition was a tie, 23 to 23.¹⁶⁸

In view of what transpired in the Legislative Assembly, the Government took the decision to hold the scheduled general election at the time when Malaysia would formally come into existence. On 3 September 1963, the Yang Di-Pertuan Negara dissolved the existing Legislative Assembly. The 12th was declared to be nomination day and the 21st polling day. These decisions were in conformity with the provisions of the law governing elections.¹⁶⁹

A great number of political parties joined in the contest, but the main fight was between the PAP and the BSS. Who the contending parties were and the results of the voting were as tabulated:¹⁷⁰

<i>Party</i>	<i>No. of seats contested</i>	<i>No. of seats won</i>
PAP	51	37
BSS	46	13
UPP	46	1
Singapore Alliance (SA)	42	0
PR	3	0
WP	3	0
PMIP	2	0
UDP	1	0
Independents	16	0

The Singapore Alliance (SA) was a new organisation. In March 1963, a conference was held in Kuala Lumpur to decide on the formation of a Grand Alliance of all pro-Malaysia political parties from the various Malaysian territories. A result of this was that the SPA and the UMNO-MCA-MIC in Singapore were put together to become its subsidiary in the island, the name SA being given to the new setup. It was registered with the Singapore Government on 29 May. Judging from its composition, it is

clear that the SA represented the interests of the well-to-do classes drawn from the various races in Singapore. The PAP commented that among the members of this party there were "bank compradores, agents for airport contractors and airplane firms, and politicians concerned with Social Welfare Lottery commissions".¹⁷¹

A significant fact about this election was that the Communists were able to establish a united front with Tan Lark Sye, in their theoretical description a national capitalist or bourgeoisie, to fight the PAP. This was contrary to what was done in the elections in 1955. On that occasion, the alignment was just the reverse. Now, however, circumstances had changed and so alignments had also to change.¹⁷² The common concerns which made an alliance between the Communists and Tan possible were issues touching upon Chinese education and the Chinese-educated. It was evident that Tan was a vehement defender of Chinese interests and so was the CPM. On this occasion, the specific complaints against the Government which fostered a friendship between the two groups were that the Government's policy of equal treatment for schools of all the four language streams worked out in practice to favour only the English schools. There was a drop in enrolment in Chinese schools. The Government was not giving any financial assistance to Nanyang University and was discriminating against its graduates in recruitment for the Civil Service. The co-operation took the form of the BSS fielding a large number of Nanyang University graduates for the election, and Tan giving them moral and material support. The BSS put up ten such candidates in contrast to the PAP putting up two, the UPP two and the PR one. Other than being the founder of the DP, which was now no more, Tan was the founder of Nanyang University and the Chairman of its ruling body, the Council.¹⁷³

During its campaign, the PAP attacked the BSS mainly on the following grounds. If the BSS won the election, the UMNO-dominated Government in Kuala Lumpur would suspend Singapore's constitution and rule the island. The BSS was also a channel through which Indonesia could do mischief in Singapore. Neither the UMNO nor Indonesia had little sentiment for Chinese rights or interests.¹⁷⁴ So the electorate, the majority of whom were Chinese, should not vote for the BSS. The BSS still counter-attacked the PAP on problems connected with merger and on Chinese education.¹⁷⁵

There were various reasons for the PAP's victory over the BSS in the elections. One was obviously the effects of Operation Coldstore. That incident drained from the BSS and the various mass organisations related to it a sizeable amount of manpower of the kind which would probably have made an impact on the election. Secondly, it has been said that the BSS cadres who were arrested in a demonstration at the Prime Minister's

Office in April 1963 were put on a long trial. This prevented them from preparing their party adequately to take part in the electoral contest.¹⁷⁶

On 25 August, the CCC called a rally of various Chinese public organisations in the padang in front of the Prime Minister's Office to claim a blood debt against Japan. During the Second World War, when the Japanese ruled the island, they had killed many Chinese. Now the CCC led the Chinese community in demanding reparations from the Japanese Government. The Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, spoke at the meeting. During the course of his speech, he was booed by left-wing organisations, including trade unions, which were taking part in the assembly. The Prime Minister reacted by having notices of deregistration served three days' later on seven major SATU unions. Then, on 9 September, the Government froze the accounts of the SGEU, the SBWU and the SBHEU, which were the pillars of SATU. This stopped the three unions from extending financial assistance to the BSS in electioneering.¹⁷⁷

Another reason, although independent of the three factors just mentioned, was the timing of the election. It has been claimed that the PAP won victory partly because of this.¹⁷⁸

From another perspective, a reason for the PAP's success in the election was its effective performance as a government during its current term of office. The two main social problems which had plagued Lim Yew Hock's administration, namely unemployment and inadequate housing, were on the way to being solved. An industrial estate was begun at Jurong and was creating opportunities for employment. In just under three years, 21,232 housing units had been completed as against the previous 23,019 units built by the former administration in 32 years. Furthermore, a sizeable number of new schools and clinics were erected, and new roads and pipes were laid. In addition, a budgetary surplus of 400 million dollars was accumulated.¹⁷⁹

A second factor which brought victory to the PAP was Lee Kuan Yew touring all the electoral constituencies to establish personal contact and rapport with the electorate on the ground before polling. This was important because Communist grassroots work was excellent. Lee's thrust was to listen to the demands and grievances of the people, and to take action to have them satisfied.¹⁸⁰

The significance of the election for both the PAP and the BSS could only be seen when viewed against electoral developments since the Hong Lim by-election in April 1961. In that by-election, it may be recalled, the PAP lost to Ong Eng Guan. After that came the Anson by-election which the PAP lost to the WP, followed by the referendum and the gallup-polls. Although the PAP won in the referendum, the CPM scored in the gallup-

polls. The Sembawang by-election was due to follow this but was not held.

The most important question in the political development in Singapore during the period under review was which of the contestants for power enjoyed more support from the electorate or the masses. The alliances on both sides of the battleline were equally alive to the crucial importance of this. When reviewing the outcome of the 1963 general election, a 1964 PAP publication made the following comment:

The moment of truth came for the Communists and the Barisan. They had all along thought that once the Communists backed out of the PAP, it was the end of a non-Communist, Socialist party. The myth that only the Communists had the support of the masses was exploded ...¹⁸¹

The PAP considered that it now had the backing of the masses.

Following close on the heels of the completion of the general election in September 1963 was the further decimation of Communist personnel and organisations. Merger and Malaysia were now accomplished. Indonesia had intensified Confrontation, bringing terrorism to Singapore. The Government had won the general election. It was now timely to close in on them.

After 1959 but before merger, it was the Internal Security Council which dealt with the Communists. Now it was the Central Government of Malaysia. Shared responsibility gave way to sole responsibility. The first strike was at the student movement. On 26 September, the police raided Nanyang University to arrest leaders who were responsible for the student movement both in the university and the Chinese middle schools. Altogether, 12 persons were apprehended. The students put up resistance and there was a fight. Two of them were injured and another two taken away, later to be charged in court for rioting.¹⁸² Along with this, the Government arrested a number of prominent members of the GNUG who had participated in the general election and were defeated. All were members of the Council of Nanyang University. It also proceeded to revoke Tan Lark Sye's citizenship. Meanwhile, Tan had voluntarily resigned his Chairmanship of the Council.¹⁸³

The Government's offensive evoked a protest movement from the students. On 1 October, the students distributed pamphlets against the Government in Chinatown. Between the 3rd and the 5th, they boycotted classes and on the 7th, 1,000 of them marched in procession to the Prime Minister's Office and had a petition delivered to the Deputy Prime Minister.¹⁸⁴

At first the students complained against police brutality. Then they took issue with the Government over its action against GNUG members

and Tan Lark Sye, condemning it as an attempt to remove obstacles in the way of the government plan of reorganising Nanyang University so as to gain control over the institution.¹⁸⁵

The long vacation in Nanyang University in 1963 was from December that year until March the next year. A University Week was scheduled to be held when the university re-opened in March. Left-wing students made an appeal to all students to stay back during the first fortnight of the vacation, as well as to return to campus during the last fortnight of the vacation to make preparations for the University Week. About 300 students listened to the appeal and began the first stay-in on 1 December 1963. The real purposes of the assembly, however, were not to prepare for the coming University Week but rather, firstly, to await the outcome of the trial of the two students arrested for rioting on 26 September and, secondly, to stand in the way of the Government in case it really attempted a reorganisation of the university during their absence. The students dispersed on 13 December. On 31 December, the university's Senate made a decision to cancel the scheduled University Week. Early in January, the two students who were tried in court for rioting on 26 September were set free on easy terms.¹⁸⁶ So the plan of the students to make trouble was aborted. It should be observed that this time the strike against the Communist student movement dealt with only persons, not organisations as well.

Nanyang University was established in 1953, and in 1956 started classes for its first batch of students who would graduate four years later.¹⁸⁷ In August 1956, as noted earlier, Lim Yew Hock took the first steps to integrate the Chinese schools in Singapore into the general system of education in the island.¹⁸⁸ Two months later, after the riots, it was suggested that Nanyang University should also be integrated in the same way.¹⁸⁹ The university was founded as a private institution and was registered with the government in the name of a limited company.¹⁹⁰ Important aspects of the integration idea were that the government should have a part in the management of the university, that it should grant the university financial assistance and that the students of the university should be able to find employment on graduation by way of the government first giving recognition to their degrees.

In early November 1958, a Nanyang University Bill was read in the Legislative Assembly for the first time and in March in the following year was passed.¹⁹¹ This law enabled the government to play a role in the administration of the university. It made provision for a new ruling University Council to be formed. This body would be composed of three representatives from the government, 20 persons who were supporters of the university and who were, by virtue of this, called members of the

university, two from the Senate and two from the Guild of [Nanyang University] Graduates (GNUG), which would be formed in due course, and the President of the University.¹⁹² Before the bill was processed in the Legislative Assembly, the Government had taken the decision to extend financial assistance to the university.¹⁹³

In January 1959, the Government, together with the university itself, appointed a commission to investigate and report upon the academic standards of the university, with a view to the Government giving recognition to the degrees to be conferred. The commission was headed by S.L. Prescott. This commission produced its report in March and commented adversely on the university. As a follow-up to its comments, it made suggestions that the university should be extensively reformed for improvement. It also proposed that an *ad hoc* committee should be appointed to decide on what should be the extent and the sequence of the reforms which were to be undertaken.¹⁹⁴

In July the same year, the *ad hoc* committee was duly appointed. It was headed by Gwee Ah Leng and submitted its report in November in the same year.¹⁹⁵ Before the *ad hoc* committee was appointed, there had been a change in government. In June, Lim Yew Hock was replaced as Chief Minister by Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister. It was the new administration which appointed the *ad hoc* committee.¹⁹⁶

In 1960, the new Government entered into negotiations with Tan Lark Sye and the newly organised GNUG about reorganising the university. According to one report, difficulties cropped up when the Government stated that it wished to have 12 representatives instead of three, as stipulated in the Nanyang University Ordinance, on the projected new University Council. Tan Lark Sye, however, insisted on the original quota. The GNUG tried to achieve a compromise by suggesting a figure of six or seven. Tan rejected also this suggestion.¹⁹⁷ Two years later, the Tenth Delegates' Conference of the university met and made a decision that the new University Council should be convened according to the terms of the University Ordinance. The GNUG voiced support for this.¹⁹⁸ Subsequently, the Council was formed and held its first meeting in September in the same year.¹⁹⁹

In 1963, however, after Malaysia was established, the dispute over the size of government representation on the Council broke out again. The Singapore Government made the submission that, besides its own quota, the Central Government of Malaysia, and the state governments of Sarawak and Sabah should also each have a representative on the Council. The GNUG objected to this and the problem remained unresolved.²⁰⁰

After the general election, when Nanyang University graduates were arrested and action was taken to cancel Tan Lark Sye's citizenship, the

charge was levelled against the Government that they were doing all this in order to remove obstacles which were frustrating their reorganisation of the University.

The Government next moved against the CPM's peasant and hawker movements. On 3 October, the SCPA and the SRRA were deregistered. Simultaneously, the SHU, the SIHSA and the ASH were dissolved.²⁰¹

The ASH was at first not noted to be anti-Government. However, in late 1962, it was reported that it had joined up with the SHU and the SIHSA to oppose the Government's prohibition of night-hawking at Woodlands.²⁰² During the past two years or more, these organisations had put up obstructions against the implementation of the Master Plan under which rural home-sites and hawking sites — the former might at the same time be vegetable, pig and poultry farms — were relocated to make way for modern developments.²⁰³ In the referendum campaign and the general election, they, as part of the Communist movement, gave support to the BSS and fought the Government.²⁰⁴

During the agitation, the organisations had grown in strength. In July 1962, the SRRA was reported to have 2,000–3,000 cadres and 10,000 members as well as 7 branches and 48 sub-branches.²⁰⁵ At the end of 1961, the SCPA was said to have about 4,500 members.²⁰⁶ The organisations had been able to forge greater unity among themselves, too. The fact that they could take common action to resist the Master Plan and to agitate on behalf of the BSS in the referendum and the general election was an indication of this. In June 1962, the SRRA and the SCPA created a Joint Committee for Safeguarding the Livelihood and Welfare of Rural Dwellers.²⁰⁷

The confrontation next moved to the labour field. When the Government took action against the students in Nanyang University, the Communist trade unions were not very much agitated. However, when the peasant and hawker organisations were closed down, they became extremely disturbed. The Government was now not merely arresting persons but also dismantling organisations. It was plain that their turn would come next.²⁰⁸

It was stated earlier that, in late August 1963, seven SATU trade unions were served notices by the Government to show cause why they should not be deregistered.²⁰⁹ Protest activities appeared as soon as the notices were served. However, the general election soon came and the attention of the Communists was diverted to working for that occasion. When the election was over and the news of the proscription of the peasant and hawker organisations was known, agitation against the threatened deregistration of the unions was resumed, and escalated.²¹⁰

On 3 October 1963, SATU convened a protest meeting against the

dissolution order. About 8,000 persons turned out for the occasion. Six resolutions were passed which, among other things, demanded the withdrawal of the deregistration orders and condemned the Government for the recent action against Nanyang University students.²¹¹

The situation developed rapidly after this. On 7 October, SATU gave the order to affiliates that a general strike should be staged over the following two days. The seven affected unions were to down tools on both days while the other unions should stop work on the second day.²¹² This action was also to be followed by mass demonstrations in which students of Nanyang University and the Chinese middle schools, as well as members of the banned peasant and hawker unions, would take part.²¹³

The Government was prepared for the Communist offensive, however. In the early morning of 8 October, the police arrested 17 leaders of the agitation, including S.T. Bani, the President of SATU and a member of the Central Executive Committee of the BSS and one of the BSS representatives in the Legislative Assembly, but who was not a member of the CPM at the same time.²¹⁴ The strike was then declared illegal. Following this, the police took action to disperse pickets who had collected outside the strike premises.²¹⁵ On 10 October, SATU issued a statement to call off the strike. The agitation had crumbled as a result of the arrest of leaders and the dispersal of pickets.²¹⁶

On 30 October, the seven unions which were supposed to close down were eventually struck off the register.²¹⁷ Furthermore, in December, the Government set up a commission to inquire into the financial transactions of the SGEU, the SBWU and the SBHEU so as to expose them as having been the instruments of the CPM.²¹⁸ On 13 November, SATU itself was informed by the Government that its application for registration was refused.²¹⁹ This meant that SATU could not remain in existence any longer.

In order to prevent the members of the deregistered unions from being drawn across the line by the NTUC to join its affiliates, the Communists gave instructions that such persons should join other specified unions in the SATU group instead.²²⁰ There were 60,000 of them.²²¹ The call was successful; by 5 November, the number of those who had joined just one of the existing unions, the Singapore Commercial House & Factory Employees' Union (SCHFEU) alone totalled about 40,000.²²² By virtue of this, the SCHFEU became the core of the Communist labour movement in the years which followed.

Immediately after it was told that its application was refused, the SATU Executive Council redesigned itself into the "Working Committee of the 30 Left-wing Trade Unions" to continue to direct and co-ordinate all the left-wing unions as before.²²³

The SMMWU of the NTUC mounted an intensive campaign to win over the members of the deregistered SATU unions to its side. It seemed to have scored some success for, by the end of the month, 29 SGEU branches, four SBWU branches, 37 SBHEU branches and four branches of the National Union of Building Construction Workers had joined its ranks.²²⁴

Two further developments completed this trend of struggle in the trade union field. On 6 November, a large unit in the left-wing group, the Naval Base Labour Union, with a membership of 11,000, was told to show cause why it should not be deregistered and was accordingly closed down two months later.²²⁵ Secondly, on 10 January 1964, the NTUC was granted the status of a formally registered organisation.²²⁶

The Open Mass Organisations

The two and a half year-period from mid-1961 till the close of 1963 had seen great struggles between the two camps. How did the various Communist open mass organisations fare after these struggles?

In the case of the trade unions, from the time of the split in the PAP and the formation of the BSS until at least May Day 1962, the Communist group remained stronger than the PAP group.²²⁷ After the referendum and Gallup-polls on merger, however, the former began to feel anxious about rivalry from the latter. The Government took the first action to dismantle the Communist organisations.²²⁸ In February 1963, Operation Coldstore neutralised a great number of the leaders of the left-wing unions as well as the other sectors of the Communist movement, many of whom were members of the CPM. The CPM itself viewed the incident as a disaster of the greatest magnitude.²²⁹ In October 1963, there were more arrests of important left-wing trade union cadres, although on a much smaller scale than previously. Perhaps more significant this time was the closing down of organisations — seven unions, the core of the whole Communist labour movement, were deregistered.²³⁰ SATU was refused registration.²³¹ In short, between mid-1961 and the close of 1963 the Communist trade union movement was effectively crippled.

With regard to the student movement, the CPM made a bid to get established again an open and legal organisation for Chinese middle school students, arising out of an agitation over the issue of restructuring Chinese secondary education. The attempt was not fruitful, however.²³² In Operation Coldstore and in September 1963, a number of student leaders were put away. The various student societies in Nanyang Univer-

sity, however, were left untouched.²³³ So the open and legal student movement in Nanyang University continued.

During the period under review, the Government bought an end to the CPM's open peasant and hawker movements. Operation Coldstore saw the most important activists in these movements being taken away and October 1963 witnessed the closing down of all the organisations.²³⁴ In Operation Coldstore, some important personalities in the various Communist cultural organisations were detained.²³⁵ But no school alumnis or such like were banned.

During this period, the BSS and probably also the PR grew in membership. The number of branches of the BSS increased from 33 to 36.²³⁶ Similar statistics for the PR are not available. However, the two purges of the Communist movement in 1963 seriously affected the leaderships of both parties.²³⁷

During the 1950s and 1960s, the CPM in Singapore had set out to build up various open mass organisations and amass strength. By the end of 1963, however, a great part of what it had accumulated had been smashed to pieces. This was injurious to its long-term plan of preparing the ground for a return to armed struggle in the attempt to seize power. It also diminished its opportunities of gaining successes in its short-term method of dealing with its enemies through the parliamentary process of elections. The heart of the mass movement comprised the trade unions, the peasant societies and the hawker associations, for their members were adults. With these organisations severely damaged or completely destroyed, the CPM could be said to have suffered serious disaster.

Notes

- 1 "LHK", paragraph 224.
- 2 *Ibid.*, paragraph 211.
- 3 The cases cited in the second next paragraph from this one and its note were all examples of transfer to Indonesia.
- 4 "CPM, 1960-68", pp. 90-91.
- 5 Fong Chong Pik was recorded to have said the following: "... many of our cadres were too 'red' to remain in Singapore without running the risk of being arrested. As they were on the run all the time, they were unable to carry out the struggle in the open front effectively. Therefore, it would not serve any useful purpose by having them remained inactive in Singapore ...". Cf. "LHK", paragraph 211. "HS" also confirmed to the author that there were these two criteria about transfers.
- 6 "OGC", paragraph 28.
- 7 "TLH", paragraphs 46-47.
- 8 "CHW", paragraph 91. Information about some other departures between 1961 and 1964 can also be found in the following: "TYC", paragraphs 20 & 185; "CYW", p. 37; "CST", paragraphs 271-280; "YMT", paragraphs 26-32; and "CHW", paragraphs 90, 100 & 104-109.

- 9 "TYC", paragraphs 185 & 191. "CYT", pp. 48-49. "CSC", paragraphs 44-45 & 48-49.
- 10 "LHK", paragraph 253.
- 11 The interpretation here is confirmed by "HS".
- 12 *Sing Cmd 33 of 1961*, p. 1. See also *Lee*, p. 80; *Straits Times*, 25 August 1961, cited in M.E. Osborne, *Singapore and Malaya* (New York: Cornell University, 1964), p. 19; and Quek Ser Hwee, op. cit., p. 6.
- 13 *Sing Cmd 33 of 1961*, p. 4. Quek Ser Hwee, op. cit., p. 7.
- 14 *Sing Cmd 33 of 1961*.
- 15 See chapter II, pp. 40-41 & 165; chapter III, pp. 110-112; and chapter IV, pp. 160-162.
- 16 Figures are from Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 21, which are compiled from official statistics.
- 17 See p. 190.
- 18 This statement was entitled "Stand of the Barisan Sosialis on our Constitutional Future". The Chinese version can be found in a booklet published by the BSS in 1961 which bore the title *Tang-chien Hsien-chih To-chêng ti Jên-wu* (*The Immediate Tasks of the Constitutional Struggle*), pp. 7-10. There is a copy of the English version in "Barisan Sosialis Singapura — Policy", pt. 1, Folio (2)^A. See p. 2 of the English version for the demands. On this point, refer also to Quek Ser Hwee, op. cit., p. 7 and "Capture", pp. 133-134, 136 & 140.
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 *Ibid.*
- 21 "Stand of the Barisan Sosialis on Our Constitutional Future", Chinese version, pp. 7-10 and English version, p. 2. "LSC(O)", vol. II, p. 352.
- 22 "Stand of the Barisan Sosialis on Our Constitutional Future", English version, p. 3. "LSC(O)", vol. II, p. 352. In 1956, when David Marshall negotiated with the British for a new constitution for Singapore, he had also proposed that Singapore should control its own internal affairs, including internal security. The external affairs and defence of the island would be given over to the charge of the British by treaty. The present BSS idea of Singapore's status in a confederation of the Malaysian territories drew inspiration from Marshall's earlier proposal. See pp. 106-109.
- 23 "Stand of the Barisan Sosialis on Our Constitutional Future", English version, p. 3.
- 24 *Lee*, p. 90. Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraphs 25 & 26. *Fong*, pp. 121-122. Quek Ser Hwee, op. cit., p. 8.
- 25 For instance, in a speech by Dr Lee Siew Choh to the Legislative Assembly on 21 November 1961 in which he mentioned again the stand of his Party regarding merger. Cf. *LAD*, vol. 15, cols. 400-401. Also "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 379-382, 399 & 509.
- 26 Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 29.
- 27 *Ibid.*, paragraph 30. *PAP 1964*, p. 214. "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 592-597 & 605-609. *IJ*, no. 8/1962, paragraph 115; and no. 9/1962, paragraph 137. "Capture", pp. 220 & 226.
- 28 *LAD*, vol. 15, cols. 282-350, 355-432, 437-518, 523-612, 615-704, 718-765, 845-890, 896-910, 943-966, 969-970, 975-1050, 1058-1122, 1288-1364, 1367-1460 & 1462-1526. Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraphs 28 & 29. Quek Ser Hwee, op. cit., pp. 10-15.
- 29 *Lee*, p. 80. "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 371-373 & 378. W.A. Hanna, *The Formation of Malaysia — New Factor in World Politics* (New York: American Universities Field Staff, Inc, 1962, 1963, 1964), pp. 113-115. Quek Ser Hwee, op. cit., p. 8. The Communists

- knew that their chances were not good in a referendum. This can be noted, for example, in what Chiam Chong Chian said to his subordinate Chia Yam Wee on the question. Chiam stated: "But no illusion should be entertained about stopping the realization of merger through a referendum". Cf. "CYW", p. 37.
- 30 *LAD*, vol. 15, col. 718; vol. 16, col. 28; vol. 17, cols. 66-103, 164-208 & 240-302; vol. 18, cols. 33-144, 180-282, 296-422, 425-542, 545-666, 669-792, 795-914 & 924-1022. Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraphs 31 & 32. *Fong*, pp. 114-118. *Barisan*, no. 18, 21 March 1962, pp. 2 & 4; and no. 34, 8 July 1962, p. 1. Quek Ser Hwee, op. cit., pp. 15-19.
- 31 According to "CYW", p. 37; "CHW", pp. 162 & 213; "TYC", paragraphs 178-179; and "LSC", p. 31, the underground gave orders to the open cadres to tell the people to cast the blank vote. However, according to "LCL(O)", pp. 37-41, the underground decided in favour of Alternative B and the blank vote was only the choice of the open cadres led by Lim Chin Siong. "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 545-546 states that some in the BSS had at the time preferred Alternative B to the blank vote. The question now arises was there more than one man in the underground who gave different orders? Or was there only one man who gave different orders to different subordinates and these at different times? The situation merits investigation when more and better sources of information become available. On this question concerning the blank vote, see also *Barisan*, no. 36, 15 July 1962; *Lee*, p. 80; Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 32; *Fong*, pp. 117-118; "Capture", pp. 232 & 234; and Quek Ser Hwee, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
- 32 *Lee*. Quek Ser Hwee, op. cit., pp. 21-24.
- 33 See pp. 193.
- 34 "LCL(O)", pp. 41-51. "LCL", paragraphs 23 & 57-74. "CHL(63)", paragraphs 7-8. "CHL(64)", pp. 9-10. "CHW", paragraphs 161, 267 & 271. *Lee*, pp. 81-83. Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course" Handout no. 68, paragraphs 14, 18, 22, 24 & 29. *IJ*, no. 8/1961, paragraphs 91^B, 97^M & 97^O; no. 9/1961, paragraphs 113^M-113^P; no. 10/1961, paragraphs 129^{BB}, 130^N-130^O; and no. 11/1961, paragraphs 142^{FP}-142^{KK}.
- 35 Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraphs 14, 18, 22, 24 & 29. *IJ*, no. 11/1961, paragraphs 142^V-142^Z, 142^{CC} & 142^{EE}; and no. 12/1961, paragraphs 149^A & 160^V-160^{MM}.
- 36 *LAD*, vol. 17, cols. 377-378. Ang Li Choo, op. cit., p. 27. Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 20.
- 37 *LAD*, vol. 17, col. 381.
- 38 *Ibid.* "CYT", paragraphs 197-201. "LSC(O)", vol. I, p. 329.
- 39 "CYT", paragraph 223. *IJ*, no. 2/1962, paragraph 14.
- 40 *IJ*, no. 9/1961, paragraph 113^H; and no. 12/1961, paragraph 160^O. Ang Li Choo, op. cit., pp. 29-30. How Lip Cheng, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
- 41 *LAD*, vol. 17, cols. 382-384. *Lee*, pp. 87-88. "TS", pp. 19-21. "WS", paragraphs 391-407 & 410. *IJ*, no. 9/1961, paragraphs 113^A-113^B; no. 10/1961, paragraphs 130^S; no. 12/1961, paragraphs 160^N-160^O; no. 1/1962, paragraphs 1^B & 9^E-9^I; no. 2/1962, paragraphs 23^R-23^N; no. 3/1962, paragraph 40^E; and no. 4/1962, paragraph 47^C.
- 42 *Lee*, pp. 81-88.
- 43 "WS", paragraphs 403-406. "LSP(63)", paragraphs 37-41.
- 44 "Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU)", pt. 1, Folios (44)^I, (45)² & (47)²; and pt. 2, Folios (53), (56)^A & (57)^C.
- 45 "CYT", paragraph 203. "TS", p. 39.
- 46 *IJ*, no. 5/1962, paragraphs 60^A & 71. "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 824.
- 47 Ang Li Choo, op. cit., p. 28. How Lip Cheng, op. cit., p. 13, note 10.

- 48 "WS", paragraphs 271-275 & 380-382. How Lip Cheng, op. cit., pp. 161.
- 49 See chapter III, p. 93 & chapter IV, p. 161.
- 50 According to "HS" who went through this old course of training.
- 51 *Barisan*, no. 3, 9 November 1961, Editorial.
- 52 "4-2 Issue", p. 1.
- 53 *Barisan*, maiden issue, 15 November 1961, p. 4; no. 3, 9 November 1961, Editorial; no. 8, 3 January 1962, p. 6; and no. 65, 11 November 1962, p. 3. "4-2 Issue", pp. 2-5.
- 54 Fong Chong Pik said to Lim Hock Koon, one of his subordinates who played a leading underground role in the agitation against the new system: "... since education was an explosive issue especially to the young, the struggle against the 4-2 conversion gave us an excellent opportunity to fight the PAP effectively ...". Cf. "LHK", paragraph 200.
- 55 Fong said also to Lim: "... the conversion issue provided us an excellent opportunity to reestablish our contact with middle school students which we lost since the SCMSU days. At the moment, we only had strength in Nantah to help us initiate our student movement ...". Cf. "LHK", paragraph 196.
- 56 According to Lim Seck Kian, who also played a leading part in the opposition against the school change but in an open capacity. Fong's exact words to him, as on record, were: "... If the [new] system was to reduce 2 years of secondary education, then the educational knowledge of the general secondary school students would be inadequate, and ideologically, they would also be comparatively immature. After leaving school, as they were immatured, they would easily become corrupt & decadent in their ideology & living. In this way, it would weaken the strength of the leftist movement ...". Cf. "LSK(65)", paragraph 82.
- 57 "Wong See Meng [one of Fong Chong Pik's aliases] pointed out that the new four-year Chinese middle school system was designed by the Government to absorb Chinese middle school education by reducing its traditional six-year to four. This would bring about an adverse effect on the educational standard of Chinese schools thereby gradually weakening the basis of Chinese education & destroying it altogether eventually ...". Cf. "LHK", paragraph 196.
- 58 "4-2 Issue". *IJ*, no. 8/1961, paragraphs 91^A & 96-96^C; no. 9/1961, paragraphs 103^A & 112-113^B; no. 10/1961, paragraphs 119^C & 129^D-129^E; no. 11/1961, paragraphs 136^C, 138^L-138^J & 141-141^{KK}; no. 12/1961, paragraphs 149 & 159-159^T; and no. 1/1962, paragraphs 8-8^B.
- 59 "4-2 Issue", pp. 1-2.
- 60 As for note 58.
- 61 *Barisan*, no. 8, 3 January 1962, p. 6. "4-2 Issue", p. 16. *IJ*, no. 10/1961, paragraphs 119^C & 129^G. *LAD*, vol. 15, cols. 772 & 783.
- 62 *LAD*, vol. 15, cols. 773 & 783-785. *Barisan*, no. 8, 3 January 1962, p. 6. "4-2 Issue", p. 25. *IJ*, no. 11/1961, paragraph 141^B. "LSK(65)", paragraphs 88-89.
- 63 *Fong*, p. 102. *IJ*, no. 11/1961, paragraph 141^C. *LAD*, vol. 15, col. 1053.
- 64 There had been a debate within the CPM on whether the boycott should be called. As recorded by Lim Hock Koon: "... Wong See Meng [that was Fong Chong Pik] told me that two schools of thought on the question of whether or not to boycott the 4-2 Examination came to light. I knew Wong ... was in favour of boycotting ... while others were against it ... The latter group feared that the boycott of the Examination might lead to student disunity because some would sit for the examination and others would not. Secondly, many students would lose their opportunity of schooling because the authorities could take stern action against students who boycotted or agitated others to boycott the examination. As such, the boycott might end in failure. However, accord-

ing to Wong ... the boycott ... would demonstrate to the government our unity which would in turn pressurize the authorities to change its attitude towards the 4-2 Conversion. Politically, the boycott could help to expose the Government educational policy in that it was designed to destroy Chinese education in Singapore ...". Cf. "LHK", paragraph 206.

65 See above note.

66 *Fong*, p. 104 and pictures between pp. 96 & 97. *IJ*, no. 11/1961, paragraphs 136^c & 141^z. *LAD*, vol. 15, cols. 1056-1057.

67 *Fong*, p. 104 and pictures between pp. 96 & 97. *IJ*, no. 11/1961, paragraphs 136^c & 141^z. *LAD*, vol. 15, cols. 774, 776, 971-973 & 1056.

68 *Fong*, p. 104 and pictures between pp. 96 & 97. *Barisan*, no. 8, 3 January 1962, p. 6.

69 *LAD*, vol. 15, col. 1129.

70 *Ibid.*, cols. 1056-1057.

71 *Ibid.*, cols. 972-974 & 1127-1284.

72 *Ibid.*, col. 1287.

73 *IJ*, no. 12/1961, paragraphs 159-159^f. "4-2 Issue", p. 46.

74 *IJ*, no. 12/1961, paragraphs 159^h-159^t. "4-2 Issue", pp. 52-53.

75 *IJ*, no. 12/1961, paragraphs 159^h-159^o. "4-2 Issue", pp. 48-51.

76 *IJ*, no. 1/1962, paragraphs 8-8^c. "4-2 Issue", pp. 64-65.

77 *IJ*, no. 4/1962, paragraphs 47^p & 52^q-52^j; and no. 5/1962, paragraphs 60^c & 70-71^l. "4-2 Issue", pp. 74 & 77-91. *LAD*, vol. 15, cols. 779 & 801.

78 According to Lim Hock Koon: "... He [that was Fong] considered that our main success was that we were able to expose the government educational policy which was still basically a colonial one and that the 4-2 agitation gave us an opportunity to whip up ill-feeling towards the government ...". Cf. "LHK", paragraph 207.

79 *Lee*, p. 71.

80 *IJ*, no. 11/1961, paragraph 141^y.

81 See pp. 51-52 & 93.

82 *IJ*, no. 11/1961, paragraphs 136^d & 144^b; and no. 12/1961, paragraphs 157 & 157^c.

83 *IJ*, no. 12/1961, paragraphs 149^b, 157^a & 157^b; and no. 1/1962, paragraph 1^c.

84 *IJ*, no. 1/1962, paragraphs 1^c, 6^c & 6^f. "Capture", p. 163.

85 *IJ*, no. 1/1962, paragraphs 1^c, 6^a, 6^b, 6^h & 6^l. "LSK(65)", paragraphs 96-97. "LSC", pp. 28-29.

86 *IJ*, no. 12/1961, paragraphs 157^a & 157^b. Quek Ser Hwee, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

87 *IJ*, no. 1/1962, paragraphs 1^c.

88 See p. 236.

89 *IJ*, no. 8/1962, paragraph 115^a. "Capture", pp. 227, 231-233, 235-236 & 238-239.

90 *IJ*, no. 10/1961, paragraphs 119, 122 & 122^a. "Capture", p. 148.

91 *IJ*, no. 6/1962, paragraphs 79^g-86-86^b. "Capture", pp. 192-193, 195 & 216. *Barisan*, no. 65, 11 November 1962, p. 4. "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 532-536. "LCS", pt. 24, Folio (1223)^r. "WS", paragraphs 635-636. "PTT", paragraphs 112-113. Quek Ser Hwee, op. cit., p. 34. Cheng Yuet Tong was instructed by his underground superior, Chiam Chong Chian, to give support to the CJA. Cf. "CYT", paragraph 228.

92 "United Democratic Party, Singapore", pt. 1, Folio (26). Folio (28)^z also refers.

93 There were ten persons in the *pro tempore* committee of this party. Among the ten were three medical practitioners, two dental surgeons, one lawyer, one accountant, one university lecturer, one storekeeper and one merchant. Cf. "United Democratic Party, Singapore", pt. 1, Folio (20)^a.

94 "United Democratic Party, Singapore", pt. 1, Folio (6)^l.

- 95 Of the ten men in the *pro tempore* committee, seven were Chinese, two were Malays and one was Eurasian. Cf. "United Democratic Party, Singapore", pt. 1, Folio (20)^A.
- 96 The six objectives were:
1. To attain and defend the sovereignty of the nation and uphold the rights & liberties of the people with a constitution based on the principle of parliamentary democracy.
 2. To strengthen the unity of Malaysians irrespective of racial descent so that they form one nation of free and equal citizens.
 3. To promote & sustain government by the rule of law.
 4. To promote & ensure the economic, scientific, technological and cultural advancement of all races and particularly to improve the economic condition of all workers & those who are economically backward by political action based on the principle of equality & racial harmony.
 5. To promote harmony among capital, labour & management with the object of securing the maximum production & employment for the benefit of the people.
 6. To cooperate with other political parties & organisations on a Malaysian basis in joint political & other actions consonant with the constitution of the "United Democratic Party".
- Cf. "United Democratic Party, Singapore", pt. 1, Folio (17)^A.
- 97 *IJ*, No. 6/1962, paragraphs 79^F & 87.
- 98 "United Democratic Party, Singapore", pt. 1, Folios (6), (6)¹ & (9)¹. *IJ*, no. 7/1962, paragraph 104.
- 99 The merger took place on 23 January 1962 "based in principle upon similarity of ideological conviction and in practice upon voluntary and mutual understanding". Cf. *IJ*, no. 1/1962, paragraph 4.
- 100 "Merger, Singapore and Federation of Malaya — Reactions to:", pt. 3, Folio (156)¹.
- 101 *IJ*, no. 7/1962, paragraph 98^C; and no. 8/1962, paragraph 115^F. "Capture", pp. 205-207. "PTT", paragraph 114. "LCS", pt. 24, Folio (1233). "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 536-546. *Barisan*, no. 65, 11 November 1962, p. 4.
- 102 *IJ*, no. 7/1962, paragraphs 102, 102^B & 102^P. "Capture", pp. 199, 206, 208-209, 216, 218, 220, 222, 224, 226 & 228. "WS", paragraphs 640-651 & 662-670. "LCS", pt. 25, Folio (1252)¹. "LCS(O)", vol. II, pp. 547-577. *Barisan*, no. 34, 8 July 1962, p. 1; no. 38, 25 July 1962, p. 1; no. 39, 29 July 1962, pp. 1 & 4; no. 42, 12 August 1962, p. 1; no. 43, 15 August 1962, p. 2; no. 44, 19 August 1962, p. 2; and no. 65, 11 November 1962, p. 4. *Fong*, p. 118. M.E. Osborne, op. cit., pp. 26-27. Quek Ser Hwee, op. cit., pp. 35-38.
- 103 *IJ*, no. 9/1962, paragraphs 137, 137^A & 141-141^B. "Capture", p. 242. *PAP 1964*, p. 214. *Fong*, pp. 122-123. *Barisan*, no. 49, 3 September 1962. W.A. Hanna, op. cit., p. 115. Quek Ser Hwee, op. cit., pp. 41 & 56. An instance of CPM reaction to the results of the referendum was the following: "The BSS lost the referendum, obtaining only 30% blank votes whilst the PAP won with 70% ... Chan Hock Wah ... explained that 30% of the votes were pro-left and another 30% pro-right, leaving another 40% whom he said were fence-sitters ... His instructions ... was to continue the spread of anti-merger propaganda & try and win over the support of the 40% fence-sitters ...". Chan [or Chen] Hock Wah was a member of the CPM who operated underground. The man he spoke to was Kow Kee Seng, who was deployed as the Chairman of the Paya Lebar Branch of the BSS. Cf. "KKS", paragraph 27.2.
- 104 *IJ*, no. 7/1962, paragraphs 98^B & 108-108^B; and no. 8/1962, paragraphs 115^B & 128^B-128^G. "Capture", pp. 204-206, 208, 222 & 224-225. *Barisan*, no. 35, 11 July 1962, p. 4; no. 36, 15 July 1962, pp. 1 & 4; no. 37, 18 July 1962, p. 4; no. 39, 29 July 1962,

- p. 4; no. 41, 8 August 1962, p. 4; no. 42, 12 August 1962, p. 2; no. 43, 15 August 1962, pp. 1 & 4; and no. 48, 31 August 1962, p. 1. "LTH", paragraphs 130-134. "CYW", p. 42. "LWK", paragraphs 74-75. "LCS", pt. 24, Folios (1230)¹ & (1231)³; and pt. 25, Folio (1256)⁶.
- 105 *Ibid.*
- 106 *Ibid.*
- 107 Dr Goh Keng Swee in "M-L Course", Handout no. 68, paragraph 41. *Fong*, p. 123 also has something to say on the point which reflects the view of the PAP.
- 108 *IJ*, no. 4/1962, paragraphs 47^B, 48^A, 48^C & 49^A. "WS", paragraphs 827-835 & 920. "LCS", pt. 22, Folios (1116), (1118)-(1120), (1122), (1127)-(1129) & (1136); and pt. 23, Folios (1150)¹ & (1153)². "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 470-474. "Capture", pp. 182 & 203. *LAD*, vol. 19, cols. 298-299.
- 109 "CYT", paragraphs 233, 236 & 237.
- 110 *IJ*, no. 10/1962, paragraphs 160^S-160^U; and no. 11/1962, paragraphs 170^L-170^K.
- 111 *IJ*, no. 10/1962, paragraphs 160^L-160^R; and no. 11/1962, paragraphs 170^M-170^N. *Fong*, pp. 124-125. "LCS", pt. 26, Folio (1322); and pt. 28, Folio (1377)¹. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 824-825.
- 112 See chapter V, p. 209.
- 113 "CYT", paragraphs 238-241. *IJ*, no. 11/1962, paragraph 170.
- 114 "CYT", paragraph 242. *IJ*, no. 10/1962, paragraphs 160^F-160^G; and no. 11/1962, paragraphs 170^B-170^E.
- 115 *IJ*, no. 12/1962, paragraphs 177^B & 181^A; no. 1/1963, paragraphs 1 & 9-9^K; and no. 2/1963, paragraph 18^A. "LSC", pp. 32-33.
- 116 *IJ*, no. 8/1962, paragraph 127^B. "LSC(O)", vol. II, p. 592 and vol. III, p. 770. *Barisan*, no. 45, 22 August 1962, p. 4; no. 46, 26 August 1962, p. 1; and no. 50, 5 September 1962, p. 4. *Fong*, pp. 119-120.
- 117 *IJ*, no. 1/1963, paragraph 1^A; and no. 2/1963, paragraph 19^H. "LCS", pt. 25, Folios (1272)¹ & (1273)³; and pt. 26, Folio (1283). "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 681, 770 & 775. "Capture", pp. 246, 252-253 & 255-256. *Fong*, p. 141.
- 118 M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 150-153 & 141-142. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 299-302. In Sarawak, the political parties which accepted Malaysia were the largely Land Dyak and Iban Sarawak National Party (SNAP); the Iban Kayan and Kenyah Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak (PAPAS); the Malay-based Party Negara Sarawak (PANAS) and the Barisan Ra'ayat Jati Sarawak (Barjasa); and the organisation of the well-to-do and English-educated Chinese, the Sarawak Chinese Association. All these parties later formed themselves into the Sarawak Alliance, on the model of the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance in the Malay peninsula. Some time later, because of internal conflicts within the group, PANAS withdrew from the coalition. All the political parties in Sabah were pro-Malaysia. They were the United National Kadazan Organisation (UNKO) which belonged to the Dusuns; the United National Pasok Momogum Organisation (PM) which was made up of Dusuns, Muruts and some Chinese; the United Sabah National Organisation (USNO) which was largely Brunei Malay, Bajan and Sulut; and the Borneo Utara National Party (BUNAP) which was Chinese. Like their Sarawak counterparts, these parties also later joined themselves into a coalition called the Sabah Alliance. Cf. M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 153-155. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 229-303.
- 119 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., pp. 80-81. M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 172-182. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 300.
- 120 *Lee*, pp. 93-96.
- 121 See chapter IV, p. 167.

- 122 Lee, pp. 93-96. "WS", paragraphs 723 & 729.
- 123 Lee, pp. 94-95. Justus M. Van der Kroef, *Communism in Malaysia & Singapore: A Contemporary Survey* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 134 & 140.
- 124 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., p. 85. "WS", paragraphs 739 & 763. "LSC(O)", vol. II, p. 650. Justus M. Van der Kroef, op. cit., p. 136.
- 125 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., pp. 87-88. "WS", paragraphs 702, 723 & 739-781. "LSP(63)", paragraphs 51-52. "TS", pp. 29-31. "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 650-651. M.N. Sophe, op. cit., pp. 172-175. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 305-306. W.A. Hanna, op. cit., pp. 131-138.
- 126 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 324-325. Justus M. Van der Kroef, op. cit., pp. 199-201 & 203.
- 127 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 324 & 327-328. Justus M. Van der Kroef, op. cit., pp. 194-195, 200-201 & 203.
- 128 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 236-327. Justus M. Van der Kroef, op. cit., pp. 195-197.
- 129 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 327. Justus M. Van der Kroef, op. cit., pp. 197-199. W.A. Hanna, op. cit., p. 5.
- 130 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 325-326. Justus M. Van der Kroef, op. cit., pp. 201-202.
- 131 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., p. 87. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., 324-325. W.A. Hanna, op. cit., p. 4.
- 132 "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 650-651. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 314-315. W.A. Hanna, op. cit., pp. 3-4 & 137-138.
- 133 "WS", paragraphs 598-622. "TYC", paragraphs 154-162. "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 439-447. *Barisan*, no. 11, 24 January 1962, pp. 1 & 4; no. 12, 13 January 1962, pp. 1, 3 & 4; no. 13, 14 February 1962, pp. 2 & 4; no. 14, 21 February 1962, p. 2; no. 15, 28 February 1962, p. 2; and no. 16, 7 March 1962, p. 4. *IJ*, no. 1/1962, paragraphs 2^N, 3^B & 5-5^B. "Capture", p. 166.
- 134 "WS", paragraph 624. *Barisan*, no. 41, 8 August 1962, p. 1; no. 42, 12 August 1962, p. 1; and no. 43, 15 August 1962, p. 1. *IJ*, no. 8/1962, paragraphs 115^C, 126 & 126^A. "LCS", pt. 25, Folios (1255)⁰², (1255)⁴ & (1255)⁵. "Capture", pp. 225-226.
- 135 *IJ*, no. 8/1962, paragraph 126. See p. 221, note 108.
- 136 "WS", paragraphs 605-610 & 612-620. "TYC", paragraph 161. "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 444 & 447-457. *Barisan*, no. 12, 31 January 1962, pp. 1 & 4; and no. 15, 28 February 1962, p. 2.
- 137 *IJ*, no. 2/1962, paragraph 17^A. *PAP 1964*, p. 214.
- 138 *IJ*, no. 6/1962, paragraph 81^B. "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 484-488. *PAP 1964*, p. 214. *Fong*, pp. 111-112 & 114.
- 139 See p. 247.
- 140 "WS", paragraphs 640, 650, 652-661, 671, 682-686, 690-715, 845-851 & 950. *IJ*, no. 8/1962, paragraphs 115^F & 117^B-117^C. "Capture", pp. 233-234. "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 570-571 which says that the CJA team won the friendship of the Indians rather than their hostility.
- 141 *PAP 1964*, p. 215. *Fong*, p. 128. "LSP(63)", paragraphs 64-68. "WS", paragraphs 848-849. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 667-670. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 314.
- 142 "ES(O)", p. 12. Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., pp. 87-88. "WS", paragraphs 739-781. *PAP 1964*, pp. 214-215. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 305-308.
- 143 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., pp. 86-89, 93-94 & 137-138. [Malaysian Government], *Indonesian Intentions towards Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur, 1964), paragraphs 40 & 84. *PAP 1964*, p. 215. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 314.

- 144 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., p. 94. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 314.
- 145 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., pp. 95-96 & 100-103. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 316.
- 146 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., p. 103. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 317.
- 147 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., p. 103. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 317-318.
- 148 "MCP — Policy", pt. 2, Folio (44)^A.
- 149 *IJ*, no. 12/1962, paragraphs 179^D-179^E & 180^A-180^B. "LSP(63)", paragraph 62. "LCS", pt. 27, Folios (1355), (1355)¹ & (1355)².
- 150 *IJ*, no. 12/1962, paragraphs 179^K-179^N. "TBK", paragraphs 171-176. "LCS", pt. 27, Folios (1358)², (1358)³, (1362), (1368), (1368)^A, (1369) & (1370)¹. "LSC(O)", vol. II, pp. 653-654.
- 151 *IJ*, no. 1/1963, paragraphs 1^B & 5^E-5^F. "TYC", paragraphs 21 & 183.
- 152 *IJ*, no. 12/1962, paragraphs 179^J & 180^B. "LCS", pt. 27, Folio (1357)².
- 153 "Operation Coldstore", pt. 1, Folio (4). "GEB(O)", pp. 192-193.
- 154 *IJ*, no. 2/1963, paragraphs 13 & 13^A. The police had originally planned to launch the operation on 16 December 1962. A change in decision was made at the last minute. Cf. *IJ*, no. 12/1962, paragraphs 179^M. The Communists themselves had expected that they would be dealt with before merger took place. Cf. "CYW", p. 37.
- 155 *IJ*, no. 2/1963, paragraphs 13 & 13^A.
- 156 Interpretation confirmed by "HS" and Archivist in Internal Security Department.
- 157 See p. 135.
- 158 "CPM — Propaganda", pt. 8, Folio (347)^A, p. 5.
- 159 "Operation Coldstore", pt. 1, Folio (4). *IJ*, no. 4/1963, paragraphs 38^A, 39 & 39^D-39^I.
- 160 *Fong*, pp. 130-132. "LCS", pt. 29, Folio (1412)². "OCS", paragraphs 40-42. "KY", paragraph 118. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 699-769. "Capture", pp. 260, 262 & 267.
- 161 *Fong*, p. 135. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 318.
- 162 *Fong*, pp. 133-134. M.E. Osborne, op. cit., pp. 46-48. Lee Kah Chuen, "The 1963 Singapore General Election", Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Singapore, 1976/77, pp. 26-27.
- 163 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 318.
- 164 [Malaysian Government], op. cit., paragraph 84. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 318.
- 165 [Malaysian Government], op. cit., paragraphs 68-73 & 76-80. *Fong*, pp. 139-140.
- 166 Lee Kah Chuen, op. cit., p. 20, note 12.
- 167 See p. 251.
- 168 "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 770-783. *Fong*, p. 133. Lee Kah Chuen, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
- 169 *Fong*, pp. 134-135. Lee Kah Chuen, op. cit., pp. 20-22.
- 170 *IJ*, no. 9/1963, paragraphs 94^A & 96-96^B. *Fong*, pp. 209-214. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., appendix IV. Pang Cheng Lian, op. cit., p. 80, appendix D. Lee Kah Chuen, op. cit., p. 54.
- 171 Lee Kah Chuen, op. cit., pp. 14-16, 24 & 45. "Alliance Party, Singapore", pt. 2, Folio (115)¹.
- 172 See p. 60.
- 173 *Fong*, pp. 135-136. "LCL(O)", pp. 53-59 & 793-795. "LCL", paragraphs 34-49. "LHB", paragraphs 8 & 95-96. "OHS", paragraphs 107-128. "LSC", pp. 41-42. Lee Kah Chuen, op. cit., pp. 49-50. Tan Eng Leong, op. cit., pp. 56-58.
- 174 "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 799. Lee Kah Chuen, op. cit., pp. 46-48 & 51.
- 175 "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 798-799. "LCL(O)", p. 59. Lee Kah Chuen, op. cit., pp. 49-50.
- 176 "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 760-764 & 768. Lee Kah Chuen, op. cit., p. 23.

- 177 "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 826. Lee Kah Chuen, op. cit., p. 24. *IJ*, no. 8/1963, paragraphs 82^E, 93^B & 93^C. "TBK", paragraphs 280-295. The seven unions which were served notices of dissolution were: SGEU, SBWU, SBHEU, National Union of Building Construction Workers, Singapore National Seamen's Union, Singapore Brickmaking Workers' Union and Singapore Machine & Engineering Employees' Union. Cf. *IJ*, no. 11/1963, paragraph 126. *Fong*, p. 144.
- 178 Lee Kah Chuen, op. cit., pp. 19-22.
- 179 T.J. Bellows, op. cit., pp. 50-51. Lee Kah Chuen, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
- 180 "LKC(O)", pp. 498-500. "HS" confided to the author that the tours were an idea suggested by him.
- 181 *PAP 1964*, p. 216.
- 182 *IJ*, no. 9/1963, paragraphs 94^C, 95^A & 101^B-101^B; and no. 12/1963, paragraphs 128^D & 132. "LTH", paragraph 148. "OHS", paragraph 128. "LSC", p. 42. "TBK", paragraph 318. "LCL", paragraph 50. "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 842. *Fong*, p. 140. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 335.
- 183 *IJ*, no. 9/1963, paragraph 94^C; and no. 10/1963, paragraph 114. "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 842.
- 184 *IJ*, no. 9/1963, paragraphs 101^G-101^H; and no. 10/1963, paragraphs 112-112^I. *Fong*, p. 140.
- 185 *IJ*, no. 9/1963, paragraphs 94^C & 101^G-101^H.
- 186 *IJ*, no. 11/1963, paragraphs 125-125^C; no. 12/1963, paragraphs 128^D & 132-132; and no. 1/1964, paragraphs 4-4^B. *Fong*, pp. 146-147.
- 187 Tan Eng Leong, op. cit., pp. 56-58.
- 188 See p. 161.
- 189 According to Chew Swee Kee, Minister for Education in the Lim Yew Hock Government. Cf. *LAD*, vol. 8, col. 1071.
- 190 *Ibid.* Tan Eng Leong, op. cit., p. 56.
- 191 *LAD*, vol. 7, col. 926; and vol. 9, col. 2113.
- 192 [Singapore] Government Gazette, 29 May 1959: *Nanyang University Ordinance, 1958*, section 19.
- 193 *LAD*, vol. 8, col. 1071.
- 194 *Prescott Report*.
- 195 *Gwee Ah Leng Report*.
- 196 "OHS", paragraph 78.
- 197 *Ibid.*
- 198 *IJ*, no. 4/1962, paragraph 51^C.
- 199 "LSC", pp. 33-34. LSC became a member of the Council by virtue of his being the President of the GNUG.
- 200 *IJ*, no. 10/1963, paragraphs 112^K & 114.
- 201 *IJ*, no. 10/1963, paragraphs 108 & 115-115^D. "PSS", paragraph 53. "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 842.
- 202 "CKY", pp. 23-25. *IJ*, no. 1/1962, paragraph 10^B; and no. 11/1962, paragraph 171^D.
- 203 *IJ*, no. 10/1961, paragraphs 131-131^B; no. 12/1961, paragraphs 161^B-161^C; no. 3/1962, paragraphs 32^A & 41^E; no. 4/1962, paragraph 54^A; no. 5/1962, paragraph 72; no. 6/1962, paragraphs 93 & 93^B-93^C; no. 7/1962, paragraphs 110^A, 110^C-110^D & 110^G-110^H; no. 8/1962, paragraph 130^B; no. 9/1962, paragraph 147^A; no. 10/1962, paragraphs 152^D & 161-161^B; no. 12/1962, paragraph 184^A; no. 1/1963, paragraphs 20 & 20^B; and no. 6/1963, paragraph 67. "LOC", paragraphs 16, 19, 20 & 27. "LWC", paragraph 108. "CKY", pp. 21-25.
- 204 "LOC", paragraphs 34-39. "LWC", paragraphs 109-111. "CKY", pp. 20-21. Lee Kah Chuen, op. cit., pp. 55 & 57.

- 205 *IJ*, no. 7/1962, paragraph 110^B. "LOC", paragraphs 21 & 24.
- 206 "PSS", paragraph 50.
- 207 *IJ*, no. 6/1962, paragraph 93^D.
- 208 *IJ*, no. 10/1963, paragraphs 108 & 113. "TS", p. 40.
- 209 See p. 262.
- 210 *IJ*, no. 8/1963, paragraphs 82, 89^D, 89^L-89^K & 89^N-89^O; and no. 9/1963, paragraphs 94^B, 102^B-102^D & 102^I. "TS", pp. 40-41.
- 211 *IJ*, no. 10/1963, paragraphs 113 & 113^B. "TS", p. 41. "TBK", paragraphs 319-328. "SGEU", p. 162. "SATU", p. 55.
- 212 *IJ*, no. 10/1963, paragraph 113^C. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 826-827. *Fong*, pp. 141 & 144. "SGEU", p. 163. "SATU", pp. 56-57.
- 213 *IJ*, no. 10/1963, paragraphs 113^C-113^D; and no. 11/1963, paragraphs 126^I & 126^L. "TS", p. 41. "TBK", paragraphs 329-334.
- 214 *IJ*, no. 10/1963, paragraph 110^C. "TBK", paragraph 335. "CYL", paragraphs 109-113. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 827-828. *PAP 1964*, p. 216. "SGEU", p. 165. "SATU", pp. 57-58.
- 215 *IJ*, no. 10/1963, paragraphs 113^D-113^E.
- 216 *IJ*, no. 10/1963, paragraph 113^E. "SATU", pp. 58-59.
- 217 *IJ*, no. 10/1963, paragraph 108^D. *Fong*, p. 144. "SGEU", p. 171. "SATU", p. 66.
- 218 *Fong*, pp. 148 & 165. "SGEU", pp. 174-175.
- 219 *IJ*, no. 11/1963, paragraph 120^C. *Fong*, p. 144. "SATU", pp. 70-71.
- 220 *IJ*, no. 10/1963, paragraph 108^D; and no. 11/1963, paragraph 126. "SGEU", pp. 171-173. "SATU", p. 68.
- 221 "SATU", p. 66. Ang Li Choo, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
- 222 "SGEU", p. 173.
- 223 *IJ*, no. 11/1963, paragraphs 120^C & 126^E-126^F. "SATU", p. 71. The 30 unions were: (1) Singapore Cleaning Workers' Union, (2) Singapore Restaurant, Bar, Eating & Coffeshop Employees' Union, (3) Singapore Fish Merchants' Employees' Union, (4) Singapore Commercial House & Factory Employees' Union, (5) Singapore Rattan Workers' Union, (6) Singapore Transport Vessel Workers' Union, (7) Singapore Bookshops, Publication & Printing Press Workers' Union, (8) Singapore Cycle & Motor Workers' Union, (9) Singapore Catering Services, Staff & Workers' Trade Union, (10) Singapore Tailors' Union, (11) Singapore Hairdressers' Union, (12) Singapore European Employees' Union, (13) Singapore Coffeshop Employees' Union, (14) Singapore Textiles & General Merchants' Employees' Union, (15) Singapore Motor Workshops Employees' Union, (16) Singapore Marine Products Workers' Union, (17) Singapore Taxi Drivers' Union, (18) Singapore Metal Box Workers' Union, (19) Singapore Metal Manufacturing Workers' Union, (20) Singapore Rubber Employees' Union, (21) Singapore Sawmill Workers' Union, (22) Singapore Union of Brewery, Confectionery, Bakery, Canning & Drinks Workers, (23) Singapore Tong Loke Shoe-Makers' Union, (24) Singapore Woodworkers Union, (25) Singapore Gold & Silver Smiths' Union, (26) Singapore Electrical & Wireless Employees' Union, (27) Confederation of Singapore Engineering Tradesmen, (28) Industrial Workers' Union of Singapore, (29) Amalgamated Malayan Pineapple Workers' Union, and (30) [?]. Cf. "SATU", p. 69. Although source states that there were 30 unions, it gives the names of only 29.
- 224 "SGEU", pp. 172-173. "SATU", p. 67. T.J. Bellows states in p. 93 of his book that by early 1966, approximately two-thirds had still failed to join any union. However, he does not quote his authority for this information.
- 225 *IJ*, no. 11/1963, paragraphs 126^O-126^Q; and no. 1/1964, paragraphs 5^C-5^G.
- 226 *Straits Times*, 10 January 1964, cited in How Lip Cheng, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

- 227 See pp. 239 & 241.
228 See pp. 249–250.
229 See pp. 256–258.
230 See pp. 266–267.
231 See p. 267.
232 See pp. 241–245.
233 See pp. 257 & 263–268.
234 See pp. 257 & 266.
235 See p. 257.
236 See p. 211. “OCS”, appendix A.
237 See pp. 257–258, 263 & 266–267.



VII

Last Days

The years 1964–1966 were the last days of the open united front struggle. During this period, as a matter of course, the war between the Government and the Communists continued and issues which bred collision were abundant. Two features marked the fate of the Communist movement in this on-going struggle: internal strife and physical loss.

Internal Strife

Two factors generated serious disunity in the movement. One was the requirement by the Malaysian Central Government that youth undergo National Service. The other was a breakup of the friendship between the Alliance Party and the PAP, which culminated in the separation of Singapore from Malaysia.

National Service

Soon after Malaysia was formed, the Central Parliament in Kuala Lumpur passed legislation which required all youth between the ages of 18 and 25 to do National Service. This need arose because of Indonesia's confrontation and rebel activities in the Borneo territories.¹

As the targets of the law were the allies of the CPM, the left-wing organisations in Singapore naturally rose up against it. However, opinion as to how to oppose it became divided. One school held the belief that the proper course of action consisted of two steps. Under the law, all those of the correct age must first register themselves with the Government. The first step was not to stop persons affected being registered. However, if after registration, persons affected were actually mobilised for active service, then they should be told not to present themselves for rollcall. This was the second step. This two-step policy was called "Principled Registration" or "Registration under Protest". This method of opposing the Government was a decision of a member of the CPM, Chen Hock Wah.² Chen was in charge of Communist operations in Singapore at this time. Fong Chong Pik had already left Singapore for Indonesia in January or February 1963³ and Chen was standing in for him.

The next school of thought advocated boycott of the law from the very outset, and proposed that affected persons should not even register

themselves with the Government in the first place. The man who favoured this option was Dr Lee Siew Choh, who was Chairman of the BSS but not a member of the CPM.⁴

In Chen's own view, he had a very good reason for not taking an extremist attitude. He later stated:

... if the people was called upon to boycott the registration completely, the Government would definitely take this opportunity to attack the leftwing for not being loyal and patriotic to the country ... the Government would without any hesitation take security action to disrupt the leftwing movement in Singapore ... I felt that the leftwing could not afford to lose anymore cadres as the leftwing had met with considerable setback since the 'cold store' arrest in 1963. For this reason, I supported the 'Principled Registration'.⁵

Quite obviously, Chen was still influenced by the 1957 directive of Lim Yew Hock's time which had urged members of the CPM to be cautious and circumspect in activities.⁶

Lee Siew Choh had good reasons of his own to champion the hard line. The arguments were:

As 'anti-Malaysia' and 'aid the North Borneo people in their struggle against colonialism' were the basic policy and principle of the Barisan Sosialis, it was, therefore, only natural that the Party should boycott the registration. They viewed that support for the registration would contravene the Barisan Sosialis basic policy. They were also of the opinion that as the anti-colonialist struggle at that moment was at its lowest ebb any support for principled registration would be tantamount to serving the reactionaries ...⁷

These views seemed to be reasonable in their own right.

A great quarrel broke out in the BSS between the two lines. As had been the case with the PAP, most of the BSS branches were controlled by members of the CPM and their supporters. Even in the Central Executive Committee, the Communists had strong representation. The Communists and sympathisers in the BSS naturally followed the lead of Chen Hock Wah. Lee Siew Choh, therefore, found himself quite isolated. He had supporters, but they were not numerous. At party meetings, in which both the branches and the Central Executive Committee took part, inevitably the majority of the votes were cast for Chen's policy. Only in the Central Executive Committee on one occasion, when a division was called on the issue, did Lee Siew Choh obtain majority support, but even in this instance, he won only by one vote. Finally, the schism ended with Lee Siew Choh and his close followers resigning from the party. The BSS was split wide open. Other parts of the Communist movement, the student and the labour sections, were also involved in the dispute.⁸

The split in the movement over the question of National Service soon reached the ears of Fong Chong Pik in Indonesia. He had word sent to Chen Hock Wah that Chen's decision on the matter was wrong and Lee Siew Choh's view was right. On this, Chen himself recollected:

... in July 1964, [L.C.T.] who had gone to Indonesia in July/August 1963, paid me a surprising visit ... He said that Fong Chong Pik had learnt that the leftist in Singapore having different views on National Service issue ... he was sent to inform me of the Party's stand which was to boycott the registration completely and that Dr Lee Siew Choh's view was correct. He told me that Fong Chong Pik ... instructed me to brief all my relevant subordinates⁹

These instructions of Fong made clear that the 1957 directive was now negated. In Chapter I, it was noted that in 1961, when the two wings in the PAP broke company with each other, the CPM had already reverted the focus of its politics from peaceful to armed struggle.¹⁰ Fong's stand on the National Service issue was an expression of a new mood.

Dr Lee Siew Choh's division with the members of the CPM on the ground in the movement in Singapore in this particular instance was only the first occasion of conflict between the two sides. More were to come. It is interesting to note that, whereas in the case of the PAP, the non-Communists always took a more moderate stand on issues than the Communists, in the case of the BSS, it was the reverse. Dr Lee was always more radical than the Communists.

Chen Hock Wah had Fong Chong Pik's instructions transmitted to all members of the CPM in Singapore. In July 1964, he, too, left the island for Indonesia.¹¹

A few months after Dr Lee Siew Choh had left the BSS, the Alliance Government announced that all youths who had registered for National Service should report for medical examination and military training. On completion of training, they would be despatched to Borneo for active service.¹²

By this time, Fong Chong Pik's instructions on the boycott of National Service from the very outset had already been received in all Communist organisations. Also, even if the policy of "Principled Registration" or "Registration under Protest" was to be followed, the second step of this policy, that was boycotting rollcall, could be put into effect. Therefore, a fight ensued between the Government and the leftists after news had spread that affected youth would now actually have to join the army.

The BSS embarked on an extensive and intensive propaganda campaign to spread the idea of boycott. This included putting out banners, pasting posters and making house-to-house visits to talk to affected per-

sons. An Anti-Malaysia Week, starting from 31 August, was also called and was to culminate in a mass rally at Hong Lim Green on 5 September. The rally, however, was not permitted by the police and instead a demonstration was staged a week later on the 12th. The demonstration was carried out in Chinatown.¹³

Although the police had refused the BSS permission to hold the mass rally, they suspected that the BSS would do so by force and so they mounted security action against the BSS and the mass organisations on 11 September in an effort to forestall the possible rally. Out of a target list of 74 persons, 45 were arrested. The next day, the demonstration occurred. The police took further action and a further 77 persons were arrested.¹⁴

The measures taken by the Government did not deter the Communist movement from continuing with its boycott campaign. Even up to November, there were reports that house-to-house visits to persuade people to shun conscription were still being conducted.¹⁵ It was only by March 1965 that agitation finally faded away.¹⁶

The Communist faction in the BSS then made an effort to get Dr Lee Siew Choh to rejoin the Party. After the Malaysian Government had promulgated the order to call up youth for military service, there was no more divergence in views between the two groups. Besides, the responsible authority in the Communist organisation in Singapore also saw things in the same light as Lee Siew Choh. When Fong Chong Pik sent out instructions to Chen Hock Wah to abandon "Principled Registration", he had also told Chen that he should order his subordinates to get Lee to return to the BSS. The record of this part of Fong's directive reads:

... the courier told me [i.e. Chen Hock Wah] that Fong Chong Pik instructed me ... also to try to get Dr Lee Siew Choh back into the Barisan Sosialis ... We should even go to the extent of admitting our mistake to Dr Lee ...¹⁷

The effort to persuade Lee Siew Choh to rejoin the BSS actually began as soon as Lee had resigned from the Party because a split in the left-wing was not in its interest. After National Service was actually implemented in Singapore and Fong's instruction about reconciliation had been received, the effort was stepped up. Negotiations with Dr Lee Siew Choh were protracted and lasted many months, and it was not until March 1965 that Lee was finally persuaded. Lee's return to the BSS restored unity to the left-wing movement.¹⁸

The verdict was that the campaign was a failure: the people had responded poorly to the BSS's boycott campaign. On this, one intelligence report said:

It would appear that the Party's agitation to get the people to oppose the call-up has no support from the masses on the grounds that it was no use opposing something that had already become law and because of the threat to national peace and harmony and Indonesian confrontation.¹⁹

Even Dr Lee Siew Choh eventually found it pointless to continue fighting against the Government. The report said of him:

... he felt it would be futile in face of the present public feeling to continue campaigning against National Service.²⁰

That the BSS campaign enjoyed little support from the people was one thing. Another thing was that security action taken by the Government against the agitation demoralised even the campaigners themselves. On this point, the effect on the BSS was reported:

... during the swoop ... a number of Barisan Sosialis Headquarters staff was arrested and those who were not arrested left their posts for fear of arrest ... the Central Committee was ... completely paralysed ... [some] openly set aside their work ... and went to Kuala Lumpur where they were known to have visited bars, patronised massage parlours and indulged in womanising ...²¹

The trade unions were also affected. It was reported that members made themselves scarce in meetings of the organisations, and collection for subscriptions at the same time fell badly in some areas. Some unions had been conducting training classes for their cadres and even here attendance fell sharply.²²

Another aspect was that the split between Chen Hock Wah and Lee Siew Choh and then the correction of Chen's decision by Fong Chong Pik brought a great deal of confusion to the rank and file in the Communist organisations. One instance of this was the Vice-Chairman of the Bukit Panjang branch of the BSS. Not finding the situation a pleasant one, he commented:

I pointed out that, as the party kept changing its decision, we would find difficulty explaining to the masses ...²³

For leadership to be effective, there must be no fickle-mindedness. Such indecision took its toll on the efficiency of the movement as a fighting instrument.

The incident of Chen Hock Wah being corrected by Fong Chong Pik revealed the damage done to the organisation in Singapore by the withdrawal of cadres from the island to elsewhere. For Fong himself to have gone away was particularly serious. A significant factor was that communications from Indonesia to Singapore were not able to arrive in time to be of any real help to the situation.

Alliance versus PAP, and Divisions in the Communist Movement

The dominant feature in the political scene in Singapore during these years was the breakup of the united front between the Alliance Party and the PAP. In reacting to this conflict between its enemies, the Communist movement became thoroughly divided in itself.

Alliance versus PAP

As argued, the co-operation between the Alliance Party, with its main component the UMNO, and the PAP, fostered through the establishment of Malaysia, was designed to deal with the Communists in Singapore. It has also been seen that around the time when Malaysia actually came into existence, this aim was fulfilled. After the Communist problem was resolved, the friendship between the two began to give way, as a result of deep conflicts between them. The differences had been suppressed only when there was a common enemy, but once that was removed, the contradiction naturally surfaced. The breakup of the united front between the Alliance Party and the PAP eventually led to the separation of Singapore from the rest of Malaysia and to its becoming an independent country.

The root of the quarrel between the UMNO and the PAP lay in political ideology. The former professed faith in the traditional Malay way of life, feudalism, as well as in modern capitalism. The PAP, on the other hand, followed what was known as democratic socialism.²⁴ The UMNO believed that the Malays should enjoy superiority over other races in the country whereas the PAP championed racial equality.

If each side was contented to practise its ideology only in the territory under its control, a break in friendship might not have happened. However, this was not the case. While the Alliance was interested in obtaining a partial share or even a full share of power in Singapore, the PAP harboured desires to spread its influence in and eventually even to acquire control over the Malay peninsula. Because of these opposing desires, the two political parties finally had to sever relations with each other. In consequence, the two territories under their respective rules had to separate and become different countries.

The first significant event which generated the conflict between the Alliance and the PAP was when the Singapore branch of the Alliance participated in the general elections in the island in 1963, as mentioned in the previous chapter.²⁵ The Singapore Alliance, or SA, was composed of the SPA and the Singapore branch of the UMNO-MCA-MIC. Neither the SPA nor the UMNO-MCA-MIC were fighting the PAP for the first time, for they had participated in the 1959 elections.²⁶ However, in 1963

they combined into one to take on the PAP. This posed a threat of new dimensions to the PAP. The SA failed to win a single seat in polling, but this did not erase the bad feelings the PAP had towards this party.

General elections in the following year also took place in the Malay peninsula. Just as the SA had entered into a contest with the PAP in Singapore, the PAP now joined in competition with the Alliance in Malaya. The PAP fought in 11 constituencies, but won in only one. When taking part in the elections, the PAP made it known that what it had set out to do was not to fight the whole Alliance but only its MCA component. The PAP wished to defeat the MCA and compel UMNO to drop MCA as a partner in the Alliance in favour of the PAP. The MCA represented Chinese interests and the PAP could do the same. During electioneering, however, the UMNO declared that it would not exchange the MCA for the PAP.²⁷

The experiences in 1963 and 1964 caused the UMNO great anxiety about the PAP. In the elections in Singapore, the SA not only failed to gain any advantage over the PAP but also lost whatever seats its components, originally the SPA and the UMNO-MCA-MIC, previously had in the Legislative Assembly. The SPA had held four and the UMNO-MCA-MIC three seats. Support for the former had come from Chinese constituencies while that for the latter from Malay ones. Loss of these seats meant that the PAP gained not only more of the Chinese support it already enjoyed, but Malay support as well. In 1964, when the PAP participated in the general elections in Malaya, although it restricted itself to competing only with the MCA and for its Chinese base, it could be assumed that ultimately it would also fight the UMNO and try to win Malay votes. The ability of the PAP to wean the Malay electorate from the UMNO in Singapore in 1963 clearly demonstrated the potential of the PAP.²⁸

It was against this background that the UMNO launched an effort to try to recover lost ground and rebuild its organisation in Singapore. The PAP was able to draw the Malays away from the UMNO to itself because it promised them a programme of better housing and working conditions. The UMNO now countered this PAP line by advocating that the Malays should have special rights over the other races in Singapore similar to what their compatriots were enjoying in Malaya. Special rights were things like having a higher quota in Government service, privileged consideration for land titles and so on. The attack was also made on the PAP that it was a Chinese party. The campaign so aroused Malay feelings that in July 1964 fighting broke out between the Malays and the Chinese in Singapore. A few months later, the Indonesians took advantage of the cleavage between the two communities and engineered further rioting. In view of the seriousness of the situation, the belligerents agreed to a ceasefire.²⁹

The truce was soon broken, however, as a result of two developments. First, the reconstruction of the UMNO in Singapore proceeded apace after the truce and it was announced that the Alliance should work to dislodge the PAP from power in the next general elections in the island in 1967.³⁰ The second development pertained to certain economic and financial difficulties between the Central and island governments arising out of the terms of merger. The person in charge of house-keeping in Kuala Lumpur was the leader of the MCA. The PAP aimed at displacing the MCA in Malaya. Because of this, solutions to the economic and financial problems between the two territories could not easily be found.³¹

During negotiations to establish Malaysia, Singapore had promised to provide assistance to Sarawak and Sabah to help them develop their economies. In return, the two territories were to allow Singapore workers to go over there to work. At the same time, Singapore would be permitted to have a common market with the other parts of Malaysia. However, now that Malaysia was established, both sides dragged their feet over their respective promises.

Then the Central Government passed a new programme of taxation and duties for all Malaysia. The new impositions were inimical to the interests of businesses and industries which were located mainly in Singapore. Because of this, of all the Malaysian territories, Singapore was the most affected by the new measures. Singapore was in a mood to resist the impositions, but did not have the ability to do so because the Central Government had acquired powers over it in these areas of administration when Malaysia was formed.

When the termination of hostilities between the Alliance and the PAP was agreed to after the riots in 1964, the PAP made suggestions on how difficulties could be settled on a more permanent basis. The PAP proposed to the UMNO that a coalition government should be formed between the Alliance and itself. This arrangement would not displace the MCA but would give the PAP a share of power in Kuala Lumpur. This proposal was supported by the British Government.³²

The UMNO, however, was not interested in the PAP move. They counter-proposed that from henceforth the Central Government would no longer exercise any control over the administration of Singapore, except in matters pertaining to defence and internal security. The Singapore Government on its part must give up any ambition of acquiring power outside Singapore anywhere in Malaysia. A new line of separation was to be drawn between the two governments.³³

UMNO's counter-proposal, however, found no favour with the PAP. The next step which the PAP took was to form a united opposition with four other political parties from other areas of Malaysia, three of which

were Chinese-based, to fight the Alliance. These four parties were the People's Progressive Party from Ipoh, the United Democratic Party of Penang, and the SUPP and the Machinda from Sarawak. A Malaysian Solidarity Convention was created and the slogan "Malaysian Malaysia" was coined.³⁴

The objective of the movement was to fight for equality for the non-Malays with the Malays. The PAP now went as far as to say openly that it was interested in obtaining the prime ministership in the Central Government. It also threatened that if the Alliance resorted to force, then Singapore would secede together with Penang, Malacca, Sarawak and Sabah to form a new country.³⁵

This attack from the PAP greatly worried the Alliance. The UMNO considered two courses of action against its enemy. What it could do on the one hand was to take repressive action against the leadership of the PAP. A second option was to expel Singapore from Malaysia and let it continue on its own. There were two difficulties in the path of the first alternative. The first was that the PAP enjoyed the support of the Chinese in Singapore. Punitive action against it would only antagonise this section of the Singapore population. The second was that the PAP also had the friendship and sympathy of Britain and other leading Commonwealth countries. If Alliance action against the PAP resulted only in making the Chinese in Singapore restless, then these countries would become disquieted.³⁶

According to the belief of the PAP, the Alliance tried to oust it in such a way as to overcome these difficulties at the same time. The solution was to cause Ong Eng Guan to resign his seat in the Legislative Assembly so that a by-election could be held in his constituency, Hong Lim. Ong was not to stand again for the by-election. The strongest rival of the PAP in Singapore at that time was the BSS. The point was to let the BSS take part in the contest against the PAP and defeat it. When the PAP was crushed, it would then be proved that the PAP had become unpopular. Then its leadership could be put aside without undesirable consequences.³⁷ Eventually, the conspiracy was carried out and there was a battle between the BSS and the PAP in Hong Lim. The result of the by-election, however, did not turn out as hoped for or expected. The BSS lost to the PAP, and, in consequence, the PAP position was strengthened rather than weakened. In such a situation, therefore, the PAP leaders could not be disposed of.³⁸

As the first choice of action against the PAP proved not feasible, the Alliance finally told the PAP to take Singapore out of Malaysia. Britain and other important Commonwealth countries were taken aback by the decision.³⁹

"Secede from Malaysia" against "Crush Malaysia"

The first effect of the conflict on the Communist movement in Singapore was to evoke a call in early 1965 for Singapore to secede from Malaysia. The call was raised by Tan Sin who was a paid official and a little later the President of the SCHFEU, the largest left-wing trade union at this time. Tan Sin was, however, opposed by Dr Lee Siew Choh, who had just returned to the BSS after the dispute over the problem of National Service. Lee considered Tan Sin's policy wrong and he proposed instead that Malaysia should be crushed. The rival slogans then became "Secede from Malaysia" and "Crush Malaysia".⁴⁰ For Singapore to secede from Malaysia meant that it should leave that country and become a nation by itself. To crush Malaysia was to have it broken up into two parts, one part consisting of Malaya and Singapore and the other, the Borneo territories. Malaya and Singapore were to be united to become one country and the Borneo territories were also to be united to become another country.

Unlike Chen Hock Wah, Tan Sin was not a member of the CPM.⁴¹ However, his policy had the support of a section of the members of the CPM in the island. His slogan found echoes in the BSS, the left-wing trade unions and other mass organisations. In these places were positioned members of the CPM. Thus, in this sense, Tan Sin's policy could be said to mirror Communist attitudes.

Dr Lee Siew Choh, like Tan Sin, was also not a member of the CPM. However, his line on the question of the Singapore-Malaya relationship evoked sympathy from some members of the CPM scattered in the various organisations. More importantly, Lee's ideas coincided with those of CPM headquarters, as two instances showed. In July 1965, a P.V. Sharma issued a pamphlet in Beijing which bore the title "For Crushing Malaysia and Establishing an Independent, Democratic, Peaceful and Reunited Malaya (including Singapore)".⁴² Sharma was a Communist and represented his party on the international front.⁴³ According to Chen Hock Wah, Fong Chong Pik at this time also advocated the crushing of Malaysia.⁴⁴

As in the case of the National Service dispute, there was now also a division in the ranks of the Communist movement. In fact, the chaos was worse than before. On the previous occasion, there was only disunity, firstly, between Communists still in Singapore and non-Communists and, secondly, between the former and Communists who had fled to Indonesia. On this occasion, however, the divisions were more complex. There were splits among the non-Communists, among Communists who were still functioning in Singapore, and between Tan Sin and those Communists who followed him and Communists in Indonesia. Over the question

of National Service, there had been no quarrel among the Communists in Singapore because Chen Hock Wah was still in the island to exercise unified command. Now, however, he was no longer in Singapore.

According to information available, in the Central Executive Committee of the BSS, members of the CPM who opposed Lee Siew Choh were Kow Kee Seng and Chio Cheng Thun, and one who stood with him was Koo Young.⁴⁵ Among trade unions, it was reported that more than 20 backed Tan Sin, and seven followed Dr Lee's lead.⁴⁶

The secession slogan was first broached in September 1964 by the leadership of the BSS during the demonstration against National Service.⁴⁷ The leadership of the BSS at this time was not the Central Executive Committee but a seven-man Committee. In May 1964, Dr Lee Siew Choh and six of his followers had resigned from the Central Executive Committee owing to the dispute over National Service. They left four persons behind who had combined with three other members of the party to form the seven-man Committee. Both Kow Kee Seng and Koo Young sat on the committee.⁴⁸ In January 1965, the SCHFEU talked to Dr Lee Siew Choh, as well as got Kow Kee Seng and Chio Cheng Thun to bring to the notice of the seven-man BSS Committee the question about raising its slogan to lead the anti-Malaysia struggle. Both Lee and the BSS requested postponement of a decision on the matter until further deliberation. This was agreed to by the SCHFEU.⁴⁹ In March the same year, however, just after Dr Lee Siew Choh had returned to the BSS, Tan Sin of the SCHFEU suddenly published the slogan in the official organ of the union.⁵⁰ This stirred a hornets' nest with Lee and sharp controversy arose over the matter.⁵¹

The dispute between the two sides dragged on for a month. By the end of April, however, Dr Lee Siew Choh prevailed over the other side. The conclusion of the tussle was that Tan Sin's group agreed to abandon their stand and go along with Lee. Thus, as in the quarrel over National Service, Lee ultimately won.⁵²

In the previous dispute, the members of the CPM who defied Dr Lee Siew Choh gave in to him because they were instructed to do so by the top leadership. In this case, it seemed likely that the same thing happened. There is information of a cell among Chinese school students who held a meeting in May 1964, at which the leader told the members of the group that the secession line was wrong and Lee's policy right. The leader mentioned that this was the decision of a Malayan National Liberation League (MNLL).⁵³ This organisation was established around this time for the purpose of carrying out underground united front and mass activities. It was the successor of the SPABL.

When Dr Lee won his victory, he insisted as on the previous occasion that his opponents make an open and public admission of their mistake. This, the other side found difficult to accept, but an effort was made to find a way out of the impasse.⁵⁴ However, the matter was finally left unresolved because of certain unforeseen developments. The first of these was that in April the Government took security action against the Communist trade unions and arrested many of the leaders (not including Tan Sin). This happened because the unions were planning to celebrate the coming May Day with a demonstration.⁵⁵ Then, in July the Hong Lim by-election took place. Those trade unions which were unfriendly to Dr Lee Siew Choh made a decision to put aside all outstanding problems for a while and maintain a common front with him against the PAP in the by-election.⁵⁶ Lastly, Singapore separated from Malaysia in August and became an independent country, which rendered the "Secede from Malaysia" or "Crush Malaysia" controversy obsolete.

The controversy once again exposed the mess that the Communist movement was in at the time. The divisions and splits did considerable damage to it. For instance, there were Communists who did not know what to do when caught in the cross-fire between the two slogans. This fact was attested to by a Ng Bok Tiong:

Chan [that was Chen Hock Wah] ... told him that their contact would be suspended for a period of two years ... During this hiatus, Ng ... felt extremely vexed; and on certain vital issues like 'Crush Malaysia' or 'Secede Malaysia' was the correct slogan, he had no way of ascertaining it. He was unable to give positive directions to his two subordinates ...⁵⁷

So there was paralysis in this group.

While the Communist movement itself was in trouble, there was little likelihood that it could do any great harm to its enemies. The Alliance and the PAP were also at each other's throats at this time, but the BSS and the other left-wing organisations did not have the capacity to take advantage of the opportunity to further their own interests.

Phoney Independence

In 1965, Singapore left Malaysia and became an independent country. Reaction in the Communist organisations towards this was again divided. Dr Lee Siew Choh took a radical view of things and advocated radical solutions to problems. At headquarters level, the CPM adopted the same attitude. Certain Communists in the BSS and in the mass organisations in Singapore also adopted strong attitudes at first but abandoned ship eventually when danger loomed.

The first point of attack Dr Lee made on the separation between Singapore and the mainland was that the independence obtained by

Singapore was not genuine but phoney. In this, the CPM at headquarters level agreed with him. Communists who were dispersed in the BSS, the trade unions and elsewhere, however, varied in their reactions.

On 9 August 1965, the BSS and the PR issued a joint statement which declared that to them Singapore's independence was not genuine.⁵⁸ The statement also put in the demand that in place of a separate Singapore there should be a Singapore united with Malaya, and a unified country should be what could be considered truly independent, democratic and united. This new country should not include the Borneo territories.

When this statement was issued, Dr Lee Siew Choh was actually abroad and not in Singapore. However, he was informed by the other leaders of the BSS about the decision to publish such a statement. Also, as soon as he returned to Singapore, Dr Lee held a press conference in which he voiced the same views as the statement.⁵⁹ Thus, the joint statement of the BSS and the PR could be taken to be his line.

The reasons why the BSS and the PR did not consider Singapore to be genuinely independent were studied and decided upon by their leaders when they met to deliberate on the problem. According to one recollection, the view was:

... the defence arrangement [of independence] evinced British control of the Republic of Singapore's defence and security were apparently in the hands of both the Malaysian and British Governments. The clause the Singapore cannot sign any agreements with other countries in matters which might affect the security of Malaysia clinched the argument ...⁶⁰

Thus, because of the special arrangement between Britain, Malaysia and Singapore in the exercising of certain powers, Singapore could not be regarded as truly independent. After the publication of the joint statement, the party sponsored a mass rally to denounce Singapore's new status. Four thousand people were reported to have participated in the gathering.⁶¹

On 10 August, the MNLL also issued a statement on the question.⁶² It refused to recognise that Singapore had genuinely become independent. Like the BSS and the PR, it also stated that the objective of the left-wing struggle should be a unified Singapore and Malaya, completely free of British influence. On the first point, the statement read:

As a matter of fact, Singapore is still a new-type colony of the British imperialists; Lee Kuan Yew clique is still the agent of the British imperialists loyally supporting British imperialists' military, political and economic interests in Singapore.

And on the second point:

Our people should resolutely struggle for realisation of our nation's real independence, democracy, peace and reunification of Malay peninsula and Singapore to the end ...

Thus, the separation of Singapore from Malaysia was looked on by the CPM at the highest level in the same light as the leadership of the BSS and the PR.

As noted, the BSS decision to issue a joint statement with the PR condemning the independence of Singapore was actually made by other leaders of the party and not Lee Siew Choh. These other leaders included members of the CPM such as Kow Kee Seng and Koo Young.⁶³ These Communists did not hold different views from Dr Lee or from CPM headquarters on the question of whether Singapore was really independent after its breakaway from Malaysia. This was not the case in other matters, as will be seen later on.

In August 1965, there were 30 trade unions in the left-wing camp, counting both the pro-Tan Sin and the pro-Lee Siew Choh groups. All these unions also came out with a joint statement on the question of the separation of Singapore from Malaysia on the same day that the BSS and the PR did. But contrary to the BSS, PR or MNLL stand, the trade union statement welcomed the separation and pointed out that what had occurred only indicated what the unions had all along championed: that Singapore should leave Malaysia. However, because Singapore had actually already left Malaysia by then, the issue could no longer be a bone of contention between the political parties and the trade unions. A later statement mentioned that the unions should henceforth make it their objective to struggle for a truly genuine reunification of Singapore with the Malay peninsula.⁶⁴ Genuine reunification meant that non-Malays and Malays should be given absolute equality.

On the question of whether or not Singapore had really become independent, the statement was silent. However, in meetings of some of the unions, leaders were noted to have passed the judgement that Singapore's independence was not true but phoney.⁶⁵ In this, the unions had the same feelings as the BSS, the PR and the MNLL.

Although the left-wing was initially quite united in its stand on the question of Singapore's independence, dissident opinions soon appeared. One BSS representative in the Legislative Assembly, Lim Huan Boon, held the view that Singapore's independence should be recognised. According to him, there was no such thing as phoney or half independence. Lim was a member of the CPM.⁶⁶ Another leader of the BSS also considered Dr Lee Siew Choh and his friends to be on the wrong path. He

was Lim Chin Siong. As seen, when Operation Coldstore was carried out on 2 February 1963, Lim was arrested. When Singapore separated from Malaysia, Lim and two others wrote a letter to the BSS. In this, Lim told the BSS that its stand of not recognising the independence of Singapore was wrong. Singapore's new status was beneficial to the left-wing struggle. The BSS was requested to withdraw its statement on the subject. The Central Executive Committee of the BSS discussed Lim's letter and rejected it.⁶⁷

Parliamentarianism Abandoned

After declining to recognise the independence of Singapore, the Communist movement took a further step in refusing to operate within the parliamentary system. First, the decision was made that the left-wing should refrain from taking part in a general election in the future, should the Government move to call one. There was also discussion of whether or not the BSS representatives should resign from the existing Parliament, the renamed Legislative Assembly after Singapore became independent, but the conclusion was that this should not yet be done. Instead, when Parliament met in session in December 1965, the BSS ordered all its representatives to boycott the sittings. The decision led some of the dissident MPs to resign their memberships in both Parliament and the Party. This necessitated by-elections in the vacated constituencies in which the BSS refused to participate. Finally, in October 1966, the BSS got all its remaining representatives in Parliament to resign their seats and started what they called extra-parliamentary struggle, which was street-fighting. On this question of the abandonment of parliamentarianism, however, as over other issues, there was no unanimity of opinion in the Communist movement. Divisions followed in the wake of arguments.

The foremost advocate of abandonment of the parliamentary system was Dr Lee Siew Choh. As early as the quarrel with the real Communists in the left-wing organisations over National Service in 1964, he had spoken about not attending parliamentary sessions, not taking part in elections and fighting in the streets.⁶⁸ In September of the same year, after he had resigned his membership in the BSS because of the National Service quarrel, government intelligence discovered that he had mentioned to some of his close supporters that, should he return to the Party, he would no longer give emphasis to open legal work but rather to underground secret work.⁶⁹

After Dr Lee took the decision to boycott working the parliamentary system in September 1965, he proposed to the Central Executive Committee of the BSS that the left-wing movement should refrain from participating in any elections in the future, should the Government move to hold

one. He further suggested that BSS members in Parliament should resign from that body when a new constitution for independent Singapore was introduced. A general election was expected to follow the introduction of a new constitution.⁷⁰ Dr Lee Siew Choh's proposals were discussed.⁷¹

In October, the Central Executive Committee, with reservations among some members, took the decision to boycott any future elections.⁷² The matter was then referred to BSS representatives in Parliament for their views, some of whom were members of the Central Executive Committee. The greater number of the MPs agreed to boycott future elections but considered it unwise to resign their seats in Parliament at that moment.⁷³ The problem was not referred to the committees of the various branches of the Party for their deliberation and decision, a step which triggered off a protest campaign against Lee Siew Choh, accusing him of being undemocratic in the conducting of party affairs.

When recommending the above proposals to his party, Dr Lee had explained the reasons for his stand. According to a report, Lee said:

He felt ... that in the present circumstances, the Party [that was the BSS] formed an ineffective opposition, not even being allowed to hold rallies in their own constituencies. Besides, he anticipated a big defeat for the Party if it contested the next general elections. Because of the lack of suitable persons, they would be unable to field all fifty-one candidates and this would create a bad impression with the public. If, however, by chance, the Party won a majority, foreign troops would be used to suppress them. On the other hand, an elections boycott would indicate to the people that the constitutional struggle was useless. It would also attract international attention to the 'phoney' independence of Singapore ...⁷⁴

On 24 December 1965, Dr Lee Siew Choh issued a statement at a press conference stipulating eight conditions which the Government must accept before the BSS would take part in future elections. This threw further light on the thinking of the BSS on non-participation in elections.⁷⁵

The decision of Dr Lee Siew Choh to boycott future elections did not find favour with everyone in the BSS. As will be explained, most of the trade unions disliked the policy as well. Some of those who differed from Dr Lee were members of the CPM, but these persons were out of touch with the underground leadership.

Information on whether CPM headquarters and Dr Lee Siew Choh shared the same view over the question of boycotting elections in Singapore is meagre. There is only one source which was connected with Chen Hock Wah. It has already been seen that Chen left Singapore in July 1964. He came back two years later, however, to help restart the armed struggle in Malaya.⁷⁶ He was given instructions by Fong Chong Pik regarding this. After his arrival, Chen re-established contact with a number of his subor-

dinates, one of whom was Ng Bok Tiong.⁷⁷ In a conversation with Ng, Chen told him that the policy of the BSS to boycott elections was correct. A record on this says:

Chan ... opined that the barisan's ... boycotting of elections were 'absolutely correct'. Later ... stressed on armed struggle ...⁷⁸

This piece of evidence indicates that the CPM leadership did think along the same lines as Dr Lee Siew Choh.

The persons in the Central Executive Committee of the BSS who differed from Dr Lee were Kow Kee Seng and Low Por Tuck.⁷⁹ Kow was a member of the CPM. Low had been a member of the SPABL but whether or not he was also a Communist is not established.⁸⁰ The Central Executive Committee took the decision to accept Dr Lee's recommendations at a meeting on 11 October 1965.⁸¹ At that meeting, Kow was absent; Low was present, but he was persuaded to accept the views of the others.⁸²

Four MPs had reservations about boycotting elections. These were Kow Kee Seng again and then Chio Cheng Thun, Poh Ber Liak and Ong Lian Teng.⁸³ Both Chio and Poh were members of the CPM.⁸⁴ Ong's status, however, remains uncertain. Why Kow, Chio and Poh were opposed to Dr Lee's policy was perhaps because they still had in mind the Communist directive of 1957. Current attitudes of CPM Headquarters seemed not to have been conveyed to them. Kow's superior in the CPM was Chen Hock Wah and at that time Chen had not returned to Singapore from Indonesia. Poh Ber Liak soon took active steps to try to frustrate Dr Lee Siew Choh's policy. He did not oppose the boycott of elections on the grounds that such a course of action was incorrect. Rather, he raised the cry that Dr Lee and his followers made up their mind on the matter without consulting the committees of the various Party branches: this was dictatorship.

Poh had thought that his tactic would be effective. It was a fact that Dr Lee was ruling the BSS with an iron hand and that he did not give the branches a say in the matter of boycotting future parliamentary elections. Another thing was that after the National Service controversy was settled and Dr Lee had resumed leadership of the BSS, he immediately got the Central Executive Committee of the Party reorganised and had two staunch supporters appointed as members, one of whom was Ong Chang Sam. Ong took over control of the Organisation Committee under the Central Executive Committee as its Secretary and then went on to fill up this committee with other loyal supporters of Dr Lee, who had no previous experience in organisation work. The new Central Executive Committee had held office for three and a half years up to the point Poh took

up the crusade against Dr Lee, even though, according to the constitution of the Party, the Central Executive Committee should be elected every other two years. There was widespread dissatisfaction in the Party against Dr Lee.⁸⁵

Poh Ber Liak was the Chairman of the Changi/Tampines Branch. He mobilised his own and 11 other party branches to launch the criticism campaign against Dr Lee and his supporters. On 18 November 1965, the Central Executive Committee under Dr Lee held a meeting with the Chairmen and Secretaries of all the party branches. At the meeting, Dr Lee propounded his views on the abandonment of parliamentarianism. Poh's 12 branches presented him with a memorandum on the lack of democratic practice in the Party. The demand was raised that a similar meeting should be called in the future to discuss the complaint in the memorandum, pending which the Central Executive Committee should desist from making any more policy decisions, especially on the question of abandoning parliamentarianism. Poh's ultimate aim was to oust Dr Lee and his group from office.⁸⁶

Dr Lee responded with alacrity to the attack. At the meeting itself, he undertook that he would have the Central Executive Committee re-elected as soon as there were no more squabbles in the Party. Next, in March the following year, he had the whole organisation of the Party overhauled, including relieving from their posts those supporters who were inexperienced in organisational work.⁸⁷

Like the BSS itself, the trade unions were divided in their opinion on whether or not future elections in Singapore should be boycotted. In October, it was noted that 11 of the 30 trade unions in the left-wing camp were in favour of Dr Lee Siew Choh's policy.⁸⁸ Of the leaders, Tan Sin was noted to have spoken against the boycott.⁸⁹ Those of the unions which were opposed to Dr Lee were supposed to have met him to resolve differences, but until November no meeting took place.⁹⁰ The PR was also a component of the Communist movement. Its Chairman threw in his lot with the hard line of Lee Siew Choh.⁹¹

In the following month, another problem cropped up which deflected attention from this issue and became the new focus of dispute with the Government. The Government did not call a general election after all, but, in December, Parliament met. When this took place, Dr Lee, in line with his general policy of repudiating parliamentarianism, called for a boycott of its sittings. Accordingly, all the BSS MPs absented themselves.⁹² Dr Lee Siew Choh announced the boycott at a press conference. In his statement, he gave an explanation of why the BSS was taking this course of action. On this, a report stated:

[He accused] the PAP government of using the Legislative Assembly as a rubber-stamp to pass undemocratic laws and legalise anti-popular expenditure incurred by PAP Ministers. Important decisions and issues of national interest were made outside the Legislative Assembly, e.g. Singapore's secession and Independence and the drawing up of the State's new Constitution. Although there is in Singapore a Parliament and elected Members of Parliament, there is no Parliamentary democracy. Parliament is only called upon to give legal approval to what is already *fait accompli*. Attendance at the Parliamentary sessions would give support and respectability to the PAP show and help the pro-imperialist PAP deceive the people by giving credence to Singapore's 'phoney' independence and display of Parliamentary democracy ...⁹³

On the question of boycotting Parliament, CPM Headquarters held the same view as Dr Lee Siew Choh. Evidence about this again came from Chen Hock Wah's section of the Communist set-up. Chen's subordinate, Ng Bok Tiong, had a subordinate of his own whose name was Toh Ching Kah. Ng told Toh that Dr Lee Siew Choh's policy of boycotting Parliament was right. What Ng said to Toh must have come from Chen Hock Wah. On the affair, Toh said:

Ng Bok Tiong ... instructed me to support Barisan's current political struggle strategy. He said the Party was of the opinion that Lee Siew Choh's policy, e.g. boycott of Parliament ... was correct, and that all leftwing unions and progressive bodies must co-ordinate with Barisan policy ... He asked me to have a good understanding of these issues and read analysis in the 'Barisan' and 'Barisan Bulletin'.⁹⁴

At this time, the PAP had charged that the stand of the BSS was the same as that of the MNLL and the CPM. The BSS denied the truth of the accusation.⁹⁵ However, judging from what was passed around in the Communist underground in Singapore at the time, as evidenced in the Chen, Ng and Toh connection, the allegation made by the PAP was not unfounded.

Over the question of boycotting Parliament, as over previous problems, Dr Lee Siew Choh's views failed to gain unanimous support in the left-wing organisations. Those in the BSS itself who disagreed with him were Lim Huan Boon, Kow Kee Seng and Chio Cheng Thun, and to such an extent that they all resigned their membership from Parliament as well as from the BSS. Lim did so in December 1965⁹⁶ and the other two in January the following year.⁹⁷ As seen, Lim had differed with Dr Lee over the problem of recognising Singapore's real independence, and Kow and Chio were not keen about boycotting elections. After the three had left Parliament and the BSS, they issued statements to the public which were unfavourable to the interests of the left-wing.⁹⁸

It may be of interest to speculate on why these three persons deserted the Communist movement. The explanation seems to be that they were demoralised. They had lost contact with their underground superiors.⁹⁹ The last directive which they received from the CPM regarding long-term strategy for the struggle in Singapore seems to have been the 1957 document. That directive advised a soft policy. However, Dr Lee Siew Choh was now adopting a militant posture and they were not receiving any instructions from the underground leadership on whether to go along with Dr Lee.¹⁰⁰ As Dr Lee's strategy was sure to invite severe retaliation from the Government, they were caught in a difficult position and the best way out for them was, of course, to give up everything.

That Lim, Kow and Chio were afraid of bloody collisions with the Government was attested to by another Communist, Koo Young. On this point, Koo Young said:

Three of the MPs, namely Lim ... Chio ... and Kow ... after boycotting Parliament for some time, began to doubt that the Barisan Sosialis C.E.C. had taken a correct decision on this matter. They felt that the objective behind the boycott of Parliament was to expose the dictatorship of the PAP and mourn the death of Parliamentary democracy in Singapore but not to become a prelude leading to extra-parliamentary struggle. Although Dr Lee ... did not mention anything about extra-parliamentary struggle at that juncture, we all could sense that the only logical conclusion of such continuous boycott would certainly lead to extra-parliamentary struggle. But none of them had expressed this feeling openly nor had they given any reason why they could not accept extra-parliamentary struggle. This was the main reason why three of them resigned from the Party.¹⁰¹

Lim and Kow themselves gave explanations of why they changed their attitudes, though not Chio. Lim went straight to the root cause of his desertion,¹⁰² but Kow made no mention of his disillusionment with Communism.¹⁰³

Following their resignations, one curious thing which Kow and Chio did was to apply the next day to the Party to allow them to withdraw their resignations and be reinstated in their memberships. The reason for this odd behaviour was that they were criticised for their action by Kow's own party branch and the two men were unable to endure the pressure of condemnation, so they sought to return to the fold.¹⁰⁴ The action of Lim, Kow and Chio incensed the rest of the leadership in the BSS. They retaliated against the three by expelling them from the Party. Their pleas for consideration of repentance were rejected. The Central Executive Committee also had the various branches of the Party condemn their conduct in a meeting convened for the purpose.¹⁰⁵

The meeting between the Central Executive Committee and the various party branches to discuss the question of intra-party democracy, which was demanded by the 12 rebellious branches in November 1965, was called in late December the same year. On this occasion, Dr Lee Siew Choh demanded that differences between his group and his critics be resolved. The 12 branches, however, refused to bind themselves to any commitment because the meeting was called too soon for them to have enough time to study the problem. Thereupon, Dr Lee dispersed the meeting but gave warning that the existing leadership would continue to function and the policy of abandoning parliamentarianism would be pursued.¹⁰⁶

This inconclusive encounter between Dr Lee and the 12 branches engendered a cold war between them. A number of the branches soon boycotted activities sponsored by the Central Executive Committee, such as refusing to sell the Party organ or taking part in canvassing for campaigns.¹⁰⁷ The Central Executive Committee responded by trying to exert pressure on the recalcitrant branches to abandon their opposition. Subjected to this, the committee of one branch resigned from office en bloc. The others, however, stood their ground defiantly. The Central Executive Committee then dissolved these branches and appointed working committees to take charge of their ordinary members.¹⁰⁸

Kow Kee Seng and Chio Cheng Thun had given help to the 12 branches in the latter's agitation against Dr Lee Siew Choh. Their quitting the left-wing movement was condemned not only by Dr Lee's group but also by the party branches as a whole. The rank and file in the BSS suspected that Kow and Chio had gone over to the Government. Because of this, they refused to show any more sympathy for the agitation of the 12 rebellious branches and rallied instead behind Dr Lee. Poh Ber Liak's protest movement, therefore, died a natural death.¹⁰⁹

The trade unions were again divided over the problem of the boycott of parliamentary sessions. Six unions came out in support of Dr Lee Siew Choh.¹¹⁰ However, more unions were against him, and a certain leader of one of these unions was heard to make the remark that the BSS was digging its own grave.¹¹¹

When Lim, Kow and Chio quit the Communist movement, the trade unions all came together to condemn the three men, despite some of them supporting the boycott of Parliament and others not. It might be surprising that even the anti-Lee Siew Choh unions should have criticised Lim, Kow and Chio. Why this happened was because, in the view of the BSS rank and file, the three men were considered to have gone over to the side of the Government, which was looked upon as a common enemy. To all

the unions, this was unforgiveable.¹¹² However, there was another aspect and this was that the anti-Lee group did not really attack the three persons as vigorously as the other group. After reading the statement issued by them, Dr Lee declared that what was said only confused the people and damaged the cause of the left-wing.¹¹³ The police confirm the impression of Dr Lee, for they found that the condemnation made by these unions was not whole-hearted and was hedged with reservations.¹¹⁴

In connection with the trade unions' criticism of the various resignations, there was another complaint from Tan Sin of SCHFEU against Kow and Chio for leaving the BSS. Tan's point, however, was not that the two men should have stayed where they were in order to give support to Dr Lee Siew Choh, but on the contrary, his idea was that they should have continued to be an obstruction to Dr Lee. By withdrawing, they left the field open to Dr Lee. Tan Sin was a persistent enemy of Dr Lee.¹¹⁵

The celebration of May Day in 1966 by the left-wing trade unions was led by Tan Sin. In this matter too, a conflict arose between Dr Lee and Tan. One point of animosity was that Tan wished to utilise the occasion to start off an anti-United States campaign, as did Dr Lee, through the BSS. In discussions on how the two sides could co-operate on a project of the same nature, Tan was told by Dr Lee that leadership must be exercised by himself.¹¹⁶ A second point of difference was that Tan Sin accepted stringent conditions imposed by the police on the celebrations. Dr Lee considered this weak.¹¹⁷ Finally, one of the resolutions adopted for the celebrations gave implicit recognition to Singapore's newly acquired independence. Dr Lee was highly irritated over this.¹¹⁸ Only 23 of all the Communist unions attended the celebrations. Six other unions stayed away and held a commemoration on their own. These six unions were supporters of Dr Lee.¹¹⁹

At the end of the month, the trade union of which Tan Sin was President, the SCHFEU, held its annual general meeting and election of new office-bearers. Dr Lee succeeded in manoeuvring a supporter of his into being elected the new President and Tan Sin into being voted out of office. Thus, Dr Lee eliminated his enemy.¹²⁰

The controversy over the problem of boycotting Parliament did great harm to the Communist movement. Low Por Tuck resigned his Treasurership in the BSS following on the heels of the departure of Lim, Kow and Chio. Explaining his action, Low declared that the intra-party crisis had made him feel that it was not worth his while to continue to work for the BSS any longer.¹²¹ Low was a close friend of Kow.¹²² Even ordinary members of the BSS lost interest in the Party. One fact showed this very clearly: the sales figure of the Party paper in January 1966 was only 6,000, whereas previously, the average monthly had been 11,000.¹²³

S.T. Bani also gave up his Parliamentary seat and BSS membership in January 1966.¹²⁴ Bani was a member of the Central Executive Committee of the BSS, a member of Parliament and President of SATU. But he was not a member of the CPM. In the security action of the Government in October 1963, he was detained. In the wake of the other left-wing leaders, Bani announced his resignation while in jail. According to Dr Lee, S.T. Bani gave up because he "broke down under pressure from Special Branch personnel".¹²⁵ Needless to say, Bani's surrender demoralised the Communist movement even further.

The PR sided with Dr Lee in his quarrel with Lim, Kow and Chio.¹²⁶ Because the four BSS MPs vacated their seats, by-elections had to be held in their various constituencies. Lim Huan Boon's constituency was Redhill, Kow's was Paya Lebar, Chio's was Chua Chu Kang and Bani's was Crawford. The by-election for Redhill was held in January 1966 and those for the other wards, two months later. In consonance with its general policy of repudiating parliamentarianism, the BSS fielded no candidates.¹²⁷

In Redhill, the PAP candidate was challenged by an Independent but defeated him. In the other constituencies, the PAP candidates were returned unopposed.¹²⁸

As there was competition in Redhill, the BSS called upon the electorate to cast blank or spoilt votes as a means of protest against the Government, but response to this plea was poor.¹²⁹ In the other constituencies, as there was no balloting, the BSS merely went round the houses to condemn the Government and explain the policy of boycott. Reaction to this propaganda, however, was also noted to be cool.¹³⁰

The CPM was in full agreement with the attitude adopted by Dr Lee Siew Choh regarding the question of the various by-elections. For the policy of the CPM, reference can again be made to the instructions given by Ng Bok Tiong to Toh Ching Kah. In the same statement, quoted earlier in this chapter, in which Ng said that the CPM supported Dr Lee's boycott of Parliament, Ng indicated that the CPM also believed in the boycott of the by-elections.¹³¹ This was only to be expected, however, because the CPM was now, like Dr Lee Siew Choh, in an extremist mood.

The boycott of the by-elections did not evoke any controversy in the BSS itself or in the trade unions. Some of the BSS branches were not actually in favour of the boycott but they subordinated themselves to the decision of the Central Executive Committee.¹³² The PR gave support to the boycott of the Redhill by-election.¹³³ This party said nothing about the other by-elections, but that it was in favour of the latter too was probably understood and no statement on the point needed to be made.

In October 1966, the remaining representatives of the BSS in Parliament resigned their seats, completing the Party's final instalment of the repudiation of parliamentarianism. The move was accompanied by a declaration that the left-wing would henceforth carry out struggles against the Government outside Parliament. This new form of struggle was called extra-parliamentary struggle.¹³⁴ The long-term considerations which led the BSS to take this last step were, of course, the arguments which underlay the whole philosophy of boycotting parliamentarianism.¹³⁵ There were, besides, two reasons which precipitated action particularly at the end of 1966. The first was a taunt thrown at the BSS by the PAP that its MPs were enjoying parliamentary allowances while not doing any parliamentary work, as they were boycotting parliament. The attack created an unfavourable picture of the BSS in the mind of the public. The second reason was that two of the BSS MPs had been convicted in court for making seditious propaganda in saying that Government was trying to murder Lim Chin Siong in prison.¹³⁶ This led to their losing their seats in Parliament. Since the strength of the BSS in Parliament would be further reduced, the BSS thought it would make better sense for it to give up Parliament altogether and fight in the streets.

According to Dr Lee, the extra-parliamentary method of struggle specifically meant:

Strikes, boycott of school classes, demonstrations and protests ...¹³⁷

With the inauguration of extra-parliamentary struggle, a new stage began in the political history of the island.

As in the case with boycotting elections and parliamentary sessions, Dr Lee Siew Choh's last act of giving up parliamentarianism had the support of the CPM. Reference may be made again to instructions given by Ng Bok Tiong to Toh Ching Kah. In the same statement mentioned before, Ng told Toh:

... the Party was of the opinion that ... extra-parliamentary struggle was correct ...

Because of this,

... all left-wing unions and progressive bodies ... must take part in Barisan's demonstrations and other forms of struggle outside Parliament in order to discredit the PAP regime and expose its so-called parliamentary democracy, to educate the masses and make them realise that the reactionaries could not be overthrown by constitutional struggle ...¹³⁸

The CPM and the BSS were thus similar.

On 1 November 1966, the 5th Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour met in Tirana. The CPM was one of 29 fraternal parties which

attended the gathering. In a message of congratulations read out to the assembly, the CPM representative made the remark:

... at present, under the leadership of the CPM, the Malayan people were holding aloft the banner of armed struggle, and are struggling to realise genuine independence. We firmly believe that under the guidance of Marx-Leninist and Mao Tse-tung thoughts, our people who have glorious revolutionary traditions will definitely be able to overcome all difficulties and achieve final victory ...¹³⁹

In connection with this, the police in Singapore observed:

The CPM's advocacy of 'armed struggle' and achievement of 'genuine independence' indicated that Dr Lee Siew Choh's 'militant' line ... has the support of the CPM and is the correct line of struggle.¹⁴⁰

The two were evidently travelling along the same path.

Just as there was no dissent in the BSS to the line of not taking part in various by-elections, so there was no disagreement to the policy of the remaining BSS representatives leaving Parliament and the launching of a new form of struggle. However, that was only one side of the picture. On the other hand, among those who gave up their seats in Parliament, three never again visited the BSS headquarters: they lost interest in their Party, because they did not really believe in the policy of extra-parliamentary struggle.¹⁴¹ The three were Poh Ber Liak, Tan Cheng Tong and Ong Lian Teng. As mentioned earlier, Poh was a member of the CPM,¹⁴² as was Tan.¹⁴³ The exact status of Ong, however, could not be ascertained.

Very obviously, Poh and Tan were in a dilemma like Lim Huan Boon, Kow Kee Seng and Chio Cheng Thun. They were still living under the influence of the 1957 directive and the CPM had not communicated to them its new strategy of struggle. Now Lee Siew Choh was advocating a course which would invite heavy punishment from the Government. They therefore dropped out of the Communist fold.

The heightened militancy in the BSS gained the sympathy and support of a great number of trade unions and the PR. Nineteen out of the 30 left-wing unions issued statements declaring a common stand with the BSS, as did the PR.¹⁴⁴ When Singapore became an independent country, the method of struggle through Parliament, previously followed by the Communist movement, in practical terms, came to an end.

Defeat and Destruction

There were further struggles between the Government and the Communists in which the latter suffered defeats and losses.

Hong Lim By-Election, 1965

The by-election in the Hong Lim constituency in July 1965, already mentioned in connection with the conflict between the Alliance Party and the PAP,¹⁴⁵ was contested by the BSS and the PAP. The BSS candidate, Ong Chang Sam, lost to the PAP candidate, Lee Khoon Choy.¹⁴⁶

Ong Chang Sam concentrated on attacking the slogan which the PAP had raised against the Alliance Party — “Malaysian Malaysia”. The objective of the PAP in raising this battle-cry was to rally non-Malay support, especially Chinese support. The BSS tried to show that the PAP could not defend Chinese interests.¹⁴⁷ Lee Khoon Choy made capital out of the fact that the BSS was a united front companion of the Indonesians, who were perpetrating sabotage and terrorist activities in Singapore, causing loss of life and damage to property.¹⁴⁸ Lee’s offensives struck home.

The outcome of the by-election was of fateful consequence to both the Communist movement in the island and the PAP. Since the referendum of 1962, the PAP had been drawing electoral support away from the leftists to itself. The general election in 1963 was another development of this trend. The Hong Lim by-election further strengthened the PAP position. Basically, whichever party enjoyed the backing of the people would win in the struggle for power.

The declining fortunes of the BSS during this period seem to have shown up in another way and this was in the contraction of its membership. It had been noted that around the end of 1963, this party had 36 branches.¹⁴⁹ By 1965, however, the number had decreased to 34,¹⁵⁰ in 1966, it shrank further to 33,¹⁵¹ and of these only about 20 were effective.¹⁵² On the other hand, the PAP maintained its 51 branches throughout the three years.¹⁵³

End of the Student Movement

During the years under review, the Government took a number of measures to wind up the left-wing student movement in the tertiary educational institutions.

In January 1964, the Registrar of Societies approved the registration of the Nanyang University Student Fellowship. Simultaneously, a “*pro tempore* committee” of the GNUG came into existence. These two organisations made attempts to capture the leadership of the NUSU and the GNUG from the Communists and their supporters. The movements failed, however, and the two organisations merely acted as rivals to the Communist groups.¹⁵⁴

In June, the same year, a group of students in the University of Singapore tried to gain control of the Socialist Club. Outmanoeuvred by the leftists in that club too, this group then made preparations to form themselves into a Democratic Socialist Club to rival the Socialist Club.¹⁵⁵

The last chapter related how the Government entered into negotiations with Tan Lark Sye as well as the GNUG on reorganising Nanyang University as early as 1960. However, until late 1963, there were still problems outstanding.¹⁵⁶ In June 1964, negotiations were resumed with the Acting Chairman, simultaneously Vice-Chairman, and other representatives of the existing Nanyang University Council. Tan Lark Sye had by then resigned from the Council as Chairman after the general elections in 1963. This time, agreement was reached between the two sides.¹⁵⁷

The crucial issue was how much representation the Singapore Government, the Central Government of Malaysia, and the state governments of Sarawak and Sabah should each have on the next University Council. The original proposal of the Singapore Government that, besides its own number of three delegates, the other governments should each have one was accepted. It was further agreed that the supporters, also known as members, of the university should be represented by 12 persons, the Senate by three and the GNUG by two. Five community leaders should also join the Council. The figures stipulated in the Nanyang University Ordinance were, on the whole, revised.¹⁵⁸

The agreement also provided for the projected new University Council to institute reforms in the university according to the recommendations of the Gwee Ah Leng Report and on the basis of the Nanyang University Ordinance. It also stated that after Nanyang University had improved, the Government would treat it in the same way as the University of Singapore in the matter of financial assistance, that it should henceforth cease to be a place of political or subversive activities, that it could continue to use the Chinese language as its medium of instruction and that the Government would recognise its degrees.¹⁵⁹

The agreement raised a storm of protest from the NUSU and other student societies in the university. Tan Lark Sye and the GNUG also opposed it. On the eve of the meeting for talks between the Government and the university representatives, the NUSU sent a memorandum to the latter and advised them to strive to keep the university as it was and resist any Government attempt to reorganise it.¹⁶⁰ About a week after the meeting, the union aired its comments in a statement on the agreement reached between the two parties. The Gwee Ah Leng Report was deprecated for having the intention to anglicise the university, that was to change the institution's medium of instruction from Chinese to English. Demands were put forth that the Government should give monetary aid to the university without any conditions as well as recognise its degrees. On the question of political activities being carried out in the university, the union charged that it was the Government which was guilty of this kind of interference.¹⁶¹ Ten days later, the NUSU, together with 12

academic societies in the university, submitted a petition to the Prime Minister in which the same views were more or less repeated.¹⁶²

Towards the end of the month, about a week after the submission of the petition, the Central Government launched a security operation in the university with the intention of arresting a total of 86 students. However, in the end only 56 were detained.¹⁶³ The NUSU reacted to the arrests by convening emergency meetings of the whole student population. In one of these meetings, a resolution was passed that a three-day hunger strike should be staged.¹⁶⁴ The hunger strike subsequently took place, but after one day the Vice-Chairman of the existing University Council visited the students and advised them to call it off. He promised to bring up their grievances for discussion at the next meeting of the Council. His advice was accepted.¹⁶⁵ In the middle of July, the Central Government had 99 students dismissed from the university. Of these, about 50 had been arrested in the previous police offensive.¹⁶⁶

Several days later, a new University Council, still elected under the terms of the Nanyang University Ordinance but not according to the new proposals of the Government, held its first meeting at the CCC. Several hundred Nanyang students assembled outside the building and petitioned the Council to help them in their opposition to the Government. Earlier, a number of university staff had also been dismissed from service. These had now joined up with the students in bringing their grievances to the attention of the University Council. The police dispersed some of the assembly, after which the rest marched to the Hokkien Association. On the way, the column again met with the police, but a great number of them eventually managed to reach their destination. The plan was to stage a camp-in at the association and to convene a parents' meeting, but this failed to materialise because the rank and file students had not been briefed by their leaders beforehand that there would be such a course of action.¹⁶⁷

Early in August, the NUSU managed to organise a meeting of some parents of the dismissed students in the campus of the university. The gathering was promptly dispersed by the police.¹⁶⁸ A few days after this event, an announcement was made that activities of the NUSU would be suspended until its constitution was approved by the new University Council.¹⁶⁹ The Government allowed the dismissed students to appeal for reinstatement. NUSU leaders advised the affected students not to submit but the advice was ignored by more than half of the affected students by the time the union was suspended.¹⁷⁰ The university reopened for registration of students in the middle of August and classes commenced soon afterwards. There was no trouble from the left-wing students.¹⁷¹

Tan Lark Sye's opposition to the proposed reorganisation of Nanyang University made itself felt in several areas. His resistance, however, was quickly overcome. The agreement to reorganise the university was concluded with the Government by a team from the University Council. A higher authority in the university than the Council was the conference of representatives of university supporters. It was probably Tan Lark Sye's hope that the reorganisation agreement would not be accepted by this gathering. In early July 1964, the conference met. Tan chaired the session, but the delegates voted approval for the reorganisation plan.¹⁷²

Tan had resigned his Chairmanship of the University Council after the general elections in 1963.¹⁷³ However, he was now interested in becoming the leader of the Council once again; obviously, his change of mind was for the purpose of fighting the Government. Towards the end of July, a new University Council was elected under the terms of the existing Nanyang University Ordinance. Tan failed to acquire the leadership of this new Council, for at its first meeting, the body elected Ko Teck Kin Chairman.¹⁷⁴

An important item in the reorganisation of the university was for the current Vice-Chancellor to be replaced by a *pro tempore* committee, consisting of the deans of the various faculties in the university and some other persons, to take charge of administration until a new Vice-Chancellor was appointed. Tan Lark Sye got the Acting Chairman of the University Council to frustrate implementation of this move. Eventually, however, the Government prevailed over Tan and the necessary reform was carried out. In consequence, the Acting Chairman of the University Council resigned his position in the Council.¹⁷⁵ Tan's defeat was capped by his Singapore citizenship being revoked in the middle of the month.¹⁷⁶

The GNUG was the next to oppose the reorganisation of Nanyang University. At the end of June, when the Central Government made arrests of students in the university, the GNUG issued a public statement condemning the action.¹⁷⁷ Early in July, it issued yet another statement expressing doubt that the agreement to reorganise Nanyang University signed between the Government and the University Council could be effectively implemented. The statement announced that the Executive Committee of the guild would resign *en bloc*.¹⁷⁸ In the following month, the new University Council made a decision that the draft constitution of the GNUG should be dealt with by the *Pro tempore* Committee of the University.¹⁷⁹

In 1965, the authorities in Nanyang University issued new regulations to govern the management of student societies within the campus so that they could no longer be manipulated by the CPM. This aroused intense

protest from the leadership of these societies.¹⁸⁰ In June, the committee members of three such societies resigned *en bloc* to show defiance. At the same time, they had statements published in the press as well as circulated to the public to voice their dissatisfaction.¹⁸¹ For making public pronouncements without prior approval, the university authorities instituted disciplinary action against the student leaders. This development gave rise to another series of protests in the form of painting slogans, pasting up posters and so on.¹⁸² In August, the vacation period, the university authorities notified by post 99 committee members of the various student organisations that they must sign letters of regret for issuing statements to the press, or distributing them to the public, on pain of dismissal if they refused. At first, the affected students resisted the order. Finally, however, all of them submitted and signed the letters.¹⁸³ Thus, the new regulations prevailed and the CPM was henceforth prevented from making use of the student societies.

In June, the authorities allowed an Economics Society to be formed to become a rival of the Communist-dominated Social Science Society. Agitation against this led nowhere.¹⁸⁴

One of the changes which had to be made in the reorganisation of Nanyang University was to reform its curriculum, which both the Prescott and the Gwee Ah Leng committees had touched upon. Consequently, in January 1965, a third committee called the Curriculum Review Committee, under the Chairmanship of Wang Gungwu, was appointed to deal with the matter; it submitted its report four months later.¹⁸⁵ Recommendations were made for a revised curriculum, a new degree structure, the appointment of competent staff and so on.¹⁸⁶

The report stirred up a hornet's nest among the students in the university and a protest movement soon appeared, the students charging that the report had the aim of anglicising the university. The basis of the condemnation was that the report suggested that the English language should be learned and made use of more widely by the students. A second criticism was levelled against the report's recommendation to abolish three existing departments in the university, namely, the Departments of Modern Languages and Literature, Education and Chemical Engineering, a move which would affect the fate of students in these departments. Other parts of the Communist movement extended assistance to the Nanyang University students in their struggle.

The report was published in September 1965.¹⁸⁷ For several days during the beginning of October, the new Vice-Chancellor of the university spoke to students of different departments on the curriculum report. At a meeting on 5 October, his speech was interrupted by jeering and

shouting, and had to be prematurely terminated. Also, when he was on his way back to his quarters, he and a party of professors were jeered at and attacked with sand and pebbles. The students dispersed only when the police arrived on the scene. At another meeting on the next day, the Vice-Chancellor was again jeered at and heckled. Fist-fights also broke out between left and right-wing students and others. People were hurt. The police also had to be called in to control the situation. On 7 October, the Vice-Chancellor was scheduled to speak again but the occasion eventually had to be called off because further trouble was expected from the students.¹⁸⁸

Following these incidents, on three different days within the same month, the various student societies in the university made submissions to the Vice-Chancellor, requesting rejection of the Wang Gungwu Report or protesting against left-wing students being beaten up in the clash on 6 October.¹⁸⁹

On 27 October, the disciplinary authorities of the university announced the dismissal of 85 students for their part in the incidents on 5 and 6 October.¹⁹⁰ The students responded to the dismissals by launching a boycott of classes. The boycott was begun on 28 and 29 October. On 1 November, the campaign was resumed and lasted 22 days. During the first stage, absenteeism was nearly 40 per cent and during the second, 100 per cent. Pickets were posted to the various classrooms to effect the campaign.¹⁹¹

By now, the agitation was not just for the rejection of the Wang Gungwu Report but also for the reinstatement of the dismissed students. A "Nantah Students' Oppose Revision of Curriculum and Oppose Oppression Action Committee" consisting of nine persons, was formed to lead the fight and look after the plight of the dismissed students.¹⁹² An intensive propaganda effort accompanied the boycott: banners, posters, slogans and suchlike appeared in the campus as well as in town. The nine-man Action Committee brought out a *Nantah Express*. Meetings were held frequently.¹⁹³ Attempts were made to get the Vice-Chancellor to negotiate the reinstatement of the dismissed students, but failed. An attempt was also made to submit a memorandum to the Prime Minister, which also failed. Efforts were undertaken to get the CCC and the University Council to come to the rescue.¹⁹⁴

On 13 November, Ko Teck Kin and a few others from the University Council had a meeting with the Prime Minister. The latter gave the assurance that the Chinese language would continue to be the medium of instruction in the university. Later on, Ko with his party and government representatives also made a decision separately to allow the present

students of the Departments of Modern Languages and Literature, Education and Chemical Engineering to continue their studies until they graduated.¹⁹⁵

Ko Teck Kin's settlement of the issues was rejected by the students, who made an announcement on this. The students used the name of the Vice-Chairman of the University Council to oppose the authority of Ko. They stated that the Vice-Chairman was against the report of the Curriculum Review Committee.¹⁹⁶

On 20 November, the Vice-Chancellor gave notice that the boycott had to be terminated and classes resumed on 22 November. The students, however, refused to comply with the order. On 22 November, the police took action to break the boycott: they moved against the pickets who were posted around the classrooms and dispersed them. Thirty-three students were arrested.¹⁹⁷ The nine-man Action Committee made strenuous efforts to get the students to continue to absent themselves for classes. The call was effective for a while but was finally ignored. The left-wing students themselves were afraid of further punishment and uncommitted students were reluctant to go along with them. On 6 December, a decision was made to call off the boycott.¹⁹⁸

In their struggle, the Nanyang University students were aided by left-wing students from other tertiary institutions in the city, the old boys' associations, the trade unions and the BSS. Other students who helped the agitators in Nanyang University were members of the Socialist Club in the University of Singapore as well as the Political Society and the Students' Union in the Singapore Polytechnic and Ngee Ann College. These issued public statements on behalf of the agitators, participated in some of the meetings and even took action to apply pressure on the CCC to intervene in the issue on their behalf.¹⁹⁹

Of the nearly three dozen old boys' associations in the left-wing camp at this time, 11 took the lead in giving assistance to the Nanyang University agitators. These formed themselves into a "Nantah Incident Sub-Committee". Their activities comprised issuing public statements, helping the students in their propaganda campaign, paying them a comfort visit and giving them a cultural show, as well as collecting donations for them.²⁰⁰

The trade unions also organised a "Nantah Incident Sub-Committee" and gave more or less the same type of assistance to the Nanyang students. The trade unions also on one occasion sent representatives to see some of the leaders of the CCC to persuade them to come out on behalf of the Nanyang students. This effort proved futile, however.²⁰¹

The BSS helped the Nanyang University students in much the same way as the others. However, it had its own special programme of paying

the students comfort visits. At the very beginning of the agitation in the university, it had arranged for different groups of its members to see the students on different days, from 3 to 6 November. The programme did not work out in the end, however. The first group was turned away by the police and other proposed trips were called off because it was discovered that the neutralist students in the campus were hostile to a BSS presence.²⁰²

For their interference in the Nanyang University issue, both the old boys' associations and the trade unions were punished and serious damage was suffered. More will be said about this later.²⁰³ In short, the Communists were defeated by the Government in the fight over the matter of the Wang Gungwu Report.

However, agitation against the reorganisation of Nanyang University was revived at the end of 1966. As part of the reorganisation programme, a new library was built for the university. On 29 October, the Prime Minister officiated at the opening of this new facility. Without warning, 200 left-wing students staged a demonstration to protest against all past and present acts of the reorganisation effort. A memorandum was presented to the Prime Minister. A student leader spoke on their grievances and the demonstrators paraded around the campus, carrying placards and banners, shouting slogans and singing songs.²⁰⁴

Agitation continued after the initial encounter. Two days later, a "Nantah Students for University Autonomy and Student Rights Action Committee" was formed to manage the struggle. Then a little later, a Students' National Action Front was created to mobilise support from English-educated students.²⁰⁵ On 1 November, the Action Committee sent a memorandum to the Vice-Chancellor of the university setting out complaints and demanding rectification. A few days later, a public forum was held in which the Government and the university authorities were attacked. Towards the middle of the month, a demonstration was held outside the Vice-Chancellor's office to demand the reinstatement of two students who had been dismissed from the university for wrongs committed in connection with other issues. Then came a protest meeting at which various discontents were aired.²⁰⁶

On 15 November, the university authorities announced the dismissal of 60 students for acts of indiscipline.²⁰⁷ The next day, the students started a boycott of classes which was to last for three days. Pickets were posted around the buildings to ensure the observance of the boycott and a protest meeting was held.²⁰⁸ That same day, the university announced the dismissal of a further 50 students.²⁰⁹ On 17 November, the Government arrested and detained 10 of the dismissed students.²¹⁰ Classes resumed two days later but attendance was poor. The university authorities gave

warning that failure to attend lectures would be punished. After this, attendance returned to normal.²¹¹ Thus, the Communists lost again.

Conflict also developed between the Government and students at Ngee Ann College. Ngee Ann College was founded in May 1963 by a group of Teochews who were originally the founders of Nanyang University, but who broke away to start this new institution. They resented the Hokkiens, led by Tan Lark Sye, for their domination of the university.²¹²

In 1964, the founders invited two American scholars to visit the college and make recommendations for its future development. Later on, a committee headed by Thong Saw Pak was appointed for much the same purpose. The committee submitted a report of its findings and recommendations in July 1966, released to the public a few months later.²¹³

The college was created as a rival to Nanyang University and was expected to develop into a university eventually. The first batch of graduates were promised that degrees would be conferred on them. The Thong Saw Pak Report recommended, among other things, that the college should become a university only in the distant future. For the present, the institution should serve only as a community college. However, current students should be given their degrees when they completed their studies. The report also suggested that, to play the role of a community college, the institution should recruit students not only from Chinese language secondary schools but also from other language-medium schools. This would entail the college giving instruction not only in Chinese but also in English or Malay.²¹⁴

The Thong Saw Pak Report incurred a storm of protest from the students in the college. Firstly, they resented the recommendation that the college could not become a university in the near future and, secondly, they disliked the prospect of English being increasingly used at the expense of Chinese. They campaigned for the rejection of the report. Students from other tertiary institutions came to their support. Middle school students, cultural organisations, trade unions, the BSS and the PR also offered aid.²¹⁵

In late September and early October, leaders from the Ngee Ann College Students' Union (NACSU) saw the Chairman of the Ngee Ann Kongsu, a public organisation of the Teochew community responsible for the college, and on the latter occasion, the Teochew Eight Districts Association, about the Thong Saw Pak Report, but achieved no result. On 12 October, they petitioned the Minister of Education on the issue.²¹⁶

Examinations in the college were scheduled for 17–20 October. The students decided to boycott the examinations. They also made up their mind to boycott classes after the examinations and camp in the compound

during the boycott. The decisions were carried out and an intensive propaganda campaign accompanied the agitation.²¹⁷ On the day the boycott of classes began, the students attempted to march in demonstration to the Ministry of Education to present a memorandum. They were broken up by the police, however. The next day, the memorandum was given to a Ministry official by representatives. On 22 October, a similar memorandum was handed over to the Ngee Ann Kongsi.²¹⁸ On 25 October, the students successfully staged a procession to the Prime Minister's Office and a memorandum, which set out their grievances and demands, was handed to the Prime Minister.²¹⁹ On 4 November, the students marched again in procession to the Prime Minister's Office. There was a "blood-signing" ceremony before the march. At the ceremony, students pricked their fingers and smeared blood on a scroll to form the Chinese characters "blood letter" below a three-point resolution calling for the repeal of the Thong Saw Pak Report and other things. At the office of the Prime Minister, the demonstrators clashed with the police and there were casualties on both sides.²²⁰ The next day, there was a "Crush Thong Saw Pak Report Data Exhibition" as well as a protest meeting in the campus, and on 12 November there was a cultural show.²²¹

The Minister of Education invited the student delegation to meet him on condition that they called a halt to the boycott of classes and the camp-in. On 18 November, the students rejected the invitation.²²² On 19 November, the police took action to break up the students on the campus. They were dispersed with tear-gas and 130 of them were arrested and detained. Later on, 81 were dismissed by the college authorities. The NACSU was dissolved.²²³ Classes resumed on 23 November, with 50 per cent attendance.²²⁴

Students from the Singapore Polytechnic, Nanyang University and the University of Singapore all came to the help of the Ngee Ann students. Organisations in these institutions which were involved were the Singapore Polytechnic Political Society, the Singapore Polytechnic Student's Union, the University of Singapore Socialist Club and the University of Singapore Students' Union. The forms of assistance given were issuing statements on behalf of the striking students, taking part in their meetings, paying them comfort visits and collecting donations. Especially important was participation in the demonstration at the Prime Minister's Office on 4 November.²²⁵ Students from some secondary schools, cultural organisations, trade unions, the BSS and the PR took sides with the Ngee Ann students too. They played a part in the support activities carried out by the students of the other tertiary institutions.²²⁶

The Trade Unions and the Cultural Organisations

In the 1964–1966 period, the fortunes of the Communist labour movement took a further nosedive. The cultural movement, too, experienced hard times. The left-wing trade unions fared badly in two ways. Firstly, they lost memberships to the affiliates of the NTUC and, secondly, they failed to build up and maintain an effective, central leadership as a substitute for SATU.

Important defections during this time from the BSS to the PAP unions occurred in the Industrial Workers' Union (IWU). In November 1964, the NAAFI Branch of the IWU left and formed a union called the Food, Drinks & Allied Workers' Union. In the same month, the bus workers section of the SMMWU, which was an affiliate of the NTUC, formed a National Chinese Bus Workers' Union. The new organisation pulled away members of the transport section of the IWU. Both the new unions attached themselves to the NTUC.²²⁷ In July or August the next year, some 1,000 members of the Cold Storage and Fitzpatrick's branches of the IWU also quit this union and joined the Food, Drinks & Allied Workers' Union.²²⁸ According to the NTUC itself, between late 1963 and January 1967, altogether 8,000 persons changed sides.²²⁹

By the third quarter of 1966, the Communist trade unions were noted as having 31,000 members. In contrast, the NTUC group had 114,000 members.²³⁰ Throughout the whole period, the left-wing unions numbered 30 or 31.²³¹ Their rivals, by the first quarter of 1966, totalled 55.²³² But the worst plight of the left-wing unions was not so much a diminution of numerical strength as the inability to maintain an effective central leadership.

As mentioned previously, in November 1963, when SATU was told by the Government that its application to register was refused, its leadership at once reconstituted itself into a "Working Committee of the 30 Left-Wing Trade Unions" to continue to manage the Communist unions.²³³ Later on, in May 1964, the Working Committee gave way to a new organ called the Five-Man Committee. This new machinery was created to take charge of the agitation among the trade unions against National Service. Then in the following month, the Five-Man Committee was abolished and a Singapore Trade Unions Liaison Secretariat (STULS) was constituted. This body had a membership of nine, each of whom came from a different trade union.²³⁴

The STULS played a big part in the agitation against National Service in 1964. As seen, the disturbances reached a climax in September that year, during which the police mounted offensives against the Communist apparatus and many persons were arrested.²³⁵ Among those ar-

rested were 18 trade unionists, several of whom occupied positions in the STULS.²³⁶ The rest of the STULS went into hiding because four of them were also wanted by the police. While underground, they continued to function and gave leadership to the left-wing unions. Contact with these unions was maintained through a team of three men. It was evident that, in a truncated form and operating in a clandestine manner, the STULS was not in a position to carry out its duties as well as it should.²³⁷ In December of the same year, the undesirable state of affairs was corrected. A new STULS was created to replace the underground body. This new secretariat was composed of seven persons, who came from seven different unions.²³⁸

In 1965, the STULS decided to celebrate May Day by holding a mass rally in Farrer Park. Permission to do so was sought from the police but was not granted. The STULS refused to be beaten and gave instructions to the unions that celebrations should proceed as scheduled. A May Day Joint Celebrations Committee was formed to handle proceedings.²³⁹ The Government became aware of the STULS's intention to defy its ban. In response, it gave orders that the secretariat should have its path blocked. Consequently, on 29 April, the police took action to arrest the members of the STULS and the Celebrations Committee. The target was nine persons and eight were secured. Of the eight, four occupied positions both in the secretariat and the Celebrations Committee.²⁴⁰ The Communists were undeterred by the arrests. A new set of leaders appeared and gave directions that the mass rally must be held.²⁴¹ In face of this intransigence, the police acted again. On 30 April, orders were issued to arrest 11 persons. Eventually, however, only five were captured. A State of Danger was proclaimed in the island and the police force was put on special alert.²⁴²

On 1 May, separate demonstrations by workers, joined by members of the BSS and old boys' associations, as well as other elements, broke out in different parts of the city. There were seven such disturbances. The smallest of these involved around 100 persons and the largest 1,500. The marchers were dispersed by the police. Through various means, 277 of them were arrested and, with some exceptions, were charged two days later for participation in an assembly.²⁴³ The greatest loss suffered by the Communists in this encounter was the breakup of the STULS: the unions lost their leadership. Pending the formation of a new central organ, a Welfare Committee was made to stand in for the old secretariat. This committee had been created to look after the welfare of those comrades who had been detained.²⁴⁴

In August 1965, a Singapore Trade Unions Working Committee (STUWC) was organised and began to function in September. This body

was made up of seven persons, each of whom represented a different union. The Welfare Committee was dissolved.²⁴⁵

In November 1965, the Communist trade unions gave assistance to the students of Nanyang University in the latter's agitation against the Wang Gungwu Report.²⁴⁶ This was led by the STUWC. For its action, the STUWC was soon punished by the Government. On 14 November, the police took action to arrest the members of the committee. These, however, managed to escape and go into hiding. Nevertheless, damage was inflicted because after this the unions were left without a leadership.²⁴⁷

The Communist old boys' associations were also involved in giving help to the Nanyang students and they were punished in the same way.²⁴⁸ On 24 November, these associations, with the support of the trade unions and the BSS, attempted to stage a procession to the Prime Minister's Office to voice their protest. Crowds were assembled for the purpose, but these were effectively dispersed. Thirty-two persons were arrested, a number of whom were trade unionists.²⁴⁹

In December 1965, the STUWC was revived when representatives from four unions appointed themselves to make up the committee. Because this new group was self-appointed but not elected by all the unions together, they were not accepted by those unions.²⁵⁰ Early in the following year, meetings of all the unions on two separate occasions were called to elect a proper STUWC and to discuss other matters. Both meetings, however, were poorly attended and did not have even a quorum. Because of this, a proper STUWC could not be formed. Some unions shied away because of the demoralising effects of recent police arrests, while others kept aloof because they were pro-Dr Lee Siew Choh and disliked those who were managing the meetings.²⁵¹ In the next month, a decision was made that, pending the election of a proper STUWC, a Safeguarding of Workers' Rights Working Committee should take on the function of leading the unions.²⁵²

Dr Lee Siew Choh was reported to have told some trade unionists in November 1966 that to have a central co-ordinating body for the trade unions was not feasible because such an organisation would be vulnerable to government assaults and the unions themselves were disunited.²⁵³ So the Communist trade unions experienced hard times in the twilight years of the open united front struggle.

Of all the different types of Communist cultural organisations, the old boys' associations remained the most active. As noted, there was an anti-National Service agitation in the latter part of 1964. The movement was led by the BSS, but the old boys' associations had a great part in it.²⁵⁴ Very soon, the Government felt it necessary to take measures to restrict the usefulness of this type of organisation in the hands of the CPM.

Broadly speaking, the school alumnis had two kinds of membership, one consisted of ex-pupils of the school who were continuing their education in a secondary school or in a tertiary institution, and the other comprised persons earning a living. The turbulent elements in the alumnis were of the first kind.

In the latter part of 1964, the Registrar of Societies required all the old boys' associations to amend their constitutions such that ex-students of the schools concerned continuing education in secondary schools or tertiary institutions would be excluded from membership. Failure to comply would be punished.²⁵⁵ At first, the alumnis resisted the order. Finally, however, they gave in. In December of the same year, it was reported that out of all of them, 26 had changed their rules and regulations, two were still holding out, four were undecided and two were preparing to dissolve themselves.²⁵⁶

In November 1965, the old boys' associations were involved in the agitation of the Nanyang University students against the Wang Gungwu Report. They assisted the students in a very substantial way.²⁵⁷ On 14 November, the police raided the premises of 11 alumnis and arrested two officials. Six days later, the Registrar of Societies deregistered all 11 associations.²⁵⁸ The old boys' associations planned a march on the Prime Minister's Office on 24 November to voice their grievances. The outcome of this effort has already been related.²⁵⁹ The members of the deregistered societies tried to regroup under the wings of the existing ones. However, the Registrar of Societies gave warning that this must not be done on pain of the existing societies being penalised. His warning was heeded.²⁶⁰ At the end of 1966, the old boys' associations, together with other cultural organisations, played a part in the Ngee Ann College disturbance. On this occasion, however, they were not punished by the Government.²⁶¹

The Return of the Evacuees

There is evidence that some members of the CPM who were withdrawn from Singapore to safe places elsewhere returned to the island in the middle of 1966. This seems to have been the beginning of a recall of comrades to the homefront. Up to as late as 1970, there were still people coming back.

The purpose of the return of escapees to Singapore was to enter the Malay peninsula to help restart "the countryside surrounding the cities" armed struggle. They could do this by performing the specific task of building afresh the mass organisations in the countryside which had been destroyed by the British between 1950 and 1951.²⁶²

On the mission of the returnees, one record states:

[F.M.B.] had a discussion with me on the future working policy of our organisation ... He said that the principal objective of their return this time was to carry out mass activities in the villages of West Malaysia ... It was quite clear that the policy of carrying out mass activities in the rural areas had been decided since 1961. We were, in fact, rather late in implementing this policy now and, for this reason, we must intensify our efforts to cover our lost ground. The CPM central had also decided to launch a Pan-Malayan Armed Struggle Campaign designed to bring about a guerilla war throughout West Malaysia in the future. Hence, our cadres should, on their return, go to the central and southern parts of West Malaysia to carry out mass activities in the villages to complement the CPM armed struggle policy ...²⁶³

The Singapore Communists indeed had an important role to play.

There were a number of reasons why the Singapore Communists took practical steps to help restart the armed struggle as late as 1966 when the policy to do so had been decided by Chin Peng five years earlier. For one thing, although after 1961, the open united front struggle, and therefore open and legal mass work, was no longer possible in Singapore, this was so only in strategic terms. In the short-run, the old course of struggle could be continued. It did not become clear until 1966 that the time of hanging on was over. The progressive and gradual decimation of the various mass movements, as accounted for in Chapter VI and the present chapter, evidences the point.

There was a hope that the continued struggle in Singapore in the open arena after 1961, and the continued sojourn of the evacuees in Indonesia and other places would lead somewhere when Indonesia was still in the fray between the anti-Communist and Communist camps. However, between late 1965 and early 1966, a political change took place in Indonesia. As explained earlier, the establishment in Indonesia before this time was made up of three parts, the PKI, the PNI led by Sukarno and the armed forces.²⁶⁴ On 30 September 1965, a fight broke out between the PKI and the armed forces, in which the former lost. After this, Sukarno was gradually stripped of power by the army. Subsequent to this great transformation, the armed forces lost interest in continuing to fight Malaysia. Peace negotiations were entered into between the new rulers of Indonesia and Malaysia to end confrontation, and hostilities between the two countries formally ceased in August 1966.²⁶⁵ Indonesia had been a powerful ally of the CPM. Now, this ally no longer existed.

It is on record that in July or August 1966, Fong Chong Pik told one of his subordinates — both men were then in Indonesia — that, in view of the anti-Communist government in that country, it was becoming in-

creasingly difficult for members of the CPM to remain there. It was necessary for them to go back home.²⁶⁶

In about the middle of 1966, Mao Tse-tung launched the Cultural Revolution in China and proclaimed the superiority of "the countryside surrounding the cities" method of seizing power against all other methods of struggle. The CPM, a close follower of the CCP, was swept up in the new tide in the international Communist movement.²⁶⁷

In the middle of 1966, Chen Hock Wah returned to Singapore.²⁶⁸ At around the same time, two others, one of whom was formerly an important official in a union of construction workers, came back to the island.²⁶⁹ At the end of 1970, a former leader of the peasant movement left Indonesia for an immediate destination in the Malay peninsula via Singapore. On the same trip with him were several others.²⁷⁰ The programme of return, like that of the withdrawal, was a long drawn-out affair. Fong Chong Pik himself was scheduled to go straight to Kuala Lumpur by air in the guise of a businessman after he had completed the task of transferring his subordinates and taking their children to a safe place for refuge.²⁷¹

From 1964 till the close of 1966, Indonesia's "Crush Malaysia" campaign continued. Terrorist attacks on public places and installations in Singapore were severe. The most serious bomb explosion occurred on 10 March 1965. An important public building in a major business district was extensively damaged, with three people killed and 33 injured, seven seriously.²⁷²

Interested nations soon offered to mediate between Indonesia and Malaysia. The most important of these was the United States of America. The peace efforts led to the Foreign Ministers of the two countries and of the Philippines meeting twice to settle matters; there was also a conference of Heads of State. However, all attempts to make peace eventually failed. The dispute was finally taken to the United Nations for a decision, the eventual outcome of which was that Malaysia obtained recognition as a new state and Indonesia withdrew its membership from that international body. It was the political change in Indonesia itself in late 1965 which ultimately restored peace between the two Malay nations.²⁷³

Notes

- 1 "CHW", paragraph 96. "KY", paragraph 137. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 846-849.
- 2 "CHW", paragraph 97.
- 3 See p. 229.
- 4 "KY", paragraph 137. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 849ff.
- 5 "CHW", paragraph 97. The passage quoted here was Chen's recollection in 1971 or 1972 of his decision. In 1963, when the National Service issue cropped up, one of the persons to whom he gave instructions on what stand to adopt was Koo Young. Koo was Chen's subordinate in the CPM and was then functioning in the open as a

member of the Central Executive Committee of the BSS as well as of the Legislative Assembly. Koo also recalled what Chen told him. Koo's words are quoted here for a comparison. Koo stated: "According to his analysis, the objectives for the introduction and implementation of National Service Registration were both political and military in nature. Politically, the registration would imbue patriotism on the young men in this country. And if the leftwing called upon the people to boycott registration, the Government could take this opportunity to brand them as anti-Nationals having no loyalty and patriotism to the nation. For this reason, the leftwing must advocate for 'principled registration'. But while doing so, they must not forget to aver one important principle, i.e. they would fight for the defence of Malaya but not in North Borneo. In this way, the Government could not find a pretext to suppress the leftwing and at the same time, our propaganda against Malaysia and refusal of going to North Borneo to repress the North Borneo people's anti-imperialist struggle would be effectively carried out. Considering from the practical point of view, 'boycott registration' could never be worked out effectively, particularly, in the Federation of Malaya. This was because half of the total population in Malaya were Malays, majority of whom earned their daily bread from the armed forces. As such, they would certainly reject the call for 'boycott registration'. Moreover, the Chinese may not respond to the call too as everyone was afraid of the heavy punishment as provided in the Law. On the other hand, the stand of 'principled registration' gave us an opportunity to disseminate our propaganda to the masses that North Borneo internal affairs had nothing to do with us in Malaya and for this reason, we should not become the cannon fodder of the British colonialists. If the people accepted our propaganda then we would achieve a great victory politically in this respect. In addition, if the Government forcibly sent our youths to North Borneo for active service and should some of them lose their lives there, their parents would be very grieved and would resent against the reactionaries for forming Malaysia. If such would be the case, we must fully exploit the situation and whip up the people's feelings against Malaysia. That was what we had been waiting for. My superior also pointed out that if our leftwing cadres, after their registration, were given the opportunity of undergoing military training, this would also be an advantage to the CPM in the future. Therefore, 'principled registration' was the correct stand for the leftwing. He wound up his analysis on this issue by adding that the leftwing must persistently oppose Malaysia in the meantime and refuse to be sent to North Borneo for active service on completion of their military training." Cf. "KY", paragraph 163.

- 6 For the 1957 directive, see pp. 132-133. That this directive conditioned the mind of Chen Hock Wah could be seen in another incident. In April 1962, he had a conversation with a subordinate who was active in an old boys' association. The following was what transpired: "Chen Hock Wah analysed to me the past mistakes committed by the party in the CUF. He said that the party was too left-inclined in the past. In 1957, it tried to capture the PAP without consideration of the consequences. This resulted in the Lim Yew Hock's government in helping Lee Kuan Yew to clear up the PAP by arresting the CPM cadres. Following this, the victory of the PAP in 1959 had also intoxicated the CPM. It failed to correct its past mistakes and continued to antagonise the non-Communist group in the PAP. He said that this was also wrong. Finally, Chen Hock Wah told me that we should not be too left-inclined in our future work in the CUF. We should try to gain mass support because we could never win by fighting alone." Cf. "AEC", paragraph 49.
- 7 "KY", paragraph 137. Another account of Lee Siew Choh's policy, which was similar to this one in substance, was given by a probationary CPM member who, like Koo Young, operated in the BSS. He was Chia Yam Loong. Chia said: "From the outset,

Dr Lee ... had been maintaining that the only correct policy towards the National Service Registration was 'boycott'. It was a matter of leftwing principle and stand, he said any attitude or view which would amount to an equivocal answer to this important issue was a sellout of the correct party line. The Barisan Sosialis as a leftwing political party should stand in the forefront against all notorious laws of the reactionary Governments." Cf. "CYL", paragraph 132.

At the beginning, Lee Siew Choh did not oppose National Service Registration. The top officials of the BSS had a meeting on 30 January 1964 and Lee took this attitude at this meeting. However, at another meeting of the CEC, Assemblymen, and Branch Chairmen and Secretaries on 9 February, Lee changed his stand. Certain members of the CEC attributed Lee's volte-face to his desire to find a reason to resign from the party should he meet with opposition. They believed that he knew that the majority of the members of the BSS did not want a frontal attack against the Government. Cf. *IJ*, no. 2/1964, paragraphs 13 & 13^H.

- 8 "KY", paragraphs 137-145. "CYL", paragraphs 133 & 135-140. "OCS", paragraphs 46-47. "KKS", paragraphs 32.6-32.7. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 848-864 & 878-879. *IJ*, no. 2/1964, paragraphs 12^A, 13^A, 13^H, 13^L, 13^M & 13^N; no. 4/1964, paragraphs 30, 30^A-31^B, 31^D, 31^E-31^N, 32^E-32^G, 33^A-33^B, 33^D, 33^F & 33^H-33^I; and no. 5/1964, paragraphs 39, 39^A-39^B, 40, 40^A-40^B, 40^F, 40^H, 40^I, 40^K-40^M & 42^H.
- 9 "CHW", paragraph 100. In July 1964, Chen Hock Wah also withdrew from Singapore to Indonesia. After he arrived, he met Fong Chong Pik. The two persons talked about the National Service trouble and Chen was chided for the decision he made: "About a month later, Fong ... came to see me ... he had a short discussion with me regarding the political situation in Singapore ... he criticised me for making wrong decision to support 'Principled Registration'. He said that I made such decision hastily without assessing the situation correctly. He seriously warned me that in future I should be very careful in making decision on any matter. I did not argue with him as I fully understood my mistake ...". Cf. "CHW", paragraphs 104 & 112.
- 10 See p. 20.
- 11 "CHW", paragraph 104.
- 12 "KY", paragraphs 151 & 175. "CYL", paragraph 143. "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 866.
- 13 "KY", paragraphs 151-154 & 175. "CYL", paragraphs 143-145 & 175. "CCT", pp. 1-2. "CYP", paragraph 116. "TTS", paragraphs 86-89. "CJP", paragraphs 25-56. "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 867, *IJ*, no. 8/1964, paragraphs 69^B, 69^D, 70^H, 70^L-70^N, 70^N-70^R, 70^{BB} & 73^E-73^F; and no. 9/1964, paragraphs 78 & 80^P-80^I.
- 14 Of the 45 persons arrested in the first instance, seven were BSS members, two PR members, 18 trade unionists, one Nanyang University student, five Chinese middle school students and 12 members of cultural organisations. Cf. *IJ*, no. 9/1964, paragraph 80^G. Also "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 867. Among the 77 arrested on the second occasion, there were ten BSS members including one Assemblyman, one Nanyang University student, 12 Chinese middle school students and one Chinese school teacher. Cf. *IJ*, no. 9/1964, paragraph 80^H.
- 15 *IJ*, no. 11/1964, paragraphs 97^B, 99 & 99^E.
- 16 *IJ*, no. 3/1965, paragraph 21^B.
- 17 "CHW", paragraph 100. Lee Siew Choh was indispensable to the Communist movement for certain reasons. Chen Hock Wah gave an explanation of this to Koo Young when telling him to make an effort to persuade Lee to return to the fold. According to Koo, the points made by Chen were: "... without Dr Lee ... other Barisan Sosialis officials were too young to inspire public confidence. But with Dr Lee ... at the helm, things would be different. He could hold press conferences and attend international

conferences on behalf of the Barisan Sosialis. Being a doctor and advanced in age, he was richer in knowledge as well as experience. And above all he had a good command of the English language which was a pre-requisite in top-level politicking. Lim Huan Boon ... although had a vast knowledge, was not fit to be a politician. He was only fit to be a good scholar ... As regards Chia Thye Poh ... he was too young to assume leadership. Therefore, the most appropriate man left in the party was Dr Lee ... Being an English-educated person himself, he could help to influence the English speaking group in our society. As he was once a Parliamentary Secretary of the PAP, it would not be easy for the Government to make the people believe that Barisan Sosialis was a Communist front organisation or a tool of the C.P.M. no matter what the Government said. For all these reasons, he stressed emphatically that Dr Lee ... must be won over to the Party ...". Cf. "KY", paragraph 164.

- 18 "KY", paragraphs 175-183. "OCS", paragraph 51. "KKS", paragraph 32.10. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 864-870 & 880-884. *Ij*, no. 5/1964, paragraphs 39^A, 40^B-40^D, 40^G, 40^I & 40^K-40^L; no. 6/1964, paragraphs 49, 50, 50^B, 50^G & 50^H-50^I; no. 7/1964, paragraphs 60, 61^A-61^B, 61^I & 61^L; no. 8/1964, paragraphs 69^A, 70^B-70^C, 70^T-70^V & 70^X; no. 9/1964, paragraphs 78^E, 80-80^A, 80^M-80^N, 80^R-80^T & 80^V-80^W; no. 10/1964, paragraphs 87^B, 89^A-89^B & 89^K-89^N; no. 11/1964, paragraphs 99^M & 99^O; no. 1/1965, paragraph 1^D; and no. 3/1965, paragraphs 19^B, 19^D, 21, 21^A-21^D, 21^N, 21^R, 21^S & 23.

Lee Siew Choh imposed certain conditions for a reconciliation between himself and his opponents. These conditions were accepted by the other side and were passed as part of a set of resolutions of the Second Delegates' Conference of the BSS held on 7 March 1965. Lee returned to the Party after that. These conditions were:

- (1) This Conference, in cognition of the present political development, coupled with objective events which have taken place, admits that the stand adopted by our Party Chairman, Comrade Lee Siew Choh, Central Executive Committee, and other comrades on the basis of the Party's consistent principle to call for boycott of 'National Service Registration' is completely correct.

'National Service Registration' and conscription is an imperialist intrigue aimed at protecting the interests of Malaysia, the neo-colonialist product, and also suppressing through violence the Malaya and North Borneo people's democratic liberation struggle. Therefore the correct stand of the Barisan Sosialis towards 'National Service Registration' should be what the Party Chairman, Central Executive Committee, and other comrades have advocated, i.e. 'Resolutely oppose National Service Registration! Call upon the masses not to register'.

- (2) This Conference admits that the resolutions adopted at the Delegates' Conference held on 29th April, 1964, and the views expressed therein concerning the 'National Service Registration' issue to oppose the Boycott stand were incorrect. In opposing the 'Boycott Stand' and calling upon the Party members and the masses to register 'under protest' has inadvertently but seriously ... contravened the basic principle and stand of the Party; and also misled the broad masses, resulting in the great loss and setback to the Party and the left-wing movement.

Therefore this Conference unanimously decides to revoke the incorrect resolutions passed at the delegates conference on 29th April, 1964.

- (3) This Conference admits that erroneous resolutions made on 29th April, 1964, on the National Service Registration issue had caused the resignation of the Party Chairman and other comrades.

This Conference unreservedly declares that the mistake must be rectified to promote the development of the left-wing forces. This Conference hereby earnestly admits the mistakes made on the National Service Registration issue and ardently

welcomes the early return of the Party Chairman and other comrades to the Party. (4) This Conference maintains identical views of the Party Chairman and other comrades and sincerely admits that the Party intra-unity is based on the Party fundamental principle and stand. This Conference appeals to all party comrades and people to unite steadfastly under the bright banner of the Party, to oppose Imperialism, Colonialism and neo-colonialist 'Malaysia' resolutely; to safeguard the basic interests of the people and to strive for the realisation of a truly free independent democratic and socialist Malaya.

- Cf. *IJ*, no. 3/1965, appendix "B", first page. Compare "OCS", paragraph 51, for a plain report of the above conditions. Also "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 868-870. See also *IJ*, no. 6/1964, paragraph 50; no. 8/1964, paragraphs 69^A; and no. 9/1964, paragraphs 78^E, 80^R & 80^T, as well as "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 868 for Lee Siew Choh's stating his conditions during the course of the negotiations between himself and the others.
- 19 *IJ*, no. 8/1964, paragraph 70^R. See also paragraphs 69^B & 70^O.
 - 20 *IJ*, no. 9/1964, paragraph 80^W.
 - 21 "KY", paragraph 175. Other examples of poor morale in the BSS can be found in *IJ*, no. 11/1964, paragraphs 97 & 97^A.
 - 22 *IJ*, no. 10/1964, paragraphs 92^R-92^D & 92^E.
 - 23 "CYP", paragraph 115.
 - 24 See pp. 55 & 61.
 - 25 See p. 260.
 - 26 See pp. 165-166 & 168-169.
 - 27 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., p. 116. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 335-339. M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 189-194. *Fong*, pp. 148-150.
 - 28 M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 189 & 190-194. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., p. 57.
 - 29 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 342-344. M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 188 & 194-196. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
 - 30 Gordon P. Means, op. cit., p. 344. M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 196-197. John Drysdale, op. cit., p. 368.
 - 31 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., pp. 115-116. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 344-345. M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 197-198 & 209.
 - 32 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., pp. 118-120. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 345-346. M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 195-197, 199, 206, 208, 211, 218, 225 & 228. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., pp. 53, 55-56 & 58.
 - 33 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., pp. 116-118. M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 198-199.
 - 34 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., p. 112. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 346-347. M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 199-204. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., pp. 59-65. *Fong*, pp. 156-160 & 164-165. A. Josey, op. cit., pp. 96-97.
 - 35 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., pp. 120-122. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 347-348. M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., p. 204. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., p. 58. A. Josey, op. cit., p. 98.
 - 36 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., pp. 127-128. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 347 & 353-354. M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., p. 208. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., p. 59. *Fong*, p. 161. *Straits Times*, 26 May 1995.
 - 37 *Fong*, pp. 162-164. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., p. 65. There was also speculation that it was the PAP itself which got Ong to resign so that it would obtain the opportunity to show that its Malaysian Malaysia concept enjoyed public support. See Gary Lee, "The Political Career of Ong Eng Guan", Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, National University of Singapore, 1986/1987, pp. 79-80. Dr Lee Siew Choh, Chair-

- man of the BSS, stated that the UMNO had a second motive in getting Ong to quit his Assembly seat. This was to frustrate Lee from taking steps to prevent the Alliance Government from being admitted into the Afro-Asian Heads of Government Conference to be held in Algiers on 29 June 1965. See "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 904-907. On Ong's resignation, see more of "LSC(O)", in vol. III, pp. 899-900, 902-903, 913-915 & 923.
- 38 See note 146 below.
- 39 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, op. cit., pp. 122-129. Gordon P. Means, op. cit., pp. 353-355. M.N. Sopiee, op. cit., pp. 198-199 & 205-212. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., pp. 58-59 & 65. Fong, pp. 165-167. A. Josey, op. cit., p. 98.
- 40 "TaS", paragraph 13. "TTS", paragraph 106.
- 41 "CHW", paragraph 347.
- 42 *IJ*, no. 8/1965, paragraph 71^A.
- 43 "AC" and "HS".
- 44 "CHW", paragraph 128.
- 45 For collusion between Tan Sin on the one hand, and Kow Kee Seng and Chio Cheng Thun on the other, refer to "KY", paragraphs 215 & 218. For rapport between Lee Siew Choh and Koo Young, refer to all relevant parts of "KY" and "KKS", paragraph 32.4. Also *IJ*, no. 3/1965, paragraph 19^B. Evidence that Kow Kee Seng and Chio Cheng Thun were members of the CPM is found in "KKS", paragraphs 9.1-9.4 & 16.1-16.5. For Koo Young, reference is to "KY", paragraph 7.
- 46 "OCS", paragraph 71. *IJ*, no. 3/1965, paragraph 21^{DD}. Among those unions which followed Tan Sin were the following: Singapore Bookshop, Publication & Printing Press Workers' Union; Singapore Woodworkers' Union; Singapore Cycle & Motor Workers' Union; Singapore Motor Workshop Employees' Union; Singapore Rubber Employees' Union; and Industrial Workers' Union. The seven which lined up behind Dr Lee Siew Choh were: Amalgamated Malayan Pineapple Workers' Union; Singapore Electrical & Wireless Union; Singapore Restaurant, Bar, Eating and Coffeshop Employees' Union; Singapore Tailors' Union; Singapore Tong Loke Shoe Makers' Union; Singapore Wood Workers' Union; and Singapore Hairdressers' Union. In this note, the Singapore Woodworkers' Union or the Singapore Wood Workers' Union is found to be both a supporter of Tan Sin and of Dr. Lee Siew Choh. This must be a mistake. The note was written before 1985 and the mistake was discovered only in 1996. But by 1996, the author has no more access to the archives of the Internal Security Department, Ministry of Home Affairs. Hence, the mistake cannot be corrected.
- 47 This was according to Lee Siew Choh as reported in *IJ*, no. 3/1965, paragraph 21^{AA}.
- 48 "KY", paragraphs 145-146.
- 49 *IJ*, no. 3/1965, paragraph 21^Z. "KY", paragraphs 215-216. "OCS", paragraph 71.
- 50 *IJ*, no. 3/1965, paragraphs 19^E, 23^B & 23^F. "KY", paragraph 216.
- 51 "KY", paragraphs 216-217. "OCS", paragraph 73. *IJ*, no. 3/1965, paragraphs 19^H-19^I, 19^H, 21^F-21^M, 21^W, 21^Z & 21^{AA}-21^B; and no. 4/1965, paragraphs 29^B-29^C, 31^B-31^M, 31^S-31^Z, 31^{BB}-31^{FF}, 31^{HH}-31^D, 31^{MM}, 32, 34^F-34^K, 34^O & 34^W.
- 52 *IJ*, no. 4/1965, paragraphs 29^C, 31^{CC}-31^{FF}, 31^{OO}, 34^O & 34^W; and no. 5/1965, paragraph 41^F.
- 53 "CPM, 1960-68", paragraph 297. The incident showed that this particular cell had received instructions from their superior on the problem. It can be inferred that other cells should also have received similar direction.
- 54 *IJ*, no. 4/1965, paragraphs 29^C & 31^{EE}-31^{FF}; and no. 5/1965, paragraph 41^F.
- 55 See later pages in chapter.

- 56 *IJ*, no. 6/1965, paragraph 49^D; and no. 7/1965, paragraphs 60^D, 62^G & 64-64^C.
- 57 "CPM, 1960-68", paragraph 265.
- 58 *IJ*, no. 8/1965, paragraphs 71, 73^D, 73^F-73^H & 74. "KY", paragraph 228. "OCS", paragraph 64. "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 934.
- 59 *IJ*, no. 8/1965, paragraph 73^M. "KY", paragraph 228. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 924-926 & 934.
- 60 "OCS", paragraph 64. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 936-938 gives a more elaborate explanation of why Singapore's independence was not considered genuine. See also "KY", paragraphs 226-227 which have on record essentially the same points.
- 61 "OCS", paragraph 65. "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 935. *IJ*, no. 8/1965, paragraphs 71^D, 73^G, 73^R & 74.
- 62 The statement bore the title of "Malayan National Liberation League Statement Re Separation of Singapore from 'Malaysia'" and was dated 10 August 1965. Cf. "CPM - Propaganda", pt. 10, Folio (395)^B, p. 5. *IJ*, no. 9/1965, paragraphs 82 & 82^A.
- 63 "OCS", paragraph 64. The leaders of the BSS who met their counterparts of the PR to discuss the Singapore independence issue were Kow Kee Seng, Koo Young, Chia Thy Poh, Fong Ying Ching, Low Por Tuck, Tay Cheng Kang and Ong himself.
- 64 *IJ*, no. 8/1965, paragraphs 71 & 76^E-76^F.
- 65 *IJ*, no. 8/1965, paragraphs 76^N & 76^{RR}-76^{FF}; and no. 9/1965, paragraph 86. In a political forum held on 16 August 1965, which was sponsored by the Singapore Bookshop, Publication & Printing Press Workers' Union, the General Affairs Officer of the union made such a remark. Cf. *IJ*, no. 8/1965, paragraph 76^N.
- 66 *IJ*, no. 9/1965, paragraph 83^O. "LHB", paragraph 35.
- 67 *IJ*, no. 8/1965, paragraphs 71^C & 73^K-73^L. "LCS", pt. 32, Folios (1569)³-(1569)⁴.
- 68 "KKS", paragraphs 32.5-32.7. "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 949.
- 69 *IJ*, no. 9/1964, paragraph 80^W.
- 70 *IJ*, no. 9/1965, paragraphs 81 & 83^H-83^I.
- 71 *IJ*, no. 9/1965, paragraphs 83^J, 83^N-83^O & 86^O-86^S; and no. 10/1965 paragraphs 94-94^C.
- 72 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraphs 93 & 94^K-94^M.
- 73 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraphs 94^N-94^U.
- 74 *IJ*, no. 9/1965, paragraph 83^H.
- 75 *IJ*, no. 12/1965, paragraph 113^{RR}. The eight conditions were: "... the immediate and unconditional release of all political detainees, the restoration of all democratic rights as well as freedom to participate in politics for those released and the right to return for those banished ... the Police be neutral and not be used to suppress the Opposition, ... all those who qualify for citizenship be automatically given citizenship and the right to vote, ... voting should be of the peoples' own choice without fear or threats by the Government or Police, ... the Elections Ordinance be amended to give adequate time and facilities for campaigning, ... the I.S.A. (i.e. the International Security Act) be abolished."
- 76 "CHW", paragraphs 125 & 127-129.
- 77 "CHW", paragraph 130.
- 78 "CPM, 1960-68", paragraph 402. See also "CHW", paragraph 312.
- 79 "KKS", paragraphs 32.6-32.7 & 32.9.
- 80 "CPM, 1960-68": 'Notes on Personalities', p. 262.
- 81 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraph 94^K.
- 82 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraph 94^M.
- 83 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraph 94^U.
- 84 "CPM, 1960-68": 'Notes on Personalities', p. 8.

- 85 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraph 103^R. "KY", paragraphs 184–188. Dr Lee Siew Choh's new Central Executive Committee was as follows:
- | | |
|----------------------|------------------|
| Chairman | Dr Lee Siew Choh |
| Organising Secretary | Ong Chang Sam |
| Treasurer | Low Por Tuck |
| Ordinary Members | Tay Cheng Kang |
| | Chia Thye Poh |
| | Fong Ying Ching |
| | Kow Kee Seng |
| | Koo Young |
- 86 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraphs 102, 103^D & 103^Q–103^{AA}. "KY", paragraphs 189–198. The 12 anti-Lee Siew Choh BSS branches were: Changi/Tampines, Geylang East, Geylang West, Rochor, River Valley/Cairnhill, Stamford, Joo Chiat/Siglap, Geylang Serai, Bras Basah, Crawford, Anson/Telok Ayer, Aljunied/Kallang.
- 87 "KY", paragraphs 196, 198 & 207–213. *IJ*, no. 3/1966, paragraphs 18^G & 20^{HH}.
- 88 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraph 93^D.
- 89 *IJ*, no. 9/1965, paragraph 86^S.
- 90 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraph 102^I.
- 91 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraph 94^H.
- 92 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraphs 94^H & 94^J; and no. 12/1965, paragraphs 111, 113, 113^E, 113^F & 113^{LL}. "KY", paragraph 234. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 960–962. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., p. 96.
- 93 *IJ*, no. 12/1965, paragraph 113^E.
- 94 "TCK(68)", paragraph 177.
- 95 *IJ*, no. 12/1965, paragraph 113^{GG}.
- 96 *IJ*, no. 9/1965, paragraphs 81^A & 83^I; and no. 12/1965, paragraphs 111^E & 113^{TT}. "LHB", paragraphs 95–97. "KY", paragraph 202. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 964–966. *Fong*, p. 175.
- 97 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraphs 1 & 2^M. "KKS", paragraph 34.8. "KY", paragraph 202. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 964–967. *Fong*, p. 175. T.J. Bellows, op. cit., pp. 96–97.
- 98 *IJ*, no. 12/1965, paragraph 113^{TT}; and no. 1/1966, paragraphs 2^P, 2^H, 2^M & 2^N. "KY", paragraph 218. "OCS", paragraph 96. "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 967. Lim Huan Boon's statement was said to have made the following points: "... Singapore's independence has rendered the policies of the Barisan Sosialis irrelevant. Its continued opposition to Singapore's independence is not in the interests of the people who should contribute towards the building up of a 'multi-racial, democratic, non-Communist society'. He accused the Barisan Sosialis of not working for the interests of the people but for international Communism." Cf. *IJ*, no. 12/1965, paragraph 113^{TT}. Kow's and Chio's joint statement contained the following: "... they could not accept the views of Dr Lee Siew Choh who could never be able to lead the Barisan Sosialis to victory or to do anything good for the people. They expressed confidence in Singapore's independence as an accomplished fact and could not understand Dr Lee's negative attitude and his opposition to anything, good or bad, so long as it came from an opposing party. They called upon the Singapore Government to make greater efforts to bring about a more complete independence and expressed full agreement with the Government's non-aligned foreign policy ...". Cf. *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraph 2^M.
- 99 Lim used to be under the direct contact of Fong Chong Pik. See "LHB", paragraphs 49–69. Kow, as said, was a subordinate of Chen Hock Wah, and Chio a subordinate of Kow himself.
- 100 That Lim was out of touch with Fong and Kow with Chen could be seen in "LHB", paragraphs 67–69, and "KKS", paragraphs 31.1–31.10.

- 101 "KY", paragraph 236.
- 102 "LHB", paragraph 67: "... As a result of my heavy personal commitments and the inability to obtain proper guidance from the Party (i.e. the CPM), my enthusiasm gradually diminished. By this time, I had also come to realise that the Communist propaganda was full of promises which could never be materialised. Events in other parts of the world helped to confirm this. In fact, this illusion caused me to give up politics finally in 1965." Paragraphs 96-97: "I was subsequently elected an Assemblyman for the Redhill Constituency [in the 1963 general election]. However, the party [i.e. the BSS] did not succeed as expected and the PAP was again returned to power. This defeat greatly upset the BSS leadership and they immediately wanted to abandon the constitutional struggle in favour of 'street struggle' ... I was one of those who opposed to this idea and our views were accepted. This incident and some other subsequent actions of the party [i.e. the BSS] caused me to lose faith in the leadership. I had also seen how our representatives were ignored at the Parliament in Kuala Lumpur [after merger, Singapore had representatives in the Parliament in Kuala Lumpur]. Members of the Parliament both from the Alliance Government and the Opposition had more respect for the PAP representatives than those from the BSS ... As my faith in the party dwindled, I began to pay more attention to business opportunities ...".
- 103 Kow himself made no mention of the fear of approaching extra-parliamentary struggle which led him to leave the Communist movement. According to him, he quit because: he could not tolerate Dr Lee Siew Choh's squeezing those who differed from him in policies out of important positions in the BSS and his practice of dictatorship; Lee's refusal to support him in his fight against the Malaysian Central Government in a court case which arose out of his participation in a demonstration in Kuala Lumpur; his fear that the PAP would expose his exploits in womanising; the displeasure of his superior in the CPM with his having made reference to gangsterism in his lectures to BSS cadres; his unpopularity with his own BSS branch; and Lim Huan Boon's leaving the left-wing movement. See "KKS", paragraphs 32.1-35.
- According to Kow, Chio had for quite some time already lost interest in the activities of the BSS. In 1964, when there was a demonstration organised by the BSS against National Service, Chio was arrested by the police. He was imprisoned for four months. That experience clinched matters for Chio. Cf. "KKS", paragraph 34.7.
- 104 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraphs 2⁰-2^p & 2^R. "KY", paragraphs 203-204. "OCS", paragraph 96.
- 105 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraphs 2^A, 2^P, 2^R-2^T, 2^{BB}-2^{CC} & 2^{FF}-2^{GG}. "KY", paragraphs 202 & 204-205. "OCS", paragraphs 95-96.
- 106 *IJ*, no. 12/1965, paragraph 113⁰⁰. "KY", paragraph 199. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 962-964.
- 107 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraph 2^U. "KY", paragraph 199. These branches were: Bras Basah, Rochor, Crawford and Geylang East.
- 108 *IJ*, no. 4/1966, paragraphs 29^B, 31^A, 31^D-31^E, 31^N, 31^P-31^R, 31^V-31^W & 31^{DD}; and no. 5/1966, paragraphs 41-41^C & 41^N-41^O. "KY", paragraphs 199-200.
- 109 "KY", paragraph 206.
- 110 *IJ*, no. 12/1965, paragraph 116^K. These six unions were: Singapore Woodworkers' Union; Singapore Hairdressers' Union; Electrical & Wireless Employees' Union; Singapore Stevedores Employees' Union; Malayan Pineapple Workers' Union; and Singapore Restaurant, Bar, Eating & Coffeeshop Employees' Union.
- 111 *IJ*, no. 12/1965, paragraph 116^L. The name of this leader was Lee Young Chow and his union was the Singapore Industrial Workers' Union.
- 112 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraphs 1^A & 6^G-6^H.

- 113 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraphs 2⁰⁰ & 2^{UU}; and no. 2/1966, paragraphs 14^K & 14^L. "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 970.
- 114 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraph 6^G.
- 115 "KY", paragraph 218.
- 116 *IJ*, no. 3/1966, paragraphs 18-18^C, 20^{XX}, 24^R, 24^Z & 24^{III}; and no. 4/1966, paragraphs 29^{II}, 32^{FF}-32^{GG}, 35^O-35^H, 35^R & 35^W. "KY", paragraph 219.
- 117 *IJ*, no. 4/1966, paragraphs 29^G, 31^{EE} & 35^{II}-35^{MM}; and no. 5/1966, paragraphs 39, 39^A, 45^L & 45^T. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 970-972.
- 118 *IJ*, no. 5/1966, paragraphs 39^A & 45^{CC}. "KY", paragraphs 220-222. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 972-973.
- 119 *IJ*, no. 4/1966, paragraphs 39-39^B; and no. 5/1966, paragraphs 45-45^N. "LSC(O)", vol. III, pp. 968 & 972.
- 120 *IJ*, no. 5/1966, paragraphs 39^C & 45^{NN}-45^{QQ}. "OCS", paragraphs 75-80. "KY", paragraph 223.
- 121 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraph 2^Q. "KKS", paragraphs 34.2-34.3.
- 122 "CPM, 1960-68": 'Notes on Personalities', p. 86.
- 123 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraph 2^B.
- 124 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraphs 1 & 2^Y. "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 967.
- 125 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraph 2^{SS}.
- 126 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraph 1^A.
- 127 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraphs 1^B, 2^G, 2^L-2^K, 2^{LL} & 2^{TT}; and no. 2/1966, paragraphs 10^E & 12^W-12^Y. "KY", paragraph 238. "OCS", paragraphs 97-99. "TTS", paragraph 109. "LSC(O)", vol. III, p. 966. *Fong*, pp. 176-177.
- 128 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraphs 1^B & 3-3^C; and no. 3/1966, paragraphs 18^{II}, 20 & 20^C-20^D. *Fong*, p. 177. The PAP polled 9,082 votes while the Independent polled 1,868 votes. The total number of blank or spoilt votes was 396. Cf. *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraph 3^C.
- 129 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraph 3^C. As seen in the previous note, the number of blank or spoilt votes was only 396. The BSS call was a failure.
- 130 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraphs 1^B, 2^G, 2^L, 2^K, 2^L, 2^Y & 2^X; no. 2/1966, paragraphs 10^E & 12^V-12^X; and no. 3/1966, paragraphs 18^{II}, 20^A-20^B, 20^K & 20^V. "KY", paragraph 239. "OCS", paragraphs 98 & 100. "TTS", paragraphs 110-112.
- 131 "TCK(68)", paragraph 177.
- 132 *IJ*, no. 2/1966, paragraphs 10^E & 12^W & 12^X.
- 133 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraphs 4^A & 4^B.
- 134 *IJ*, no. 10/1966, General Comment, paragraphs 1 & 2; and pt. I, paragraphs 1-5 & 12. *Fong*, p. 178. "OCS", paragraph 109. "TTS", paragraph 147.
- 135 "KY", paragraphs 241-246. When advocating the new line of struggle, Dr Lee Siew Choh gave an explanation of it to the CEC of the BSS. Extracts are quoted below: "... the Barisan Socialis as a constitutional political party had two main roles to play in the political scene. One was to expose the enemies and the other was to educate the masses. On the first function ... the Party had done enough in this respect, but neglected its second role in the past ... extra-parliamentary struggle was the only effective way to educate the masses in Singapore where parliamentary democracy was no longer in existence ... Firstly, it [i.e. extra-parliamentary struggle] would help us to raise the people's anti-imperialist spirit. Secondly, it would enhance their belief that they had the capacity to liberate themselves and that the leftwing forces in Singapore were still very much alive to lead them. He [i.e. Lee Siew Choh] was confident that we could inculcate this spirit into the minds of the masses ... once this was achieved, the people would be able to stand firmly on their anti-imperialist belief and this would

benefit the Barisan Sosialis in its struggle against the imperialists, the Alliance and the PAP in future.

... parliamentary democracy could be used to educate the masses but unfortunately the Government had taken away this legal means, for example, parliament only sat once or twice a year; no police permit for leftwing organisations to hold their mass rallies; and, very short notices were given before elections. All this did not give the leftwing forces an opportunity to explain their policies ...

... in the past, ... the British Imperialists, the PAP and the Alliance could deceive the people that they could elect a government truly representing them through the one-man-one-vote system. But the results of the National Referendum and the General Election of 1963 indicated otherwise because of Government's manipulations in the elections. Under such conditions, the people could not vote freely ...

On the question that some people fear that the extra-parliamentary struggle was a prelude to Communist armed struggle, Dr Lee ... explained that this was not true because extra-parliamentary struggle was within constitutional means ... He then quoted a number of demonstrations which took place in Japan and ... European countries to prove this point. He added that so long as the Barisan Sosialis did not take up arms during their demonstrations and processions, how could one accuse us for playing into the Communist game?"

136 "KY", paragraph 240.

137 *Fong*, p. 178.

138 "TCK(68)", paragraph 177. See also paragraph 213.

139 *IJ*, no. 11/1966, pt. I, paragraph 1.

140 *IJ*, no. 11/1966, pt. I, paragraph 2.

141 "KY", paragraphs 236-237.

142 See p. 297.

143 "CPM 1960-68": 'Notes on Personalities', p. 8. Confirmation by "AC" and "HS".

144 *IJ*, no. 10/1966, pt. I, paragraphs 7 & 8; and no. 11/1966, pt. I, paragraph 21. "KY", paragraphs 249-251, 253 & 256. "OCS", paragraphs 109, 113 & 117.

145 See p. 289.

146 *Fong*, pp. 162-164 & 214. T.J. Bellows, *op. cit.*, p. 65. *IJ*, no. 7/1965, paragraphs 60^D, 62^F & 62^K. "OCS", paragraphs 78 & 60. Ong Chang Sam polled 4,346 votes while Lee Khoon Choy obtained 6,398.

147 "OCS", paragraph 58.

148 *Fong*, p. 164.

149 See p. 269.

150 "OCS", appendices B & C. OCS was the Organising Secretary of the BSS for a number of years.

151 "OCS", paragraphs 146 & 147. *IJ*, no. 2/1966, paragraphs 12^L-12^N.

152 This was according to Chia Thye Poh, a member of the Central Executive Committee of the BSS. Cf. *IJ*, no. 3/1966, paragraph 23^P.

153 Pang Cheng Lian, *op. cit.*, pp. 26, 45, 52 & 53.

154 *IJ*, no. 1/1964, paragraph 4^C; no. 2/1964, paragraphs 12^B & 15^C-15^E; no. 3/1964, paragraphs 20^C & 24^A-24^D; and no. 4/1964, paragraph 32^A.

155 *IJ*, no. 6/1964, paragraphs 52^O-52^R; no. 6/1965, paragraphs 55^H-55^R; and no. 7/1965, paragraphs 63-63^F.

156 See p. 265.

157 *IJ*, no. 6/1964, paragraph 52. *Straits Times*, 6 June 1964, pp. 1 & 22. *Nanyang Siang Pau*, 6 June 1964, p. 5.

- 158 *Straits Times*, 6 June 1964, pp. 1 & 22. *Nanyang Siang Pau*, 6 June 1964, p. 5.
- 159 *Ibid.*
- 160 *IJ*, no. 6/1964, paragraph 52^A.
- 161 *IJ*, no. 6/1964, paragraphs 52^B-52^C. *Barisan*, no. 69, 13 June 1964, pp. 3-4; and no. 70, 20 June 1964, p. 2.
- 162 *IJ*, no. 6/1964, paragraph 52^E.
- 163 *IJ*, no. 6/1964, paragraph 52^G.
- 164 *IJ*, no. 6/1964, paragraphs 52^H-52^K.
- 165 *IJ*, no. 6/1964, paragraph 52^N.
- 166 *IJ*, no. 7/1964, paragraph 64^I.
- 167 *IJ*, no. 7/1964, paragraphs 60^A & 64^L-64^N.
- 168 *IJ*, no. 8/1964, paragraphs 72-72^C.
- 169 *IJ*, no. 8/1964, paragraph 72^F.
- 170 *IJ*, no. 8/1964, paragraph 72^G.
- 171 *IJ*, no. 8/1964, paragraph 72^D.
- 172 *IJ*, no. 7/1964, paragraph 64.
- 173 See p. 263.
- 174 *IJ*, no. 7/1964, paragraphs 64^A, 64^I & 64^O.
- 175 *IJ*, no. 7/1964, paragraphs 64^B-64^E.
- 176 *IJ*, no. 7/1964, paragraph 64^P.
- 177 *IJ*, no. 6/1964, paragraph 52^K.
- 178 *IJ*, no. 7/1964, paragraph 64^S.
- 179 *IJ*, no. 8/1964, paragraph 72^E.
- 180 *IJ*, no. 6/1965, paragraph 53^Q.
- 181 *IJ*, no. 6/1965, paragraphs 53-53^A & 53^C.
- 182 *IJ*, no. 6/1965, paragraphs 49^F & 53^E-53^G.
- 183 *IJ*, no. 8/1965, paragraph 75^F; and no. 9/1965, paragraphs 85-85^A.
- 184 *IJ*, no. 6/1965, paragraphs 53^A-53^B.
- 185 *Wang Gungwu Report*.
- 186 *Ibid.*
- 187 *IJ*, no. 9/1965, paragraph 81^U.
- 188 *IJ*, no. 9/1965, paragraphs 96-96^E.
- 189 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraphs 96^F-96^G, 96^I & 96^O-96^P.
- 190 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraph 96^Q.
- 191 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraphs 96^R, 96^T, 96^V & 96^Y; and no. 11/1965, paragraphs 102^E-102^F, 105, 105^B-105^D, 105^G, 105^L, 105^O, 105^Q, 105^U-105^W & 105^Y.
- 192 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraphs 105^B & 105^O-105^M.
- 193 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraphs 96^Q, 96^R-96^T, 96^V-96^Z & 96^{BB}; no. 11/1965, paragraphs 105-105^C, 105^F-105^G, 105^L-105^M, 105^O-105^P, 105^S, 105^W-105^X, 105^{AA}-105^{BB} & 105^{EE}; and no. 12/1965, paragraphs 115^B & 115^E.
- 194 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraphs 96^T, 96^V & 96^{AA}; and no. 11/1965, paragraphs 105^C, 105^H, 105^M-105^P, 105^S & 105^{EE}.
- 195 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraph 105^T.
- 196 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraphs 105^T-105^U.
- 197 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraphs 102^F & 105^W-105^{AA}.
- 198 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraphs 105^{BB}-105^{EE}; and no. 12/1965, paragraphs 111^F, 115^A-115^C & 115^E.
- 199 *IJ*, no. 10/1965, paragraphs 96^I, 96^V & 96^{BB}; and no. 11/1965, paragraphs 105^D-105^E, 105^O & 105^S.
- 200 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraphs 102^G, 105^C, 105^G, 105^L, 105^O & 107-107^I.

- 201 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraphs 102^H, 105^C, 105^L, 105^X, 106–106^A, 106^C–106^E, 106^L–106^I & 106^L.
- 202 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraphs 103, 103^C, 103^O, 103^{PP}, 105^O & 105^L.
- 203 See p. 319.
- 204 *IJ*, no. 10/1966, paragraphs 5 & 35–36. “Nanyang University — Report of the Curriculum Review Committee (1965) — Reactions to:”, pt. 10, Folio (406).
- 205 *IJ*, no. 10/1966, paragraph 37; and no. 11/1966, paragraph 3.
- 206 *IJ*, no. 11/1966, paragraphs 25–26 & 28–29.
- 207 *IJ*, no. 11/1966, paragraph 30.
- 208 *Ibid.*
- 209 *Ibid.*
- 210 *IJ*, no. 11/1966, paragraph 31.
- 211 *IJ*, no. 11/1966, paragraph 32.
- 212 *Thong Saw Pak Report*, p. 2.
- 213 *Ibid.*, pp. 1–3.
- 214 *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 17–18 & 27–29.
- 215 *IJ*, no. 9/1966, paragraph 16; and no. 10/1966, paragraph 38.
- 216 *IJ*, no. 10/1966, paragraph 38.
- 217 *IJ*, no. 10/1966, paragraph 40. *Fong*, p. 179.
- 218 *IJ*, no. 10/1966, paragraph 41.
- 219 *IJ*, no. 10/1966, paragraph 43.
- 220 *IJ*, no. 11/1966, paragraphs 33 & 36. *Fong*, pp. 180–181 and pictures between pp. 96 & 97.
- 221 *IJ*, no. 11/1966, paragraphs 34 & 41.
- 222 *IJ*, no. 11/1966, paragraph 42.
- 223 *IJ*, no. 11/1966, paragraph 43.
- 224 *Ibid.*
- 225 *IJ*, no. 10/1966, paragraphs 39–42 & 44; and no. 11/1966, paragraphs 33 & 41. *Fong*, pp. 179–181 and pictures between pp. 96 & 97.
- 226 *IJ*, no. 10/1966, paragraph 44; and no. 11/1966, paragraphs 34–35 & 41.
- 227 *IJ*, no. 11/1964, paragraphs 102^H & 102^L.
- 228 *IJ*, no. 8/1965, paragraph 76.
- 229 *Perjuangan*, vol. 3, no. 3, January 1967, p. 4. The *Perjuangan* was an official organ of the NTUC. Cited in Teo Kah Beng, *op. cit.*, p. 32, note 40.
- 230 Chan Fee Hon, “The Leftwing Trade Unions: Structure and Policy”, Unpublished BA Hons. Academic Exercise, University of Singapore, 1966/67, p. 14, basing himself on Registry of Trade Union statistics.
- 231 Sources which state that there were 31 left-wing trade unions between 1964–1966 were, for instance: *IJ*, no. 2/1964, paragraph 16^G; no. 3/1964, paragraphs 25^O & 25^L; no. 4/1964, paragraphs 33, 33^C, 33^U–33^L & 33^N; no. 5/1964, paragraphs 43–43^C, 43^E & 43^K; no. 6/1964, paragraphs 49^A & 53; no. 7/1964, paragraph 65^D; and no. 8/1964, paragraphs 69^D & 73^F. Sources which state that there were 30 unions were, for instance: *IJ*, no. 7/1964, paragraph 65^B; no. 8/1964, paragraphs 73^E, 73^U, 73^L & 73^O; no. 5/1965, paragraph 44^W; no. 6/1965, paragraphs 49^D, 54^A, 54^C & 54^P; no. 7/1965, paragraphs 64^D, 64^L–64^K & 64^P; no. 8/1965, paragraphs 71, 76^E, 76^T & 76^W–76^V; no. 9/1965, paragraphs 86^A & 86^W; no. 10/1965, paragraphs 97^E, 97^U, 97^L & 97^S; no. 11/1965, paragraphs 106^C–106^B & 106^I; no. 12/1965, paragraph 116^O; no. 1/1966, paragraphs 6, 6^C, 6^I & 6^O; no. 2/1966, paragraphs 10^H, 14^R & 14^T; no. 3/1966, paragraphs 24^F & 24^{OO}; and no. 4/1966, paragraphs 35^A, 35^C, 35^S–35^T & 35^U.
- 232 Chan Fee Hon, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

- 233 See p. 267.
- 234 *IJ*, no. 6/1964, paragraphs 49^A & 53^F.
- 235 See p. 284.
- 236 *IJ*, no. 11/1964, paragraphs 97^D & 102^B.
- 237 *IJ*, no. 10/1964, paragraphs 87^A & 92^A; and no. 11/1964, paragraphs 97^D & 102^B.
- 238 *IJ*, no. 12/1964, paragraphs 109^A -109^C & 109^G; and no. 1/1965, paragraphs 1^F, 6-6^B & 6^D.
- 239 *IJ*, no. 4/1965, paragraphs 29^D & 34^{FP}. "HFS(67)", paragraphs 294-299.
- 240 *IJ*, no. 4/1965, paragraphs 34^{FP} & 34^U-34^{LL}.
- 241 *IJ*, no. 4/1965, paragraph 34^{OO}.
- 242 *IJ*, no. 4/1965, paragraphs 34^{OO}-34^{FP}.
- 243 *IJ*, no. 5/1965, paragraphs 44-44^D. "TCK(68)", paragraphs 96-104. "HSF(67)", paragraph 299.
- 244 *IJ*, no. 6/1965, paragraphs 49^E, 54^F & 54^L-54^K; and no. 8/1965, paragraphs 76^R-76^U.
- 245 *IJ*, no. 8/1965, paragraphs 71^F & 76^U-76^X; and no. 9/1965, paragraphs 86^L-86^K.
- 246 See p. 312.
- 247 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraphs 102^H & 106^H.
- 248 See p. 312.
- 249 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraphs 102^G & 107^I.
- 250 *IJ*, no. 12/1965, paragraphs 116^C & 116^G.
- 251 *IJ*, no. 2/1966, paragraphs 10^G, 14^B-14^C, 14^M-14^N & 14^P-14^Q; and no. 4/1966, paragraph 35^C.
- 252 *IJ*, no. 3/1966, paragraphs 24 & 24^B.
- 253 *IJ*, no. 11/1966, paragraph 63.
- 254 See pp. 283-284.
- 255 *IJ*, no. 8/1964, paragraph 74.
- 256 *IJ*, no. 12/1964, paragraphs 110-110^A.
- 257 See p. 312.
- 258 *IJ*, no. 11/1965, paragraphs 102^G & 107^H-107^I. The 11 old boys' associations were: Ai Tong OBA, Chiang Teck OBA, Chin Kang OBA, Chong Cheng OBA, Chong Hock OBA, Kong Yong OBA, Pei Ching OBA, San Shan OBA, Shin Min OBA, Hong Wen OBA and Ying Shin OBA.
- 259 See p. 318.
- 260 *IJ*, no. 1/1966, paragraphs 1^G & 7-7^D.
- 261 See p. 315.
- 262 See p. 14.
- 263 "LHK", paragraph 354.
- 264 See pp. 252-253.
- 265 Gordon P. Means, *op. cit.*, pp. 360-363.
- 266 "LHK", paragraph 253.
- 267 See p. 20.
- 268 "CHW", paragraphs 125, 295, 312 & 346.
- 269 "YMT", paragraph 67.
- 270 "LHK", paragraphs 348-351.
- 271 "LHK", paragraph 355.
- 272 *Fong*, p. 155.
- 273 Gordon P. Means, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-323.

VIII

Conclusion

The CPM's open united front struggle in Singapore between 1954 and 1966 was initially a success, but ultimately a failure. Further struggles after 1966 saw the Party attempting to exploit this mode of operation time and again whenever there was a need and an opportunity to do so.

Success and Failure

The CPM was founded in 1930. On its fiftieth anniversary in 1980 it issued a proclamation with the title "The Fifty Years of the Communist Party of Malaya(马来亚共产党的五十年)" to commemorate the occasion. The document surveyed the history of the Party during its existence and drew lessons, which Party members could learn, from the vast and varied experiences undergone. The summing-up covered the struggle in Singapore between 1954-1966, the relevant part of which is cited here as it tells succinctly what transpired in those days. The review reads:

In the fifties, our Party adopted the open and legal form of struggle in Singapore to mount large scale mass movements. The gigantic struggle against National Service initiated by middle school students on 13 May, 1954 was a prelude to a new upsurge in such movements. Following this incident, the student, the workers' and other movements developed vigorously. Our Party sent cadres to set up together with Lee Kuan Yew the People's Action Party. It also mobilised the broad masses to support this Party in the 1959 elections in the island, thus enabling it to win a landslide victory. The mass movements initiated by the Singapore Factory and Shop Workers' Union, acting as the core, and which included the various organisations of the various opposed strata, as well as the student and political movements started by the Nanyang University, acting as the leaders, played a positive role in the promotion of the progressive movement in Singapore.

After coming into power with the support of the Communist Party, Lee Kuan Yew adopted an anti-Communist and anti-people policy. He arrested and detained for long periods batch after batch of Communists and anti-Imperialist patriots. He banned all progressive trade unions and people's organisations, and frantically suppressed the progressive movement ...

The period when the open united front could be maintained with the PAP, which afforded a shield to protect the development of the mass

movement, was a time of success for the CPM. But when the PAP severed the alliance, the CPM met with defeat.

Further Struggles

The struggle of the CPM continued after 1966 even up to the present time. The nearly 30 years of history between 1966 and the present divide into three periods, namely 1966 to 1980, 1980 to 1989, and since 1989. In the first stage, as noted in the Introduction,¹ the CPM pursued armed struggle again; in the second, it changed to a line of action which it called a combination of non-armed and armed struggle. The term "non-armed struggle" had never occurred before; what it meant will be explained in later pages. Since 1989, the CPM has followed peaceful struggle. The situation in 1966-1980 was similar to that in 1941-1945 and 1948-1954. The years 1980-1989 bore some resemblance to 1954-1966, and post-1989 was hoped to become somewhat like 1945-1948 but this never transpired.

As seen in the Introduction, the present study focuses on some crucial aspects of the Communist movement, namely its aims or objectives, its methods of struggle, the organisational tools it used to further its purposes, and whether it carried out activities openly and legally, or underground and in contravention of the law. This brief review of post-1966 developments will address these themes too. However, it will not treat them separately, as in the story so far told, but simultaneously, as there is insufficient data to go into as much detail as for the earlier days.

The Assault Unit Offensive

The new round of military activity, begun in 1968, initially took the form of infiltrating small guerilla groups, called assault units, from the Thai-Malaysian border back to the Malay peninsula to create "a net-work of guerilla bases [in various localities] that would eventually envelope the entire Peninsula and constitute the spring boards from which the armed struggle would be launched".² A full-blown uprising could not be attempted right from the start because the previous war in the late forties and the fifties left the CPM with no military presence in the country. The Party had no choice but to start from scratch all over again. The first guerillas were at that time located at the Thai-Malaysian border because the Party had in 1952 evacuated its headquarters³ and subsequently rebuilt the movement there. At this juncture, it had three regiments in the place⁴ and the various assault units were detachments from these formations.

It was envisaged that the Party would be able to win this new war and seize power in the country by 1975.⁵ A fellow Communist force in Southeast Asia, the Vietcong, captured South Vietnam in that year which also subsequently led to Communist forces overrunning Cambodia and Laos. But the CPM was unable to fulfil its ambition in Malaya. By 1975, its success amounted to only having set up primitive bases in 25 areas in the northern half of the country,⁶ the most important of which were in central Perak and west Pahang, two states in the country where ground support was the strongest.⁷ After 1975, the Party fared worse. Perhaps stimulated by the events in Indochina, the CPM declared the year to be one of combat which led it to step up its attacks on the Government. Also, by this time, it had, for reasons to be explained later, broken up into three rival parties: the CPM itself; a Communist Party of Malaya, Revolutionary Faction (CPMRF) and a Communist Party of Malaya, Marxist-Leninist (CPMML). The three competed in demonstrations of revolutionary fervour which resulted in even more intense pressure on the Government. Especially sanguinary, among other acts, were assassinations of police personnel and sabotage of installations perpetrated by underground mass and united front organisations which rendered logistical and manpower support to the various assault units. The violence had the effect of provoking the Government into taking them seriously. Up till then, the Government had only reacted to their thrusts, but now it assumed the offensive. In the years that followed, the Government imposed severe penalties on them, so much so that by 1979, the assault unit strategy was noted to be "not making headway".⁸ The next year, the Party had to change tack again.

The southward march was doomed from the start. Because his forces had been infiltrated by government agents, before a single soldier had crossed the border Chin Peng instituted a purge of suspected elements that was so drastic that two units from the regiments seceded and declared themselves separate parties as the CPMRF and the CPMML. Thereafter, there was a war of words as well as of blood between the parent body and the rebels. This internal split, naturally, had a debilitating effect on the work down in the peninsula.⁹ As well as fighting among themselves, the different Communist parties were attacked and harrassed by Malaysian and Thai security forces who acted sometimes separately and sometimes jointly. The assault by such forces intensified after 1975. Co-operation between the two was sometimes disrupted and generally the Thais were not as helpful as expected. Nevertheless, the pressures exerted kept the different Communists constantly on their toes, and this, needless to say, must have had an adverse effect on the effort to develop the revolution in the south.¹⁰ It was reported that security analysts, observing the scene at

the time, held the opinion that the Communists, plagued by the twin evils, had little chance of really creating an upheaval in Malaysia.¹¹

Once having arrived in the jungles in the peninsula, the various assault units were subjected to incessant "search and destroy operations" mounted against them by the Government's security forces. They tried their best to avoid contact, for at this stage of their return their mission was not to engage in fighting but to build up bases. However, they were unable to escape discovery completely and over the years suffered severe decimation. What hit them most was not so much losses in the battlefield but rather the continuous disruption of the underground mass and united front organisations which provided them with infrastructural and manpower support. Chief among such organisations was a Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF), formed only after this campaign began. Over the years, and especially after 1975, when the Government stepped up its counter-action, members and supporters of these bodies were rounded up and neutralised in great numbers, so much so that by the end of the seventies they were said to have become completely "disorganised and leaderless". Without sufficient background support, the assault units were unable to carry on effectively.¹²

Alongside the Government's offensives and attacks on them, the various mass and united front organisations pushed feverishly to recruit fresh blood and in other work not only to replenish losses but also to expand. As seen already, to engage in mass and united front movements in order to develop was standard Party practice. In fact, at the beginning of the military campaign which was underway, the CPM, in addition to what other political groups were already doing, contributed to intensifying racial polarisation between the Chinese and the Malays so as to facilitate attracting recruits from both communities to rally to its cause. The Chinese at the time were disgruntled with Malay dominance in politics and the Malays in turn were resentful of Chinese superiority in the economy. In the late sixties, the Malayan People's Socialist Front (MPSF), made up of the Labour Party of Malaya (LPM) and the Partai Rakyat of Malaya (PRM), one Chinese-based and the other Malay-based but both penetrated by CPM men,¹³ sponsored a spate of agitation against the Government over various issues. The fires were stoked so hot that following the general election in 1969, the Chinese and the Malays broke out into a fight resulting in widespread rioting and killing.¹⁴ The CPM made the best of the tense situation which continued afterwards by forming, among the Chinese, the MNLF. Among the Malays, a Barisan Tani Malaya (Malayan Peasant Front) and a Parti Persaudaraan Islam (Islamic Brotherhood Party) were deployed to make contacts. As they were mostly peasants and Muslims, a land reform programme was advocated and

propaganda to demonstrate that Communism and Islam were not incompatible was disseminated to try to capture their interest.¹⁵

The Government suspended the parliamentary system after the racial disturbances which froze the MPSP, the LPM and the PRM. Consequently, CPM open and legal operations came to an end as they had in Singapore after 1966. However, several years later, an effort to infiltrate agents into lawful political parties, trade unions and student bodies was revived, but exactly which organisations were targeted for penetration or penetrated is unknown as data are unavailable. Up to 1980, it was noted, little success was achieved in the campaign.¹⁶

As on the military front, so also in mass and united front activities, the Government met the challenges of the CPM head on. The Government promoted mass and united front movements of its own, and competed vigorously with the CPM for popular support. Immediately after the 1969 riots, the Alliance Party, the ruling coalition consisting of the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC),¹⁷ reached understandings with the Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) and with the People's Progressive Party (PPP) in 1972, as well as the Parti Islam Semalaysia (PAS) the following year. The first two are based in the states of Penang and Perak respectively, where the majority of the population is Chinese and where, in the case of the latter state, the CPM had one of its most widely-supported assault units. PAS is based in Kelantan, a predominantly Malay area. The widened coalition was renamed the National Front (NF) in 1974.¹⁸ In 1971, a New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced which aimed to give the Malay people an equal share of the national economy along with the other races in the country, including the Chinese.¹⁹ These moves enlarged the united front of the ruling party and also helped to consolidate its mass base.

Non-Armed and Armed Struggle

Faced with continuous losses and setbacks both in the battlefield and in mass and united front work, the CPM had no alternative but to push even harder in the latter to rebuild the strength of the revolution. Armed struggle would not be given up, but would have to be held in abeyance. After mass and united front efforts had amassed sufficient resources, the armed struggle could be resumed. This was a strategy of combining non-armed and armed struggle. In a statement issued in June 1988 to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the 1948 uprising against the British Colonial Government, for instance, this line of action was made clear.²⁰

Of course, the most fruitful way to contact and mobilise mass and united front targets was through open and legal channels, and so an effort

was mounted in the seventies to exploit this strength, and in addition to the underground movement it was now made the main thrust of all activities. Political warfare would occupy centre stage.²¹

As a consequence, the situation which emerged between 1980 and 1989, bore a resemblance to that between 1954 and 1966. Yet there was a profound difference between the two periods. Whereas in the earlier years, the Party actually wished to wind up military fighting and disband its armed forces but did not do so because the enemy refused to accept its terms of peace, on the present occasion, it was only planning to shelve armed revolution temporarily. Even in 1954-1966, the Party leadership as a whole, as noted,²² never really believed that peaceful means would secure conquest of the country; how much less this time.

Along with the scaling down of military activities and the diversion of resources to political warfare, the CPM altered its revolutionary goal for the time being, as it had between 1945-1948, from seeking to create a Democratic Republic of Malaya to working for the establishment of a democratic coalition government for the country. Actually, a democratic republic would also be managed by a coalition. However, as it would come about as a product of a new democratic revolution, the coalition would be dominated by the CPM. The proposed democratic coalition, as it was not going to ensue from the victory of a new democratic revolution, on the other hand, would not be led by the CPM but rather by some other political party, and the CPM would occupy in it only a junior position. To strive for a Democratic Republic of Malaya was the long-term programme of the Party and to fight for a democratic coalition was the specific programme for that present period of time.²³

The proposal to form a democratic coalition regime for the nation was first made in 1980.²⁴ Several years later, the proposal was adjusted to include calling for a democratic consultative board, consisting of representatives from all patriotic and democratic parties, people's organisations and independents in the country, to be convened first, and then a democratic coalition government to be set up afterwards through truly democratic and just elections. Representatives from the various component parties in the ruling NF, which had become patriotic and democratic, would be entitled to join the regime and the CPM, for its part, would be willing to dedicate its efforts to help bring about such an administration in which it would participate.²⁵ Later, the proposed democratic consultative board was renamed the National Political Consultative Council. On this occasion, it was suggested also that the Council should constitute for itself a permanent committee to handle all important and urgent problems facing the nation.²⁶ Clearly, if all the demands were accepted by the NF Government, the CPM would gain recognition and legal status as well as

a share of state power. It would be enabled to develop mass and united front movements openly and legally, and would have the opportunity to accumulate resources rapidly for an eventual military uprising.

Other than the fact that by the end of the seventies the assault unit armed campaign was not achieving its purpose, there were other developments which compelled the CPM to adopt the new course of combining non-armed and armed struggle in the eighties. One such development was the changed strategic situation China found herself in from the sixties. The CCP of China was the mentor of the CPM; any fortune or misfortune befalling this party inevitably entailed consequences for the latter.

In the early days, China was solidly a member of the Soviet bloc in the Cold War against the USA and her allies. But the dispute between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung on the best method of struggle to be followed in this war precipitated, as seen, a split between the two nations.²⁷ Added to this ideological difference, rival claims over territories along their common border soon worsened the division. Tension escalated eventually into armed conflict between the two countries in the late sixties. When China was friendly with the USSR, she was blockaded by the USA and allies all along the Chinese sea coast. China's security guarantee, besides her own defence capability, was the Soviet Union. Now that China and the USSR had fallen out, China found herself in a position of being encircled by hostile forces on both sides. The USSR, was even able to tie up with India and Vietnam to perfect the besiegement. The Indians, like the Soviets, had fought wars with the Chinese over border problems, and the Vietnamese, who were extensively supported by the Chinese in their independence and unification wars against the French and the Americans respectively, severed the friendship once their troubles were over. The USSR had, on occasions, proposed to the USA that the two should launch joint operations against the common enemy. China had to break out of the impasse. In 1971, consequently, Mao Tse-tung patched up with the USA. Eight years later, a new Chinese leader, Teng Hsiao-ping, established formal diplomatic relations with the Americans. Such a fundamental transformation of the international stance of the Chinese would inescapably have an impact on the fate of the CPM in Malaysia. Teng had, besides security considerations, another motive in getting closer to the Americans. He needed capital, technology and markets from the capitalist world to help modernise his country.²⁸

When China was still the enemy of the USA, she was hostile also to the latter's allies, including Malaysia, and consequently gave full backing to the CPM in its attempt to overthrow that country's government. But a change in her attitude towards the USA also brought about a new stance towards Malaysia. In 1975, Mao Tse-tung got China to establish diplo-

matic relations with Malaysia and Teng Hsiao-ping, after his accession to power, sought closer and closer ties with the Malaysians.²⁹

The altered international position of China, against the background of the futility of the assault unit offensive, compelled the CPM to make adjustments to its method of attempting to seize state power. Hence, the change from a line of armed struggle to one of combined non-armed and armed struggle. In 1980, in a message cabled to the CPM to congratulate it on its fiftieth anniversary, the CCP mentioned specially the fact that its own fight against what itself called Soviet hegemonism was heightening and that to participate in this effort had become the common task of Southeast Asia which was also facing the threat of Soviet-Vietnamese expansion and infiltration.³⁰ In a statement celebrating its own birthday on the same occasion, in which the proposal to form a democratic coalition government for the nation was first put forward, the CPM also made the observation that the principal contradiction in society in Malaysia and Singapore was still its conflict with the respective governments of the two territories, but the secondary conflict between all the people in the country, as represented by the CPM itself, and Soviet-Vietnamese hegemonism was worsening and could one day replace the first contradiction to become the main conflict. Struggles should be mounted against both enemies.³¹ That the Soviets and the Vietnamese were posing a threat to the Southeast Asian nations was a fact. In the mid-seventies, a leading Malay intellectual and two Malay ministers in the Malaysian Government were discovered to be politically involved with Soviet diplomats and subsequently detained by the police. And in Singapore, a Soviet bank, in a series of adventurous and speculative business deals, had secured significant business holdings in the island.³²

A third factor which persuaded the CPM to alter strategy in the eighties seems to have been a changed attitude towards it on the part of the Thai authorities. That the CPM could take refuge at the Thai-Malaysian border and rebuild itself after the defeat in the 1948-1960 war was due to the connivance of the Thais. Although throughout the sixties and seventies they co-operated with the Malaysians in mounting military operations against the CPM, their support was seldom whole-hearted. The relationship between the Thais and the CPM was one of live-and-let-live. However, in the eighties, for a variety of reasons not fully known, the Thais wanted the Malayan Communists to lay down their arms and abandon fighting in exchange for an amnesty. To enforce the offer, they exerted real military pressure.³³ The idea of a democratic coalition regime for Malaya and the various subsidiary proposals relating to it were probably counter offers made by the CPM. As the Thais were involved in the confrontation between the Malaysian belligerents, they were naturally

drawn in as well to act as mediator in negotiations for peace between the two. The new attitude of the Thais thus contributed to influencing the CPM to transform its method of revolutionary struggle.

In pursuing "the countryside surrounding the cities and the seizure of power through armed struggle", the CPM was indebted to Mao Tse-tung for the guidance. This latest attempt to initiate a Political Consultative Conference, leading to the establishment of a democratic coalition government was also following an example set by Mao. From 1945 to 1946, Mao negotiated for peace with Chiang Kai-shek, his political opponent, on the basis of convening a Political Consultative Conference of political parties and independents to produce a democratic coalition government for China. At the time, Mao leading the CCP and Chiang leading the Kuomintang were fighting in a united front against the Japanese who had invaded China since 1937. Before the Japanese came, the two had fought each other, and after the Japanese had withdrawn, it was clear that they would come to blows again. Mao and the CCP were the weaker force. Mao's negotiations were underpinned by the desire to earn for his party greater mass following among the people and united front support from political parties which were neutral between the CCP and the Kuomintang, as well as the goodwill of the USA which was involved with the Chinese in fighting the Japanese. They all did not wish to see China plunge into turmoil and chaos again after the surrender of the Japanese. Mao attempted to build up as much strength as possible before he went in for the inevitable showdown. Eventually, a peace was concluded between the two rival forces under American mediation, but it was all only on paper. Soon war flared up, and Mao triumphed over Chiang in 1949.³⁴

Following a decision on the new line of struggle, the CPM took steps at once to launch mass and united front activities to gather strength to fight for its goals. Particularly, mass and united front support had to come from the Malay people if it was to succeed to any degree. The UMNO, the dominant party in the ruling NF, was well liked by most Malays and had many friends in other political parties. Therefore, alongside the Barisan Tani Malaya and the Parti Persaudaraan Islam, a Revolutionary Malay National Party (RMNP) was launched in 1981 to attract the Malay crowd. This organisation was actually a reincarnation of the MNP which had been a united front partner of the CPM between 1945-1948 against the British Colonial Government.³⁵ The MNP was formed in 1945, a year earlier than the UMNO, and was therefore senior to it. In its day, it also enjoyed widespread Malay support. Thus, a revived MNP in the form of a RMNP could probably undermine the UMNO's strength and challenge its dominance. It will not be far-fetched to speculate that the CPM intended to use the RMNP as a united front partner to get a Political

Consultative Conference convened and a democratic coalition government produced. In China, a party which often saw eye to eye with the CCP against the KMT was the Democratic League. The RMNP could be a similar organisation in Malaya. This party was to function in the open and not underground.³⁶

In 1980, before the inauguration of the RMNP, the Chairman of the CPM, Musa Ahmad had surrendered to the Malaysian Government and returned to Malaysia from China where he had been staying. He had become head of the Party in 1955, just before Chin Peng went to the peace talks in Baling. Chin Peng left the Thai-Malaysian border for China in 1961 accompanied by Musa. While there, difficulties arose between the two men, and in 1972 Musa decided to give up the Party and return home. But he was unable to do so until Teng Hsiao-ping's time when the Chinese Government allowed him to give himself up to the Malaysian authorities. Once back in Malaysia, Musa was put on television and radio to denounce his Communist past and other things. Musa took the opportunity also to try to show that he was never a Communist but in fact a nationalist who had got involved with the CPM only to fight the British. He laboured this point to such an extent that the Malaysian authorities considered the possibility that he was trying to "rebuild his own tarnished image into that of a new nationalist leader, and to acquire such a public following and support that the Government would not be able to deter him from becoming a new political power".³⁷ He was probably to become the Chairman of the RMNP. Thereafter, his speaking on television and radio was stopped, and he was "put on ice".³⁸ Later on, the CPM appointed Abdullah C.D., a Central Committee member of the CPM and formerly an agent of the Party in the MNP, to become the head of the RMNP. However, the new man was living in the jungle and could not emerge into the open to run the organisation. Thus the RMNP was eventually unable to pose a challenge to the UMNO.³⁹

In June the same year, immediately after the formation of the RMNP, the CPM promulgated a ten-point draft national, i.e. racial, programme in which it attacked what it considered to be the ultra-chauvinist racial, i.e. pro-Malay, policy of the ruling NF, and advocated a moderate socio-economic, educational and cultural programme which would appeal to the aspirations of all the different communities in the country.⁴⁰ The programme, hopefully, would enlarge the mass and united front base of the Party.

Data are unavailable to show whether in the eighties, the CPM achieved any success in its drive to promote an open and legal mass and united front movement. But failure was more likely in view of the fact that the RMNP was unable to perform. It can also be surmised that attempts

by underground mass and united front outfits to infiltrate lawful political parties and other public organisations encountered government counter-moves. Evidence is also not at hand to indicate how underground mass and united front recruitment exercises fared. Perhaps precisely because throughout the decade of the eighties its movement was unable to grow, it did not succeed, in the end, in getting a National Political Consultative Conference convened and a democratic coalition government created. In China, the CCP was able to achieve success with similar demands because it had great bargaining strength; it governed large tracts of "liberated areas" with large populations and possessed a large fighting force.⁴¹ The CPM did not have these.

In place of a National Political Consultative Conference, what came about eventually was only a meeting between CPM representatives and Thai officials in a long series of negotiations to talk peace, towards the end of which some Malaysian officials sat in as observers. The Thais met all three groups of Communists actually, the original CPM, the CPMRF and the CPMML. Meanwhile, in 1983, the CPMRF and the CPMML had combined to become one party called the Communist Party of Malaysia. In 1987, the Thais finally got the new party to lay down its arms and accept an amnesty, with its members being given land to settle down in Thailand as peaceful residents. Chin Peng's group negotiated until 1989 whence it accepted the Thai terms which did not confirm it on its path of a combination of non-armed and armed struggle but instead put it on a path of peaceful struggle, similar to what befell it in 1945. The strategy of combined non-armed and armed struggle after a decade of trial concluded in failure.⁴²

Peaceful Struggle

The year 1989 opened a new era for the CPM. In December the Party signed agreements of peace with both the Governments of Thailand and Malaysia. These provided for the CPM to terminate all its armed activities at the Thai-Malaysian border and in the Malay peninsula. Its armed forces were to disband and all their weapons were to be surrendered and destroyed. Ex-guerillas who were citizens of Malaysia – there were among them Thai, Singapore and other nationals – would have the right to return to Malaysia and take part freely in politics as long as this was done within the framework of the country's constitution and laws. They would also be treated fairly by the Malaysian authorities.⁴³

What would be the aim or objective of the revolution under the new mode of struggle? In the previous decade, even fighting for a mere share of power in a proposed democratic coalition regime did not prove possible. Now, in the years ahead, did the Party have to lower its sights even

further? Early in 1991, more than a year after the conclusion of the peace agreements, Chin Peng was reported to have said in Thailand that in the projected struggle to be conducted through the parliamentary system in Malaysia, he was optimistic that some Malaysians would give him support but such support would not be so extensive as to enable him to win a majority among the electorate. It would be enough for him just to initiate a political movement.⁴⁴ The Party's temporary goal was indeed lowered to merely forming a lawful opposition in the country's political system. Chin Peng probably realised he had not lost all by facing up to hard reality in this manner. As the aim of securing partial state power in a democratic coalition government could not be realised, to be able to develop an opposition movement in an open and legal way would still avail the Party the opportunity to recoup its strength. Once nursed back to health, the Party could perhaps look forward to a future that would be bright.

However, the new situation did not actually hold out as much promise for the Communists as hoped for or imagined. As noted so frequently before, Chin Peng never believed that without the gun it would be possible to complete the revolution. Therefore, why, on this occasion, was he so willing to disarm himself? Undoubtedly, he must have been caught in circumstances so difficult that he had no option but to take this way out.

In recapitulation, the domestic development which compelled the CPM to change course was the inability of the line of combined non-armed and armed struggle to produce results, and one of the external factors which influenced it was the prevailing attitude of the Thais throughout the eighties that it should compromise.

One international development, some speculated, that had an immediate impact on the CPM was the June 4th Incident which took place in Beijing just half a year before the CPM concluded its peace agreements with Thailand and Malaysia,⁴⁵ in which certain university students in the city demonstrated against their government over various complaints like the lack of democracy in politics, corruption in officialdom and inflation in the economy, and were shot down by government forces. Some enemies of the Chinese Government lent support to the students and heaped trouble on China. In order to minimise her isolation, the Chinese Government stepped up its efforts to develop friendships internationally. Malaysia was one of the countries highly valued by China. The best show of friendship that the Chinese Government could make to Malaysia in order to deepen existing ties was to get the CPM to forgo trying to overthrow its government by force of arms.

At the time, what was afoot in the other great Communist power, the USSR, and the consequences of that also had a bearing on the fortunes of

the CPM. Mikhail Gorbachev was winding up the Cold War with the USA which brought peace to many points of conflict in the world where the two nations had been locked in confrontation, freed the Eastern European nations from their unpopular Communist regimes and ushered in democracy and liberty to the Soviet Union. These changes on the world scene caused many in the Malayan Communist movement to feel that it would be futile for them to continue in their old ways.⁴⁶

Under the terms of the peace settlement, then, the Malaysian Government would have to allow the ex-guerillas to return to Malaysia to take part in the country's politics so long as this was done within the rules of the existing political system. They should have the opportunity to engage in mass and united front activities openly and legally to try to rebuild the fortunes of the Party. However, the government was also empowered to require all those who wished to return to go through a sifting process before they would really be entitled to rejoin politics. Also, the government could make it such that they would have no legal instrument or political organisation through which they could carry out activities. In the end, they would be hemmed in so much that they would not be able to play their kind of politics at all.

Limited and imperfect information suggests that the sifting process consisted of several stages. The first stage stipulated that all aspiring returnees must report to a special committee, made up of Thai and Malaysian officials whose duty would be to scrutinise their personal particulars and put them under observation for six months before qualifying them to step on Malaysian soil.⁴⁷ The committee would also conduct interviews.⁴⁸ Early in 1991, it was reported that 1,100 persons had applied to return and 400, including Chin Peng, were shortlisted for interview.⁴⁹ By the middle of 1993, two and a quarter years later, about 300 of the 400 were accepted and subsequently were readmitted into the country.⁵⁰ However, Chin Peng and other Party leaders were not among the successful returnees. These finally found that it was not possible for them to go through the mill. Only a short while after the peace pacts were signed in December 1989, the Malaysian Inspector-General of Police made a statement saying that there were two kinds of Malaysian Communists, one without rank and the other with rank. The first kind were people who accepted the failure of the Communist movement around the world, wished genuinely to give up their struggle and return home to live a normal life. The second kind, however, were those who, once Communists, would always remain so and would continue to cling on to their ideology.⁵¹ This was why, in the end, Chin Peng and other fellow leaders failed to make the grade to return. Because, finally, only safe ex-guerillas

were taken back into the country, the Communist movement could not be rebuilt. By themselves, the returnees did not have the aspiration or the ability to undertake the task.

The second stage of the clearing process ensured that the safe returnees would actually be made safe. It required them to undergo a period of rehabilitation in a detention camp, which could last quite some time, before they would be able to re-enter society. Rehabilitation was getting them to genuinely reject the Communist ideology and not become agents in disguise.⁵² After having gone through rehabilitation, the ex-Communists would be less likely to start giving trouble again.

The final stage was putting the rehabilitated persons under observation and assessing them in their activities while they lived a normal life for another five or six years. Only after they had been found to have behaved well over this period of time would they be given the green light to rejoin politics.⁵³ But, by then they would be more likely to play safe rather than dangerous politics.

After the returnees had passed all the sifting, there remained the question of whether they would have a political party or organisation to enable them to carry out activities. There were several possibilities, all of which, finally, turned out to be illusory.

The best option that the ex-guerillas could hope for was that they would be permitted to conduct activities in the name of their original party, the CPM. This, however, was not possible. Regardless of the peace settlement, the CPM was not given recognition by the Malaysian Government.⁵⁴ The ban on it imposed by the British Colonial Government in 1948 when it rebelled against that government was upheld. If the returnees could operate as the CPM, they would have a situation similar to that between 1945-1948.

Denied the ideal alternative, Chin Peng was reported by the media in Thailand to have either requested the Malaysian Government to allow him to change the name of his party from the CPM to the Malayan People's Party so that it could operate in Malaysia or permit him to form a new organisation altogether under the new name. The Malaysian Government's response to the first probable proposal was that it would take it a year to consider the idea. To the second, the answer was that no registration would be granted so long as Communism was followed.⁵⁵ Subsequently, nothing was heard further about the matter and it can be assumed that Chin Peng failed in his bid.

A final way out for the ex-guerillas was to join other people's political parties, and mass and united front organisations. In mid-1993, it was discovered by the police that a certain organisation, headed by a leader of the previously lawful but now proscribed MPSF, was making a special

effort to recruit people formerly involved in the Communist movement to become members. The organisation was warned to correct its ways and, presumably, it obeyed. Thus, it was not easy for the ex-Communists to try to make use of other people's facilities.⁵⁶

Eventually, therefore, the right which ex-guerillas had to participate in politics remained only theoretical. In fact, in November 1989, only a few days before the Communists signed the peace accords with the Thai and Malaysian Governments, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, made the following comment: "If they sign the agreement, it must mean the end of their struggle."⁵⁷

However, it is not really the end yet. The fact remains that the CPM, the political organisation, still exists and has not been dissolved. The peace agreements did not provide for it to be recognised and allowed to function in Malaysia, but, at the same time, did not require it to be wound up. So long as the Party remains, the struggle will go on.

How, then, is the struggle likely to be conducted presently? What probable future is the Party looking forward to? In Malaysia and Singapore,⁵⁸ the Party is likely to be trying to reconstruct its strength through pushing underground mass and united front activities as in the past. This would have been done anyway, even if open and legal similar activities were possible. These activities will be attempted in production centres, i.e. work places, as well as lawful public organisations like political parties. But, probes of these sorts will be watched and countered by the authorities.⁵⁹ How great will be the chances of success?

While, on the one hand, the Party engages itself in rebuilding its strength, on the other, it should be hoping and watching out for favourable developments to occur both at home and abroad to enable it to arise from the ashes.

Notes

- 1 See p. 20.
- 2 *Resurgence*, paragraph 17.
- 3 See p. 14.
- 4 The three regiments were called the 8th, the 10th and the 12th Regiments.
- 5 According to the then Inspector-General of Police, Malaysia, Tan Sri Haniff Omar, as in *FEER*, 6 March 1981, p. 28.
- 6 *Ibid.*
- 7 See, for instance, *YB* for 1977, p. 125 and for 1979, pp. 151-152.
- 8 *YB* for 1975, pp. 115-117; for 1976, pp. 110-112; for 1978, pp. 134-136; and for 1979, pp. 150-153. *FEER*, 6 March 1981, pp. 28-30. Richard Sim, "Malaysia: Containing the Communist Insurgency", in *Conflict Studies*, no. 110, August 1979, pp. 10-15. Aloysius Chin, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-161 & chapter 14.
- 9 Xiulan, *I Want to Live* (Malaysia: Star Publications (Malaysia) Bhd., 1983), pts. II & III. Xiulan was one of the victims of the purge. Also *FEER*, 20 June 1980, pp. 18 &

- 22; and 6 March 1981, p. 27. *YB* for 1974, p. 107; for 1975, p. 115; for 1976, p. 112; and for 1977, pp. 124-125. Aloysius Chin, op. cit., chapter 13.
- 10 *YB* for 1967, p. 127; for 1968, p. 127; for 1969, p. 97; for 1970, p. 100; for 1974, p. 107; for 1975, pp. 115-116; for 1977, p. 125; for 1978, p. 135; and for 1979, pp. 150-151. *FEER*, 20 June 1980, pp. 16-19; 6 March 1981, pp. 28-31; 1 May 1981, p. 14; 9 October 1981, p. 24; 1 October 1982, pp. 13-14; and 23 May 1985, pp. 51 & 53.
- 11 *FEER*, 9 October 1981, p. 24.
- 12 Xiulan, op. cit., pts. IV & V. Xiulan fought in the assault units. *YB* for 1969, p. 97; for 1970, pp. 99-100; for 1971, pp. 110-111; for 1972, pp. 98 & 132-133; for 1974, pp. 106-108; for 1975, pp. 115-116; for 1976, pp. 110-112; for 1977, pp. 125-126; for 1978, pp. 134-136; and for 1979, pp. 150-153. Muhammad Ghazali bin Shafie, *Subversive Activities: How They Are Disrupted* (Statement by Minister of Home Affairs at a press conference on 13 August 1976). Aloysius Chin, op. cit., pp. 158-159. "Wu-shih-nien".
- 13 See pp. 251-252 for earlier information on these organisations.
- 14 *Path of Violence*. *YB* for 1967, pp. 128-129; for 1968, p. 127; and for 1969, pp. 96-97. Aloysius Chin, op. cit., pp. 121-122, 143-145 & 151-158.
- 15 *Path of Violence*, paragraphs 61-70. *Resurgence*, paragraph 20. "Wu-shih-nien". Richard Sim, op. cit., p. 8.
- 16 Xiulan, op. cit., p. 118. Muhammad Ghazali bin Shafie, op. cit., p. 3. *YB* for 1974, p. 108; and for 1975, p. 117.
- 17 See p. 18. The Malaysian Chinese Association was originally called the Malayan Chinese Association and changed to the new name only after Malaya became Malaysia. The Malaysian Indian Congress joined the Alliance Party in 1955. Originally, it was also known as the Malayan Indian Congress.
- 18 *YB* for 1994, pp. 459-463.
- 19 Richard Sim, op. cit., p. 4.
- 20 Statement by the Communist Party of Malaya Central Committee issued on the fortieth anniversary of the uprising against the Colonial Government in 1948 and entitled "Unite and Continue the Struggle", dated 18 June 1988. Towards the end, the statement says: "Our party and army have initiated and maintained the long-term revolutionary armed struggle. Under the present situation, we must combine the armed and non-armed struggle, maintain the armed struggle, develop a mass movement, and widen the united front so as to gradually increase the people's power and ripen the revolutionary situation."
- 21 *YB* for 1981, p. 141 observed: "As a result of the several losses suffered by the terrorists and their underground supporters during the last few years, the communists are now changing the tactics of their struggle. They still regard the armed struggle as the main form of struggle but it is to be complemented with intensified underground activities and [open] United Front efforts. More emphasis will be given in future to promoting [open] United Front activities by communists penetration into open and legal organisations, such as political parties, trade unions, student unions and other social organisations in order to influence and control these organisations. The communists will attempt to subvert the vast membership of these organisations in order to create unrest and turmoil in the country during which the terrorists will seek to accelerate the pace of the armed struggle which is not making headway at present."
- 22 See p. 16.
- 23 Interpretation according to "HS".

- 24 Statement by the Communist Party of Malaya Central Committee issued on its fiftieth anniversary and entitled "Long Live the Communist Party of Malaya", dated 28 April 1980. The relevant part reads: "People of all nationalities and various strata throughout the country, unite ... and establish a democratic coalition government comprising representatives of all patriotic and democratic parties and nonparty patriots."
- 25 Statement by the Communist Party of Malaya Central Committee issued on its fifty-fifth anniversary and entitled "Fight for the Realisation of the Present Special Program", dated 29 April 1985.
- 26 Statement by the Communist Party of Malaya Central Committee issued on the fortieth anniversary of the uprising against the Colonial Government in 1948 and entitled "Unite and Continue the Struggle", dated 18 June 1988. Important and urgent problems to be handled by the suggested permanent committee included "putting an end to the domestic war, safeguarding political democracy, promoting economic development, consolidating racial unity, promoting language instruction, and other issues ...".
- 27 See p. 20.
- 28 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, *op. cit.*, chapters 27, 30 & 34.
- 29 Richard Sim, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
- 30 Congratulatory cable from the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to the Communist Party of Malaya Central Committee on its fiftieth anniversary, dated 28 April 1980.
- 31 *Supra*, note 23.
- 32 Richard Sim, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
- 33 *FEER*, 1 October 1982, pp. 13-15 and 23 May 1985, pp. 50-54. *Straits Times*, 13 May 1987, 14 December 1988 and 23 November 1989. *Lianhe Zaobao*, 25 November 1989 and 28 November 1989.
- 34 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, *op. cit.*, chapter 25.
- 35 See pp. 12 & 26.
- 36 *YB* for 1984, p. 135. "The Communist Party of Malaya and Its Attempts to Capture Power - Final Part", by C.C. Too in *New Straits Times*, 6 December 1989. Too was at one time the head of the Malaysian Government's Psychological Warfare Section which dealt with the Communists. Also "Wu-shih-nien".
- 37 "The Communist Party of Malaya and Its Attempts to Capture Power - Part Three", by C.C. Too in *New Straits Times*, 5 December 1989.
- 38 *Ibid.*
- 39 Too's article in *New Straits Times* on 5 and 6 December 1989. *FEER*, 16 January 1981, pp. 13-14. "Wu-shih-nien".
- 40 Too's article in *New Straits Times* on 6 December 1989.
- 41 Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, *op. cit.*, p. 619.
- 42 *Straits Times*, 13 May 1987, 14 December 1988, 20 August 1989, 31 October 1989, 2 November 1989, 6 November 1989, 7 November 1989, 23 November 1989, and 26 November 1989. *Lianhe Zaobao*, 24 November 1989, 25 November 1989 and 28 November 1989. *FEER*, 23 November 1989, p. 11. Aloysius Chin, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-234 & 239-242.
- 43 Joint Communiqué by the contracting parties. *Malay Mail*, 3 December 1989. Aloysius Chin, *op. cit.*, p. 243.
- 44 *Straits Times*, 4 February 1991.
- 45 For instance, C.C. Too held this opinion. See *Straits Times*, 30 November 1989.
- 46 Pohji Kasem, deputy commander of the CPM's 10th Regiment, in an interview with

- a Bangkok newspaper, the *Post*, once said: "... in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iran or Iraq, they are now talking about how to achieve peace ... Is it worth keeping up the fighting?" *Straits Times*, 24 June 1989.
- 47 This was according to Major-General Kitti Rattanachaya, Deputy Commander of the 4th Army Region, Thailand, who mediated in the peace settlement. See *Straits Times*, 29 December 1989.
- 48 According to the Deputy Home Minister, Malaysia, Megat Junid Megat Ayub. See *New Straits Times*, 20 May 1991.
- 49 According also to the Deputy Home Minister, Malaysia. See *Straits Times*, 24 March 1991.
- 50 According to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Malaysia, Abdul Rahim Mohamed Noor. See *Malaysian Nanyang Siang Pau*, 9 July 1993.
- 51 *Straits Times*, 15 February 1991.
- 52 As stated by the Deputy Home Minister, Malaysia. See *Straits Times*, 26 March 1991.
- 53 As stated by the Deputy Home Minister, Malaysia. See *Straits Times*, 20 August 1990.
- 54 Statement by the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, to newsmen in *New Straits Times*, 3 December 1989.
- 55 *Straits Times*, 3 December 1989, 19 December 1989, 23 January 1990, 24 January 1992 and 25 January 1992. *Lianhe Zaobao*, 3 December 1989.
- 56 *Straits Times*, 12 July 1993.
- 57 *Straits Times*, 28 November 1989.
- 58 The CPM functions also in, for instance, Thailand and elsewhere. It is not possible to speculate what it does outside Malaysia and Singapore.
- 59 Only a short while after the peace accords were signed amongst the three parties, the Malaysian Director of Internal Security and Public Order, Mohamed Yassin Jafaar stated that the Police Field Force which had been engaged in jungle fighting with other security forces against the Communist guerillas would now shift its priority to checking possible infiltration in legitimate organisations. See *The Star*, 10 January 1990.

Select Bibliography

Primary Sources

There are nine groups or classes of primary sources on which this work is based. A few words on the value or otherwise of these materials are in place.

The first group or class of records are from the Internal Security Department, Ministry of Home Affairs, Republic of Singapore. Of these, there are eight divisions. Some need not be questioned as regards their reliability. Others, however, when used, have to be handled with care.

Division 1 of the Internal Security Department materials are CPM documents, publications, etc. in the possession of the department's archives or library. These sources have come from the Communist Party itself and are, therefore, the best guides or clues to the mysteries of the Communist movement. However, they provide information about only the general framework of the concerns of the present study. For day-to-day developments of the open united front, one has to look at the other divisions which follow, especially 2 and 3.

Division 2 of Internal Security Department materials are periodical and regular reports on all political activities, those of the CPM as well of other political parties or groups, in Singapore, compiled and written by the director of the department for the information of, at first, the British Governor, and later the elected local Chief Minister/Prime Minister and a few other senior governmental officers who also had to be acquainted with developments in the political field. This was the most authoritative source of information on politics in Singapore that any researcher could consult. In the various endnotes of this book, this is the most extensively cited material: of a total of 1463 notes, 532 refer to this police journal.

Division 3 of Internal Security Department data consists of unpublished security statements made to the department by ex-detainees. Because of its peculiar nature, this source, unlike the previous ones, has to be used with great circumspection. It is prone to mainly two types of defect: omission and misinformation. Why such problems arise is obvious. Those who give such statements realise the value of what they have to say and so tend to be as unco-operative as possible. Fortunately, there are a number of ways by which one can check the accuracy of such materials.

In the first place, one can verify with Internal Security Department officers the reliability of any particular statement: whether it was given with ease or with difficulty, and what opinion such officers have on the value of the statement. For instance, the confession of one Wong Mau Choong – see name in the relevant part of the bibliography – was through this procedure found to contain a number of pitfalls. Wong's greatest mischief was to use a Chinese phrase "Put Chang's cap on Lee's head" or, in other words, to say that an office held by Chang was rather held by Lee. Next, one can determine the virtues of a statement by looking at such items as internal consistency, consistency with statements of other persons, or consistency with yet other sources. It is the general opinion of Internal Security Department officers that the statements, as a whole, are a good guide to understanding Communist activities. These officers regularly carry out their departmental functions based on the authority of these statements. Because of the care one has to take in the use of this category of materials, the documentation of texts in this work is often very copious, since, as a rule, the statement of only one person as the authority of an event is not alone used but also those of other detainees, besides non-statement sources, e.g. the police journal referred to in the previous division. Of a total of 404 endnotes making use of statements of ex-detainees in this study, only 92 rely on evidence from one person alone. Corroboration in these cases was not insisted upon because alternative authorities were not available.

Division 4 consists of police security assessments of persons. In content, i.e. in topics covered, this group of materials is much the same as Division 3. The only difference is that, while in the latter, the information is given by the persons concerned themselves, in the former, it is compiled by departmental officers, from various sources of data available to them. Needless to say, such officers have to be conscientious in their compilations for they are in no position to mislead themselves by telling mishaped tales. This is not to say, however, that they could not make a few occasional mistakes. Nevertheless, on the whole, this category of materials are as dependable as one can wish them to be.

Division 5 are files which are of three types, namely organisational, personal and by subject. All kinds of things can go into a file, for example Communist documents, newspaper cuttings and agents' reports. Discussion of the reliability of Communist documents, newspaper cuttings and similar materials is needless. Agent's reports, however, can sometimes be accurate and at other times, not so. Security officers have their own methods of grading the reliability of such reports. The author takes into consideration the assessments of such officers when he uses these materials. In principle, one may state that if there were no files, security

officers would not be able to operate at all. This will perhaps give an indication of the value of the files.

All titles from Division 1, 3 and 4, in actual fact, can be found in the files of Division 5. However, they are separately mentioned because I have not read the files in which they can be found. Whole files which have been consulted by me are those with titles listed in Division 5. The parent files of materials listed in Divisions 1, 3 and 4 were left untouched because they were not considered to be useful for the purpose of this study.

Division 6 are governmental studies of various aspects of the Communist movement. This division in nature is very much the same as Division 4. Regarding the question of reliability, what is said of Division 4 applies to this division as well.

Division 7, being information on some specific points furnished by the Internal Security Department, is beyond any suspicion regarding accuracy.

Personal communication from Internal Security Department officers forms Division 8. The author has benefited greatly from this source of information. There were many areas in the Communist movement which one is unable to understand from the reading of written materials alone, but which have to be cleared up by personal discussions. The officers consulted have always been most forthcoming in their assistance. The only concern about information from this source is that sometimes things can be remembered wrongly or even entirely forgotten. I have, however, taken pains to check any such shortcomings with the other types of data.

The second group or class of materials on which the present work is based are interviews of persons who had been or are active in Singapore politics, or others who had something to do with politics, e.g. police officers, done by the Oral History Department, Ministry of Information and the Arts, Republic of Singapore. By origin, these sources are similar to the statements of police ex-detainees which have been reviewed earlier, but there is one vast difference between the two. This difference lies in the fact that whereas in these interviews stories told were given voluntarily, in the statements of ex-detainees they were often not. Because of this, this group of sources are less open to suspicion regarding accuracy. Nevertheless, sometimes interviewees might unwittingly or deliberately forget things, tell lies or exaggerate issues. Caution is also necessary when using these materials. In the present study, the interviews of only a limited number of persons have been consulted because only these gave permission to the author to use their transcripts.

Groups III to V of the primary sources are publications of political parties other than the CPM, personal memoirs of politicians and similar materials. For information about such parties and such persons, as well as

other parties and persons related to them, such collections of materials are extremely useful. The question of accuracy of reportage in some cases does arise even in materials of such kinds, especially when it comes to memoirs which are prone to defects of the types found in Oral History interviews. Personal memoirs are used with care in this work.

Groups VI to VIII are documents, publications and so on of the Singapore, Malaysian and British Governments. Obviously, there need be no discussion about the trustworthiness of these sources.

Group IX are some public papers, newspapers and magazines. The public papers are more or less semi-government documents, and newspapers have always been accepted as more or less reliable chronicles of contemporary events. Good magazines, on their part, often provide not only information about current developments but also analyses of such.

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*Abbreviation in notes**

1. *Communist Documents, Publications, Etc.*

i) *Original Chinese Titles*

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Ma-lai-ya Kung-ch'an-tang Hsüan-yen — Hua-ling Ho-p'ing T'an-p'an Ssü Chou-nien (A Declaration by the Communist Party of Malaya — The Fourth Anniversary of the Baling Peace Talks), 28 December 1959, handwritten copy.

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一九五九年十二月廿八日。
手抄本。

Ma-lai-ya Kung-ch'an-tang Hsüan-yen — Wei Shih-hsien Ma-lai-ya ti Tu-li, Min-chu, Ho-p'ing êrh Tou-chêng (A Declaration by the Communist Party of Malaya — To Struggle for the Realisation of Independence, Democracy and Peace in Malaya), loose leaflet, dated 23 December 1955.

马来亚共产党宣言—为实现马来亚的独立、民主、和平而奋斗。
散件，有日期一九五五年十二月廿三日。

Ma-lai-ya Kung-ch'an-tang ti Wu-shih-nien (The Fifty Years of the Communist Party of Malaya), 27 June 1981, Editorial, Voice of Malayan Revolution, handwritten copy.

马来亚共产党的五十年。
一九八一年六月廿七日，马来亚革命之声社论。
手抄本。

"Wu-shih-nien"

Ma-lai-ya Kung-ch'an-tang Wan-sui! Chi-nien Ma-lai-ya Kung-ch'an-tang Tan-shêng Sa-êrh Chou-nien (Long Live the Communist Party of Malaya! In Commemoration of the Thirty-second Anniversary of the Communist Party of Malaya), [1962], handwritten copy.

马来亚共产党万岁！
纪念马来亚共产党诞生卅二周年。
[一九六二年]。
手抄本。

Ma-lai-ya Min-tsu Chiai-fang Chên-hsien Chien-chang (A Brief Constitution of the Malayan National Liberation Front), handwritten copy.

马来亚民族解放阵线简章。
手抄本。

Abbreviation in
notes

Ma-lai-ya Mìn-tsu Chiaí-fang-chün Tsung-ssü-ling-pu Chung-yao Shêng-ming (An Important Statement by the Headquarters of the Malayan National Liberation Army), loose leaflet, dated 10 January 1952.

马来亚民族解放军总司令部重要声明。
散件，有日期一九五二年一月十日。

Ma-lai-ya Tu-li Yün-tung yü Ma-lai-ya Kung-ch'an-tang (The Malayan Independence Movement and the Communist Party of Malaya), [1962], handwritten copy. A speech given by a leading comrade.

“1962 Speech”

马来亚独立运动与马来亚共产党。
[一九六二年]。
手抄本。
一位领导同志的演讲。

Ma-lai-ya Wei Tzū-yu êrh Chan (Malaya Fights for Freedom), handwritten copy.

马来亚为自由而战。
手抄本。

Mao Tse-tung ti T'ung-i Chan-hsien Ts'e-lioh (Mao Tse-tung's Strategy of the United Front), compiled and printed by Tzū-yu-pao Shê (Freedom News Press), Singapore, n.d.

毛泽东的统一战线策略。
星洲自由报社编印。编印日期不详。

Mêng ti Wên-ta (Questions & Answers regarding the Singapore People's Anti-British League), Tzū-yu-pao Shê (Freedom News Press), Singapore, n.d.

盟的问答。
星洲自由报社出版。出版日期不详。

Mê-wên, Ch'ê-ch'uan Li-kuang-yao Kuang-po ti Fan-kung Fan-jên-mìn Yin-mou (Mê-wên, Expose the Anti-Communist and Anti-People Conspiracy of Lee Kuan Yew's Broadcasts), 25 October 1961, handwritten copy.

麦文著：拆穿李光耀广播的反共反人民阴谋。
一九六一年十月廿五日。
手抄本。

Mìn-yün Kung-tso Chung ti Chi-ko Wên-t'i (Problems in People's Movement Work), handwritten copy.

民运工作中的几个问题。
手抄本。

Abbreviation in
notes

Mu-ch'ien Kung-tso Wên-t'i (*Problems of Work at the Present*),
handwritten copy.
目前工作问题。
手抄本。

Musa bin Ahmad, *Yen-cho Wan-ch'uan Min-tsu Tu-li ti Tao-lu*
Ch'ien-chin! Chi-nien Ma-lai-ya Kung-ch'an-tang Chien-tang San-
shih Chou-mien (*Follow the Path of Complete National Independ-*
ence and March Forward! In Commemoration of the Thirtieth
Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of Malaya),
[1960], handwritten copy.
穆沙、宾、阿默德著：沿着完全民族独立的道路前进！
纪念马来亚共产党建党三十周年。
〔一九六〇年〕。
手抄本。

Nan-tao chih Ch'un (*Spring in the Southern Island*), Ma-lai-ya
Ch'u-pan-shê (Malayan Publishing House), Singapore, 1946.
南岛之春。
一九四六年星洲马来亚出版社出版。

Ngo-mên tui Chêng-ch'ü Hsing-ma T'ung-i ti K'an-fa ho Chu-
chang (*Our Views and Proposals on the Struggle for the Unification*
between Singapore and Malaya), printed and distributed by
Chen-pao Shê (Truth News Press), Penang, October 1961.
我们对争取星马统一的想法和主张。
一九六一年十月檳城真报社印发。

P'ing Ya-tu-la-man ti "Ch'üan-mien Chan-chêng" Chi-hua (*A*
Comment on Abdul Rahman's Plan of "Total War"), loose
leaflet.
评押都拉曼的「全面战争」计划。
散件。

Stalin, Joseph, *Su-lien Shê-hui-chu-i Ching-chi Wên-t'i* (*Eco-*
nomic Problems of Socialism in the USSR), edited and printed by
Tzù-yu-pao Shê (Freedom News Press), Singapore, 1953.
史大林著：苏联社会主义经济问题。
一九五三年星洲自由报社编印。

Tang ti Chêng-chih Lu-hsien (*The Political Line of the Party*), re-
printed by Hung-Hsing-pao Shê (Red Star News Press), n.p.,
1948.
党的政治路线。
一九四八年红星报社翻印。翻印地点不详。

Abbreviation in
notes

Tang ti Chien-shé (The Building of the Party), handwritten copy.
党的建设。
手抄本。

Ts'e-lioh ti Ling-tao (Tactical Leadership), n.pub., Singapore,
1953.
答略的领导。
一九五三年星洲出版。出版社不详。

*Tui "Ma-lai-ya Ké-ming Chan-chêng Chan-lioh Wên-t'i" ti Pu-
ch'ung I-chien (Supplementary Views on "Strategic Problems of the
Malayan Revolutionary War")*, reprinted by Tzū-yu Ch'u-pan-
shé (Freedom Press), Singapore, n.d.
对「马来亚革命战争战略问题」的补充意见。
星洲自由出版社翻印。翻印日期不详。

Tzū-yu-Pao (Freedom News), nos. 1-84, Tzū-yu Ch'u-pan-shé, TyP
(Freedom Press), Singapore, January 1949-April 1957.
自由报。第一至第八十四期。
一九四九年一月至一九五七年四月间星洲自由出版社出版。

*Wei Chêng-ch'ü Chan-chêng ti Kêng-ta Shêng-li êrh Tou-chêng
(To Struggle for Greater Victories in the War)*, reprinted by Tzū-
yu-pao Shé (Freedom News Press), Singapore, 1951.
为争取战争的更大胜利而斗争。
一九五一年星洲自由报社翻印。

*"Wei Chêng-ch'ü Chan-chêng ti Kêng-ta Shêng-li êrh Tou-chêng"
ti T'ung-su T'i-kang ("To Struggle for Greater Victories in the
War" - A Popular Outline)*, printed by Tzū-yu-pao Shé (Free-
dom News Press), Singapore, 1951.
「为争取战争的更大胜利而斗争」的通俗提纲。
一九五一年星洲自由报社印。

*Wei Shih-hsien Tu-li, Min-chu yü Ho-p'ing êrh Fên-tou - Ma-
lai-ya Min-tsu Chiai-fang Ch'an-chêng Pa Chou-nien Chi-nien
(To Struggle for the Realisation of Independence, Democracy and
Peace - In Commemoration of the Eighth Anniversary of the
Malayan National Liberation War)*, [1956], handwritten copy.
为实现独立、民主与和平而奋斗—马来亚民族解放战争八周
周年纪念。
[一九五六年]。
手抄本。

ii) *Titles in English Translation*

Congratulatory cable from the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to the Communist Party of Malaya Central Committee on its fiftieth anniversary, dated 28 April 1980.
Voice of Malayan Revolution broadcast on 30 April 1980.

Fight for the Realisation of the Present Special Programme,
29 April 1985.
Voice of Malayan Democracy broadcast on 29 April 1985.

*Let Us Fight to Avoid the Domestic Counterrevolutionary War,
Establish a Democratic Coalition Government*.
Voice of Malayan Democracy broadcast on 28 April 1988.

Liu Shao Chee, *Outlines of Trade Union Movements in White
Areas* [sic], loose sheet.

Loh Yam Keong, *Discourse on Illegal and Legal Activities*, loose
sheet.

*Long Live the Communist Party of Malaya — In Commemoration
of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party
of Malaya*, 28 April 1980.
Voice of Malayan Revolution broadcast on 28/29 April 1980.

*The Malayan Communist Party Is the Force at the Core Leading
the Malayan Revolution*, 26 April 1975. "The Core"
Voice of Malayan Revolution broadcast on 29 April 1975.

*To Strive for the Implementation of the Party Central Committee's
April 28th Statement*, Editorial.
Voice of Malayan Revolution broadcast on 30 April 1981.

*To Struggle for the Realisation of the Specific Programme for the
Present Period*.
Voice of Malayan Democracy broadcast on 29 April 1985–
1 May 1985.


Unite and Continue the Struggle, 18 June 1988.
Voice of Malayan Democracy broadcast on 19 June 1988.

2. *Police Intelligence Journals.*

Malayan Security Service, *Political Intelligence Journal*, April 1946–August 1948. IJ

Pan-Malayan Review of Political and Security Intelligence, September 1948–July 1953. IJ

Abbreviation in notes

- Singapore Police Force, *Police Intelligence Journal*, September 1953–May 1960. *IJ*
- Polis Negara Singapura, *Police Intelligence Journal*, June 1960–August 1963. *IJ*
- Royal Malaysia Police, Singapore, *Intelligence Journal*, September 1963–1964. *IJ*
- Police di-Raja Malaysia, *Police Intelligence Journal*, January–July 1965. *IJ*
- Polis Negara Singapura, *Police Intelligence Journal*, August–December 1965. *IJ*
- Polis Republik Singapura, *Police Intelligence Journal*, 1966. *IJ*
- Singapore Intelligence Journal*, February 1966–1968. *IJ*
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3. *Particulars of Unpublished Security Statements of Ex-Detainees*

Name	Date of statement ¹	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Ah San	2.6.55(a)	NA ²	NA	Member, State Committee, CPM	Nil	Paid Cadre, CPM	"AS"
Ang Chee Theng	20.9.62(c)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Nil	Paid Cadre, CPM	
Ang Choon Hock	8.1.71- 1.2.71(a)	12.12.70	14.12.71	Nil	Propaganda/Education Officer, Delta/Tiong Bahru Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Construction Worker	

¹ There were many ways in which the dates of the statements of the various ex-detainees and detainees were recorded. These variations were found to be the following:

- i) The first variation is the entry of a relevant date in the title of a statement. Often, the entry actually consists of two dates. The first marked the beginning of the recording of the statement. The second marked is the conclusion of it. A statement is usually not taken down in one day, but over a period of time. Although, generally speaking, two dates appear together in the titles of statements, sometimes only one date appears. This might mean that the particular statement concerned was recorded in just one day.

This first way of dating statements is here designated variation (a).

- ii) The second variation consists also of two dates, one at the beginning of a statement, in the section dealing with the personal particulars of the person concerned, and the other at the end of the statement at a place where the officer responsible for taking down the statement affixed his signature. In this case, the first date indicates the beginning of the recording of the statement, and the second, the end of the process. This variation here is represented by the symbol (b).

- iii) The third variation is when a particular statement carries a date only in its section covering personal particulars. Such a date, as under the second variation, shows only the time when the statement first began to be recorded. This variation is here called (c).

- iv) The fourth way in which dates appear in statements is together with the signature of the officer taking down the statement. Such a date also marks the time when the officer finished his task. This fourth way is represented here as (d).

- v) The fifth method by which statements carry dates is for the detainee himself, and not the officer concerned, to sign his own statement. The date appears under his signature at the end of the statement. This is variation (e).

- vi) Finally, a statement can be found not to carry a date affixed by a government officer or the detainee himself, but by the typist who prepared the statement. This last kind of practice is called (f).

It should be noted that a statement by a detainee is usually taken over a period of time and not in one day. Usually, where two dates occur, the dating can be presumed to be more accurate than in cases where only one date appears.

² NA: Not available.

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Ang Eng Chong	24.10.72(f)	(Not detained, interviewed by Internal Security Department)	3.8.72-2	Member, CPM	Member, Propaganda Section, Central Executive Committee, Barisan Socialis Singapura	Manager, a construction company	"AEC"
Ang Eng Siang	5.2.63(a) & 11.2.63(e)	NA	NA	Nil	Clerk, Singapore Textile & General Merchants' Employees' Union; General Affairs Officer, Kang Yong Old Boys' Association	Trade Unionist	
Ang Tuan Kim	19.11.54-19.12.54(b)	29.6.54	16.12.54	Member, District Committee, CPM	Nil	Farmer	"ATK"
Chai Ko Nyet	28.5.70(d)	25.5.70	24.6.70	Nil	Nil	Construction Worker	
Chan Chee Weng	6.9.55(c)	NA	NA	Member, SPABL; Secretary, "E" Branch, CPM	Nil	Paid Cadre, CPM	
Chan Chiaw Thor	27.2.63(a) & 29.1.64-26.2.64(a)	NA	NA	Nil	Member, Central Executive Committee, as well as Assistant Administrative Officer/Rural Organiser, Barisan Socialis Singapura; Paid Secretary, Singapore Farmers' Association	Paid Official, Singapore Farmers' Association	"CCT(63)" "CCT(64)"
Chan Chong Keen	4.6.51(e), 16.9.57(c) & 25.10.65-4.12.65(b)	8.10.63	29.12.65	Member, CPM	Paid Secretary, Singapore Motor Workshop Employees' Union, as well as Secretary of English section of same union; Member, Paya Lebar Branch, Barisan Socialis Singapura; Member, Executive Committee as well as Member, Labour Disputes Sub-committee, Singapore Association of Trade Unions	Trade Unionist	"CCK(57)"

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Chan Hock Wah	9.6.72(f)	17.2.71	NA	Member, District Committee, CPM	Nil	Carpenter	"CHW"
Chan Hoon Hock	16.11.74(f)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Nil	NA	"CHH"
Chan Kee Nam	18.8.54(c)	29.7.54	2.3.55	Probationary Member, CPM	NA	Fitter	
Chan Mong Hock	27.2.64(e)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	President, Singapore Women's Federation	Teacher	"CMH"
Chan Tong Ann	12.10.63(a)	NA	NA	Nil	Vice-Chairman, Singapore Electrical & Wireless Employees' Union	Worker	
Chan Weng Hsi	18.4.73(d)	16.3.73	9.4.73	Nil	General Affairs Officer, Ocean Art Organisation	Clerk	
Chan Yean Fock	26.5.72(f) & 19.1.73(f)	10.2.72	12.2.72	Member (actual rank believed to be higher than that of an ordinary member), CPM	Nil	Managing Director, trading company	"CYF(72)" "CYF(73)"
Chang Joo Phong	2.2.71(f)	18.6.70	20.10.71	Nil	Assistant Secretary-General, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Paid Official, Barisan Sosialis Singapore; Proprietor, small business	"CJP"
Chang Kiah Lin	16.4.71(d)	4.1.71	2.2.71	Nil	Activist in Tanjong Pagar Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Carpenter in building industry	

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Chang Kong Yin	26.2.65-10.3.65(b)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Paid Secretary of Hawkers' Union as well as Cycle & Motor Workers' Union	Trade Unionist	"CKY"
Chen Mong Seng	3.4.63(a)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Member, Executive Committee, Nanyang University Students' Union	Student	
Chen Tian Jen	11.2.63(a)	NA	NA	Nil	Paid Secretary, Singapore Woodworkers' Union as well as Singapore General Employees' Union	Trade Unionist	
Cheng Mong Seng ⁵	26.10.49(c)	NA	NA	Probationary member, CPM	Member, Executive Committee, Singapore Chinese Primary School Teachers' Association; Member, Singapore's Women's Association	Teacher	
Cheng Yuet Tong	28.11.63(d)	27.11.63	1.2.65	Member, CPM	Assistant Secretary-General, Singapore Business Houses Employees' Union; Assistant Treasurer and Member of the Labour Capital Dispute Sub-committee, Singapore Association of Trade Unions	Radio Mechanic	"CYT"
Cheong Seng Cho	6.65(a)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Member, Aljunied/Kallang Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	NA	"CSC"

⁵ Same person as Chen Mong Seng.

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Cheong Siew Ngau	5.3.72(d)	13.3.68	5.6.72	Nil	(No formal position, but in charge of indoctrination of a few students)	Student	
Cheong Siew Teng	23.9.75(g)	NA	NA	Member, District Committee, CPM	Nil	NA	"CST"
Chew Hwee	2.63(d)	NA	NA	Member, SPABL	Secretary, Women's Section, Singapore Rural Residents' Association	NA	"CH"
Chew York Chye	12.1.71(d)	18.6.70	28.7.71	Nil	Liaison Officer, East District, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	NA	
Chia Bak Song	Nil	16.3.73	9.4.73	Nil	Member, Sembawang Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore; Member, Si Shan Old Boys' Association; Member, Singapore Equator Arts Society	Construction Worker	
Chia Ek Tian	26.10.56(a)	NA	NA	Member, SPABL	Member, Central Executive Committee, People's Action Party; Paid Secretary, First Branch, Singapore Factory & Shop Workers' Union	Trade Unionist	"CET"
Chia Siew Tin	5.8.71(f)	21.1.71	22.6.72	Member, CPM	Nil	Housewife	"CST"
Chia Yam Loong	10.6.67-3.7.67(a)	25.4.63	19.4.71	Nil	Secretary, Ponggol/Upper Serangoon Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore; Official, Kong Yong Old Boys' Association	Teacher	"CYL"

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Chia Yam Wee	12.2.65(d)	2.2.63	29.5.65	Member, CPM	Member, Central Executive Committee and Secretary, Central Propaganda & Education Committee, as well as Member, Referendum Working Committee, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	Teacher	"CYW"
Chiam Hui Leng	16.2.63(a) & 11.8.64(f)	NA	NA	Member, SPABL, Courier, CPM	Nil	NA	"CHL(63)" "CHL(64)"
Chiam See Tee	28.5.71(d)	16.3.71	17.9.71	Nil	Leader, <i>hajah-haji</i> cell; Member, another <i>hajah-haji</i> cell	Cakemaker	
Chiang Seng Ngiap	11.71(a)	7.11.71	4.12.71	Nil	Trustee, Central Executive Committee as well as Assistant Propaganda and Education Officer, Green Bus Branch, Singapore Industrial Workers' Union	Bus Ticket Inspector	
Chin Kwong Fong	23.3.56(c) & 19.9.56(c)	NA	NA	Nil	President, Singapore Primary School Teachers' Association; Treasurer, Singapore Cultural Society; Member, Executive Committee, Chin Clan's Association	Teacher	"CKF(3.56)"
Chin Swee Hiong	4.12.50(a)	NA	NA	Member, Singapore Town Committee, CPM	Nil	Paid Cadre, CPM	

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Chio Cheng Thun	26.9.64(c)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Member, Central Organising Committee, Barisan Socialis Singapura; September 1963 elected Party's Assemblyman for Chua Chu Kang	NA	"CCT"
Chng Yong Par	15.12.69(d)	11.9.64	4.11.70	Sympathiser, CPM	Vice-Chairman, Bukit Panjang Branch, Barisan Socialis Singapura; Vice-Chairman, Cheng Hwa Old Boys' Association; Member, Bukit Panjang Branch, Singapore General Employees' Union	Odd-job Man	"CYP"
Chok Koh Thong	9.4.63(a)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Member, Central Executive Committee, as well as Secretary, Central Organising Committee, Barisan Socialis Singapura; Vice-President, Singapore Harbour Board Workers' Union	Harbour Worker	
Chong Koi Fatt	15.11.71- 22.11.71(a)	7.11.71	14.2.72	Nil	Secretary, Bus Workers' Branch, Singapore Industrial Workers' Union	Bus Conductor	
Chow Kim Wah	26.2.72(d)	22.6.70	21.7.70	Sympathiser, Malayan National Liberation Front	Nil	Student	
Chua Kun Huat	8.6.67(c)	NA	NA	Nil	Member, Central Executive Committee (Organising Officer), Barisan Socialis Singapura	NA	

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Chua Say Guan	1.11.72- 20.11.72(e)	30.10.72	21.11.72	Nil	Activist in Siglap Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Printer	
Ec Ching Seng	31.3.70(d)	27.4.64	17.6.70	Nil	Head, Publication Section, History & Geography Society, Nanyang University	Student	
Eng Ah Gin	7.73- 9.73(e)	3.7.73	3.7.73	Member, secret <i>hsieh-hsieh</i> cell	Nil	Mosaic Worker	
Gan Hong	29.7.48(c)	NA	NA	Member, SPABL	Nil	Assistant to father in business	
Gan Siew Tham ¹	16.5.50(e)	3.4.50	3.8.50	Member, District Committee, CPM	Nil	do	
Goh Boon Toh	9.10.57(c)	NA	NA	Nil	Member and Assistant Treasurer, Central Executive Committee, as well as Vice-President, Central Education & Cultural Committee, People's Action Party, Secretary, Singapore Cycle & Motor Workers' Union	NA	"GBT"
Goh Lam San	Nil	11.9.64	1.2.65	Nil	Vice-President, Singapore Business Houses Employees' Union	Shipping Clerk	
Goh Seng Gim	15.1.70- 21.1.70(e)	7.1.70	4.2.70	Nil	Assistant Treasurer, Tampines Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Construction Worker	

¹ Same person as Gan Hong.

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Hee Nam Fong	14.4.70(f)	7.1.70	4.2.70	Nil	National Language Tutor & Assistant Officer-in-Charge of Library in Headquarters, Partai Rakyat	Clerk	
Heng Fook Seng	19.10.64(a) & 30.3.67(a)	NA	NA	Nil	Paid Secretary, Singapore Tailors' Union and Singapore Factory & Shop Workers' Union	Trade Unionist	"HFS(64)" "HFS(67)"
Ho Hui Choon	18.11.56	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	"HHC"
Ho Lung	Nil	5.4.58 (Surrendered himself)	NA	Member, Central Committee, and Central Figure of South Malayans Bureau, CPM	Nil	Paid Cadre, CPM	"HoL"
Ho Yut Meng	29.11.65(c)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Nil	NA	"HYM"
Hoa Poh Choon	17.4.70(d)	31.1.70	22.12.70	Nil	General Affairs Officer, Tao Nan Old Boys' Association	Clerk	
Hor Long ⁵	Nil	5.4.58 (Surrendered himself)	NA	Member, Central Committee, and Central Figure of South Malayans Bureau, CPM	Nil	Paid Cadre, CPM	"HL"
Hui Vin Chook	11.12.68-6.1.69(a)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Nil	NA	
Jukri bin Parjo, alias Warjo	12.2.65(e)	27.1.65	21.6.66	Nil	Chairman, Partai Rakyat; Assistant Secretary, Singapore Industrial Workers' Union	Film Projectionist	

⁵ Same person as Ho Lung.

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Kho Suan Hong	13.3.64(a)	NA	NA	Sympathiser, CPM	Nil	NA	"KSH"
Kia Ba Ba	15.7.71(d)	10.11.68	28.12.71	Nil	Culture & Education Officer, Aljunied Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Construction Worker	
Koh Pee Seng	28.1.72(f)	7.11.71	11.3.72	Nil	Paid Secretary, United Bus Company Branch, Singapore Industrial Workers' Union	Trade Unionist	
Koh Tong Eng	24.9.56(c) & 1.10.56(a)	NA	NA	Member, SPABL	Assistant Director of Recreation, Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union	Student	"KTE(10.56)"
Kok Yew Chow	31.10.63(a)	NA	NA	Member, SPABL	Vice-Chairman, Bras Basah Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	NA	
Koo Young	23.6.67-21.9.67(a)	15.6.67	27.1.68	Member, CPM	Assistant Secretary-General, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Paid Official, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	"KY"
Kow Kee Seng	Nil	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Member, Central Executive Committee, Barisan Sosialis Singapore; Member of Parliament	NA	"KKS"
Kwa Boo Sun	Nil & 16.10.65(e)	NA	NA	Nil	Member, Singapore Teachers' Union	Teacher	
Lam Chit Lee	27.4.65(a)	27.4.65 (Surrendered himself)	10.11.65	Member, CPM	Member, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Secretary, Nanyang University Canteen	"LCL"
Lam Swee	6.7.50(a) & 23.8.50(a)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Vice-President, Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions	Paid Cadre, CPM	

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Lau, Peter	13.7.50(c)	NA	NA	Member, SPABL	Nil	NA	
Law Peia Sin	15.4.72(f)	16.3.72	11.4.72	Member, a revolutionary organisation in Kluang, Malaysia (name unknown)	Member, Labour Party of Malaya	Rearing tropical fish	
Lee Khiok Fong	8.4.70(d)	12.11.68	18.7.70	Member, secret <i>hsieh-hsieh</i> cell	Nil	Kindergarten Teacher	
Lee Theng Hee	25.11.66(d)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Secretary-General, Nanyang University Students' Union	Student	"LTH"
Lee Theng Sia	21.6.71(d)	27.2.70	11.10.71	Nil	Member, Central Executive Committee, Sheng Hwa Old Boys' Association	Paid Secretary of an association of ship-owners & maritime traders	
Lee Yew Thong	25.8.73-5.9.73(a)	23.8.73	22.9.73	Secretary, Malayan Workers' & Peasants' Liberation Front	Nil	Seaman	
Lee Yuen Theng	10.2.70-23.2.70(a)	31.7.70	28.11.71	Nil	Chairman, Kwong Fook Old Boys' Association	Clerk	
Leong Keng Seng	16.10.63(a)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Member, Central Executive Committee, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	Teacher	
Leong Kok Sin	12.4.65(c), 15.4.65(e) & 4.6.65(a)	(Not detained)		Member, CPM	Nil	Teacher	"LgKS(6.65)"

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Leow Fatt	27.9.54(c)	29.7.54	10.10.55	Member, CPM	Nil	Blacksmith	"LWC"
Leow Wai Cheng	9.9.76(g)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Nil	NA	
Low On San	11.6.70(d)	5.6.70	30.6.70	Nil	Nil	Odd-job Worker in construction company	
Low Yong	20.5.70(d)	8.5.70	2.6.70	Nil	Member, Crawford Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	Businessman	
Lim Boey Tee	6.5.70- 23.5.70(a)	26.4.70	22.12.70	Nil	Member, a discussion group	Electrician	
Lim Chin Joo	20.9.65(e)	NA	NA	Member, SPABL	Nil	NA	"LCJ"
Lim Fook Sin	7.4.71(f)	12.12.70	9.9.71	Nil	Cadre, Tanjong Pagar Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	Apprentice Electrician	
Lim Guan Tun	14.11.72(f)	26.10.72	NA	Nil	Committee Member, Pasir Panjang/Telok Blangah Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	Hawker	
Lim Hock Koon	7.9.71(d)	21.1.71	NA	Member, District Committee, CPM	Nil	Construction Worker	"LHK"
Lim Huan Boon	14.12.69(f)	2.11.53	4.11.53	Member, CPM	Assemblyman for Barisan Sosialis Singapura	Merchant	"LHB"
Lim Joo San	28.9.71(d)	18.6.70	28.12.71	Nil	Choir Instructor, Jalan Paya Sub-branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	Construction Worker	
Lim Kok Hin	17.1.70(d)	12.11.68	18.7.70	Member, secret <i>hush-hush</i> cell	Nil	Worker in motor workshop	

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Lim Meng Jow	Nil	8.5.70	22.12.70	Member, Directing Cell, Nanyang University	Nil	Accounts Clerk	
Lim Onn Chai	17.2.63(a)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Paid Secretary, Singapore Rural Residents' Association	Paid Official, Singapore Rural Residents' Association	"LOC"
Lim Say Chong	10.9.64(d)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Member, Executive Committee, Guild of Nanyang University Graduates	NA	"LSC"
Lim Seck Kian	26.2.63(a) & 13.4.65-18.4.65(a)	9.4.65	18.4.65	Member, CPM	Chairman, Singapore Chinese School Teachers' Union	Teacher	"LSK(63)" "LSK(65)"
Lim Shee Ping	23.63(a) & 5.65(a)	4.2.63	28.12.63	Member, CPM	Member, Central Executive Committee, Barisan Sosialis Singapore; Committee Member, Singapore Association of Trade Unions; Hon. Adviser, Harbour Board Staff Association; Paid Research Secretary, Singapore Business Houses Employees' Union	Trade Unionist	"LSP(63)" "LSP(65)"
Lim Sian Teng	3.11.63(a)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	NA	NA	
Lim Swee Gor	18.9.62-26.9.62(b)	17.9.62	27.10.62	Member, CPM	Nil	Housewife	"LSG"
Lim Swee Hoe	18.6.73-4.7.73(a)	12.6.73	11.7.73	Member, secret cell; Leader, another secret cell	Nil	Carpenter in building industry	

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Lim Woon Kiat	19.10.66- 10.11.66(e)	30.4.56	10.4.58	Member, SPABL	Member, Nanyang University Development Research Sub-committee, as well as Vice-Chairman, Nanyang University Week Working Committee, Nanyang University Students' Union	Student	"LWK"
Loh Yang Whai	15.5.67- 16.6.67(a)	20.4.67	19.5.71	Sympathiser, CPM	Nil	Accounts Clerk	
Loo Cheng Hong	24.4.73- 10.5.73(a)	16.3.73	30.8.73	Nil	Member, Hokkien Association Brass Band	Army Driver	
Low Joo Ping	6.7.64(d)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Secretary, Singapore Motor Workshop Employees' Union	Motor Worker	"LJP"
Luk King Hang	12.1.70- 4.2.70(e)	9.1.70	4.2.70	Nil	Chairman, Bukit Merah/Queenstown Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	Port Labourer	
Moak Sweet Seng	14.3.63(d)	NA	NA	Member, SPABL	Vice-President, Nanyang University Students' Union	Student	"MSS"
Nair, C.V. Devan	18.1.51(c)	NA	NA	Member, SPABL	Secretary-General, National Trades Union Congress	President, Republic of Singapore	
Neo Heng Cheong	9.3.72- 21.3.72(e)	24.2.72	24.3.72	Head, Overseas Compatriot Library	Nil	Bank Messenger Boy	
Ng Ah Lek	5.70(a)	26.4.70	5.10.70	Member, secret barish-hai cell	Nil	Employee of electrical trader	

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Ng Swee Lai	21.10.72(f)	20.8.72	16.9.72	Member, SPABL	Vice-Chairman, Bagan Api Branch, Permusjawatan Pemuda [sic] Indonesia ⁶	Businessman	
Ngiam Tong Hai	20.10.66(a)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Member, Singapore Factory & Shop Workers' Union; Member, Singapore Chinese Journalists' Association	Journalist	"NTH"
Ong Ah Mee	26.2.63(a)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
Ong Chang Sam	29.11.66(f)	NA	NA	Nil	Member, Central Executive Committee, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Paid Secretary, Central Executive Committee, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	"OCS"
Ong Chye Aun	10.10.57(c)	NA	NA	Nil	Assistant Secretary, as well as Director, Organising Committee, Farrer Park Branch, People's Action Party; Member, Singapore Motor Workers' Union	Worker	"OCA"
Ong Gwo Chyun	9.72(a)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Nil	Journalist	"OGC"
Ong Hock Siang	22.6.66(d)	NA	NA	Member, SPABL	Nil	NA	"OHS"

⁶ This was an Indonesian and not a Singaporean organisation.

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Ong Kim	1.4.57(c)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Paid Secretary, as well as Chairman, Life Press Ltd. Branch, Singapore Factory & Shop Workers' Union; Paid Secretary/Treasurer, Amalgamated Malayan Pineapple Workers' Union	Trade Unionist	"OK"
Pang Toon Tin	6.6.65(a)	2.2.63	17.1.66	Member, CPM	Vice-Chairman, Partai Rakyat; Paid Secretary, Singapore Bookshop, Publication & Printing Press, Workers' Union	Trade Unionist	"PTT"
Phang Say Mun	5.1.71- 21.1.71(a)	4.1.71	23.1.71	Nil	Propaganda & Education Officer, Geylang East Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	Kindergarten Teacher	
Phua Hok Tian	15.5.70(d)	9.5.70	21.5.70	Sympathiser, Malayan Workers' & Peasants' Liberation Front	Member, Executive Committee, Nee Soon Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	Army Camp Orderly	
Png Lye Wah	26.6.63(d)	NA	NA	Nil	Chairman, HJ Tong Old Boys' Association; Member, Telok Ayer Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	NA	
Poh Soon Seng	5.9.75(g)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	President, Singapore Country People's Association	NA	"PSS"
Pung Pek Seng	23.4.70(f) & 19.3.71(d)	31.1.70	9.7.71	Nil	Committee Member, Kwong Fook Old Boys' Association	Businessman	

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Puthucherry, J.J.	10.2.63- 23.2.63(a)	2.2.63	28.11.63	Member, SPABL	Adviser, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Trade Unionist	"PJ"
Seet Chay Tuan	19.12.55(c)	NA	NA	Member, SPABL	Committee Member & Head of Financial Section, Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union	Student	"SCT"
Sim Teong Hioh	20.3.70- 17.4.70(a)	31.1.70	9.5.74	Nil	Committee Member, Cheng Hwa Old Boys' Association	Private Tutor	
Singh, Jamit	3.4.63(a)	NA	NA	Nil	General Secretary, Singapore Harbour Board Staff Association	Trade Unionist	"SJ"
Soh Ben Ann	8.10.70- 20.12.70(a)	18.6.70	2.2.71	Nil	Vice-Chairman, Siu Poh Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapore	Private Tutor	
Soh Chin Heng	5.65(a)	29.4.65	10.10.66	Nil	Nil	Stenographer	"SKK"
Soon Kwong Keen	14.11.66(d)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Nil	NA	
Soon Low Boon	2.10.56(c)	NA	NA	Nil	President, Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union	Student	"SLB"
Sun Lai Fong	20.1.59(a)	NA	NA	Member, Regional Committee, CPM	Nil	NA	"SLF"
Tan Bang Kiat	5.2.70(d)	8.10.63	21.1.70	Member, CPM	Chairman, Singapore Restaurant, Bar, Eating & Coffeeshop Employees' Union; Organising Officer, Singapore Association of Trade Unions	Restaurant Waiter	"TBK"

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Tan Boon Chai	2.70(a)	31.1.70	6.3.71	Nil	Chairman, Cheng Hwa Old Boys' Association	Clerk	
Tan Jing Quee	28.1.66(a)	8.10.63	4.5.66	Nil	Paid Official, Singapore Business Houses Employees' Union	Trade Unionist	
Tan Kai Hee	13.5.54(c)	NA	NA	NA	Member, Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union	Student	
Tan Kim Soon	13.5.70(d)	8.5.70	21.5.70	Nil	Chairman, Sepoy Lines Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	Goods Delivery Driver	
Tan Kok Guan	20.2.55(c)	NA	NA	Nil	Vice-Chairman, Bukit Timah Branch, People's Action Party	NA	
Tan Kong Guan	8.1.58(c)	NA	NA	Nil	Vice-Chairman, Central Executive Committee, People's Action Party	NA	"TnKG"
Tan Lai Seng	4.70-5.70(a)	26.4.70	9.9.70	Member, District Committee, Malayan National Liberation Front	Nil	Farmer	
Tan Seah Chua	9.2.70-15.2.70(a)	29.1.70	27.2.71	Nil	Nil	Owner, coconut plantation	
Tan Sin	12.8.69(a)	NA	NA	Nil	Paid Official, Singapore Commercial House & Factory Employees' Union	Trade Unionist	"T+S"

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Tan Soo Pinan	17.10.65(a)	NA	NA	Nil	Committee Member, Hong Wen Old Boys' Association; Paid Secretary, Singapore Woodworkers' Union; Paid Secretary, Singapore Electrical & Wireless Employees' Union	Trade Unionist	
Tan Swee Hong ⁷	7.5.50(c)	NA	NA	Member, Singapore Town Committee, CPM	Nil	Paid Cadre, CPM	
Tan Wah Ming	19.2.71- 3.3.71(a)	NA	NA	Nil	Member, Cultural Subcommittee, Singapore Gold & Silver Smiths' Union	Worker	
Tan Yam Seng	7.2.51(c) & 16.2.66(d)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
Tay Cheng Kang	28.11.56(c) & 28.2.57(c)	NA	NA	Nil	Committee Member, Jurong Branch, People's Action Party	NA	
Tay Giok Chai	26.12.70(d)	11.9.67	22.4.71	Hsieh-hsiih student	Nil	Student	
Tay Leong Biew	29.4.70(d)	31.7.70	23.8.71	Nil	Second-in-Charge of the Propaganda & Education Section, Cheng Hwa Old Boys' Association	Carpenter in building industry	
Teo Hong Liang	26.4.63(a)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Member, Propaganda & Education Committee, Barisan Socialis Singapura; Member, Cheng Hwa Old Boys' Association	NA	

⁷ Same person as Chin Swee Hong.

Name	Date of statement	Date of detention	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Teo Lek Heng	13.7.71(d)	25.5.69	22.10.71	Nil	Member, Swan Socks Branch Committee, Pioneer Industries Employees' Union	Factory Worker	
Teo Leong Hock	Nil	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Secretary, Singapore Rural Residents' Association	NA	"TLH"
Teo Teck Soon	18.1.71(f)	18.6.70	20.10.71	Nil	Head, Central Propaganda & Education Committee, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	Paid Official, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	"TTS"
Thandayubhambani, Sibiah	21.4.64-1.6.64(d)	8.10.63	15.2.66	Nil	President, Singapore Association of Trade Unions	Trade Unionist	"TS"
Tng Yoong Chiauw	3.7.65(a)	2.2.63	7.2.66	Secretary of Branch, CPM	Chairman, Geylang East Branch, Partai Rakyat	Worker	"TYC"
Toh Cheng Kah	6.11.67(d) & 17.1.68(d)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Paid Secretary, Singapore Bookshop, Publication & Printing Press Workers' Union	Trade Unionist	"TCK(68)"
Toh Choon Sui	1.12.52-12.12.52(b)	26.11.52	8.10.53	Member, District Committee, CPM	Nil	Brickmaker	
Toh Han Boon	18.2.71(f)	3.8.70	17.8.71	Nil	Treasurer, Tanjong Pagar Branch, Barisan Sosialis Singapura	Construction Worker	
Toh Siew Tin	8.12.71(d)	27.2.70	12.2.72	Nil	Committee Member, Kwong Fook Old Boys' Association	Kindergarten Teacher	
Wong Mau Choong	10.4.54(a)	29.1.54	21.1.56	Member, District Committee, CPM	Nil	Paid Cadre, CPM	"WMC"

Name	Date of statement	Date of detection	Date of release	Last-known underground organisational status	Last-known open organisational status	Last-known professional status	Abbreviation in notes
Wong Tai Peng	26.4.71(d)	27.6.64	30.1.72	Nil	Assistant Publication Officer, Nanyang University History & Geography Society	Student	
Woodhull, Sandrasgaran	17.6.63(d)	2.2.63	1.2.64	Nil	Vice-Chairman, Barisan Sosialis Singapore; Adviser, Singapore General Employees' Union	Trade Unionist	"WS"
Yeo Mong Teck	12.6.79(e)	NA	NA	Member, CPM	Nil	NA	"YMT"
Yong Koh Kim	3.9.48(c)	NA	NA	Nil	Member, Amalgamated Malayan Pineapple Workers' Union	Worker	

*Abbreviation in notes*4. *Police Security Assessment of Persons*

Chia Thye Poh
 Fong Swee Suan
 Leong Kwan Fei
 P. Tehlin
 Putschuchearry, Dominic

"CTP"
 "FSS"

5. *Files*i) *Organisation Series*

Alliance Party, Singapore, part 2.
 Barisan Sosialis Singapura, parts 1-5.
 Barisan Sosialis Singapura - Policy.
 Front Socialist Raayat - Malaya, parts 1-3.
 Joint Action by 33 Singapore Chinese Schools' Alumni Associations, parts 1-9.
 Malaysian Socialist Conference, part 2.
 Nanyang University - Report of the Curriculum Review Committee (1965) - Reaction to:, part 10.
 Nine-Man Liaison Secretariat of the 31 Leftwing Trade Unions, parts 1-21.
 PAP
 Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya, part 1.
 Persatuan Islam Se-Malaya (PIS), parts 1-3.
 Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU), parts 1-3.
 Singapore Citizens' Party, part 1.
 Singapore People's Alliance, formerly known as United Socialist Front, Singapore, parts 1-3.
 Singapore Teachers' Union, part 7.
 The Labour Front, Singapore, parts 1-9.
 The Workers' Party, Singapore, parts 1-3.
 United Democratic Party, Singapore, parts 1-3.
 United People's Party, Singapore, parts 1-5.
 University of Malaya Socialist Club, parts 4, 6 & 7.

ii) *Series on Persons*

Fong Chong Pik, part 1.
 Lim Chin Siong, parts 1-34.
 Lim Yew Hock, parts 1-6.
 David Marshall, parts 1-13.
 Ong Eng Guan, parts 7-10.
 Yeung Kwo, parts 1-2.

"LCS"
 "LYH"
 "DM"
 "OEG"

*Abbreviation in
notes**iii) Subject Series*

- City Council Elections, parts 6-15.
 Communist Penetration of Trade Unions.
 Communist Subversion of TU Movement in Singapore 1950s
 and early 60s, part 1.
 CPM - Policy - General, parts 1-3.
 CPM Organisation - Communist Documents found on 11.5.60
 in an almeirah in a house at No. 90, Hua Guan Avenue.
 CPM Organisation - MNLL, parts 1-2.
 CPM - Propaganda, parts 1-11.
 CPM Relations with and Penetration of other Parties - P.A.P.
 Education Ordinance - Reaction to the 4-Year Chinese
 Middle Schools Boycott.
 Election - Legislative Council.
 Legislative Assembly Elections, parts 1-10.
 Legislative Assembly Elections - 1959, parts 1-21.
 Legislative Assembly Elections, 1963, parts 1-4.
 Legislative Assembly Elections - Hong Lim By-Elections, 1961,
 parts 1-4.
 Malayan Communist Party (M.C.P.) - Organisation, parts
 1-5.
 MCP - Acts among dock and port workers.
 MCP - Acts among youth and students.
 MCP - Policy, parts 1-4.
 MCP - Organisation, parts 1-4.
 MCP - Organisation - "A" Branch (Coronation Road Group)
 - Documents seized at Coronation Road on 18.9.1957.
 MCP - Organisation - Anti-British League.
 MCP - Organisation - Central Committee, parts 1-2.
 MCP - Organisation - "E" Branch.
 MCP - Organisation - Town Committee.
 MCP - Organisation - Town and Rural Committee.
 MCP - Organisation - Workers' Protection Corp., parts 1-2.
 MCP - Penetration and Exploitation of Cultural Organisations.
 MCP Relations with and Penetration of Other Parties - Partai
 Rakyat.
 Merger, Singapore and Federation of Malaya - Reaction to,
 parts 1-8.
 Operation Coldstore, parts 1-3.
 Operation Seaside - Titt Fung Documents -
 Correspondence re.
 Singapore National Referendum, parts 1-9.
 Tanjong Pagar & Cairnhill by-elections, parts 1-3.
 Trade Union Act - Paper re.

*Abbreviation in notes*6. *Governmental Studies*⁸

- Basic Paper on the Malayan Communist Party*, March 1950. "Basic Paper"
- "Chan-hou Hsing-chia-p'o Ma-kung Ko-ko Shih-ch'i ti Huo-tung (The Activities of the Malayan Communists in Singapore during the Different Periods after the War)".
战后星加坡马共各个时期的活动。
- "Communist Party of Malaya".
- "Communist Subversion in Political Parties and Trade Unions".
- "Draft Paper on the CUP". "Draft Paper"
- "Oral History Project: PAP-CUF Struggle, 1954-63".
- Vol. 1: National Service Issue, 1954 "NSI"
Hock Lee Bus Riots, 1955 "HLBR"
Singapore Factory & Shop Workers' Union "SFSWU"
(SFSWU)
Singapore Chinese Middle School Students' Union "SCMSSU"
(SCMSSU).
- Vol. 2: Singapore General Employees' Union (SGEU) "SGEU"
Secondary IV Examinations Boycott (The 4-2 "4-2 Issue"
Issue)
Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU). "SATU"
- Vol. 3: Capture of the PAP; PAP/BSS Split; Referendum. "Capture"
- "Subversion in Chinese Middle Schools".
- "The Communist Party of Malaya: Organisation in Singapore, 1960". "CPM, 1960"
- "The Communist Party of Malaya: Organisation in Singapore from 1960 to 1968". "CPM, 1960-68"
- "The Communist United Front (CUF)".
- "Violence Perpetrated by the Barisan Sosialis Singapura (BSS) after Its Boycott of Parliament".

⁸ These studies were made by the governmental authorities. In some instances, the names of authors are known, while in others, they are not. In any case, such names have to be omitted from this bibliography for security reasons.

*Abbreviation in notes*7. *Departmental Communication*

Letters from Internal Security Department to author dated 4 April 1988 and 14 July 1988 respectively.

8. *Personal Communication*

Ah Chin, an officer in the Internal Security Department. At one time, the Secretary of the Singapore Town Committee, CPM. "AC"

Ho Seng, also an officer in the Internal Security Department. At one time, Central Figure, Propaganda Department, Singapore Town Committee, CPM. "HS"

II. *Interviews of Persons, Oral History**Department, Ministry of Information and the Arts*

Bogaars, George E.

Corridon, Richard B.

Guo Ren Huy

Kow Kee Seng

Lam Chit Lee

Lee Khoo Choy

Lee Siew Choh

Lee Yew Seng

Low Por Tuck

Marshall, David S.

Puthucherry, James J.

Ong Chang Sam

Othman Wok

Selkirk, Earl

Tay Seow Huah

"GEB(O)"

"KKS(O)"

"LCL(O)"

"LKC(O)"


"LSC(O)"

"MDS(O)"

"PJJ(O)"

"ES(O)"

"TSH(O)"

III. *PAP Publications, Etc.*

15th (Fifteenth) Anniversary Celebration Souvenir, 1969. PAP 1969

Fong Sip Chee, *The PAP Story - The Pioneering Years*, n.d.⁹ Fong

4th (Fourth) Anniversary Celebration Souvenir, 1958, 1958. PAP 1958

People's Action Party, 1954-1979, 1979. PAP 1979

Petir (Chinese edition), various issues.

行动报。各期。

⁹ Actually published by Times Periodicals Pte Ltd, Singapore, but on behalf of the author who was an important PAP cadre.

Abbreviation in notes

Petir (English edition), various issues.

Our First Ten Years, 1964.

PAP 1964

Sixth Anniversary Celebration Souvenir, 1960, 1960.

PAP 1960

The Tasks Ahead; PAP's Five-Year Plan, 1959-1964, parts 1 & 2.

Twelve Years of Achievement, n.d.

IV. BSS Publications, Etc.

Barisan, various issues.

阵线报。各期。

Barisan Express, various issues.

阵线报快讯。各期。

Chien-lao Kuan Pu Chu Wei-ta ti Shé-hui-chu-i (Great Socialism Cannot Be Jailed in the Prison), 1965.

监牢关不住伟大的社会主义。

一九六五年。

Constitution of Barisan Socialis, 1961.

Fong Swee Suan, *Kung-yün Lun-wên Chí (Essays on the Workers' Movement)*, 1962.

方水双著：工运论文集。

一九六二年。

Ho-ping, Chiai-ho-ping Yü Pang-lien (Merger, Phoney Merger and Confederation), 1962.

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